19 N.Y.S. 550 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1892
The defendant was convicted at a court of oyer and terminer held in Monroe county upon an indictment charging him with having feloniously and extorsively obtained from Levi Adler and others, doing business as manufacturers of and wholesale dealers in clothing in the city of Rochester, with'their consent, the sum of $1,000, such consent being induced by the wrongful use of fear on the part of the defendant, induced by a threat made by the defendant to the said firm to do an unlawful injury to Lheir property; that is to say, to injure and destroy the business of them, the said Levi Adler and others, doing business as aforesaid, and to prevent' and hinder them .from carrying on the same, contrary to the form of the statute, etc. The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment in the Monroe county penitentiary for-the term of one year. The principal question litigated upon the trial arid argued upon this appeal was whether the injury to the business of the said Levi Adler and others was, within the meaning of the statute,
A very large proportion of the defendant’s very numerous exceptions were taken upon the assumption of his counsel that the organization known as the “Knights of Labor” (of which organization the defendant was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him, master workman) in some way had the right to interfere in the business of the firm of L. Adler Bros. & Co., and dictate as to whom they should employ in the prosecution of their business. Believing, as we do, that this claim has no foundation -in justice or inlaw, the exceptions of the defendant having reference to that question are, we think, without merit. The only exception which merits discussion is one taken by the defendant to the ruling of the court allowing the prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge to" the juror William Rosenbauer. The practice was adopted in impaneling the jury of examining each juror as he was called, and if found competent, and he was not peremptorily
It appears from the record that Mr. Baines’ application followed very soon after the juror Bosenbauer was sworn, and before any adjournment of the court had been had. It frequently occurs that information comes to counsel engaged in the trial of causes, after a juror is accepted, that for some reason he is disqualified to sit. Had the information been received before Bosenbauer was sworn, he would have been peremptorily challenged. The defendant’s counsel did not question the power of the court to allow a peremptory challenge for cause, but insisted that the court should not exercise its discretion unless the plaintiff’s counsel stated under oath the matters which had come to his knowledge leading him to think the juror should not sit. Attorneys are sworn officers of the court, charged by the law with grave duties and responsibilities in the trial of causes. Courts are accustomed to act upon their unsworn statements while engaged in the trial of actions. It very rarely occurs that they are misled by such statements; quite as rarely as they are when they act upon sworn statements. The law has provided means in both cases by which the court can punish a person who intentionally makes an untruthful statement with a view of misleading the court. Counsel for the defendant assumed by the form of his objection that it was within the discretion of the court to permit the peremptory challenge in case the people’s counsel would in some manner other than by his oral statement show the facts which had come to his knowledge. He thereby conceded that the court would grant the request for cause. The request was for permission to use a peremptory challenge. The nature of the challenge contemplated that no reason need be given for its use. It might well have been very prejudicial to the people’s case or to the defendant’s case to have had the facts stated in the presence of the jury. As the defendant’s counsel conceded that for cause the court had power to grant the request, the court decided to act upon the unsworn statement of one of its officers, and exercise its discretion, and grant the prosecuting attorney’s request. The defendant’s counsel having assumed that to be the rule by which the court should be guided, he should be estopped from thereafter insisting upon a contrary rule. Lewis v. Railroad Co., 123 N. Y. 496, 26 N. E. Rep. 357. The request of the district attorney was for permission to exercise a challenge which at the time, without the consent of the court, he had no right to use. The question presented to the court was as to the propriety of allowing the request. The court concluded that it was good cause for allowing the request that the information had come to the prosecuting attorney just after the juror had been sworn, and before the panel was complete; and it not appearing that the rights of the defendant would in anyway be injured thereby, the request was granted. We do not see that any substantial right of the defendant was prejudiced thereby. It was held, in the case of People v. Tweed, reported in 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 371, that “the court had power to allow a juror to be peremptorily challenged after he had been sworn in.” Tweed was on trial for falsely auditing claims against the county of Flew York. After 11 jurors had been impaneled, counsel for the prosecution stated to the court that they had received information relating to one of the jurors who had been accepted and sworn which justified them in applying to the court for leave to interpose a peremptory challenge. John Graham and William Fullerton were heard in opposition on the question of power to grant leave at this stage of the proceedings. “Davis, J., after re
Pen. Code, § 552, declares that “extortion is the obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right,”1
Section 553 declares that “fear, such as will constitute extortion, may be induced by a threat to do an unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened, or to any relative of his, or to any member of his family ”