Defendant was represented by retained counsel when he pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a business place with intent to commit larcency on October 22, 1964. * The plea was accepted and the case was adjourned for sen/ fencing. The court explained: “We’ll call Mr. Kralick [the defendant’s counsel] and have him come also and at that time we’ll discuss the matter [of sentencing] and decide what should be done.”
Defendant was sentenced December 2, 1964. After an unrecorded conference in chambers the *223 court said: “It’s my understanding that Mr. Kralick is no longer your attorney. Is that correct?” The defendant answered “Yes.” After receiving a negative answer to its question whether defendant had anything to say before sentence was passed, the court proceeded to discuss the factors entering into the length of sentence to be imposed. The court did not inquire whether representation by counsel was desired, nor did the defendant object to proceeding without counsel present. Sentence was 3-1/2 to 10 years.
Motion for a new trial was denied May 13, 1965.
Defendant appeals on the ground that absence of counsel at sentencing deprived him of his constitutional right to representation by counsel .and requires the sentence be vacated.
This identical issue was considered in
People
v.
Dye
(1967),
Notes
CL 1948, § 750.110, as amended by PA 1964, No 133 (Stat. Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 28.305),
