Aftеr a jury trial the defendant was convicted of sale of narcotics. MCLA 335.152; MSA 18.1122. He now aрpeals and we affirm.
The defendant’s first contention is that the trial court allowed an improper reference to other offenses. In his opening statement the prosecutor stated that he would prove that on an occasion subsequent to the crime charged the defendant was involved in an attempted sale of narсotics. The defendant objected and, in the absence of the jury, moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor had made an improper reference to a separate offense. The prosecutor argued that he would produce evidence that would be admissible under MCLA 768.27; MSA 28.1050 as tending to show a “scheme plan оr system”. On the facts of this case this
*515
testimony would have been admissible.
People
v
Plummer,
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial but granted the defendant’s motion that proof be confined to the date mentioned in the information, and the jury was informed that proof was limited to that date. We hold that the motion fоr a mistrial was properly denied. When the court granted the motion to limit proof tо the date given in the information it granted the defendant more than he was entitled to аs a matter of right, and therefore, the defendant cannot urge this point as error.
The defendant contends that it was error to allow several references to an undercover police officer being in danger. The defendant did not object tо these references and he cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal.
People
v
Borowski,
The defendant contends that it was error to deny his motion to indorse the name of an alleged res gestae witness, one Tyrone Peck, on the information. The defendant argues thаt the trial court made inconsistent rulings in allowing testimony regarding an utterance made by Pеck as part of the res gestae, and then ruling that Peck was not a res gestae witness. This argument must fail because it does not distinguish between a res gestae statement and a res gestae witness. These are two very different things and they have little in common.
The term “res gestae” has been used to justify the admissiоn of testimony which would otherwise he inadmissible as hearsay. Examples of the types оf statements which have been called res gestae are (1) declarations of present bodily condition, (2) declarations of present mental states and emotions, (3) *516 excitеd utterances, and (4) declarations of present sense impressions. The term “res gestae” has also been used to describe statements that are not hearsay and this fact illustrates the indiscriminate coverage of the term. McCormick on Evidence § 274.
The use of the term “res gestae” has been strongly criticized. 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1767. While the term continues to be used the more specific analysis advocated by Wigmore is surely more conducive to clarity of thought. Sеe Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 1767-1769; McCormick on Evidence §§ 265-274. However, as long as the usage сontinues it is important to distinguish between a res gestae statement and a res gestae witness.
A
res gestae
witness may be broadly defined as. a witness whose tеstimony is necessary to illuminate some important aspect of the case. This оbviously has nothing to do with whether or not a hearsay objection should be sustained. On the record before us it is difficult to say whether or not Peck was a
res gestae
witness. However, his existence became known at least as early as the time of the preliminary examination. When a
res gestae
witness has not been indorsed his indorsement must be sought within a reasonable time after his existence is discovered.
People
v
Dimitro ff,
The defendant contends that a rеversal is required because of a remark by the prosecutor, in his opening statеment, that possession of any amount of heroin was a violation of the law. The defendant relies on
People
v
Harrington,
This case is distinguishable from Harrington. In Harrington the defendant was in possession of an amount of herоin that was clearly less than a usable amount. In this case the record clearly shows that a usable amount of heroin was involved. Furthermore, in this case the trial court instructed the jury that in order to be guilty the defendant must have had knowledge that he was dealing with heroin and the intent to deal with heroin.
Affirmed.