THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TIMOTHY JONES et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Crim. No. 25455
Supreme Court of California
Aug. 25, 1988.
46 Cal.3d 585 | 250 Cal.Rptr. 635 | 758 P.2d 1165
John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jay M. Bloom, Maxine Cutler, Pat Zaharopoulos and Gil P. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Christopher N. Heard as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
KAUFMAN, J.-This case raises two principal questions: (1) whether a person convicted of multiple felonies, of which only one is a violent sex offense enumerated in
As will appear, we conclude a single conviction of an enumerated sex offense is sufficient to trigger the sentencing court‘s discretion under
I
Factual and Procedural Background
One evening near midnight Davina B. heard a knock on her door and opened it, thinking it was her roommate. Three young men forced their way in, one holding a gun. The men covered their faces, drank, and searched the house for drugs and valuables. Davina‘s roommate Robin S. came home around 1 a.m. Each victim was asked at gunpoint to perform a sex act but refused. The men eventually left, taking various items with them and driving away in the pickup truck Robin had been driving.
Defendants Timothy Jones, Raymond Brooks and Arnell Williams were charged with multiple crimes in connection with these incidents. As a result of a plea bargain, each defendant pleaded guilty to multiple crimes. Jones pleaded guilty to one rape and one robbery count in connection with the second incident. Brooks and Williams each pleaded guilty to two rape counts in connection with the second incident and one robbery count in connection with the first. Defendants were minors when they committed these offenses: Jones and Brooks were 17 and Williams was 16. Notwithstanding determinations by the YA that Jones and Williams were amenable to YA commitment, the court imposed state prison sentences of 17 years for Jones and 23 years each for Williams and Brooks.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the Brooks and Williams judgments. It reversed the Jones judgment for purposes of resentencing only, holding that in his case the lower court had erred in imposing a full and consecutive sentence pursuant to
The People petitioned for review, contending the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that multiple enumerated sex offense convictions are required before the sentencing court may impose a full, consecutive term under
This court granted review and appointed counsel for each of the three defendants. Defendant Brooks resubmitted his Court of Appeal brief contending the sentencing court abused its discretion in declining to commit him to YA. Brooks also challenges the sufficiency of the court‘s stated reasons for imposing full, consecutive sentences for his two rape convictions.
With our permission two amicus curiae briefs have been filed. In support of defendant Jones, the State Public Defender urges that the legislative
II
Section 667.6, Subdivision (c)
Defendant Jones was convicted of one count of rape and one count of robbery. His rape conviction was for a violation of
The Legislature enacted
As a more severe consecutive sentencing alternative to the
Aside from the final clause, “whether or not etc.,” this language is plain and unambiguous. It clearly states that, when a defendant has been convicted of multiple felonies, the court has a sentencing choice as to each ESO conviction among those felonies. The court may impose a full, consecutive sentence under subdivision (c) for each such conviction or, instead, it may apply the standard consecutive sentencing formula in
A. The Word “crimes” in Subdivision (c)
Turning first to subdivision (c)‘s provision that a full, consecutive term may be imposed for each ESO conviction “whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction,” it is at once apparent that the “whether or not” language was intended to broaden the scope of subdivision (c)‘s effect not to restrict it. Thus, it is highly illogical to suppose that the reference to “the crimes” in the broadening clause was intended to alter the express applicability of the court‘s discretion to “each violation.” Further, throughout California‘s Penal Code, “the singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular. . . .” (
Finally, and most importantly, the assumption that the words “the crimes” in subdivision (c) refer only to the ESO‘s is incorrect. Subdivision
Nothing in the use of the plural “the crimes” in subdivision (c), therefore, limits that provision‘s application to the situation in which two or more ESO convictions are being sentenced. Contrary to the suggestion made, this conclusion is in fact confirmed by comparing the use of the word “crimes” in subdivision (c) to that word‘s use in subdivision (d).
B. The Word “crimes” in Subdivision (d)
Defendant Jones argues the use of the plural word “crimes” in both subdivision (c) and subdivision (d) necessitates the conclusion that subdivision (c) is limited to the multiple ESO situation. Defendant Jones‘s logic proceeds as follows: since subdivision (d) only applies to the multiple ESO situation and the word “crimes” appears in both provisions, that word must refer in subdivision (c) to a minimum of two ESO convictions as it concededly does in subdivision (d).5 This argument too is incorrect in light of applicable rules of statutory construction and the important differences in the language and effect of subdivisions (c) and (d).
Clearly, subdivisions (c) and (d) both authorize the sentencing court to impose a full, consecutive sentence for each ESO conviction. However, while subdivision (c) permits full, consecutive sentencing of each ESO conviction on a discretionary basis, subdivision (d) mandates full, consecutive sentencing of ESO convictions under the circumstances therein specified. The functional difference between a legislative grant of discretionary authority and a legislatively mandated sentencing scheme would suggest that the meaning of the word “crimes” in subdivisions (c) and (d) may not have been intended to be the same.
In addition to the difference in their function, the language of subdivisions (c) and (d) is manifestly different. First, subdivision (c) features the following prefatory clause which is conspicuously absent from subdivision (d): “In lieu of the term provided in
Secondly, as subdivisions (c) and (d) were originally enacted and as they read at the time defendant committed the crimes and was sentenced in this case, there was a significant language difference in the word immediately preceding and modifying the word “crimes” in the two subdivisions. (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 10, p. 3258 (see fn. 2, ante).) The relevant language delimiting the application of subdivision (c) read as follows: “whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction.” (Id., italics added.) The correlative phrase in subdivision (d) read: “if such crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.” (Id., italics
As we noted earlier (see fn. 2, ante), subdivision (d) was amended in 1985 to change the words “such crimes” to “the crimes.” But nothing in the legislative history of the 1985 amendment reveals any substantive purpose for that change. In fact, the amendment indiscriminately removed all 14 appearances of the word “such” from not only subdivision (d) but from all of
Thus it would be incorrect to conclude that the 1985 amendment changed the meaning of subdivisions (c) and (d) with respect to the question raised in this case or, as the dissent suggests, that the removal of the word “such” from subdivision (d) merely revealed that the Legislature intended all along that the word “crimes” in subdivisions (c) and (d) would refer to the same thing, i.e., multiple ESO‘s. While the dissent apparently prefers simply to disregard the significance of the Legislature‘s original use of the words “such crimes” in subdivision (d) and the words “the crimes” in the correlative portion of subdivision (c), we believe such disregard would be improvident. “The adjective ‘such’ sometimes serves a useful purpose, as where it saves having to repeat a concept that cannot be referred to in a word or two. In statutes and regulations, for example, it may be necessary to make clear that the second reference is to exactly the same concept mentioned previously. The word ‘such’ is the simplest way to do so.” (Weihofen, Legal Writing Style (2d ed. 1980) p. 37, italics added.)
We conclude, therefore, that the word “crimes” as used in subdivision (c) does not refer to the same crimes as does the word “crimes” in subdivision (d). As already explained, given the introductory clause in subdivision (c) noting that sentences imposed pursuant to it are “[i]n lieu of the term provided in
C. Section 667.6‘s Legislative History
The applicability of subdivision (c) to the case at bench also is strongly supported by the legislative history of
The proposal as originally worded would have mandated consecutive sentencing for each and every ESO conviction with one exception: “[U]nless such violation is committed upon one victim at the same proximate time and place as part of and in immediate conjunction with any other violation of this section upon such victim for which such term is imposed.” (Sen. Bill No. 13 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) § 7, subd. (g), as introduced Dec. 4, 1978.) The first amendment to Senate Bill No. 13 (offered Feb. 28, 1979) retained the mandatory consecutive sentencing scheme but replaced the exception with the following all-inclusive clause: “whether or not the crimes were committed with a single intent or objective or during a single transaction.” This language would have mandated consecutive sentencing for each ESO conviction regardless of the particular temporal and mens rea aspects of the offense.6 In other words, the February 28 amendment would have altogether
Clearly, in the subsequent enactment of
It is most unlikely that in enacting subdivision (c) the Legislature intended it not to apply to the offender who commits a single ESO coupled with a burglary or robbery, because such a scenario is all too common and usually involves particularly pernicious criminal conduct. One frequently recurring scenario is as follows. A burglar breaks into a residence, assuming it to be unoccupied and intending only to steal some items inside, when he comes upon a woman who is unarmed and alone. The burglar recognizes an opportunity to take advantage of the circumstances and commits a “convenient,” additional offense involving a separately formed criminal intent-forcible rape, sodomy or oral copulation. It would be improvident to conclude the Legislature disregarded this most common set of criminal circumstances when its clear objective was to vest the sentencing court with discretionary authority to consecutively sentence “each violation” of the egregious sex offense enumerated in subdivision (c).7
Jones lastly suggests that subdivision (c) is, at the very least, ambiguous, and that ambiguities in penal statutes should be resolved in favor of defendants. For this familiar rule of statutory construction, defendant Jones cites People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186], which states: “[W]hen language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted. [¶] The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.’ [Citations.]” (Accord People v. Garfield (1985) 40 Cal.3d 192, 200 [219 Cal.Rptr. 196, 707 P.2d 258]; People v. Superior Court (Douglass) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 428, 435 [155 Cal.Rptr. 704, 595 P.2d 139]; Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 488 [134 Cal.Rptr. 630, 556 P.2d 1081].)
As we have discussed, the language of subdivision (c) is largely unambiguous and not reasonably susceptible to more than one construction. Even if it could be said that certain aspects of the provision are ambiguous, the various indicators on the face of
The rule of statutory interpretation that ambiguous penal statutes are construed in favor of defendants is inapplicable unless two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., that resolution of the statute‘s ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable. (See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1145-1146 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306]; People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 391 [1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102]; People v. Mancha (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 703, 719 [114 Cal.Rptr. 392].) “[A] rule of construction . . . is not a straitjacket. Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent.” (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948] [discussing
This court has the constitutional duty and function of ascertaining legislative intent and construing statutes in accordance therewith. By necessity, this function becomes significant only when a statute is unclear in some respect. It would be inappropriate to automatically conclude that, because a statute is ambiguous in some respect, we are not to attempt to construe its meaning and effect. Such overbroad reliance upon one principle of statutory
We conclude that where a defendant stands convicted of multiple felonies, subdivision (c) vests the sentencing court with discretionary authority to impose a full, consecutive term for any ESO conviction, even when the defendant stands convicted of only one ESO.8
III
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707.2
Because each of the 3 defendants was either 16 or 17 years old at the time of these offenses, the court referred them to the YA for an evaluation and report pursuant to
Defendants rely on People v. Carl B. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 212, 214-215, 217-220 [155 Cal.Rptr. 189, 594 P.2d 14]. In that case, decided under an earlier version of
Before the 1982 amendment
The 1982 amendment to
The amended
The legislative history fully supports, indeed compels, the conclusion that the Legislature intended to broaden the sentencing court‘s discretion in this area. The analysis of Assembly Bill No. 3190 by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary included the following comments: “In In re Carl B. [sic] (1979) 24 C.3d 212, the California Supreme Court held that if the YA recommends that a minor be committed to its jurisdiction, the court must give great weight to that recommendation absent substantial countervailing considerations.
“This bill is a response to that decision.
The amendment does not mean, of course, that the court is now free to ignore a YA report. The Legislature chose to retain the provision requiring such a report, and that provision would be meaningless if the court were not required to give the report serious consideration.11 (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 647 [335 P.2d 672] [statutes should not be so construed as to render any provision nugatory].) The court may decide to reject the recommendation, but its decision to do so must be explained on the record (
After reviewing the record we are satisfied that the court‘s action here was based upon legitimate considerations, such as the need to protect society and the nature and seriousness of the offenses. When sentencing Jones, the court discussed in detail the five factors listed in the statute. It reviewed the nature of the attack upon Elizabeth and Ricardo C., stressing that it involved an armed invasion of a private home, and that the perpetrators were not satisfied with merely robbing the victims at gunpoint, but “brutalized and humiliated” them, raping and sodomizing the wife many times over, and leaving the family “totally destroyed.” The court expressed its belief that the siege involved very serious crimes, that society‘s need for protection from such attacks is high, and that retributive justice and deterrence required a more severe punishment than a YA commitment.
The court reviewed the YA report in some detail, pointing to several comments in each evaluation that it believed undermined the reliability of the overall finding of amenability. It observed that the probation officer disagreed with the YA recommendation. The court concluded that the first three factors-the need to protect society, the seriousness of the offenses, and the interests of justice-outweighed the two remaining factors, defendant‘s amenability to YA treatment and training and defendant‘s needs. Accordingly, it sentenced Jones to state prison.
When sentencing defendant Williams, the court again reviewed the five factors and reached the same conclusion, buttressed this time by the fact
Addressing the YA report, the court again pointed to passages in each evaluation that militated against a finding of amenability. The court emphasized that both the evaluators who assessed Williams‘s potential for rehabilitation had deemed it “guarded” and that the probation officer had disagreed with the YA recommendation. The court concluded that the first three factors outweighed the other two, and that Williams should therefore be sentenced to state prison.
In short, neither defendant succeeds in showing that the court failed to give serious consideration to the YA recommendation, or that the court‘s decision to disregard that recommendation was based on improper considerations. We conclude, therefore, that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Jones and Williams to state prison notwithstanding the YA recommendations.
IV
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it relates to Jones‘s sentence under
Lucas, C. J., Panelli, J., and Eagleson, J., concurred.
MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.--I concur in the majority‘s conclusion that the Legislature, in amending
I dissent, however, from the majority‘s conclusion that
Our goal in construing statutes is to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent in order to effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 559 [224 Cal.Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d 585].) In determining that intent, we must view each part of a statute in the context of the whole statute and its purpose. (People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 [184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104].) Accordingly, we must construe subdivision (c) in the context of
There is no doubt that the three subdivisions of
The word “crimes” appears in both subdivision (c) and subdivision (d). There is no doubt that the “crimes” referred to in subdivision (d) are multiple ESO‘s. Since we presume, “in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary, that a repeated phrase or word in a statute is used in the same sense throughout” (People v. Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 462, 468 [179 Cal.Rptr. 239, 637 P.2d 706]), we must presume the word “crimes” in subdivision (c) refers to multiple ESO‘s unless something in the statute
First, the majority contend it is illogical to conclude that subdivision (c) refers only to multiple ESO‘s because the phrase “whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction” was generally intended to broaden rather than restrict the subdivision‘s effect. (Majority opn. at p. 593.) The contention is in error. As I will show, the contention ignores the fact that the quoted language was added to the statute in response to an issue concerning only multiple ESO‘s. Further, the phrase-even when properly understood to refer only to multiple ESO‘s-in fact broadens rather than restricts subdivision (c)‘s effect.
As the majority themselves observe (majority opn. at p. 597), the “whether or not” language was added to the statute in response to a proposed exception to otherwise mandatory consecutive sentencing for multiple ESO convictions. That exception, as originally proposed, would have applied when the ESO‘s were “committed upon one victim at the same proximate time and place as part of and in immediate conjunction with any other violation of this section upon such victim for which such term is imposed.” (Sen. Bill No. 13 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) § 7, subd. (g), as introduced Dec. 4, 1978.) A subsequent amendment eliminated the proposed exception by requiring consecutive sentencing “whether or not the crimes were committed with a single intent or objective or during a single transaction.” (Sen. Bill No. 13, as offered Feb. 28, 1979, italics added.) The “crimes” referred to in the amendment quite obviously were the multiple ESO‘s which had been the subject of the proposed exception; in slightly altered form, the same language eventually became part of the discretionary sentencing scheme set forth in subdivision (c). Thus the most logical inference is that the word “crimes” in that subdivision continues to refer to multiple ESO‘s. In addition, the origins of the “whether or not” language demonstrate that the phrase in fact broadens rather than restricts subdivision (c)‘s effect by eliminating what might otherwise have been an exception to eligibility for discretionary consecutive sentencing.
Second, the majority invoke
The language in question, reduced to its essentials, reads as follows: “A consecutive term may be imposed for each violation . . . whether or
Third, the majority assert that subdivision (c) does not require multiple ESO‘s because, unlike subdivision (d), it starts with the phrase “In lieu of the term provided in
As explained above, all subdivisions of
Fourth, the majority attach great significance to the fact that at the time the defendant committed the crimes and was sentenced in the present case, subdivision (c) referred to “the crimes” while subdivision (d) referred to “such crimes.” (Majority opn. at pp. 595-596.) This difference, they assert, raises a “compelling” inference that the Legislature did not intend for the word “crimes” in subdivision (c) to refer to multiple ESO‘s. (Majority opn. at p. 596.) However, at the same time they are “ascrib[ing] significance to every word” (majority opn. at p. 596), the majority are quick to dismiss as insignificant the fact that the Legislature later eradicated the very distinction on which they rely. (Majority opn. at pp. 591, fn. 2, 596.)
Thus the majority‘s view on the point is nothing less than an assertion that the Legislature, having carefully expressed its true intent by paying
Fifth, the majority contend the legislative history of
It is revealing in this connection to observe the majority‘s interpretation of certain legislative committee reports. First, the majority claim support from reports which have no bearing on the present question: all address the original version of Senate Bill No. 13 before it had been amended to include the current versions of subdivisions (c) and (d). (See majority opn. at pp. 597-598, fn. 6.) Second, the majority acknowledge yet dismiss later reports which plainly contradict their view. (Ibid.) Those reports-written after subdivisions (c) and (d) were added-consistently described subdivision (c) as applying “upon conviction for two or more of the [enumerated offenses].” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1646 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, italics added; Assem. Com. on Crim. Law & Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1646 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) p. 3; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2512 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 6.) The logical implication of the quoted language is obvious: subdivision (c) applies only in multiple-ESO situations. The majority, however, attempt to evade the ob-
Sixth, the majority contend subdivision (c) must apply to the offender who commits a single ESO coupled with another felony because the Legislature is unlikely to have intentionally excluded this “frequently recurring scenario” from the reach of subdivision (c). (Majority opn. at p. 598.) Their sole statement in support of this assertion is that “It would be improvident to conclude the Legislature disregarded this most common set of criminal circumstances when its clear objective was to vest the sentencing court with discretionary authority to consecutively sentence each egregious sex offense enumerated in subdivision (c).” (Majority opn. at p. 598.) The statement is bootstrapping of the first order: it cites the majority‘s own interpretation of the very issue being decided-i.e., the Legislature‘s intent regarding subdivision (c)-as authority in light of which a contrary interpretation would be “improvident.”
The Legislature‘s intent to make subdivision (c) applicable only to multiple sex offenders is apparent not only from the structure and wording of
The reason is simple: because few crimes carry heavier individual penalties than those for the ESO‘s specified in
In addition, the Legislature has provided elsewhere for increased penalties in aggravated single-ESO situations.
Finally, the majority reject the contention that the language of subdivision (c) is sufficiently ambiguous to entitle the defendant to the benefit of the doubt. Although they acknowledge the familiar rule that ” ‘[W]hen language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted’ ” (majority opn. at p. 599, quoting People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186]), they seek to avoid its application by simply declaring that “the language of subdivision (c) is largely unambiguous and not reasonably susceptible to more than one construction.” (Majority opn. at p. 599, italics in original.) The emptiness of this self-serving declaration is obvious: if subdivision (c) were in fact unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one construction, the majority would not have had to offer the series of tortured and untenable arguments outlined above. Nor would the Courts of Appeal have sharply disagreed in their interpretations of the statute. (See People v. Ottombrino (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 574, 586 [179 Cal.Rptr. 676]; People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 237 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406]; People v. Waite (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 585, 590-591, 594 [194 Cal.Rptr. 245]; People v. Jamison (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1174-1177, 1178-1183 [198 Cal.Rptr. 407] (dis. opn.
In my view the language, construction, and history of
Broussard, J., concurred.
ARGUELLES, J., Concurring and Dissenting. -I concur fully in the majority‘s conclusion that the trial court did not violate
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority‘s conclusion as to the proper interpretation of
In light of the established principle of statutory construction-reiterated by Justice O‘Connor in writing for the United States Supreme Court just a few months ago-“that uncertainty concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity” (United States v. Kozminski (1988) 487 U.S. 931, 952 [101 L.Ed.2d 788, 810, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 2764]; see, e.g., Simpson v. United States (1978) 435 U.S. 6, 14-15 [55 L.Ed.2d 70, 77-78, 98 S.Ct. 909]; People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 345 [193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686]), and in view of the fact that the Legislature could rationally have intended to reserve the more severe sentencing alternative of subdivision (c) for defendants who commit multiple sex offenses, I conclude that the statute should be interpreted to apply only to cases involving multiple sex offenses. If the Legislature believes that a “full, separate and consecutive sentence” should be an available sentencing option when a