308 N.Y. 1 | NY | 1954
Lead Opinion
At 4:30 in the morning of May 24, 1953, while Mr. and Mrs. Bay E. Horton were asleep at their home in the Town of Southport, Chemung County, New York, she was awakened by a cry from her husband — ‘ * There is a knife in me; put the light on. ’ ’ Failing to convince him that he was dreaming, Mrs. Horton turned on the light and observed him making an effort to raise himself from the bed with his right hand “twisted” behind his back. When, during that effort, she noticed he had slumped back and her closer observation had disclosed that his night clothing bore bloodstains and that a knife lay near his back, Mrs. Horton, by telephone, summoned local medical aid and notified the Sheriff’s office.
Bay E. Horton, while asleep, had suffered a stab wound in the back from which death resulted within an hour after his condition was discovered. His son, Norman, the defendant-appellant, now stands convicted of murder in the first degree upon an indictment which charged that “ * * * Norman L. Horton, in the Town of Southport, County of Chemung and State of New York, on or about the 24th day of May, 1953, willfully feloniously and of malice aforethought and from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the death of Bay E. Horton, struck and killed Bay E. Horton with a knife, said act not being justifiable or excusable.”
At the trial of the indictment there was no proof that at the hour of the crime the defendant had been seen at or near his home; nor was there evidence of fingerprints which proved his presence there. There was evidence, however, that he had been seen at the college he was then attending — sixty miles from his home — at about 6:3Q in the evening preceding the crime, and that he was seen again in one of the college dormitories at about 7:00 on the following morning of May 24th, the day of the crime. Proof of what had occupied defendant’s time during the interval
At the time of the crime the defendant, then eighteen years of age, was about to complete his first year at college. The college year then drawing to a close had not been for him in any sense a success. His hope for fraternity membership had not been fulfilled; the friendships he had made in a few instances, and certain forms of misbehavior in which he had engaged and which he recognized as wrong, were not conducive to his being well regarded in the student body; his scholastic standing was at no time of a grade satisfactory to his father who did not withhold expressions of his disappointment in the young man — a continuation of an attitude amounting almost to scorn which the father had shown toward his son over a period of years. Thus it came about that on May 23, 1953, four days before the year’s final examinations, for which he was unprepared, the defendant was in a state of complete frustration — lonely, discouraged, with an attitude toward his father which through the years of misunderstanding between them had grown to deep hatred and in addition had finally led the son to regard his father as accountable for the plight in which he found himself. Baffled by the adverse circumstances then affecting him, and convinced that his father was accountable for his major failures, he concluded the best solution of his problem was to take his father’s life, and thus make it possible for him to reside with his mother, for whom he had a deep affection. With that project in mind and having been offered transportation in the car of an acquaintance, he left the college campus and reached the vicinity of his home about 10:30 on the night of Saturday, May 23d. After finding in his father’s garage a hammer and a pair of gloves — the gloves being necessary “ * * * because I knew they would be looking for fingerprints ” — he waited several hours until the light was out in his parents’ bedroom and the time arrived when the noise and whistle of a train due to pass nearby would muffle any noise he happened to make. When the train
Arriving at his dormitory room between 6:00 and 7:00 in the morning of May 24th, he had been there only a short time when there was relayed to him a telephone message informing him of his father’s death without mentioning the cause. Later in the day, while he was returning to his home with three friends of his family — who assumed his father’s death had been due to a heart attack — the defendant expressed to them surprise because, as he said, his father “ didn’t have a heart condition ”.
For a period of days after he returned home, the defendant was repeatedly questioned by State Police and members of the Dis
Following the defendant’s arraignment upon the indictment and his plea thereto of “ Not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity ”, there was conducted, pursuant to court order and in accord with sections 658-662 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an examination of the defendant by two psychiatrists, qualified as defined in the Mental Hygiene Law, to determine whether he was in such a state of insanity as to be incapable of understanding the charge made against him in the indictment, or of making his defense thereto. Thereafter a hearing was held by direction of the Trial Justice, pursuant to section 662-a id., at which hearing counsel for the defendant was afforded an opportunity to controvert findings of the examining psychiatrists and to examine them in reference thereto. Thereupon, in accord with the report of the examining psychiatrists, the court found that the defendant was not in such a state of insanity as to be incapable of understanding the charge in the indictment, or of making his defense thereto.
Although it is argued on behalf of the defendant that there is no evidentiary basis in the record which justified a finding by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who inflicted the stab wound which caused his father’s death, our renew of the facts — which we are permitted to do in a capital case (N. Y. Const., art. VI, § 7; People v. Crum, 272 N. Y. 348, 349-350) —leaves us in no doubt that the jury was justified in finding that the killing was the act of the defendant. There remains for determination the question — which was practically
Mindful that no act is deemed criminal or punishable in this State unless prescribed or authorized by statute (Penal Law, § 22), we turn to section 1120 of the Penal Law which prescribes in part that: “ A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as: 1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or 2. Not to know that the act was wrong. ’ ’
As to the burden cast by that statute upon the prosecution, we have recently said (per Conway, J.): “ When the defense of insanity is raised under section 1120 of the Penal Law, the People must establish on the whole case beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant knew the nature and quality of his act and that he knew the act was wrong. To put it in another and converse manner, the defendant is entitled to acquittal if the jury find either that he did not know the nature and quality of his act or that the act was wrong.” (People v. Kelly, 302 N. Y. 512, 515; italics in original text.) Guided by that analysis of the statutory pattern prescribed by section 1120, we turn to the record before us of proof interposed at the trial to determine whether, when the entire evidence is considered, the prosecution established beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time the crime was committed, the defendant knew the nature and quality of his act, and knew that the act was wrong.
Prior to introducing in evidence the defendant’s statement made on June 27, 1953 — to which reference has already been made — the prosecution called witnesses whose testimony established without contradiction that at about 4:50 in the morning of May 24, 1953, Eay E. Horton died as the result of a deep stab wound in his back which had severed the victim’s liver and had caused profuse internal hemorrhage; that a carving knife — one of the items in a carving set kept in a wooden box in the Horton home — was found near the victim’s body; that there was no evidence that a struggle had taken place in which the victim was involved; that a white stone was found bracing
The defendant did not take the stand as a witness in his own defense but called numerous character witnesses by whom the jury was told that, based upon the speech of people in the community in which he lived, the defendant was a well-mannered youth, reserved, and quiet; that although his scholarship in grammar school was good, it deteriorated when he reached the junior year in high school; that his deportment and “ reputation for peace and quiet ” were excellent. It also appears of record that, although the defendant graduated from high school, his scholarship in college did not meet the required grades.
In support of his defense of insanity, evidence was offered by the defendant of the following episodes, among others, which it is claimed afforded proof that at or about the time of the homicide his mind was disordered. One incident — mentioned by the defendant in his statement of June 27, 1953 — occurred at college a few days prior to the final examinations for his first year and at a time when, as he described it, “I was so far behind in my work and I had just become slack and put things off. Well, I just wasn’t doing what I should and so I just kept thinking ‘ How am I going to get out of it? ’ Of course, all this time this hate and feeling, * Well, whose fault
There was also testimony from a witness who had called upon the defendant and his mother at the Horton home before the funeral of the defendant’s father. On that occasion the defendant led the witness into the room where his father’s body lay in a casket. After commenting on the display of flowers, the defendant walked over to a piano in the same room and proceeded to play classical music.
In addition, there was introduced in behalf of the defendant testimony by a psychologist who in the month of October, 1953, had subjected him to certain psychometric examinations from which the witness concluded that the defendant at the time of those examinations was in a state of intellectual deterioration. The defense also called two physicians who had specialized in psychiatry, each of whom had examined the defendant and had read his statement of June 27,1953. Based upon such examinations and upon facts of record recited in a hypothetical question, each witness testified that at the time of the homicide on May 24, 1953, the defendant was in such a mental state that he did not know the nature and quality of the act he then committed and did not know that it was wrong.
When the defense had rested its case, the prosecution called a clinical psychologist who in December, 1953, had subjected the defendant to certain psychological tests which showed him to be a “ narcissistic ”, viz., a person given to emotional outbursts when his needs are denied. The prosecution also called two physicians who had specialized in psychiatry, each of whom had examined the defendant and had read the statement made by the defendant on June 27, 1953. In answer to a hypothetical
Thus did it come about that when the evidence was closed the issue of the defendant’s sanity had become the chief issue and, as a clear question of fact, was a proper subject for determination by the jury. As to the scope of our consideration of the jury’s verdict, if the record in its entirety presents a fair conflict in the evidence, or if conflicting inferences can properly be drawn from it, “ * * * the determination of the jury will not be interfered with, unless it is clearly against the weight of evidence, or appears to have been influenced by passion, prejudice, mistake or corruption.” (People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 405.) The defendant cannot be excused from criminal liability because at the time of the killing his mind may have been disordered to a degree less than that which is fixed by section 1120 of the Penal Law. " A weak or even a disordered mind is not excused from the consequences of crime ”. (People v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251, 265.) Under section 1120 of the Penal Law, as we have seen, the defendant was entitled to an acquittal only in the event the jury found either that, at the time he committed the act with which he is charged, he did not know the nature and quality of his act or that the act was wrong. Applying that statutory formula to the defendant’s evidence, we think that evidence falls short of exculpating him. His conduct immediately before the killing was not that of a man in frenzied haste; the crime was carefully planned by him alone and was executed deliberately in exact accord with that plan. Upon arriving at his home before his parents had retired for the night, he waited not only until their room had been darkened, but for a period of time thereafter until the noise of a passing train and the sound of its whistle would muffle any noise he might make in forcing his entry into the house. When he had accomplished an entrance into the living room, in the manner already mentioned, he did not go hurriedly about his baneful project, he “ just sat and thought ”; when he had gone slowly up the stairs to his parents’ bedroom armed with a long-bladed knife and had reached his father’s side, he paused two times —
As apposite to the problem presented by this record, we quote a statement made for this court more than fifty years ago (per Maynard, J.): “ Eminent alienists criticise the rule of the Penal Code, because it excludes consideration of the question, whether the accused possessed suEcient power of self-restraint to forbear the commission of an act, which he clearly perceived to be criminal. They contend that it is unreasonable and unjust to punish a human being for that which he does not have the power to refrain from doing, but if such a result may follow, which we by no means admit, it is an argument to be addressed to the body which makes the law, and not to the tribunal whose sole duty it is to construe, apply and enforce it.” (People v. Taylor, supra, pp. 407-408.)
Having read and considered with care the evidence of record, and having reached the conclusion that it affords no basis for our interference with the jury’s verdict, we pass to a consideration of the defendants challenge to certain evidentiary rulings by the Trial Justice and to the legal suEciency of his charge to the jury.
During the cross-examination of one of the psychiatrists called as an expert by the defendant, the witness testified without objection that the defendant was a schizophrenic; that his behavior when he stabbed his father and during prior acts incidental thereto was his response to a delusional process and that such delusional motivation made him psychotic and “ incompetent of knowing what he was doing.” The same witness, on
As to the assertion that in his charge to the jury the Trial Justice should have commented upon the evidence bearing upon the defense of insanity, we have in mind the fact that the case was submitted to the jury after seven days of testimony. The theory of insanity upon which the defense was based had been repeatedly the subject of questions propounded by counsel and answers given by experts in psychology and psychiatry called in behalf of the defendant and by the People. Believing, as we do, that at the close of the evidence the jury had been thoroughly informed of the theory of insanity upon which the defense was based and the relation of that theory to evidence descriptive of the crime, we conclude that in the circumstances disclosed by
It is also argued in behalf of the defendant that an error of substance, which was prejudicial to his rights before the jury, was made by the Trial Justice when, after reading correctly to the jury the text of section 1120 of the Penal Law, and on three subsequent occasions making a correct contextual application of its provisions, there came a time when the court stated: " Individuals of inferior intellect with depraved minds, individuals have morbid propensities to commit acts and whose mentality is low and unstable, are none the less answerable for their crimes if they have sufficient mental powers to know the nature and quality of the act or to know that the act was wrong.” Obviously, the use in that context of the disjunctive " or ” instead of the conjunctive " and ” was wrong. The record shows that when, at the end of his charge, the Trial Justice was apprised by counsel of his erroneous use in one instance of the disjunctive " or ” he sensed his inadvertence and was quick to give the following clear admonition to the jury: " The Court : If I made such a mistake, I was wrong. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant knew the nature and quality of his act and he knew that it was wrong. If he didn’t know the nature and quality of his act your verdict must be not guilty by reason of insanity, or if he didn’t know it was wrong. The statute reads ' or.’ It isn’t ' and.’ ” It is difficult to conceive of a clearer statement, or one more perfectly designed to set aright any misunderstanding which any juror might have gained from the misuse of one word in the original charge.
The circumstances here differ in an important respect from those in People v. Kelly (302 N. Y. 512, supra) and People v. Sherwood (271 N. Y. 427), where no admonition in such clear and unmistakable language, as is to be found in the present record, was given to the jury.
In addition to the rulings by the Trial Justice now challenged by the defendant, to which reference has already been made, we have considered with care all other matters to which the briefs of counsel direct our attention. Our conclusion is that the record contains no errors which so adversely affect the
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). A new trial should be granted, in my view, on account of rulings upon the admission of evidence and the charge to the jury in relation to the defense of insanity.
Appellant has been found guilty of murdering his father by stabbing him while sleeping at his home on May 24, 1953. At this time appellant was a freshman in college, eighteen years of age. Ample character evidence establishes that he was not the callous type of juvenile delinquent, coarse and indifferent to human life, but that he was a sensitive and mannerly youth, aware of the rights and feelings of other people. Beginning with the end of high school, he had undergone personality deterioration. His grades, which were average during the earlier half of his high school course, fell in his junior year at high school and reached a point where he was unable to meet the scholastic requirements at college. His intelligence quotient dropped from 108 to 81, he became moody, withdrew from social contacts and developed homosexual practices. One of his high school teachers noticed extended periods during which he would sit in revery with a silly, shallow smile upon his face. In his relationships with his father, there was more than misunderstanding. Given to introspection, he came to blame his father for all of his own shortcomings and frustrations. While at the Binghamton State Hospital for observation after the homicide, he made a fifty-six-page confession, as accurate, it seems to me, in depicting his inner consciousness as it was proved to have been in narrating the details of the homicide. The demonstrated accuracy of this lengthy statement has counted heavily against appellant, both in connecting him with the homicide and in defeating his defense of insanity. It does connect him with, the homicide and indicates that he had not lost the power of consecutive thought, yet the mental and emotional condition which it discloses may seriously be questioned to have been that of a sane man. In this statement or confession, he blamed his father-for failure in his studies, for failure to make a fraternity in college, and for being homosexual; he stated when he attempted to relieve Ms nervous indigestion by throwing a beer mug at the
The defense psychiatrists stressed this inappropriateness of emotions to the subject matter in Ms mind. They testified that lack of memory and intellectual disorientation are not necessarily involved in schizophrenia, but that when the emotions and the intellect run at cross purposes, it is an indication of serious mental disorder. TMs is on a plane with the lay observation of a newspaper man who testified that the way in wMch defendant played the piano at the family home wMle Ms father lay in the casket impressed him as irrational, and the testimony of a fellow high school student, who was there during the same night, that the defendant was constantly engaged in irrelevant flippancies.
The Binghamton State Hospital records show that he was diagnosed as a psychopatMc personality, although without psychosis. One of the People’s psychiatrists, Dr. Harry A. Steckel, stated: The boy suffers from ‘ ‘ psychopathic personality ”; in Mm “ There is absence of emotional and volitional control. There is poor judgment and inability to profit by experience; that in a general way is the background upon wMch the behavior
The other People’s psychiatrist, Dr. Hugh S. Gregory, admitted that appellant was a “psychopathic personality ”, adding “ That diagnosis does not constitute insanity ”, but testified that neither does it constitute ' ' normalcy. ’ ’ Although both of these People’s experts testified that in their opinions appellant knew the nature and quality of his act and knew that it was wrong, their testimony indicates the probability of mental disease.
Appellant’s psychiatrists testified that appellant had a definite psychosis in that he suffered from schizophrenia, which is the modern name for dementia praecox. Dr. Irving Handin testified that at the time of the homicide appellant was “ psychotic insane and his reason, or his ability to reason was so disturbed that he could not know the difference between right and wrong.” He said: “We have the hebephrenic type with the silly smile, this air of detachment. You have elements of paranoid schizophrenia, this projection of his own hate so it seemed to be reflected from his father, and he received the impression ‘ my father hates me; he doesn.’t love me; he will do anything to harm me. ’ This is mental distortion. Then there is the catatonic element, this rage reaction he had in college where he would smash up china crockery so it would disturb the whole dormitory. This was a psychotic reaction he had here that we find in catatonics. So we had a mixture of three types.” On cross-examination, Dr. Handin conceded that appellant was not mentally disoriented in the sense that he lacked ability to plan the homicide and his escape, but testified: ‘ ‘ When I spoke of detach
The main problem on this appeal is whether mental disease of this nature is relevant to the legal defense of insanity. A similar question has arisen in various forms since the test of whether the defendant knew that the act was wrong (Penal Law, § 1120) was proclaimed and reaffirmed in 1843 in M’Naghten’s Case (10 Cl. & Fin. 200). So little did the conception of mental illness enter into that definition, as it was originally conceived and applied, that nineteen years after M’Naghten’s Case, the Lord Chancellor of England allowed himself to state that “ the introduction of medical opinions and medical theories into this subject [the criminal law] has proceeded upon the vicious principle of considering insanity as a disease ”. (165 Hansard’s Debates, 3d series, 1297, quoted in Overholser: “ Psychiatric Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Since M’Naghten ”, 42 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 283, 284.) The development of psychiatry appears to have transferred the main professional attention from disorganization of the intellect to emotional disturbances. The legal definition remains focused upon intellectual disorientation, that is to say, upon whether a defendant has recognized in his mind that the act was contrary to law and to accepted standards of morality, regardless of how distorted his own standards of behavior may have been due to emotional disintegration. It is now settled, however, that mental disease is relevant and necessary in order to establish the legal defense of insanity, by showing that mental disease has been the cause of impairment of a defendant’s intellectual faculties to an extent such that he failed to understand the nature and quality of his act or to know that it was wrong (People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324).
“ The Court: You should answer the question. ” Defendant’s attorney took an exception to holding the witness to a “ yes ” or “ no ” answer. A little later the District Attorney stated: “ You concede, then, Doctor, that this series of connected activities seemed to be rational? A. Seemed to be rational just as the case of a paranoid praecox. They are a whole series of
In ruling out this branch of Dr. Brancale’s testimony upon the ground that it was immaterial whether appellant perpetrated this homicide in response to this delusional idea, the trial court thereby instructed the jury, in effect, that appellant’s counsel’s theory of fact on the subject of insanity was either incredible or irrelevant. This error went uncorrected when it came to the charge. No details of the evidence were cited in the charge to aid the jury in applying the law to the facts. The trial court contented itself with instructing the jury concerning what constitutes insanity in the language of sections 34 and 1120 of the Penal Law, adding merely that to know that an act is wrong under section 1120, a defendant must know that it is contrary to law and to the accepted standards of morality. No reference was made to any of the evidence in the record, nor was mention made of the theory or basis of insanity advanced in behalf of appellant. Omission to comment upon any of the evidence respecting this complicated question of insanity, constituted error under the principle thus stated in People v. Odell (230 N. Y. 481, 488, 494): “ The better practice for the court in a criminal case, emphatically in a capital case, even when uninvited by the defendant, is to present to the jury the case on
The jury were left with the understanding, so forcibly inculcated in them during Dr. Brancale’s testimony, that even if appellant acted from delusions of persecution by his father, that would of necessity be immaterial in deciding whether he knew that what he did was wrong.
This court has felt the need to integrate into the criminal definition of insanity in some manner the existence of delusions (see the discussion of Lord Erskine’s defense in Hadfield’s Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1282, in the year 1800, in Weihofen: Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, pp. 56, 105-106), although in this State their relevance has been limited to whether the homicide was the product of a delusion of such nature as to obscure the defendant’s knowledge of right and wrong (People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398; People v. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 365, 378; People v. Sherwood, 271 N. Y. 427, 430). In People v. Sherwood (supra, p. 430) the court said: “ The claim of the defense was that the mother killed the child because she had become obsessed with a delusion that in death alone could there be safety and freedom from pain, suffering and misery for her son. The time has gone by when such a claim could seem fantastic, either to judge or juror. While we still — and rightly — accept the validity of such claims with the utmost caution, we nevertheless know now that they may be valid.” In People v. Schmidt (216 N. Y. 324, 338, 340, supra), although it was recognized that the test of legal insanity must be adhered to as defined by our statutes, the court said: “ We must not, however, exaggerate the rigor of the rule by giving the word ‘ wrong ’ a strained interpretation, at war with its broad and primary meaning, and least of
With his life at stake, appellant was entitled, as it seems to me, to have had the basis in the evidence for his claim of insanity explained to the jury in the charge by appropriate reference to details of the evidence, at the least, to have had the theory of insanity on which the defense was based mentioned in the charge, especially in view of the circumstance that it had been discredited by the remarks of the trial court while Dr. Brancale was testifying. The defense of insanity was based on the idea that, although appellant may have known that what he did was punishable by law, nevertheless, in his inner consciousness he considered that what he did was not wrong, but justifiable due to mental derangement produced by delusions of persecution by his father which were symptomatic of mental disease. The jury were not bound to uphold this defense, but they could not consider nor weigh it unless it were presented to them, especially after they had been given to understand during the trial that it was irrelevant.
The defense of insanity as advanced by appellant’s experts falls within the legal definition expressed in sections 34 and 1120 of the Penal Law, which has previously been considered. As the record stands, this defense was not adequately presented to the jury and therefore they should not be regarded as having passed upon it. As was said in People v. Sherwood (supra, p. 432): “It was of the utmost importance, therefore, that the law as respects criminal responsibility under section 1120 of the Penal Law, should have been made clear to the jury.”
The conviction of appellant of murder in the first degree should be reversed and a new trial should be granted.
Conway, Desmond, Dye, Ftjld and Froessel, JJ., concur with Lewis, Ch. J.; Van Voorhis, J., dissents in an opinion and votes to reverse and to grant a new trial.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
