People v HolzPeople v Holz
People v Holz, 167 AD3d 1417, reversed.
Fahey, J.
The Criminal Procedure Law sets out an appeals process that provides a right to first-tier, direct appеllate review of all factual determinations. Particularly relevant here,
I.
On October 3, 2014, the Irondequoit Police Department received a tip indicating that a man walking near the site of a burglary two days earlier may have been involved in the crime. A laptop computer had been stolen. Acting on the tip, a police officer stopped defendant, who matched the description provided. The offiсer directed defendant to remove his hands from his pockets and saw that there was something in defendant‘s right hand. The officer asked defendant what he was holding, and defendant revealed a plastic bag, containing jewelry, which the officer seized. Defendant claimed he had bought the jewelry at a nearby yard sale and agreed to accompany the officer and two others who had arrived on the scene to that house to confirm the purchase. The homeowner, however, denied owning or selling the jewelry. Approximately 30 minutes after the initial stop, defendant was arrested.
Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of burglary in the second degree (
Defendant moved to suppress the jewelry, contending that his detention and the seizure of the jewelry violated his right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 [1976]). Following a suppression hearing, with testimony from two of the police officers present at the arrest, Suprеme Court denied defendant‘s motion, concluding that the police had “reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed and that the defendant was the perpetrator.”
Defendant, a predicate felony offender who was facing a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison if convicted of both counts of burglary, pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree, in satisfaction of the entire indictment. After some confusion regarding which burglary count defendant was pleading to,1 defendant pleaded guilty to the October 1 burglary, as charged in the cоunt pertaining to the theft of the laptop computer, in satisfaction of the count charging the October 3 burglary of jewelry, which was the subject of his motion to suppress. Supreme Court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of six years’ incarceration plus five years’ postrеlease supervision.
Defendant appealed from the judgment, contending that Supreme Court had erred in denying his motion to suppress the jewelry.
The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that “the judgment of conviction on appeal here did not ensue from the denial of the motion to supрress and the latter is, therefore, not reviewable pursuant to
The cited statute provides that “[a]n order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty” (
A single Justice dissented, asserting that whether a guilty plea “ensues from” a suppression order depends on whether there is a “reasonable possibility that the [alleged suрpression] error contributed to the plea” (id. at 1422 [Whalen, P.J., dissenting] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The dissenting Justice would have reached the merits of defendant‘s challenge to the suppression determination (see id. at 1425-1427).
The dissenting Justice granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court, and we now rеverse.
II.
Defendant initially contends that the Appellate Division erred by holding it was jurisdictionally precluded from reviewing the suppression order of Supreme Court. We agree with defendant. Both the plain meaning of
A governing principle of statutory construction is that courts must attempt “to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used” (People v Williams, 19 NY3d 100, 103 [2012]).
What is meant by “ensuing judgment of conviction” in
In using the word “ensuing,” the legislature chose the broadest of relational terms to convey the connection between the suppression order and the judgment of conviction. Moreover, if the legislature had intended to limit appellate review to suppression orders specifically pertaining to the evidence underlying the count to which the defendant pleaded guilty, it easily could have said so (compare Matter of Sinker [Sweeney], 89 NY2d 485, 487-488 [1997] [holding that the legislature‘s use of the term “in connection with” indicates its intent for a broad application because a more narrow term could have been used to restrict the scope of
The legislative history of
When the Code of Criminal Procedure was repealed, effective September 1, 1971, and replaced by the Criminal Procedure Law (see Bill Jacket, L 1970, ch 996), one aspect of the code that remained unchanged was a defendant‘s right to appellate review of a suppression order despite pleading guilty. The Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and
Consistent with that legislative intent to provide a broad right of review, this Court previously “ha[s] countenanced a forfeiture of this statutory right [to appeal] only where a defendant pleaded guilty ‘before the hearing on his suppressiоn motion,’ thereby foreclosing appellate review for lack of a sufficient factual record” (People v Elmer, 19 NY3d 501, 509 [2012], quoting People v Fernandez, 67 NY2d 686, 688 [1986]). To now inject the requirement of a narrow causal relationship between suppression order and guilty plea into the statute would conflict with the broad language of the statutе. “[W]hen a conviction is based on a plea of guilty an appellate court will rarely, if ever, be able to determine whether an erroneous denial of a motion to suppress contributed to the defendant‘s decision, unless at the time of the plea he states or reveals his rеason for pleading guilty” (People v Grant, 45 NY2d 366, 379-380 [1978]; see also People v Wells, 21 NY3d 716, 718-719 [2013]). More fundamentally, “the interplay between the evidence and the various related charges in an indictment cannot readily be traced” (Matter of Forte v Supreme Ct. of State of N.Y., 48 NY2d 179, 187-188 [1979]).
The threshold question of whether a suppression order is reviewable on appeal must be distinguished from the question whether аn error in the suppression order is harmless. Harmless error analysis occurs, if at all, only after a court has determined that it has jurisdiction to review an order. It is not the appropriate method for deciding reviewability. To suppose that an erroneous suppression determination directly related to one count has no effect on a defendant‘s plea to another count in the same indictment would ignore the practical realities of plea bargaining. The distinction between counts pleaded to and counts satisfied by the plea may be less significant thаn
A defendant who pleads guilty to one count will invariably take into consideration that other counts are satisfied by the plea. Importantly, a count satisfied by a guilty pleа bears the double jeopardy consequences of a judgment of conviction. The judgment in this case prevents the People from prosecuting defendant again for the October 3, 2014 burglary, even though defendant did not plead to that count (see Holz, 167 AD3d at 1423 [Whalen, P.J., dissenting], citing
The People assert that a count satisfied by a guilty plea, but not directly reflected in the judgment of conviction, does not fall within the meaning of
Finally, policy considerations are consistent with our broad reading of the statute. To conclude that the Appellate Division lacks jurisdiсtion to review a trial court‘s determination on a suppression matter when the evidence in question is not directly related to the count of conviction would insulate erroneous decisions from review and could lead to a proliferation of unreviewable legal errors at the trial level. The People, as part of a plea offer, may “obtain[ ] [a] concession from the defendant
III.
Defendant further asks this Court to grant his motion to suppress, contending that Supreme Court erred in holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the detention and seizure of the jewelry. Here, the Appellate Division did not reach the underlying suppression question and we remit to the Appellate Division to make its determination on the merits.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted to that court for further proceedings in aсcordance with this opinion.
Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Stein, Garcia, Wilson and Feinman concur.
Order reversed and case remitted to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.