delivered the opinion of the Court.
On May 12, 1977, the defendant, Jon R. Jamerson, was convicted by a jury of theft by receiving.
1
Shortly thereafter, on May 16, 1977, we held a portion of the theft by receiving statute unconstitutional in
People
v.
Johnson,
The prosecution contends on appeal that a new trial order granted after trial and pursuant to a motion for new trial is equivalent to a reversal on appeal for speedy trial purposes. The trial court’s characterization of its decision as a mistrial, therefore, is asserted to constitute error. We agree.
Neither Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 1973, nor our dismissal rule, Crim. P. 48, distinguishes mistrials from new trials. Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968), provides the following definitions:
“MISTRIAL. An erroneous, invalid, or nugatory trial; a trial of an action which cannot stand in law because of want of jurisdiction, or a wrong drawing of jurors, or disregard of some other fundamental principle.” (Citations omitted.)
“TRIAL. New trial. A re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court after a trial and decision by a jury or court or by referees. . . . A reexamination of the issue in the same court, before another jury, after a verdict has been given. ... A re-examination in the same court of an issue of fact, or some part or portions thereof, after the verdict by a jury, report of a referee, or a decision by the court.” (Citation omitted.)
Similarly, the court in
In re Estate of Bartholomae,
“A mistrial and a new trial are unlike in both name and effect. A mistrial is equivalent to no trial; it is a nugatory trial. A new trial recognizes a completed trial which for sufficient reasons has been set aside so that the issues may be tried de novo. . . .”
We approve of the foregoing definitions and statements. The crucial consideration in applying these principles to a jury trial is whether a verdict has been rendered after the trial is concluded. Prior to the entry of a verdict by a jury, a mistrial is procedurally correct. But once a verdict has been entered, the trial is complete for purposes of appellate review, and a new trial motion can only result in the entry of an order for a new trial. A motion for new trial, although filed in the trial court, is the initial step in the appellate process.
We hold, therefore, that a new trial order pursuant to a new trial motion is similar to a reversal on appeal for purposes of our speedy trial provisions and results in a six-month speedy trial period. Crim. P. 48(b)(2); section 18-1-405(2), C.R.S. 1973.
Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
MR. JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.
Notes
Section 18-4-410, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Supp.).