Thе defendant is charged with a violation of 'section 1102 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law: “No person shall fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer or other person duly empowered to regulate traffic.”
The facts do not seem to be in disputе. Testimony adducéd at the trial shows that, on February 7, 1973, Marie Casucci was working as a school crossing guard on Route 22 in Miller-ton near the Webutuck Elementary School. She testified that the defendant stopрed her vehicle on Route 22 at approximately 8:55 a.m. to discharge her children so that they might рroceed along a drive to the school.
Casucci had told the defendant on at least twо prior occasions not to stop her vehicle at that location to discharge her children. Casucci’s direction to the defendant was' based on her belief that the stopping of the vehicle created a dangerous situation.
Two issues must be decided here: (1) Is a school crossing guard a “person duly empowered to regulate traffic”; and (2) was school crossing guard Casucci’s оrder lawful?
It seems clear that a school crossing guard is empowered to regulate traffic: “ Thе duly constituted authorities of any city, town or village or any county police department may designate, authorize and appoint such a number of persons as such authority shall deem necеssary, and at such salaries as such
Power to direct traffic necessarily means that authority to direct vehicle operators to do or not do сertain things, provided that the order is lawful.
The next question is, of course, the meaning of “ lawful ” under section 11Ó2 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The prosecutor suggests in his memorandum that ‘ ‘ as long as the order givеn is one that does not require the operator to break the law, it is a lawful order.” I do not agree, because that could, in theory anywáy, subject the passing motorist to the slightest whim of the crossing guard.
It sеems to me that the touchstone of lawfulness in situations such as these is reasonableness. The functiоn of the school crossing guard is to protect school children going to and from school; she is nоt there to prove her self-importance. As long as her commands are reasonably designаted to achieve the former and not the latter, they should be .upheld.
In this instance, the school crossing guard’s belief that the stopping of the defendant’s car created a potentially hazardous situation is supported by the facts. The defendant stopped her vehicle in the traveling lane, since there really is no parking lane at that point. This would prevent the free passage of other vehicles going in the same direction, unless, of course, they crossed into the oncoming lane.
Defendant cites People v. Dalton (
I agree with defendant to the extent that the school crossing guard could not take it upon herself to put up “ stop ” signs, designate “no stopping or standing zones”, etc. I do not find any evidence that the crossing guard here attempted to designate and regulate traffic in the same manner as the рolice department in Dalton.
In Dalton, the police department, pursuant to the ordinance held invalid, hаd set up a pattern of traffic regulations applicable to all vehicles. In this case, we are concerned only with
If it is the defendant’s contention that a peace officer оr other person empowered to regulate traffic can give orders only pursuant to existing traffic regulatory devices, e.g. a “no stopping ” sign, then there would be no need for section 1102 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. It seems to me that one of the purposes of that section is. to provide a means for the proper authority on the scene to exercise his or her responsibility reasonably and in a manner designated to accomplish a proper objective.
Accordingly; the defendant is found guilty.