People v. InoaPeople v. Inoa
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered December 14, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first and second degrees, attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 73 1/3 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony (see People v. Polanco, 50 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see also People v. Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert‘s opinion was based on “facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert” (People v. Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied on information “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable” or provided by “a witness subject to full cross-examination” (id.). “In interpreting the coded communications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other facts already in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him” (People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent any of the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People‘s principal fact witness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, and the witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted within its discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and the witness‘s testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Any hearsay in the witness‘s testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or was otherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning any alleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that argument to be without merit. The People did not introduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in
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Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro,
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony (see People v. Polanco, 50 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see also People v. Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert‘s opinion was based on “facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert” (People v. Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied on information “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable” or provided by “a witness subject to full cross-examination” (id.). “In interpreting the coded communications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other facts already in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him” (People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent any of the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People‘s principal fact witness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, and the witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted within its discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and the witness‘s testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Any hearsay in the witness‘s testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or was otherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning any alleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that argument to be without merit. The People did not introduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in
SWEENY, J.P.
DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.
An appeal having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald Zweibel, J.), rendered on or about July 14, 2011, said appeal having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, due deliberation having been had thereon, and finding the sentence not excessive, it is unanimously ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same is hereby affirmed. Concur—Sweeny, J.P., DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels and Clark, JJ.
Wait, Brito is very short. Brown/Saade is before it but starts with “Order...“. Inoa is the most substantial. I‘ll provide the HTML for the Inoa case. Actually, the instructions say “convert only the MAIN opinion“. These are digests in a reporter. I‘ll treat People v. Inoa as the main opinion.Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered December 14, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first and second degrees, attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 73 1/3 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony (see People v. Polanco, 50 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see also People v. Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert‘s opinion was based on “facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert” (People v. Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied on information “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable” or provided by “a witness subject to full cross-examination” (id.). “In interpreting the coded communications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other facts already in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him” (People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent any of the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People‘s principal fact witness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, and the witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted within its discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and the witness‘s testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Any hearsay in the witness‘s testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or was otherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning any alleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that argument to be without merit. The People did not introduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in
SWEENY, J.P., DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy S. Friedman, J.), entered July 19, 2012, which granted the motion of individual defendants Chris Brown, Julio Marquez and Javier Saade to dismiss the complaint as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
In this action to recover legal fees for services rendered to the corporate defendant, the motion court properly dismissed the fraudulent inducement cause of action asserted against the individual defendants. Plaintiff law firm claims that the individual defendants induced it to provide legal services by falsely promising to pay for past services rendered as well as future services to be provided in connection with an action that was pending in federal court. This alleged promise is not collateral to the contract for legal services entered into between plaintiff and the corporate defendant. Rather, the promise concerns the corporate defendant‘s performance of the contract itself. Accordingly, the fraud claim against the individual defendants is duplicative of the breach of contract claim asserted against the corporation (see Fairway Prime Estate Mgt., LLC v. First Am. Intl. Bank, 99 AD3d 554, 557 [1st Dept 2012]). Plaintiff does not contend that the individual defendants were parties to the legal services contract.
We have considered plaintiff‘s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Sweeny, J.P., DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels and Clark, JJ.
SWEENY, J.P., DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered December 14, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first and second degrees, attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 73 1/3 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony (see People v. Polanco, 50 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see also People v. Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert‘s opinion was based on “facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert” (People v. Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied on information “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable” or provided by “a witness subject to full cross-examination” (id.). “In interpreting the coded communications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other facts already in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him” (People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent any of the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People‘s principal fact witness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, and the witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted within its discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and the witness‘s testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Any hearsay in the witness‘s testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or was otherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning any alleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that argument to be without merit. The People did not introduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in
SWEENY, J.P.
DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.
Permanency hearing order, Family Court, New York County (Jody Adams, J.), entered on or about July 10, 2012, which changed the permanency goal for the subject child from return to parent to placement for adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Appeal from order, same court and Judge, entered on or about July 10, 2012, which denied respondent mother‘s motion to vacate the portions of a dispositional order entered on or about November 16, 2011, requiring her to comply with a referral for a drug treatment assessment and psychiatric evaluation, unanimously dismissed, without costs.
Since the July 10, 2012 permanency order changed the permanency goal for the child from return to mother to adoption, it is not moot (see Matter of Jacelyn TT. [Tonia TT.—Carlton TT.], 80 AD3d 1119 [3d Dept 2011]). On the merits, the court properly found that petitioner agency met its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the change in Alexander‘s goal was appropriate (see Matter of Acension C.L. [Jesate J.], 96 AD3d 1059 [2d Dept 2012]). Concur—Sweeny, J.P., DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels and Clark, JJ.
SWEENY, J.P., DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered December 14, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first and second degrees, attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 73 1/3 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony (see People v. Polanco, 50 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see also People v. Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert‘s opinion was based on “facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert” (People v. Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied on information “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable” or provided by “a witness subject to full cross-examination” (id.). “In interpreting the coded communications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other facts already in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him” (People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent any of the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People‘s principal fact witness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, and the witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted within its discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and the witness‘s testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Any hearsay in the witness‘s testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or was otherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning any alleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that argument to be without merit. The People did not introduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in
SWEENY, J.P.
DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered December 14, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first and second degrees, attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 73 1/3 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony (see People v. Polanco, 50 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see also People v. Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert‘s opinion was based on “facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert” (People v. Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied on information “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable” or provided by “a witness subject to full cross-examination” (id.). “In interpreting the coded communications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other facts already in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him” (People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent any of the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People‘s principal fact witness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, and the witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted within its discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and the witness‘s testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Any hearsay in the witness‘s testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or was otherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning any alleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that argument to be without merit. The People did not introduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in
SWEENY, J.P.
DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered December 14, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first and second degrees, attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 73 1/3 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony (see People v. Polanco, 50 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see also People v. Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert‘s opinion was based on “facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert” (People v. Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied on information “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable” or provided by “a witness subject to full cross-examination” (id.). “In interpreting the coded communications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other facts already in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him” (People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent any of the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People‘s principal fact witness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, and the witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted within its discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and the witness‘s testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Any hearsay in the witness‘s testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or was otherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning any alleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that argument to be without merit. The People did not introduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in
SWEENY, J.P.
DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered December 14, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first and second degrees, attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 73 1/3 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony (see People v. Polanco, 50 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see also People v. Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert‘s opinion was based on “facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert” (People v. Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied on information “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable” or provided by “a witness subject to full cross-examination” (id.). “In interpreting the coded communications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other facts already in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him” (People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent any of the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People‘s principal fact witness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, and the witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted within its discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and the witness‘s testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Any hearsay in the witness‘s testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or was otherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning any alleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that argument to be without merit. The People did not introduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in
SWEENY, J.P.
DEGRASSE, MANZANET-DANIELS AND CLARK, JJ.