Following a trial by jury appellant was found guilty of felonies committed October 18, 1967. Under the third and fourth counts of the information filed against him he was found guilty of violating Penаl Code section 211 for the armed robberies of Robert R. Gulley and John Bogosian, Jr., respectively, the offenses being fixed as of the first degree. Under counts V and VI he was found guilty of violating Penal Code, section 245 for assaults with a deadly weapon upon John Bogosian, Jr., and William Olney. (The first count against him was dismissed and he wаs found not guilty of the second count, each' relating to the unlawful taking or use of an automobile occurring October 5,1967.)
The first point on appeal is thаt evidence does not support his conviction under count IV for the armed robbery of John Bogosian. The facts are simple enough. On October 18, 1967, appellant and another individual drove into a service station in Montebello in a stolen Chevrolet automobile. Appellant got out of the passеnger side and walked into the gas station where he pointed a pistol at Robert Gulley, demanded and took from him money. While he was doing this the driver of the ear similarly pointed a pistol at John Bogosian, Jr., and took his wallet. Appellant ran from the station and got into the automobile which sped away. As it did so, a shоt was fired at Bogosian by the driver of the car.
It is appellant’s claim these armed robberies were independently committed' and there is no evidence to show any connection between appellant and the crime of his companion who robbed Bogosian. Under Penal Code section 31 аppellant may be considered a principal if he aided and abetted commission of a crime. The circumstances recited were sufficiеnt to leave this for determination by a jury
(People
v.
Lodge
(1963)
*207 As a second ground for reversal appellant claims error in the triаl court’s ruling upon an alleged privileged communication. Respecting this, the evidence shows that the fleeing vehicle was pursued by Officer Olney. Both driver аnd passenger fired shots at him and the pursuit ended when their vehicle crashed into a curbing and adjacent wall. Appellant crawled out, ran away and was pursued by the officer who lost sight of him. John Piper, a minister of the Church of Christ was sitting in his office in the church with the door open. He heard a noise in the hallway and on looking out saw appellant. Piper then answered a telephone call and appellant walked into his office, paced up and dоwn in front of his desk, sat down and said he was in trouble and that he had been hitchhiking and was picked up by some persons who had robbed a gas station; there had beеn a chase and an accident and he needed help. Piper told him the best thing to do would be to call the police and appellant agreed. Piper had heard sirens, so he and appellant walked outside where Piper saw a police officer who came to the curbing and Pipеr related to him what he had been told by appellant. Appellant was standing beside him as Piper told this to the officer.
It should further be noted that Piper was nоt dressed in ministerial vestments but was wearing an ordinary business suit. Appellant was a stranger to him and not a member of his congregation.
Appellant objected tо Piper’s testimony regarding his conversation with him claiming it was privileged under Evidence Code section 1032. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence but thereafter struck it on motion of appellant, so advising the jury and admonishing it to disregard such evidence. Despite the admonition, howevеr, appellant contends the evidence was improperly admitted and incurably prejudicial and that his motion for mistrial should have been granted. We disagree. It is not every statement made by any person to a minister that is privileged. Evidence Code section 1032 specifically defines those “penitential communications” which are privileged. While Evidence Code section 917 establishes that where privilege is claimed there is a presumption that a communication was made in confidence, there is little or nothing to show appellant’s statement to Piper was a “communication made in confidеnce” or “in the course of” the relationship required. The fact appellant accompanied Piper to the curbside discussion with the officer, having agreed that was the thing to do, would *208 offset, if not totally dispel, the presumption by demonstrating a waiver. (Evid. Code, § 912.) Furthermore, other required elements of a privileged “penitential communication'’ are missing. (Evid. Code, § 1032.) Thus, there is no evidence to show that Piper was authorized or accustomed to hear suсh communications, or that he had a duty to keep any such communications secret under the discipline, practice or tenets of his church. There was no error in admitting the evidence. Thus, there can have been no prejudice to appellant either in striking it from the record or doing no more thаn admonishing the jury to disregard it.
Appellant contends that statements he made to the police were erroneously admitted into evidence in violation of his constitutional rights as set forth in
Miranda
v.
Arizona
(1966)
Appellant was fоund guilty under count IV of armed robbery of John Bogosian, Jr., and under count V of assault on John Bogosian, Jr., with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced under eaсh count and contends this was error as in violation of Penal Code section 654. The evidence reflects that appellant and his partner robbed the two service station attendants. When the robberies were completed, they drove away from the station and as the car left a shot was fired from the car. Whether this act was divisible from the robberies was a question of fact decided by the trial court, and was properly determined under the authorities.
(People
v.
Houghton
*209
(1963)
There is an irregularity in the judgment, however, which should be corrected though not raised аs a point on appeal. It has been held improper to include in the judgment a finding that a defendant was armed when he is convicted of armed robbery.
People
v.
Sparks
(1967)
The judgment is modified by striking the finding that defendant was armed; in all other respects it is afSrmed. The appeal from the order denying appellant’s motion for new trial is dismissed.
Files, P. J., and Jefferson, J., concurred.