People v. JeffersonPeople v. Jefferson
Lead Opinion
Opinion
The “Three Strikes and You’re Out Law” (
In this case, defendants, each of whom had a prior strike, were convicted of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (hereafter attempted premeditated murder). Under the applicable punishment provision (§ 664) attempted premeditated murder is punishable by life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, which both parties agree is an indeterminate prison term. But section 664 says nothing about service of a minimum term subject to doubling under
We have found two such provisions: section 3046 and former subdivision (b)(2), now subdivision (b)(4), of section 186.22 (hereafter section 186.22(b)(4)). Under section 3046, a defendant sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole must, before becoming eligible for release on parole, serve “at least seven calendar years” or a term established pursuant to any “other section of law” that “establishes a minimum period of confinement” in prison. Here, the “other section of law” is section 186.22(b)(4). It provides that when a defendant commits a felony “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and receives an indeterminate sentence, the defendant “shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.” (§ 186.22(b)(4).) By requiring a defendant to serve at least 15 years of imprisonment before parole, section 186.22(b)(4), read together with section 3046, establishes a minimum term of 15 years that is subject to doubling under
I
Defendant Andre Brown was a member of the Southside Village Crips, a criminal street gang; defendant Walter Jefferson
The jury convicted each defendant of two counts of attempted premeditated murder. (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, 189.) It also found tme allegations that they committed the crimes on behalf of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), that defendant Jefferson personally used a firearm in committing the crimes (§ 12022.5), and that defendant Jefferson personally inflicted great bodily injury on victim Hernandez (§ 12022.7). Each defendant also admitted a prior serious felony conviction (
The trial court sentenced defendant Jefferson to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole on the first count of attempted premeditated murder. The court doubled that sentence by adding a second term of life in prison because of Jefferson’s prior strike, and it imposed a third life sentence for the second count of attempted premeditated murder. The court also sentenced Jefferson to three years in prison for the great bodily injury enhancement, five years for the firearm-use enhancement, and five years for the prior serious felony enhancement. In addition, the court ordered Jefferson to serve 15 years in prison before becoming eligible for parole, based on the jury’s finding that the crimes fell within the criminal street gang sentencing provision. In all, the court sentenced Jefferson to 3 life terms plus 13 years, with a parole ineligibility period of 15 years.
The trial court sentenced defendant Brown to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the first count of attempted premeditated murder. Because of Brown’s prior strike, the trial court doubled that sentence by adding a second term of life in prison, and it imposed a third life sentence for the second count of attempted premeditated murder. It also sentenced Brown to five years in prison for the prior serious felony enhancement. And because the jury found true the criminal street gang allegation, the court ordered Brown to serve 15 years before becoming eligible for parole. Brown’s total sentence: three life terms plus five years, with a parole ineligibility period of fifteen years.
Both defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions, after striking from each judgment one life term and the fifteen-year parole ineligibility period imposed under the criminal street gang provision.
In striking the 15-year parole ineligibility period the trial court had imposed under the criminal street gang statute, the Court of Appeal reasoned: “Although [the] 15-year period of confinement [without parole] applies, . . . this is not a matter which the trial court imposes in sentencing the convicted felon. Instead, it is a matter addressed by the Board of Prison Terms in determining the prisoner’s parole eligibility status.”
The Court of Appeal also faulted the trial court for doubling defendants’ life sentences under the Three Strikes law. The court observed that the sentence of a defendant who has one prior strike must be doubled if a determinate sentence is imposed, and the minimum term of a defendant with one prior strike must be doubled if he or she has been given an indeterminate sentence. The court concluded that in this case sentence-doubling was improper because both defendants were sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, which the court viewed as an indeterminate sentence with no minimum term.
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review.
In 1994, the Legislature enacted the Three Strikes law (
Under the Three Strikes law, if a defendant is convicted of a felony, and the trial court or jury finds one or more prior strikes (convictions for certain violent or serious felonies), sentencing proceeds under the Three Strikes law “[njotwithstanding any other law.” (
Ill
Under California law, most felonies carry a “determinate” prison sentence consisting of a specific number of months or years in prison. Some serious felonies, however, carry an “indeterminate” sentence, which means the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment but the Board of Prison Terms can in its discretion release the defendant on parole.
Some indeterminate sentences expressly include a minimum prison term. For example, the punishment for second degree murder is ordinarily “a term of 15 years to life,” while first degree murder generally carries “a term of 25 years to life.” (§ 190, subd. (a).)
When a defendant is convicted of a felony and has a prior strike,
The Attorney General agrees with the Court of Appeal that a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole is an indeterminate term, because the trial court does not determine the length of the defendant’s confinement in prison. He argues, however, that life imprisonment has
To determine the merits of the Attorney General’s argument, we apply well-established rules of statutory construction. “The goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995)
Here, we must interpret the phrase “minimum term for an indeterminate term,” as it is used in
Before July 1, 1977, California law provided for indeterminate sentencing. Under that sentencing scheme, penal statutes specified a minimum and a maximum sentence for felonies, often ranging broadly from as little as one year in prison to imprisonment for life. (See Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 8 (Cassou & Taugher).) A trial court would simply sentence a defendant to prison for “the term prescribed by law,” while the actual length of a defendant’s term, within the statutory maximum and minimum, was determined by the Adult Authority. (Ibid.; In re Rodriguez (1975)
Under the pre-1977 sentencing law, the Adult Authority decided when to release prisoners on parole. (Former § 3040, as enacted by Stats. 1957, ch. 2256, § 57, p. 3934.) Parole consisted of “the release of a prisoner prior to expiration of his term of imprisonment conditioned upon his continuing
To summarize: “Under the indeterminate sentence law, a ‘term’ included the total time the state had jurisdiction over the prisoner. The parole date was the date of release from actual custody, but the balance of the ‘term’ was to be served on parole.” (Cassou & Taugher, supra, 9 Pacific L.J. at p. 28.)
On July 1, 1977, the Legislature replaced California’s indeterminate sentencing scheme with a new law, the Determinate Sentencing Act. Under the new law, most felonies specify three possible terms of imprisonment (the lower, middle, and upper terms); after weighing any aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court selects one of these terms. (§ 1170, subd. (b).) Some particularly serious crimes, however, remain punishable by indeterminate sentences of life in prison with the possibility of parole. (See crimes listed ante, at pp. 92-93 & fn. 2.)
As under the old sentencing law, defendants who under current law are sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole must serve at least seven years in prison before being eligible for parole (§ 3046), and all parolees remain in the constructive custody of the Department of Corrections and may be incarcerated for violating the terms and conditions of parole. (§ 3056.) But there is a significant difference between the old and current sentencing schemes: “Under the new law, the prisoner must be released upon expiration of his ‘term’ less good-time credits, with parole acting simply as a variable period of supervision after the end of the term. Parole is no longer service of the term. . . . ‘ Term’ now means the period of actual confinement prior to release on parole.” (Cassou & Taugher, supra, 9 Pacific L.J. at p. 28, some italics added, fn. omitted.)
Thus, under the present law the prison “term” is the actual time served in prison before release on parole, and the day of release on parole marks the end of the prison term. Unlike the pre-1977 sentencing law, the period of parole is not part of a defendant’s prison term, and the length of time an offender may remain on parole or may be incarcerated for a parole violation is measured by statutory provisions setting the maximum parole period for most offenses at three years and establishing the maximum period of confinement for a parole violation at one year. (§§ 3000, subd. (b), 3057.) This applies to determinate sentences as well as indeterminate sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for crimes committed after enactment of the current sentencing law, which as we noted earlier treats a prisoner who is serving a life sentence and is released on parole as having completed the prison term. (Cassou & Taugher, supra, 9 Pacific L.J. at p. 28; see § 3041, subd. (a) [parole release dates for indeterminate sentences under the Determinate Sentencing Act “shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public . . . .” (Italics added.)].)
From the above review of the old and current sentencing laws we learn this: A statute requiring a prisoner to serve a specified term of incarceration before being
Defendants insist that the sentence for attempted premeditated murder does not have a minimum term, because section 664, the relevant penalty provision, does not mention service of any minimum term, stating only that the punishment is “imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.” But as we have explained, the minimum term for a defendant found guilty of attempted premeditated murder is found not in section 664 but in section 3046. The parole ineligibility period set by section 3046 is a minimum term within the sentence-doubling language of
The dissent asserts that we reach this conclusion because we are “dissatisfied” with an “apparent decision” by the Legislature not to include the period described in section 3046 within the meaning of
Any other construction of
Defendant Jefferson also argues that the Legislature’s reference to section 3046 in subdivision (e)(2)(A) of
As previously explained,
Defendant Jefferson points out that
Defendant Jefferson fails to consider that
Like defendant Jefferson, the dissent relies heavily on
The dissent also argues: “If the drafters had understood section 3046 as defining a ‘term,’ they would not have mentioned the section [in subdivision (e)(2)(A)(iii) of
The dissent further contends: “[W]hen the drafters did make use of section 3046 [in
In this case, the trial court tried to comply with the sentence-doubling requirement of
Section 3046 specifies the minimum term for an Indeterminate sentence as “seven calendar years or ... a term as established pursuant to any other section of law that establishes a minimum period of confinement under a life sentence before eligibility for parole, whichever is greater.” (Italics added.) In this case, the “other section of law” that establishes a “minimum period of confinement” for each defendant’s life sentence is section 186.22(b)(4), which pertains to criminal street gangs, and establishes a minimum confinement period of 15 years. Defendants argue that even if, as we have just concluded, section 3046 establishes a minimum term, section 186.22(b)(4)’s 15-year minimum confinement period is not subject to doubling under
IV
Here, the jury found true allegations that defendants’ crimes fell within the criminal street gang language of subdivision (b) of section 186.22 and thus were subject to greater punishment. That provision imposes an increased penalty for “any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members ....’’ (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) For most felony convictions, subdivision (b)(1) of section 186.22 requires an additional prison term of either one, two, or three years. But section 186.22(b)(4) provides that any person who, like each defendant here, “violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.” At the time of the offenses committed here, the 15-year minimum appeared in subdivision (b)(2) of section
Based on the jury’s finding in this case that the crimes fell within the criminal street gang sentencing provision, the trial court ordered defendants to serve 15 years in prison before becoming eligible for parole. The court did not, however, invoke
Defendants disagree. They contend that even if, as a general rule, a law prescribing a minimum period of confinement before release on parole establishes a minimum term under
Decisions of the Courts of Appeal that have addressed the issue have held, albeit without extended analysis, that
A sentence enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.” (
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the trial court erred when it attempted to comply with the sentence-doubling requirement of
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it ordered the trial court to strike from each defendant’s judgment of conviction the 15-year minimum term imposed under the criminal street gang provision of section 186.22(b)(4). The Court of Appeal is directed to remand the matter to the superior court with directions to resentence defendants in accordance with the views expressed herein.
George, C. J., Baxter J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.
Notes
Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Other provisions specifying an indeterminate sentence that includes a minimum term are those for gross vehicular manslaughter with prior convictions for vehicular manslaughter or driving under the influence (§ 191.5, subd. (d) [15 years to life]), attempted murder of a public official (§ 217.1, subd. (b) [15 years to life]), aggravated sexual assault on a child (§ 269 [15 years to life]), fatal assault on a child by means likely to produce great bodily harm (§ 273ab [25 years to life]), and aggravated arson (§ 451.5, subd. (b) [10 years to life]).
The Court of Appeal in this case also held that the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence should not have included the minimum term established by sections 186.22 and 3046, because the question of when defendants should be released on parole is “a matter addressed by the Board of Prison Terms in determining the prisoner’s parole eligibility.” The Court of Appeal therefore modified the judgments by striking each defendant’s 15-year minimum term. The Attorney General contends that the Court of Appeal was wrong and that it is not improper for the trial court to include, as part of a defendant’s sentence, the minimum term of confinement the defendant must serve before becoming eligible for parole. Defendants here do not dispute this contention, and we agree with the Attorney General.' By including the minimum term of imprisonment in its sentence, a trial court gives guidance to the Board of Prison Terms regarding the appropriate minimum term to apply, and it informs victims attending the sentencing hearing of the minimum period the defendant will have to serve before becoming eligible for parole. Thus, when the trial court here pronounced defendants’ sentences, it properly included their minimum terms, although for the reasons explained in part IV, ante, it erred when it did not double those terms under
The Attorney General points out that each defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted premeditated murder, and that the jury found that each count fell within the criminal street gang provision. He therefore argues that the trial court should have sentenced each defendant “to two indeterminate life terms (§§ 664/187, 3046), each with a 15-year minimum (§ 186.22, former subds. (b)(1), (b)(2), 3046), doubled (
Dissenting Opinion
In this case the “Three Strikes” law does not appear to increase the amount of time that defendant, a second strike offender with a life sentence, must serve before becoming eligible for parole. This result seems counterintuitive, since a stated purpose of the Three Strikes law is “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.” (
The majority seems dissatisfied with the Legislature’s and the electorate’s apparent decision to allow the Board of Prison Terms to retain this measure of discretion. Casting about for a source of judicial sentencing power, the majority fixes upon section 3046, a statute directing the Board of Prison Terms not to grant parole to life prisoners until they have served “at least seven calendar years." The majority would require trial courts to treat section 3046 as articulating a “minimum term” to be doubled and imposed as a sentence. This conclusion, however, cannot fairly be drawn from section 3046 or reconciled with the language of the Three Strikes law. Considered as an attempt to ensure longer sentences, the majority’s holding is unnecessary because the Board of Prison Terms in any event can require a life prisoner to serve far more than seven, or even fourteen, years before being released on parole. The majority’s holding also invades the powers of the board and the Governor, who share, to the exclusion of the courts, the discretion to determine when, if ever, parole shall be granted. (§§ 3040, 3041.2; see also
While the popular understanding of the Three Strikes law is that a second strike results in a doubled sentence and a third strike in life imprisonment, the actual words of the law are far more complex. As judges, we must look for the law’s meaning in its words. The author of the majority opinion, on an earlier occasion, persuasively explained why this is so: “[I]n construing the Three Strikes law, it is not enough to say that because the Legislature and the electorate wished to impose tougher penalties on repeat violent offenders, we should therefore give that enactment the harshest possible construction. Judges are constrained by the law. For the sake of the predictability and stability of the law, our guideposts in interpreting the Three Strikes law must be the usual principles of statutory construction that apply in every case, not our projections of the hopes and fears that led to the statute’s enactment. . . . ‘For judicial construction to stick close to what the legislation says and not draw prodigally upon unformulated purposes or directions makes for careful draftsmanship and for legislative responsibility. . . . Judicial expansion of meaning beyond the limits indicated is reprehensible because it encourages slipshodness in draftsmanship and irresponsibility in legislation. It also enlists too heavily the private . . . views of judges.’ ” (People v. Davis (1997)
Speaking technically, in the language of sentencing, the precise question before the court is how to sentence a second strike offender whose current offense is punishable by the indeterminate term of life imprisonment without a stated minimum term. The Three Strikes law directs courts to sentence second strike offenders by doubling “the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term.” (
The majority, as mentioned, purports to find a minimum term in section 3046, which makes life prisoners ineligible for parole for “at least seven calendar years.” The majority has misread section 3046. The section merely places a limit on the discretion of the Board of Prison Terms; it is not addressed to courts and does not
To double the seven-year period mentioned in section 3046, as the majority would, also appears contrary to the intent of the drafters of the Three Strikes law. While the drafters did make use of section 3046 in computing the sentence for a third strike defendant, the manner in which they did so strongly indicates they could not have intended the result the majority reaches. Under the Three Strikes law, the sentence prescribed for a third strike defendant’s current offense is “an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of: [f] (i) Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction ...[;] HQ (ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years [; or] [ft] (iii) The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, ... or any period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046.” (
Three things can be said with certainty about how the drafters used section 3046 in calculating the sentence of a third strike defendant:
First, the drafters clearly knew how to refer to section 3046 when that is what they wished to do. They did not refer to the section in calculating the sentence of a second strike defendant (see§ 667 , subd. (e)(1)), and we are not free to add what they omitted. (E.g., In re Hoddinott (1996)12 Cal.4th 992 , 1002 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 706 ,911 P.2d 1381 ]; see generally,Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 .)
Second, that the drafters made use of section 3046 in defining the punishment for a third strike offender does not mean that section 3046 prescribes a “minimum term for an indeterminate term” (§ 667 , subd. (e)(1)) within the meaning of the provision defining the punishment for a second strike offender {ibid.). If the drafters had understood section 3046 as defining a “term,” they would not have mentioned the section at all, because they would have assumed that courts would automatically refer to the section in calculating a third strike offender’s sentence undersection 667 , subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i) (prescribing a minimum term of “[t]hree times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction”). (Italics added.)
Third, even when the drafters did make use of section 3046, they did not require the court to multiply the seven-year period of parole ineligibility set out therein. For the rare third strike case not covered by another provision of the Three Strikes law, the drafters apparently were satisfied to rely on the Board of Prison Terms to decide when, if ever, after the period set out in section 3046, such an offender would be released on parole. How can we justify doubling the period set out in section 3046 for a second strike defendant when the drafters left the same period unmultiplied for a third strike defendant? To be sure, section 3046 itself multiplies the seven-year parole ineligibility period when a defendant is sentenced to multiple consecutive life sentences. (§ 3046 [second sentence].) But the drafters of the Three Strikes law simply accepted “any period prescribed by Section . . . 3046” (§ 667 , subd. (e)(2)(A)(iii)) without further multiplication.
The majority would justify its conclusion as a way to avoid the “anomalous result” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 97 et seq.) of punishing
At oral argument, the People expressly conceded that the seven-year period of parole ineligibility set out in section 3046 “is not part of the sentence which the court must necessarily articulate . . . .” The People went on to argue that “there is nothing preventing the court from articulating it.” But the latter argument appears to have been based on the notion that the court, by referring to section 3046, would simply be providing information to the public and to “the victims and the families of the victims” about defendant’s prospects for release on parole. Indeed, the People specifically endorsed the conclusion that the court might properly enter a straight life sentence, without articulating a minimum term, leaving the determination of any parole release date to the Board of Prison Terms: “[I]n this particular case, for example, the court could have simply said that the defendants have been found guilty of attempted premeditated murder, the appropriate term for that is life with the possibility of parole, further, the criminal street gang act enhancement was found to be true, and said nothing more on the matter.”
If it is true, as the People conceded, that the application of sections 3046 and 186.22, subdivision (b)(4) (see fn. 1, ante) falls within the jurisdiction of the Board of Prison Terms, then a sentencing court has no business doubling and imposing as a sentence the periods of parole ineligibility set out in those statutes. To do so is to purport, without authority, to bar the board from granting parole for 14 years (section 3046, doubled), or 30 years (section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), doubled), when those sections by their terms expressly confer upon the board the power to grant parole after 7 or 15 years. This violates the constitutional separation of powers. (
The People also contended at oral argument that, if the court did sentence defendant to life imprisonment without stating a minimum term, then “the Board of Prison Terms would be forced by operation of law” to double the applicable statutory periods of parole ineligibility. We have no occasion to consider this argument because our only role in this case is to review the judgment, including the sentence. For the reasons already discussed, however, the argument that the Three Strikes law directly compels the board to double any applicable periods of parole ineligibility, even if true, would not support the conclusion that the trial court may enter an order purporting to tell the board what to do.
In conclusion, I fear the majority has gone astray searching for a minimum term to double, when defendant’s current offense simply does not carry a minimum term. (§ 664, subd. (a).) Nor can we properly double the indeterminate straight life sentence, as the majority acknowledges (maj. opn, ante, at p. 102), because the Three Strikes law authorizes us to double only a “determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term” (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)). Under these circumstances, the most correct application of the Three Strikes law in this case appears to be simply to commit defendant to prison for life, subject to release if and when the Board of Prison Terms and/or the Governor see fit to grant parole after any statutory period of parole ineligibility.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Mosk, J., concurred.
The majority would also find a minimum term for defendant’s current offense in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), which affects the parole eligibility of a defendant convicted of committing a felony in association with a criminal street gang. The subdivision provides that “[a]ny person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.” {Ibid.) The subdivision does not set out a term to be imposed by a court; other subdivisions of section 186.22 do. Subdivision (a), which defines a crime, provides for a term of sixteen months, or two or three years, and subdivision (b)(1) provides for an enhancement of one, two or three years. Subdivision (b)(4), on which the majority relies, like section 3046, is directed to the Board of Prison Terms and simply overrides the Legislature’s usual instruction to the board not to consider parole for at least seven years (§ 3046).