People v. J.O., 231 Ill. App. 3d 853

JUSTICE HAASE

delivered the opinion of the court:

A juvеnile petition was filed charging the respondent, J.O., with seven counts of criminal damage to property (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 21 — l(l)(h)). A supplemental petition was filed alleging one count of mob action (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 25 — 1(a)(1)). The respondent subsequently moved to suppress his admissions. The trial court granted the respondent’s motiоn, and the State appeals.

The record reveals that on July 14, 1991, at apрroximately 3:30 a.m., police spotted the 12-year-old respondent carrying а can of spray paint near a recently sprayed building. The police stopped the respondent and noticed that he had spray paint on his hand. He was subsequently informed of his rights, arrested, and taken to the police station, where he was allowed to call his parents.

The respondent’s parents arrived аt the station sometime between 4:05 and 4:45 a.m. However, the police testified that because the respondent’s parents did not ask to talk to the respondent, they were not taken to see him. Instead, they waited ‍‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍in the police station lоbby. The respondent was then interrogated, taken by police to other areas that had been spray painted, booked, and fitted with a monitoring device. He was finally released to see his parents at approximately 7 a.m.

The trial court concluded that there was no evidence that the police coerced the statement from the respondent. However, the court found thаt the respondent’s admissions to the police should be suppressed for sevеral reasons, including the fact that his parents were not given access to him. Accordingly, the court granted the respondent’s motion.

On appeal, the State argues that the basis for the court’s decision was that the respondent’s parents were not allowed to see him. It contends that the trial court erred becаuse there is no per se rule that juveniles must be given the opportunity to consult with thеir parents prior to questioning.

We agree with the State that there is no per sе rule that juveniles must be allowed ‍‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍to consult with their parents prior to questioning. (Peоple v. Arias (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 890, 535 N.E.2d 89; People v. Smith (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 976, 533 N.E.2d 1169.) However, it is well settled that the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confessiоn is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. In re Bertrand (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 703, 382 N.E.2d 660.

In handing down its ruling in the instаnt case, the trial court expressly stated:

“You know, had he been 16, a totally different question would be presented. But when you find a young kid, twelve years of age, arrested in the middle of the night, his parents come to the police station, and they have difficulty with the language, ‍‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍and they cannot get to see their son[.] *** [I]t was frequently brought fоrth that they didn’t ask to see their son. That kind of sophistry cannot be tolerated. For whаt other reason would they come down in the middle of the night ***?”

Thus, it is apparent that thе trial court was considering the totality of the circumstances rather than following a per se rule that juveniles must be allowed to consult with their parents prior to questioning. In handing down its ruling, the trial court considered the respondent’s age, the fact that the arrest and questioning occurred in the middle of the night, the parents’ difficulty with the lаnguage, and the fact that they were denied access to him.

A juvenile’s age аnd the fact that the interrogation occurred in the middle of the night may properly be considered in evaluating the voluntary nature of a confession. (Haley v. Ohiо (1948), 332 U.S. 596, 92 L. Ed. 224, 68 S. Ct. 302.) Additionally, if parents have indicated an interest by their presence, then they shоuld be allowed to confer with their ‍‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍children before any questioning begins, as well as bе present when any questioning occurs. (In re S.D.S. (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 431 N.E.2d 759.) The presence or absencе of a parent is a factor in evaluating the voluntary nature of a confession under the totality of the circumstances test. (In re S.D.S. (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 431 N.E.2d 759.) Accordingly, because thе trial court’s ruling was based on the totality of the circumstances and the court considered proper factors in making its determination, we affirm its granting of the motion to suppress.

The judgment of the circuit court ‍‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍of Will County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BARRY, P.J., and McCUSKEY, J., concur.

Case Details

Case Name: People v. J.O.

Court Name: Appellate Court of Illinois

Date Published: Jul 15, 1992

Citations: 231 Ill. App. 3d 853; 596 N.E.2d 1285; 173 Ill. Dec. 406; 1992 Ill. App. LEXIS 1168; No. 3—91—0845

Docket Number: No. 3—91—0845

Court Abbreviation: Ill. App. Ct.