People v Isiah RR.

Jul 16, 2026
CR-23-1621
Versions:

Decided and Entered: July 16, 2026

Calendar Date: May 26, 2026

Cynthia Feathers, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.

Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), for respondent.

Ryba, J.

Appeal from an order of the County Court of Schenectady County (Michael Smrtic, J.) entered May 5, 2023, which denied defendant‘s motion for resentencing pursuant to CPL 440.47, after a hearing.

In 2008, defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of murder in the second degree in satisfaction of a multicount indictment related to a fatal shooting that occurred on June 22, 2007 and he was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to a prison term of 20 years to life. Defendant appealed and subsequently pursued additional collateral challenges to the conviction, all of which proved unsuccessful. In October 2022, defendant moved for resentencing pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (hereinafter the DVSJA) (see CPL 440.47; Penal Law § 60.12, as amended by L 2019, ch 31, § 1; L 2019, ch 55, § 1, part WW, § 1) alleging that he was abused by his mother during his childhood and adolescence, and that such abuse constituted a significant contributing factor to his commission of the underlying offense. Following a hearing, County Court denied the application on the ground that defendant failed to establish that he was the victim of substantial abuse at the time of the offense and that any prior abuse significantly contributed to his crime. Defendant appeals.

The DVSJA was enacted to address the failure of prior sentencing laws to adequately account for the impact of domestic violence on criminal conduct and permits courts to impose reduced or alternative sentences on qualifying defendants who were victims of such abuse (see People v Brenda WW., 44 NY3d 594, 598 [2025]; People v Duane MM., 248 AD3d 1570, 1570 [3d Dept 2026]). To obtain relief under the DVSJA, a defendant must demonstrate that he or she was the victim of substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a family or household member at the time of the offense, that such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the underlying crime, and that an otherwise authorized sentence would be unduly harsh in light of the nature of the crime and the defendant‘s history, character and condition (see Penal Law § 60.12 [1]; CPL 440.47; People v Devon Y., 247 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Fisher, 221 AD3d 1195, 1196 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 41 NY3d 1001 [2024]). A defendant seeking the imposition of an alternative sentence must prove facts necessary to support each of the three elements by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Ava OO., 233 AD3d 1186, 1187 [3d Dept 2024]; People v Boyd P., 232 AD3d 1000, 1001-1002 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 1006 [2025]).

At the hearing, defendant testified that he endured physical abuse, verbal degradation and psychological manipulation at the hands of his mother primarily during the years 2002 and 2003. Family Court records admitted into evidence documented multiple domestic incidents within the household during that period, including the issuance of an order of protection against the mother in favor of defendant and defendant‘s subsequent placement at a specialized residential facility following a juvenile delinquency adjudication. Additional proof established that defendant‘s mother possessed a significant criminal history, including multiple felony convictions and periods of incarceration during defendant‘s youth. According to defendant, throughout his childhood and adolescence, his mother expected him to respond to any perceived threat or insult with physical aggression. Defendant further testified that shortly before the shooting that gave rise to his conviction, he became the target of a gang-related threat and was lectured by his mother to rectify the situation. According to defendant, he responded to his mother‘s lecture by going to the victim‘s residence to look for one of the individuals allegedly involved in the threat. Defendant testified that his encounter with the victim escalated into an argument during which the victim made an unidentified comment that purportedly “triggered” the trauma of his childhood abuse. Believing that his mother would be displeased if he did not take aggressive action, defendant chased the victim into the residence and shot him nine times, causing his death.

As to the first element requiring that defendant was the victim of abuse inflicted by his mother “at the time of the instant offense” (Penal Law § 60.12 [1]), while the abuse and the offense need not have been contemporaneous, there must nevertheless be a sufficient temporal nexus between the history of abuse and the criminal conduct (see People v Devon Y., 247 AD3d at 1369; People v Ava OO., 233 AD3d at 1187; People v Boyd P., 232 AD3d at 1001-1002; People v Fisher, 221 AD3d at 1196). Here, defendant attempted to establish a temporal nexus between the alleged abuse and the shooting by relying on the alleged lecture given by his mother shortly before the shooting, but County Court properly found the claimed nexus to be tenuous and incredible. The evidence demonstrated that the alleged abuse occurred during the years 2002 and 2003, whereas the subject crime occurred years later, after defendant had long been removed from his mother‘s household and was no longer subject to her immediate control and influence. The alleged statements made by defendant‘s mother before the shooting were insufficient to bridge the temporal gap between the abuse and the offense, particularly given defendant‘s inability to even recall the substance of the victim‘s comment or explain how it was related to the abuse. County Court expressly found this testimony to be lacking in credibility and “carefully crafted” to satisfy the statutory “at the time of the offense” requirement, and we defer to that credibility determination, which is amply supported by the record (see People v Rebecca X.X., 230 AD3d 1492, 1494 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 946 [2025]; People v Williams, 198 AD3d 466, 467 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1165 [2022]).

With respect to whether the prior abuse was a significant contributing factor to the offense, defendant‘s own testimony undermined any claim of causation. Defendant admitted that he was an active gang member at the time of the shooting and that the incident arose from perceived threats connected to rival gang activity, suggesting that the shooting was motivated by gang-related tensions rather than abuse inflicted by defendant‘s mother. Likewise, the testimony of defendant‘s forensic psychologist did little to provide any meaningful connection between the claimed abuse and defendant‘s crime. While the expert‘s opinion echoed the statutory language regarding causation, the expert conceded that he never interviewed defendant or his mother, did not review the contemporaneous materials concerning the homicide and was unaware of many of the facts surrounding the shooting. Although the expert generally opined that defendant‘s upbringing contributed to his criminality, County Court reasonably concluded that the opinion was not worthy of any meaningful weight (see People v Duane MM., 248 AD3d at 1571). Given these evidentiary deficiencies, County Court properly found that defendant failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that trauma from childhood abuse significantly contributed to his criminal conduct (see id. at 1572).

Because defendant failed to establish the first two statutory elements by a preponderance of the evidence, County Court properly declined to reach the question of whether the agreed-upon sentence of 20 years to life was unduly harsh (see Penal Law § 60.12 [1]). Although the record reflects that defendant has made commendable rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated, including participation in violence-prevention and educational programming, such efforts alone do not warrant resentencing under the DVSJA absent proof satisfying the statutory criteria. Accordingly, defendant‘s application for resentencing was properly denied.

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.P., Ceresia, McShan and Mackey, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed.