THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MATTHEW HORNE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2-23-0382
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
December 18, 2023
2023 IL App (2d) 230382
JUSTICE JORGENSEN
Appeal from
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 In this interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023), defendant, Matthew Horne, appeals from the trial court‘s order granting the State‘s petition to deny defendant pretrial release and ordering him detained pursuant to Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act).1 See Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). Defendant argues that the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offenses that qualified him for pretrial detention; (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on specific, articulable facts of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of less restrictive conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on specific, articulable facts of the case. We affirm.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On September 6, 2023, the Stаte charged defendant with two counts of aggravated battery (
¶ 4 The police synopsis completed by Deputy Chief Jeff Wig related that, on August 30, 2023, Senne and Wig responded to 950 Constance Lane in Sycamore for a report of a domestic battery. Upon arrival, Wig spoke with Sandy, who stated that defendant attacked her inside their residence. They spoke outside, as Sandy had run from the home. She stated that defendant punched her with his fist several times on her head, face, and upper chest and shoulder areas. Wig observed red marks on Sandy‘s upper body and neck/face areas. She refused to be photographed. Sandy further related to Wig that she asked a neighbor to call 911 because she believed that defendant was going to kill her.
¶ 5 Wig stated that defendant (age 29, 6 feet tall, and weighing 250 pounds) was inside the residence and that he and Senne approached the residence from the rear sliding glass door. Senne slid it slightly open, and defendant was inside, yelling. As Senne began to speak to him, defendant struck Senne in the head with his palm, sending her head back. Wig pulled defendant by his arm from the residence and took control of him on his right side. Senne called for additional officers. She also took control of defendant‘s left side. Wig dropped his right leg to take himself and defendant to the ground to gain control of defendant. A struggle ensued, Senne‘s left arm got near defendant‘s mouth, and defendant bit Senne and would not release his bite. Senne screamed and yelled at defendant to release his bite. Wig drove his thumb and knuckle into the mandible area of the left side of defendant‘s jaw until he released his bite. After defendant released his bite, Senne and Wig controlled defendant until additional officers arrived.
¶ 6 While he was restrained, defendant yelled “bizarre, nonsensical and threatening things,” including that he was going to shoot Senne and Wig, he did not believe they were police officers, they were pedophiles and “we just killed them all,” they had killed the real cops and wore their uniforms, the police were about to be tortured and were all about to die, and he was going to “f*** all of us (the police) up right now.”
¶ 7 On September 29, 2023, defendant was admonished of the charges against him. He was present via Zoom and represented by the public defender. Also on that date, the State petitioned to deny defendant pretrial release (
¶ 8 A pretrial services bond report, also dated September 29, 2023, listed defendant‘s prior offenses. They included: retail theft (2013); consumptiоn of liquor by a minor, driving under the influence, and speeding more than 35 miles per hour over the limit (2014); domestic battery, for which he received supervision (2016); domestic battery and criminal damage to property not exceeding $500, both of which he was found guilty and for which he was sentenced to 12 months’ conditional discharge and spent 67 days in jail for failing to satisfy the conditions imposed (2021);
¶ 9 The report also related that a pretrial risk assessment identified defendant‘s risk of pretrial misconduct as 5 out of a possible score of 0 through 14. Thus, there was a 90% probability that he would appear аt all future hearings and that no new offenses would occur during the pendency of this case. The report stated that defendant appeared to be appropriate for pretrial release pending trial, with the following conditions: that he be placed on pretrial supervision and report to pretrial services; that he be placed on electronic home monitoring (EHM) and comply with all requirements and that a hearing be set within 30 days to evaluate the need for continued use of EHM; that defendant not contact or communicate with Sandy for a period of time determined by thе court; and that, if he possesses firearms, they and his Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card/concealed carry card be surrendered.
¶ 10 At the hearing on the State‘s petition, also on September 29, 2023, the State argued that defendant‘s violent criminal history, the nature of this case, and his statements to and violence toward the arresting officers warranted a finding that he is a danger to Sandy as well as the community and that he should be detained. Defense counsel noted that it was the State‘s burden to show that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the charged offenses. Counsel аlso acknowledged that domestic battery is a detainable offense but argued that the State had not met its burden by relying solely on the police synopsis. Counsel noted that Sandy was not present at the hearing to testify whether she believed that defendant was a danger, and counsel argued that the State had not proven that defendant was a danger. Counsel noted defendant was currently medicated and had spent one month at Chicago Behavioral Health, a residential mental health facility, after the incident. She argued that defendant should not be detained based on the offenses and “all the оther circumstances” upon which the court could rely. Acknowledging that defendant had a criminal history, counsel asserted that it did not support detaining him.
¶ 11 The trial court granted the State‘s petition, denying pretrial release. It found that, based on the foregoing, the State had established by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had committed detainable offenses and that the Act‘s dangerousness standard had been met. In announcing its findings, the court summarized the police synopsis and the pretrial services bond report and noted that defendant was on probation for criminal damage to prоperty, had a 2021 violation of a domestic battery bail bond, had a 2016 domestic battery charge, and scored 5 out of 14 on the pretrial risk assessment. In delineating its reasons for finding that defendant posed a real and present threat to Sandy and “to [other] persons in the community[,] that is[,] the police,” and why less restrictive conditions would not avoid his threat to their safety, the court listed that (1) the alleged incident involved harassment or abuse as defined in the
¶ 12 In the form order the court entered, it checked the following boxes reflecting its reasons for finding that defendant should be denied pretrial release and why less restrictive conditions were not warranted: the nature and circumstances of the offense; that his prior criminal history is indicative of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior; the identity of any person or persons to whose safety he is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the threat; any statements made by or attributed to defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding them; that, at the time of the current offenses or arrest, defendant was on probation, parole, aftercare release, mandatory supervised release, or other release from custody pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence; and “Other.” In the “Other” category, the court repeated many of its oral findings, including that defendant has a history of domestic violence as defined within the domestic violence statute, thаt he has a history of violating court orders, and that he has been or is potentially a threat to other persons and may have mental health issues.
¶ 13 On October 13, 2023, defendant filed his notice of appeal, and, on November 15, 2023, the Office of the State Appellate Defender elected to file a notice in lieu of an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023) memorandum.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 A. Pretrial Release Provisions of Code
¶ 16 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code), as amended by the Act.
¶ 17 If the trial court finds that the State proved a valid threat to the safety of any person or the community, the defendant is likely to flee to avoid prosecution, or the defendant failed to abide by previously issued conditions of pretrial release, the trial court must determine which pretrial
¶ 18 If the trial court determines that the defendant should be denied pretrial releasе, the court must make written findings summarizing the reasons for denying pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or prevent the defendant‘s willful flight from prosecution.
¶ 19 There is a split of authority concerning the proper standard of review for aspects of pretrial release appeals that do not involve statutory construction questions. The Fourth District has held that the trial court‘s determination regarding pretrial release will not be rеversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11 (adopting standard after noting that bail appeals under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(c)(1) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023) have historically been reviewed for an abuse of discretion and that the Act does not mandate or suggest a different standard of review for appeals under Rule 604(h)). The Fifth District takes the position that the trial court‘s overall determination regarding pretrial release and questions as to whether the court properly considered statutory factors in determining dangerousness and/or conditions of release are reviewed for an abuse of discretion; howеver, it concludes that the trial court‘s findings that mandatory conditions of release would not protect any person or the community, that the defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, or that the defendant failed to comply with prior conditions of pretrial release thereby requiring modification or revocation, are reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10. The Fifth District came to this conclusion by relying on In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001), a termination-of-parental-rights case setting the manifest-weight standard for reviewing parental unfitness determinations, where the State‘s burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10. In a subsequent case, the Fourth District disagreed with Vingara and rеaffirmed that only the abuse-of-discretion standard applies. People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶¶ 27-30. In Jones, the Fourth District concluded that a trial court‘s decision as to whether the State established that “release conditions would not protect the community is inextricably linked to any decision to grant or deny pretrial release” and stated that courts “enjoy broad discretion in making such decisions.” Id. ¶ 30 (further noting that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies when assessing fact-dependent challenges in section 2-1401 proceedings and when assessing a court‘s application of proper criteria when it weighs facts). We need not deсide whether one or two standards apply, as our conclusion here is the same regardless. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court‘s determination is unreasonable. People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9. A court‘s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the determination is unreasonable. People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008).
¶
¶ 21 Defendant argues first that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the qualifying offense. Specifically, he contends that the State merely argued that the written Gerstein2 in each case was sufficient to еstablish that defendant committed the qualifying offenses. He also contends that there was no testimonial evidence for any of those charges and that no photographs or videos were submitted.
¶ 22 We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the State established, via clear and convincing evidence,3 that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the qualifying offenses. Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated battery and two counts of domestic battery. As charged, a person commits aggravated battery when, in committing battery, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she knows the individual battered is a peace officer performing his or her official duties.
¶ 23 The police synopsis related that Senne and Wig responded to Sandy and defendant‘s home. They spoke with Sandy outside the home. Sandy stated that defendant had attacked her inside their residence and that she had run from the home to a neighbor‘s house to ask the neighbor to call 911 because she believed defendant was going to kill her. Sandy rеlated that defendant punched her with his fist several times in her head, face, and upper chest and shoulder areas, and police observed red marks on Sandy‘s upper body and neck/face areas. In addition to detailing the qualifying offense of domestic battery, the synopsis also related that, once police entered the house, they saw defendant inside, yelling. As Senne began to speak to him, he struck her on the head with a palm strike, sending her head back. Once the officers pulled defendant down to the ground, a struggle ensued, and defendant bit Senne‘s arm when it got near his mouth. She screamed аnd yelled at him to
¶ 24 In finding that the State had established by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had committed the qualifying offenses, the trial court relied on the foregoing. The evidence itself was detailed, and it was not inherently incredible; rather, it reasonably could be viewed as reliable. Defendant does not explain how it was unreasonable for the court to determine that the evidence was sufficient to meet the State‘s burden to show that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the qualifying offenses. Furthermore, defendant cites no authority reflecting that it was improper for the trial court to “merely” rely on the police synopsis and the pretrial services bond report or any authority suggesting that video and/or photographs were required. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err in determining that the State established, via clear and convincing evidence, that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the qualifying offenses.
¶ 25 C. Real and Present Threat
¶ 26 Second, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of prоving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of this case. Specifically, he argues that the State merely asserted that defendant had some violent criminal history and presents as having some mental health issues. There was no evidence presented, defendant asserts, that he has issues with following court orders. Also, when questioned about Sandy‘s desires concerning detention, the State did not provide such information. Defendant also contends that the Statе relied upon information provided by its victim coordinator, who did not complete an adequate interview. Finally, defendant notes that he is not known to possess any weapons.
¶ 27 Under the Code, factors that the trial court may consider in making a determination of dangerousness, i.e., that the defendant poses a real and present threat to any person or the community, include, but are not limited to (1) the nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon, or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the identity of any person to whom the defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by or attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding them; (5) the age and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of the victim or complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapons; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or other form of supervised release from custody; аnd (9) any other factors, including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (
¶ 28 We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that defendant poses a real and present threat to Sandy and the community, specifically the police. The court relied on the police synopsis and the pretrial services bond report. The court noted that the police synopsis related statements defendant made to Senne and Wig while he was restrained, including threats to torture and kill them. The pretrial services bond report reflected that
¶ 29 Defendant‘s argument that the State should have provided evidence concerning Sandy‘s desires concerning pretrial detention fails because he cites no support for this proposition. He also notes that he is not known to possess any weapons. We do not find that this warrants reversal, as the police synopsis reflected that defendant committed violent acts without weapons. Finally, defendant‘s argument that the State relied upon an allegedly inadequate interview also fails, because he does not specify how it was inadequate or what information is lacking.
¶ 30 D. Feasibility of Less Restrictive Conditions
¶ 31 Defendant‘s final argument is that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on specific articulable facts of this case. Specifically, defendant asserts that the State argued only for detention and failed to show that defendant could not comply with other conditions, such as EHM or compliance with medications. He further contends that the State did not provide any reasoning as to why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community. The State responds that this argument is without merit because defendant lives with Sandy, the victim whom he brutally attacked in this case.
¶ 32 Where the trial court finds that the State proved a valid threat to the safety of any person or the community, the court must determine which pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the appearаnce of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.”
¶ 33 We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that no conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of Sandy or the police.
¶ 34 The Code requires only that the State‘s petition be verified and state the grounds upon which it contends defendant should be denied pretrial release, including the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts or flight risk, as appropriate.
¶ 35 The Code does require the trial court, in a detention order, to make written findings summarizing why a defendant should be denied pretrial release, “including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.”
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County, No. 23-CF-485; the Hon. Philip G. Montgomery, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd and James Wozniak, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prоsecutor‘s Office, of Springfield, for the People.