People v. IveryPeople v. Ivery
As a result of the theft of a casino card from Nancy McSorley and a credit card from Ronnie Mustio while those individuals were shopping in a grocery store, defendant and his wife, Francis Davis-Ivery, were indicted on various charges, and defendant was ultimately convicted of grand larceny in the fourth degree and petit larceny. Defendant contends that his convictions are against the weight of the evidence.1 To that end, where, as here, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we must ” ‘weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony’ ” (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987], quoting People ex rel. MacCracken v Miller, 291 NY 55, 62 [1943]).
Initially, while defendant is correct that there was no direct evidence that defendant actually stole either item, we note that the People were required to demonstrate only that defendant acted as an accomplice to Davis-Ivery (see
Defendant‘s remaining contentions are likewise without merit. Because the People offered both direct and circumstantial evidence of defendant‘s guilt, County Court properly administered to the jury a partial circumstantial evidence charge with respect to the fourth degree grand larceny count (see People v Daddona, 81 NY2d 990, 992 [1993]; People v Varmette, 70 AD3d 1167, 1171 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 845 [2010]). Finally, defendant alleges that he received ineffective assistance of standby counsel because counsel did not call Davis-Ivery as a witness or interject during the jury charge conference. The record reflects that defendant was assigned substitute counsel after he complained about the services of his first assigned counsel; he then complained about the services of the substitute counsel. When County Court refused to assign a third attorney to him, defendant chose to proceed pro se. The court instructed assigned counsel to remain as standby counsel to provide defendant with “legal advice as to how to frame motions and frame questions and give him procedural advice as to how the trial [would] proceed.” Having elected to proceed pro se, defendant waived his constitutional right to have counsel conduct the trial on his behalf and he may not now argue that his standby counsel was ineffective by failing to mount a defense and negotiate the jury charges (see People v Brockenshire, 245 AD2d 1065, 1066 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 940 [1998]; see generally People v Rodriguez, 95 NY2d 497, 501-502 [2000]).
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.