710 NYS2d 844 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 2000
OPINION OF THE COURT
Defendant by his attorney moves for various relief. The omnibus motion is disposéd of as follows:
This court has granted the defendant’s motion to inspect and has read the Grand Jury minutes in camera. The evidence adduced before the Grand Jury was, essentially, that defendant had been admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York on March 30, 1977; that his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice law in this State by the Appellate Division, First Department, on or about June 17, 1993; that in September 1997 the defendant met with the complainant, Kevin Joyce, in the latter’s Bronx apartment; that at this meeting, the defendant held himself out as an attorney and undertook to prepare and file and prosecute a mechanic’s lien on béhalf of the corporation of which Mr. Joyce was the principal in consideration of a $4,000 retainer ($1,000 of which was paid at that time and the balance of which was paid thereafter); that the defendant thereafter prepared a mechanic’s lien and related documents and signed Mr. Joyce’s name thereto without the latter’s review of the documents or authority and filed same in New Jersey; and that the mechanic’s lien was thereafter vacated in New Jersey due to defendant’s failure to adhere to proper practice and procedure there. The Grand Jury indicted defendant for one count of practicing law without being admitted (Judiciary Law § 478),
Defendant next moves to dismiss the first two counts on the basis of the rule of lenity, to wit, that Judiciary Law § 478 is unconstitutionally vague in that it does not provide adequate guidance as to what conduct it prohibits.
Defendant next argues that the first two counts are duplicitous in that each charges more than one crime. Both counts charge the defendant with violating the Judiciary Law between
Defendant next argues that there is neither jurisdiction nor venue in this county for the prosecution of any of the counts with the possible exception of the fifth count, grand larceny in the third degree. Inasmuch as the court has dismissed counts one and two with leave to resubmit, I will not address this issue with respect to such counts at this time. As to the balance of the indictment, the People have established jurisdiction and venue in this county. As indicated above, the evidence was that the defendant came to the complainant’s apartment in the Bronx; misrepresented that he was authorized to practice law for the purpose of obtaining a $4,000 retainer, $1,000 of which was then paid; and thereafter signed the complainant’s name to a mechanic’s lien and related documents without showing them to the complainant and without his authority. While there was no evidence that the documents were issued or forged or possessed by the defendant in the Bronx (cf., CPL 20.40 [4] [j]),
The defendant’s motion for a Sandoval hearing is granted.
The People are reminded of their continuing duty to disclose exculpatory material and specifically of their obligations under Brady v Maryland (373 US 83), Giglio v United States (405 US 150) and CPL 240.43.
The motion is otherwise denied.
. Judiciary Law § 486 does no more than prohibit a disbarred or suspended attorney from performing those acts prohibited by Judiciary Law § 478.
. The evidence was that the defendant operated out of two offices: one in midtown Manhattan and the other in Long Beach in Nassau County. The defendant’s letterhead listed his law office address as 463 Walnut Street, Long Beach, New York, and that was the same address listed in the “Record and Return” box on the mechanic’s lien and related documents. On the other hand, when defendant- returned the file to the complainant, they met outside defendant’s midtown Manhattan office.