Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions for delivery of at least 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), conspiracy to deliver at least 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a(a), fleeing and eluding a police officer, MCL 750.479a(3), and possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). On October 5, 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to ten to twenty years in prison for the delivery conviction, ten to twenty years in prison for the conspiracy conviction, no incarceration fоr the fleeing and eluding conviction, and one to twenty years in prison for the pos *492 session with intent to deliver conviction. We affirm the convictions and sentences.
On May 17, 1999, undercover Police Detective Thomas Fine telephoned Jorge Rodriguez to arrаnge a cocaine purchase. Fine had purchased cocaine from Rodriguez on nine previous occasions in 1999, and defendant had accompanied Rodriguez to four of those sales. 1 On May 17, Fine met defendant and Rodriguez in a parking lot. Defеndant drove the car in which he and Rodriguez arrived. Rodriguez got out of the car and walked to Fine’s car with a bag in his hand. The bag contained 55.908 grams of cocaine. Rodriguez handed the bag to Fine, and Fine gave Rodriguez $2,200. Rodriguez returned to his car. At Fine’s signal, a van carrying the arrest team stopped behind their car. Rodriguez and defendant fled in their car. Marked police cars chased defendant and Rodriguez through Muskegon. Ultimately, defendant and Rodriguez stopped the car and were arrested.
A subsequent search of dеfendant’s home revealed 28.941 grams of cocaine, money that had been used by the police to purchase cocaine from Rodriguez, and a scale and plastic sandwich bags that are consistent with the distribution of cocaine. The cocаine and scale were found inside the pocket of a shirt hanging in a closet of an upstairs bedroom. A safe containing a Michigan identification card with defendant’s pic *493 ture was found on the floor of the closet. At trial, evidence of the ten cocаine sales to Fine was presented to the jury.
On appeal, defendant first contends that evidence of the nine prior drug sales was improperly admitted at trial because it was not relevant. We review eviden-tiary decisions for an abuse of discretion.
People v Starr,
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would be without thе evidence. MRE 401;
People v Crawford,
Although defendant was not present during sales of cocaine to Fine on March 18, 1999, March 30, 1999, April 14, 1999, and May 4, 1999, these sales were relevant to prove the existence of a conspiracy by show
*494
ing thаt Rodriguez had the intent to distribute cocaine. The intent of a coconspirator to perform an unlawful act is an essential element of a criminal conspiracy.
Id.
at 349. The fact that defendant was not directly linked to these four drug sales is of no moment. It is not necessary that one conspirator participate in all the objects of the conspiracy.
People v Meredith (On Remand),
With respect to the remaining sales, the record reflects that Rodriguez spoke with defendant during the sales to Fine on May 7, 1999, and May 11, 1999. Defendant drove Rodriguez to the sale on May 11, 1999. The record reflects that Rodriguez identified defendant as his partner during the April 20, 1999, drug sale. Defеndant also drove Rodriguez to the April 23, 1999, sale and Rodriguez indicated to Fine that the profits from the sale were split evenly between himself and another person. During the April 28, 1999, sale, Rodriguez told Fine that Rodriguez would have to check with “Jose” before he could рurchase a kilo of cocaine. Rodriguez had introduced defendant to Fine as “Jose.” Notably, marked funds from the April 28 sale were found in the safe containing defendant’s identification card. We conclude that evidence of the nine prior drug sales was rеlevant to establish the existence of a conspiracy.
*495
Defendant also contends that the prejudicial nature of this evidence deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant did not argue the prejudicial nature of this evidence below. Accordingly, this issue is unprеserved.
People v Griffin,
Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of delivery of more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine. In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Johnson,
A person who аids or abets the commission of a crime may be convicted and punished as if he directly committed the offense. MCL 767.39;
People v Turner,
Defendant confessed to a police officer that he had purchased in Grand Rapids the 55.908 grams of cocaine sold to Detective Fine on May 17, 1999. During their tape-recorded telephone conversation to arrange the sale, Fine negotiated with Rodriguez regarding the price of the cocaine. The tape indicated that Rodriguez discussed the price of the cocaine with another person, whose voice Fine recognized as defendant’s. Defendant also drove Rodriguez to the drug sale on May 17. We believe this evidence, combined with the evidence that showed Rodriguez delivered the cocaine to Fine, constitutes sufficient evidence to convict defendant on an aiding and abеtting theory. MCL 767.39;
People v Norris,
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to depart downward from the statutorily mandated ten-year minimum sentence for his delivery and conspiracy convictions. 2 Pursuant to the new statutory sentencing guidelines, his recommended minimum sentence ranges frоm three years and nine months to six years and three months. *497 Defendant contends that in light of this disparity the minimum sentence under the guidelines in and of itself constitutes a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the mandatory ten-year minimum sentence.
The sentencing court may depart from the minimum term if it finds “substantial and compelling reasons to do so.” MCL 333.7401(4);
People v Daniel,
The Legislature recently codified the sentencing guidelines. The statute expressly provides that “if a crime has a mandatory determinant penalty . . . the court shall imposе that penalty.” MCL 769.34(5). Additionally, the Legislature made the sentencing guidelines applicable to controlled substance offenses. MCL 777.13. Notwithstanding the mandatory sentences prescribed by the controlled substances act, defendant argues that the inclusion of these offenses in the sentencing guidelines statute indicates the Legislature’s intention that the court consider the guide *498 lines in deciding whether to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence. Further, defendant maintains that to ignore the Legislature’s inclusion of sentencing guidelines for drug offenses would render this inclusion in the sentencing guidelines meaningless and unnecessary. We disagree.
The statutory sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.1
et seq.,
MCL 777.13, and the controlled substances act, MCL 333.7101
et seq.,
address sentences for drug offenders. Statutes that relate to the same subject or share a common purpose are “in pari materia” (literally, “upon the same matter or subject”).
Webb, supra
at 274;
People v Stephan,
Employing these principles and construing the two statutes, we beliеve that it is inappropriate to rely on the recommended minimum sentence under the guidelines as a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the mandatory minimum terms prescribed by the statute. Instead, we reconcile these *499 statutory provisions by сoncluding that only in cases where substantial and compelling reasons exist to warrant a departure may the court then consider the guidelines in determining the magnitude of the departure. Our conclusion is consistent with the recognized legislative goals of “keep[ing] drug dealers in prison for long periods, both to remove them from society and to deter others from following their example.” Fields, supra at 67-68.
During sentencing, defense counsel argued that defendant’s age (twenty) and the absence of a prior record militated in favor of dеparture from the required minimum term. The trial court acknowledged and properly considered these factors. See id. at 77. The court then proceeded to observe that defendant worked with an associate who seemed to look toward defеndant for guidance in the drug sales, and defendant was willing and able to deliver a significant amount of drugs to Fine. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to resentencing.
Affirmed.
Notes
These transactions all occurred in parking lots. According to Fine’s testimony, defendant drove Rodriguez to prior sales on April 20, 1999, and May 11, 1999. Defendant arrived in the car with Rodriguez at sales on April 23, 1999, and May 7, 1999. On all these occasions, defendant waited in the car while Rodriguez got out of the car and walked to Fine’s vehicle. The record is somewhat vague regarding the proximity of the vehicles at each sale. Fine testified that at the April 23 sale their cars were ‘‘not close at all,” and at the May 11 sale the vehicles were pаrked about thirty or forty feet apart.
Pursuant to MCL 750.157a(a), a person convicted of conspiracy “shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit[.]” See
People v Denio,