People v. HotzPeople v. Hotz
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Chiepcooke
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs in error, Walter Hotz, Manford C. Butler and Anna Struck, were convicted in the circuit court of Effing-ham county for the murder of Minnie Madge. Hotz and Butler were each sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for a term of twenty years and Anna Struck was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for a term of fourteen years.
The first ground relied upon for reversal is, that the court erred in overruling the motion made by Hotz and Butler to be set at liberty. On May 4, 1912, Butler was
The grounds set up by Hotz and Anna Struck in their motion for a separate trial were, first, that the testimony of certain witnesses whose names were given and the substance
Minnie Madge was an orphan girl, eighteen years of age. She had lived with her grand-parents in Altamont until she was sixteen years of. age and then went to live with her uncle, Conrad Stettbacher, who lived one-half mile west and one-half mile south of the village of Moccasin, in Effingham county. Walter Hotz spent the winters with his father, who lived about a mile and a quarter north-west of Moccasin, and worked away from home in the summer. The village of Moccasin is the first station north of Altamont on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and the village of Beecher City is the first station on that road north of Moccasin. Holland .is the first station north of Moccasin on the Chicago and Eastern Illinois railroad and is aboüt two miles north-e.ast of Beecher City. About January 4, it/x‘2, Minnie Madge went to Moccasin to work in the home
On February 16, 1912, Minnie’s uncle, Conrad Stettbacher, took her to the State’s attorney’s office and she made complaint against Hotz for bastardy. A warrant was issued and he was arrested at Bloomington and taken back to Effingham county on February 20. A preliminary hearing was
Butler lived a short distance south-west of Holland. Anna Struck lived with her sister, Tillie, her brother, Philip, and her mother, about four miles north-east of Moccasin and near the village of Shumway. During the month of March and the fore part of April Hotz made several trips
Dr. A. L. Stringer, a dentist at St. Elmo, testified that during the latter part of March or the first of April, 1912,
After Minnie Madge ceased working for the station agent at Moccasin she returned to the home of Conrad Stettbacher and remained there until April 23, with the exception of one night which she spent at Altamont with her grandmother.
Butler was a single man and Anna and Tillie Struck were single women. Eor several years Butler had been going to the Struck home, and his acquaintance with Tillie Struck, at least, was intimate. Prior to April 23, 1912, neither Anna nor Tillie Struck had any acquaintance whatever with Minnie Madge. On Sunday evening, April 14, 1912, Butler drove from his home near Holland to the Struck home and had his supper there. After supper, accompanied by Anna Struck, he drove to the home of Conrad Stettbacher. When they arrived the family had retired, Minnie Madge being up-stairs. Stettbacher came to the door and had a conversation with Butler in which the latter said they were looking for a girl; that Mr. Turner, a neighbor of his, wanted a girl to work for him while his wife was sick. Charles Turner, referred to by Butler in this conversation, lived about two miles west of Holland and his family at that time was quarantined on account of scarlet fever. Butler further said to Stettbacher that he had gone to the Struck
Two witnesses testified that on the morning of April 29 they heard a telephone conversation between Tillie Struck and Butler in which Tillie asked Butler whether he was coming over that morning, to which he replied, “No, it is raining;” that Tillie told him to put on his raincoat and come over; that Butler inquired, “Is there anything doing?” to which she replied, “If you was here you would think there was something doing.” Butler went over’ to the Struck home that afternoon.
No physician was called on Monday and none of Minnie’s relatives were notified of her condition. On Tuesday afternoon Anna Struck went to Shumway after Dr. C. S. Borton. The only information she gave the doctor was that there was a lady visiting at her home and that she was sick and wanted him to go and see her. Dr. Borton arrived at the Struck home about four o’clock that afternoon • and was informed that Minnie had aborted the previous day. Her condition then was serious. Anna and Tillie Struck showed him the fcetus and part of the afterbirth in an earthen vessel in an adjoining room, but the doctor did not remove the fcetus from the vessel and made no examination of it, merely noticing, as he testified, that it was in a decomposed condition. Upon learning that Minnie’s relatives had not been informed of her condition Dr. Borton told Anna and Tillie Struck to notify them. The doctor returned the next morning and made another visit in the afternoon, when he was accompanied by Dr. Haumesser, of Shumway. They inquired whether Minnie’s relatives had been notified, and Anna and Tillie Struck replied that they had not, as Minnie did not want them to send any word to them. Dr. Haumesser insisted that they notify her relatives. and stated that she would probably die. That evening Anna Struck drove over to Conrad Stettbacher’s home and stated to him, “Minnie had
The condition of Minnie Madge continued to grow worse, and she died about ten o’clock in the evening of Thursday, May 2, from peritonitis. On the following day the undertaker embalmed the body and took it to Altamont. On May 4, 1912, the coroner, having been notified of the circumstances attending the death, empaneled a jury and called Drs. Baker, Borton and Haumesser to make a postmortem examination. This examination disclosed a puncture at the top of the womb, which the evidence for the People tended strongly to show must have been caused by an instrument inserted through the vagina into the womb during the lifetime of Minnie Madge, and which the evidence offered by plaintiffs in error tended to show might have been caused by the undertaker’s trocar when the body was embalmed. The testimony of every physician who was called was to the effect that if this puncture in the womb was caused by the insertion of an instrument through the vagina and into the womb, death would result from blood-poisoning. Physicians on the part of the People who were present at the p‘ost-mortem examination testified that there were indications that nature had attempted to heal over this wound, — something that could not have occurred after death. Dr. G. M. Baker, who opened the abdomen and removed the womb at the post-mortem examination, and Dr. Cecil Baker, who was present at that examination, both testified that
•On the night the coroner’s jury returned its verdict Hotz left Spriñgfield, Illinois, where he had been staying for some time, and proceeded to Pana, from which place the next afternoon he telephoned Anna Struck to meet him at Beecher City that night, which she did and took him to her home shortly before midnight. The other members of the Struck family had been arrested and were then confined in jail.
In addition to the above the People proved by several witnesses that Butler for over a year had had in his possession, instruments commonly used for producing abortions, and the testimony of these witnesses tends to show that Butler had admitted having produced abortions with these instruments. Butler and Hotz both admitted their meeting at Holland, as testified to by the witnesses for the People, but testified that the object of those meetings was to consult about the bastardy bond. Hotz offered no explanation as to why it was necessary for him to consult with Butler instead of his attorneys about his bond. Butler also admitted having had conversations with Dial, Burke and Hubbart in Holland, but
Prom the. facts thus shown it will be seen that there was- an agreement and understanding among plaintiffs in error and Minnie Madge to commit an abortion upon her, and if any one of plaintiffs in error is guilty they are all guilty. It therefore follows that there is no basis for the contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of Anna Struck.
The evidence was sufficient to show the corpus delicti. It has been said that the corpus delicti in murder consists of two elements, viz., the fact of death and the criminal agency of another as the cause of the death. (Campbell v. People, 159 Ill. 9.) The corpus delicti may be proved by presumptive or circumstantial evidence where that is the best evidence obtainable, although caution should be observed in acting upon it. (Campbell v. People, supra; People v. See, 258 Ill. 152.) The death of Minnie Madge was proven directly, and the other element necessary to complete the corpus delicti was proven abundantly by circumstantial evidence.
The court did not err in denying the motions for separate trials or in admitting testimony as to statements made by Butler in reference to his possession of instruments commonly used to produce abortions and his use of the same, and evidence as to his possession of such instruments at
During the course of the trial, and after the jury had been excused for the day, counsel for the plaintiffs in error complained to the court that the bailiff in charge of the jury had made improper remarks in the presence of the jury and asked to have him removed and another bailiff put in charge. The court thereupon heard the testimony of witnesses concerning certain statements alleged to have been made by the bailiff. E. H. Hubbart testified that he had a conversation with the bailiff the night before at a hotel in Effingham, in which the bailiff said the judge had told him that he would send all the defendants to the penitentiary; that in response to his reply that the judge was too smart for that, the bailiff responded, “I will bet you twenty-five dollars,” but that he refused to bet. The witness did not know where the jury was at the time this conversation occurred. The bailiff admitted having had a conversation with Hubbart at the hotel, but he and another witness who was present and heard the conversation denied that he made the statements testified to by Hubbart. After hearing this testimony the
’ Numerous rulings of the court in admitting and excluding testimony are complained of. Emma Stettbacher, an aunt of Minnie Madge, was one of the relatives who arrived at the Struck home about an hour and a half before she died. She remained there until the afternoon of the following day. She testified that after Minnie had died she was present in a room with Tillie and Anna Struck; that Anna was lying across the foot of a bed and had been lying there for about an hour; that she did not know whether she was asleep or awake; that Tillie Struck and the witness were standing within a few feet of where Anna was lying; that in response to a remark made by the witness that she was so sorry that this had taken place there, Tillie Struck said she was sorry also, and added, “But we want you to understand that Minnie was. willing to have this happen; don’t blame me for it.” Anna Struck took no part in this conversation and said nothing at the time this statement is alleged to have been made by her sister. Counsel for plaintiffs iñ error objected to this testimony, and after it was admitted moved to strike it out for the reason that it was made outside the presence of plaintiffs in error, and that as the witness had stated that she did not know whether Anna was asleep or awake, and as she had been lying on the bed for an hour or more and took no part in the conversation, the presumption was that she was asleep and heard no part of’ it. The court overruled the motion and stated, “If the time ever comes that the evidence shows she was sleeping then I will pass upon the matter.” Anna Struck testified in her own
It is contended that this testimony was not admissible unless the statement was made in the presence of Anna Struck and under such circumstances that she was able to hear it, and that the presumption is, from the testimony of Emma Stettbacher, that Anna Struck was asleep when the statement was made. That presumption does not arise from the facts testified to by Mrs. Stettbacher. If Anna Struck was, in fact, asleep when it is testified this statement was made, and was therefore unable to hear, it, this testimony
Dr. Horton and Dr. Haumesser both testified on behalf of the plaintiffs in error. Each was asked to state whether,
.During the examination of Dr. Lorton on this question it is claimed that the court made remarks which were prejudicial. Dr. Haumesser had been examined along the same line and the court had held that this evidence was not proper. During the examination of Dr. Lorton he was asked whether he got a. history of the case, to which he replied that he did. He was then asked’ from whom he got it. To this question an objection was sustained. He was then asked what the history of the case was as he got it, to which an objection was also sustained. He was then asked whether he got the history from Minnie Madge. In sustaining an objection to that question the court reminded counsel that he did not want to sustain so many objections to the same question, informing them that it was all right to make a record but not necessary to repeat the question four
Dr. Baker called to see Minnie Madge at the request of Conrad Stettbacher, arriving at the Struck home a short time before she died. Drs. Dorton and Haumesser arrived there at the same time and they entered the house together. Dr. Baker was the family physician of the Stettbachers and had known Minnie Madge all her lifetime. He went into the sick-room alone, closed the door and had a private conversation with her about the cause of her illness. He was called by plaintiffs in error, who offered to prove by him an alleged dying declaration of Minnie Madge. The jury were excused, and he testified, upon preliminary examination, that after he had gone into the sick-room and closed the door he talked to lyiinnie Madge on the subject of her death; that
It is well settled that a dying declaration is admissible on behalf of the accused as well as on behalf of the prosecution, and in some jurisdictions it is held that the same strictness in regard to the preliminary proof will not be required when the declaration is offered in favor of the accused as when it is made against him. The first case wherein the rule in regard to the admission of dying declarations was defined in this State was Starkey v. People, 17 Ill. 17, and it is there stated that dying declarations are such as are made by the party, relating to the facts of the injury of which he afterwards dies, under the fixed belief and moral conviction that his death is impending and certain to follow almost immediately, without opportunity for repentance and in the absence of all hope of avoidance, when he has despaired of life and looks to death- as inevitable and at hand. The principle upon which this rule is founded is there stated to be, that such declarations are made in a condition so solemn and awful as to exclude the supposition that the party making them could have been influenced by malice, revenge or any conceivable motive to misrepresent, and when every inducement, emotion and motive is to speak the truth, — in other words, in view of impending death and under the sanction of a moral sense of certain and just retribution. It was also held in that case,— and these holdings have been uniformly followed in this vState, — that it is for the court in the first instance to determine upon the admissibility of the declarations upon proof of the condition of mind of
. It is insisted that the court erred in not allowing Dr. Haumesser to testify in regard to the mental condition of Minnie Madge at the time Dr. Baker was there. Dr. Haumesser testified that he was present when Dr. Baker made his diagnosis, but was not allowed to state any conversation he heard at that time. He was asked several questions as to her mental condition at that time and whether he heard her say anything in reference to dying, to all of which objections were properly sustained because this examination was in the presence of the jury. ’ Finally, following a suggestion by the court, the jury were sent out, and an effort was then made to lay the foundation for the admission of a dying declaration. The doctor then stated that he had no conversation with the patient upon the question of her death, and he was not asked his opinion as to her mental condition during the absence of the jury. Moreover, this testimony was given before Dr. Baker was called on behalf of plaintiffs in error, and therefore, necessarily, before it appeared that plaintiffs in error would attempt to prove a dying declaration by Dr. Baker, and after Dr. Baker testified Dr. Haumesser was not re-called to the stand. It therefore did not appear that this testimony was offered for the purpose of making preliminary proof for the introduction of an alleged dying declaration made by Minnie Madge to Dr. Baker. The offer to prove a dying declaration was properly excluded.
Plaintiffs in error offered to prove by Anna Struck that after Dr. Baker had left the Struck home Minnie Madge detailed to her a conversation she had had with Dr. Baker, stating that she had told Dr. Baker she believed she was about to die and had told him her miscarriage had been
Dr. Horton was one of the principal witnesses for plaintiffs in error and his testimony was quite favorable to their theory. He testified on direct examination that in his opinion this abortion was caused by exertion, and he explained that he meant by exertion any undue work or exercise by the mother. On cross-examination he was asked whether he did not state in the presence of four persons, (naming them,) three of them relatives of the deceased, at the Struck home immediately after the death of Minnie Madge, “I advise you to get this corpse out of here before daylight or there will be the greatest disturbance you have ever heard in this neighborhood.” An objection to this question was overruled, and the doctor denied that he had made this statement. On rebuttal the persons named in the question as having been present when the statement was made testified that it was made by Dr. Horton under those circumstances. It is now urged that this was prejudicial error for the reason that it was not a proper subject of impeachment. Dr. Horton had testified that in his opinion the death of Minnie Madge resulted from natural causes, and in the expression of this opinion’ he wholly absolved plaintiffs in error from the charge under which they were being tried. He did not pretend to state that as a matter of fact this abortion resulted from exertion. He simply gave that as his opinion. In order to test the sincerity of that opinion the question asked was proper in the way of impeachment. If he made the statement credited to him immediately after the death of Minnie Madge it was proper to be considered by the jury in connection with his testimony as to his opinion of the cause of her death,
During the argument to the jury counsel for the prosecution turned to plaintiff in error Butler and said, “You miserable wretch.” This was objected to and the objection sustained, the court stating to the jury that those words were not proper and that they should not consider them. It is complained that this was prejudicial. While counsel have the right, in argument to the jury, to draw any reasonable deduction from the facts proven that they see fit, and have a right to depict the defense in any light that in their opinion the evidence warrants and to characterize the defendants and their acts in any manner justified by the evidence, it is improper for counsel to direct his remarks personally to a defendant.. The court promptly sustained an objection to this statement and instructed the jury to disregard it. The jury would be exceedingly unmindful of their duty if they should allow such a circumstance to work harm after the ruling of the court. In any event the action of the court cannot be complained of, as the ruling was in favor of plaintiffs in error.
Complaint is made of the giving of six instructions on behalf of the People. The tenth instruction stated, in substance, that if the jury believed that Minnie Madge was a woman pregnant with child, and that the defendants, “by means of any instrument or other means whatever,” caused Minnie Madge to abort or miscarry, and that the abortion was not necessary for the preservation of her life, and that she died as the result of such abortion, the defendants would be guilty of murder. Complaint is made of the language quoted, on the ground that no proof was made on the part of the prosecution of any fact that tended to show the commission of the crime except by means of some instrument, and it was error to instruct the jury that they might find that the abortion was committed by any means whatever.. The proof on the part of the People did tend
Instructions n, 12 and 13 consist of definitions of the term “reasonable doubt.” They state at length what a reasonable doubt does and does not consist of. The definitions incorporated in these instructions have been repeatedly approved. While it was not error to give them, they were no doubt somewhat confusing, and, as we have had occasion to say heretofore, could serve no useful purpose, as it is doubtful whether any better definition can be given of this term than the words themselves.
The fourteenth instruction was on the question of the credit to be given the testimony of plaintiffs in error, and is substantially the same instruction as was approved in Maguire v. People, 219 Ill. 16, where the authorities in support of the giving of such an instruction were discussed.
Plaintiffs in error offered fifty-two instructions. Of these sixteen were given as asked, two were modified and thus given, and thirty-four were refused. Complaint is made of the refusal to give nineteen of these instructions and to the modification of one of them. A number of’ them covered the same ground as the instructions given. Many of them dealt with the same subject and were different only in the phraseology used. A «umber of them assumed that matters which had been excluded by the court were
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Vickers, dissenting.