THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DELORES JAMES, Appellant.
No. 75490
Supreme Court of Illinois
Opinion filed December 22, 1994.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Thomas J. Difanis, State‘s Attorney, of Urbana (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Terence M. Madsen and Martha E. Gillis, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Tom Leahy and Dennis A. Rendleman, of Springfield
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The instant appeal presents the question of whether it is reasonable for a police officer to believe that he has been granted the right to search a closed purse that he finds on the passenger seat in an automobile, where the driver of the car, but not the passenger, has consented to a search of the vehicle.
In April 1992, the defendant, Delores James, was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped by officers of the Urbana police department. The officers directed the driver and the passengers to step out of the car. When defendant exited the vehicle, she left her purse on the front, passenger-side seat of the car. One of the officers then escorted defendant away from the automobile.
Although defendant was not aware of it, the driver of the car agreed to a police search of the vehicle. During this search, the officers opened and looked into defendant‘s purse, where they found cocaine. She was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found by police officers during their search of her purse. She argued that she had not consented to the search and that the driver lacked the authority to consent to a search of her purse. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court allowed the defendant‘s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed the trial court‘s ruling (242 Ill. App. 3d 675 (1993), with one justice dissenting (242 Ill. App. 3d at 677-79 (Cook, J., dissenting))). We allowed the defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal (145 Ill. 2d 315(a)).
At the trial court‘s hearing with respect to defendant‘s motion to suppress, the defendant testified that on April 1, 1992, at approximately 7 p.m., she was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by Ruth Boolman. Defendant was sitting in the front passenger seat of the car. A third passenger, Shirley James, was in the back seat of the car. They were stopped by an Urbana police department squad car. One officer approached the driver‘s side of the car, another officer came to the passenger side, and a third officer went to the rear of the vehicle.
The officer near the driver, Boolman, spoke to her briefly. The officers then asked defendant and Shirley James to exit the car and they complied. One of the officers “walked [defendant] off a good piece by a tree” away from where the others were located. Defendant could not hear the conversations between the police officers and the other occupants of the vehicle. A short while later, one of the other officers approached defendant and asked her about her purse. She described the purse as a “little brown wallet with just a snap on it.” Defendant had left the purse on the front passenger seat in the car. She stated that the officer told her he had looked in the purse and removed “a pipe and the bag and the tie.” The officers never asked her permission to look inside her purse. Defendant admitted that the items found inside the purse belonged to her.
Officer Troy Phillips of the Urbana police department testified that on the night of the incident, he and his partner stopped a vehicle because it had no rear license plate and because a document indicating that a license had been applied for was torn and illegible. When the officers stopped the car, they examined the document and found it to be in order.
Officer Phillips testified that there were three women passengers in the car and two small children.
Officer Phillips then asked Boolman if he could search her car, advising her that he was looking for drugs or weapons. Boolman consented to a search of the automobile. Officer Phillips stated that all of the passengers had exited the car before he searched it. During the search, he noticed a purse on the front seat. He opened the purse and found drug paraphernalia inside it.
Officer Phillips stated on cross-examination that when Boolman consented to the search of her vehicle, she was standing behind her car, in between her own vehicle and the squad car. The officer stated that he believed the other passengers were still in the vehicle at the time he sought Boolman‘s consent. After Boolman consented to the search, Officer Phillips asked the passengers to step out of the car. The officer admitted that he did not tell the passengers that he was going to search the vehicle.
Based on this testimony, the trial court allowed the defendant‘s motion to suppress the evidence taken from her purse. In its oral pronouncements, the trial court acknowledged that the officers had lawfully stopped the Boolman vehicle in order to check the validity of its license plates. The trial court also found no impropriety in Officer Phillips’ request that Boolman permit him to search the vehicle.
With respect to Officer Phillips’ search of the defendant‘s purse, however, the trial court found it sig-
The State appealed from the trial court‘s ruling, arguing that the driver‘s consent to search the automobile reasonably included the contents of the purse found on the front passenger seat of the vehicle. The appellate court agreed and reversed the trial court‘s allowance of the defendant‘s motion to suppress. The appellate court reasoned that “driver consent to search for drugs extends to closed containers *** which may belong to others who have exited the vehicle.” (Emphasis omitted.) (242 Ill. App. 3d at 676.) Indeed, the appellate court “ponder[ed] how the searching officers [could] distinguish between ownership of the various containers in the vehicle” and noted that “[i]n the search process, such split-second decisions are likely given little thought.” 242 Ill. App. 3d at 676.
The appellate court also observed that a “third party may give legally sufficient consent for a search if he has
One justice dissented from this disposition. This dissenting justice believed that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse, which was closed when she left it in the automobile. (242 Ill. App. 3d at 677 (Cook, J., dissenting).) The dissent noted that a police officer is “not always entitled to accept a person‘s *** consent to search personal property.” (242 Ill. App. 3d at 678, citing Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 161, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2801.) The dissenting justice concluded that the trial court‘s factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the cases cited by the majority were distinguishable and inapposite. 242 Ill. App. 3d at 678.
II
Defendant argues that the trial court‘s suppression of the evidence taken from her purse was correct and should be upheld by this court. Defendant contends that Boolman‘s consent to Officer Phillips’ search of the automobile did not justify his search of defendant‘s
The State responds that although the trial court‘s factual findings should be reversed only if manifestly erroneous, the trial court‘s legal determination regarding the reasonableness of the search is subject to de novo review. The State emphasizes that there is a lesser privacy interest in a vehicle than there is in a private dwelling and asserts that the Supreme Court “has accorded automobiles fewer constitutional protections than other non-mobile entities.” The State contends that Supreme Court precedent supports the appellate court‘s ruling, citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 111 S. Ct. 1801, and United States v. Ross (1982), 456 U.S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157.
The State suggests that the “fact that Officer Phillips may have incorrectly assumed that the purse belonged to the driver of the car is not a factor relevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis.” The State relies upon the apparent authority rule enunciated by the Supreme
The Illinois State Bar Association, as amicus curiae, agrees with the position advocated by the defendant. The Association contends that the appellate court‘s decision should be reversed as an improvident erosion of fourth amendment rights.
III
Generally, a trial court‘s ruling with respect to a motion to suppress evidence is subject to reversal only if manifestly erroneous. De novo review by this court is appropriate “[w]hen neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is questioned ***. [Citations.]” (People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 66, 76; see also People v. Smith (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 229, 251; In re D.G. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 404, 408-09.) The State urges that we apply the standard of review set forth in Wanless v. Rothballer (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 158. However, that case pertained to a review of whether the evidence proved actual malice in a libel suit, and is therefore inapposite to the instant cause. Because the testimony provided by defendant and Officer Phillips was not wholly consistent or uncontradictory, we find the manifest error standard of review is applicable in the present cause.
Under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, the “right of the people to be secure in
Initially, we note that general principles of fourth amendment jurisprudence provide no validity for the law enforcement officers’ actions in the case presently before us. The amendment explicitly requires that officers obtain a warrant, supported by probable cause, before they may search persons or property. (See, e.g., Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 356-57, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514.) The record does not show that Officer Phillips had a warrant for his search of the Boolman car or the defendant‘s purse.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the fourth amendment‘s warrant require-
Under the automobile exception, law enforcement officers may undertake a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains evidence of criminal activity that the officers are entitled to seize. (See, e.g., Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280.) Thus, in United States v. Ross (1982), 456 U.S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157, and in California v. Acevedo (1991), 500 U.S. 565, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, 111 S. Ct. 1982, the Supreme Court held that, under the automobile exception, police officers may undertake a warrantless search of a closed container found in a vehicle when the officers have probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity will be found in the container.
The State relies upon the view expressed by the Court in Ross, and echoed in Acevedo, that “the expectation of privacy in one‘s vehicle is equal to one‘s expectation of privacy in the [closed] container, and *** ‘the privacy interests in a car‘s trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable container.’ [Citation.]” (Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 573, 114 L. Ed. 2d at
The record offers only one reason for Officer Phillips’ search of Boolman‘s vehicle: he undertook his search of the automobile because Boolman consented to this search. Therefore, if Officer Phillips’ search of defendant‘s purse is to be justified under fourth amendment principles, the State must find refuge in Boolman‘s consent to the officer‘s search of the vehicle.
On the issue of consent, the State seeks to justify the officer‘s search of defendant‘s purse in light of the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Florida v. Jimeno (1991), 500 U.S. 248, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 111 S. Ct. 1801. In Jimeno, a police officer stopped the vehicle which defendant was driving because of a traffic offense. The officer asked to search defendant‘s automobile for narcotics and the defendant consented. During the search, the officer saw a folded, brown bag on the floor
The Supreme Court determined that the officer‘s search of the brown paper bag was authorized by the defendant‘s consent to a search of the vehicle. The Court reasoned that the “standard for measuring the scope of a suspect‘s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? [Citations.]” (Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 302, 111 S. Ct. at 1803-04.) The Court framed the question before it as “whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect‘s general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car.” (Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 302-03, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.) The Court noted that the parameters of a search are usually defined by the purpose of the search. The Court reasoned that “it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondents’ car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs.” (Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.) On this basis, the Court found that the consent to search “extended beyond the surfaces of the car‘s interior to the paper bag lying on the car‘s floor.” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
The State argues that the Court‘s ruling in Jimeno shows that the officers in the instant case were justified in searching the purse found in Boolman‘s car. We disagree, because we find that Jimeno is significantly different from the present case.
The defendant in Jimeno was the driver of the vehicle. In his capacity as driver, the defendant had the authority to consent to a search of the car, because he
Our conclusion in this respect also finds support in the decision of the Federal court of appeals in United States v. Welch (9th Cir. 1993), 4 F.3d 761. In that case, the driver of a car consented to a police search of his vehicle. During this search, the officers also found and looked into the purse of the defendant‘s companion, which had been left in the automobile. The court determined that Jimeno did not resolve the question of whether the officers’ search of the purse was justified. The Welch court‘s reasoning is applicable to the present cause. As in Welch, the “dispositive issue *** is not what areas of the car [Boolman] may have intended [her] consent to encompass, whether or not [she] intended to
The “apparent authority” rule was recognized and adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), 497 U.S. 177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 110 S. Ct. 2793. In that case, the defendant‘s girlfriend consented to police officers’ entrance into the defendant‘s apartment. Once they had gained entry, the authorities saw drug paraphernalia as well as containers filled with a substance later determined to be cocaine. The defendant was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the apartment, arguing that his girlfriend lacked the actual authority to consent to police entry into the residence.
The United States Supreme Court held that the girlfriend lacked the actual authority to allow the police to enter the apartment, since she no longer lived in the apartment and had no legal interest in the premises. (Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181-82, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 156-57, 110 S. Ct. at 2797-98.) However, the Court accepted the State‘s argument that the officers’ entry was nevertheless valid, because the officers reasonably believed that the girlfriend had the authority to allow them to enter the apartment. The Court stated that “in order to satisfy the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government *** is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 159, 110 S. Ct. at 2800.
Consistent with Rodriguez, decisions from other jurisdictions have generally held that a driver‘s consent to a search of the vehicle does not extend to an item remaining in the car that belongs exclusively to a passenger of the vehicle. United States v. Welch (9th Cir. 1993), 4 F.3d 761 (passenger‘s consent to search of car did not permit search of companion‘s purse); People v. Suazo (1993), 133 N.J. 315, 627 A.2d 1074 (driver had no authority to consent to search of passenger‘s luggage;
Applying this jurisprudence to the present case, we conclude that Officer Phillips should have ascertained who owned the purse he found in the Boolman vehicle before he opened and searched the contents of the purse. In our view, it would have been objectively reasonable for the law enforcement officer to realize that the purse might belong to one of the passengers rather than to Boolman. A purse is normally carried by a woman, and all of the adult occupants of the vehicle were women. Thus, the purse could logically have belonged to any one of the three adult women in the car. The purse was found on a passenger seat in the car, not on the driver‘s seat, thereby tending to the conclusion that the purse belonged to the passenger, not the driver. It would have been unreasonable for the officer to believe that Boolman shared some common use in the purse with one of the passengers in the vehicle, since a purse is generally not an object for which two or more persons share common use and authority.
Also, it is uncontradicted that defendant did not
Given all of these considerations, we conclude that Officer Phillips’ actions were not objectively reasonable and that his search of defendant‘s purse was therefore invalid.
By our holding we emphasize that the apparent authority rule does not allow law enforcement officers to “proceed without inquiry in ambiguous circumstances or always accept at face value the consenting party‘s apparent assumption that he has authority to allow the contemplated search.” (3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 8.3(g), at 266 (2d ed. 1987).) One commentator has succinctly remarked:
“[U]nder a sound application of the apparent authority rule the police must be required to make reasonable inquiries when they find themselves in ambiguous circumstances. This does not mean that the police must contest every claim of authority ***. But sometimes the facts known by the police cry out for further inquiry, and when this is the case it is not reasonable for the police to proceed on the theory that ‘ignorance is bliss.‘” 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 8.3(g), at 266-67 (2d ed. 1987).
Similarly, the officer in the present case acted unreasonably when he proceeded to search the closed purse, although he was ignorant of the identity of the owner of the purse. The State suggests that Officer Phillips was mistaken and incorrectly believed that Boolman did in fact own the purse. There is nothing in the record to support this contention, however. Officer Phillips did not testify that he mistakenly believed that Boolman
The appellate court found that further inquiry by Officer Phillips would not have been advisable because it would have been difficult for him to determine who owned the various pieces of property in the vehicle. (242 Ill. App. 3d at 676.) The court also suggested that when a search is undertaken, “such split-second decisions are likely given little thought.” 242 Ill. App. 3d at 676.
Similar sentiments have been expressed in decisions from other courts regarding the apparent authority rule. We would agree that the apparent authority doctrine should not be applied so strictly that it becomes “unworkable and place[s] too heavy a burden on the police.” (United States v. Poole (E.D. La. 1969), 307 F. Supp. 1185, 1190.) Also, the emergency nature of the circumstances confronting the police in various situations may not permit protracted investigation into the true ownership or authority over the property or premises which the police have been given the permission to search. (See, e.g., People v. Adams (1981), 53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 537, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877.) Consent searches provide a valuable investigative tool for law enforcement authorities, by providing a lawful avenue for the officers to exonerate the innocent and focus their efforts on others who are more likely to be guilty of criminal activity.
However, neither police convenience nor the exigencies of the moment justified the officer‘s failure to ask
Based upon our review of the record and the pertinent precedent, we find no manifest error in the trial court‘s determination that Officer Phillips’ search of the defendant‘s purse was not objectively reasonable. At no time did the defendant abandon her possessory interest in or control over her purse. The purse was closed when she left it on the passenger seat of the vehicle, where she had been riding, and she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s allowance of the defendant‘s motion to suppress. We reverse the appellate court‘s decision that the trial court‘s ruling was in error.
We decline to consider the State‘s invitation that this court adopt the apparent authority rule as a matter of substantive Illinois constitutional law, pursuant to our State constitutional provision that bars unreasonable searches and seizures. (
We need not and do not decide whether the apparent authority rule has not been, but should be, adopted as an element of our State constitutional jurisprudence prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. As stated more fully above, the apparent authority rule does not justify the officers’ conduct in the present cause. As a result, our recognition of the rule as an element of Illinois constitutional law would not alter our conclusion that the trial court‘s decision was correct, and that the disposition of the appellate court should be reversed.
For the reasons stated, judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed; cause remanded.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
I dissent for the reasons adequately expressed in the majority opinion of the appellate court which this court now reverses. 242 Ill. App. 3d 675.