PEOPLE v HOLLEY
Docket No. 133264
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided April 23, 2008.
480 MICH 222
Julias Holley was tried in the Wayne Circuit Court, Thomas E. Jackson, J., on charges of felonious assault,
In an opinion by Chief Justice TAYLOR, joined by Justices WEAVER, CORRIGAN, and YOUNG, the Supreme Court held:
The prosecution is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime sought to be reported was committed or attempted by another person in order to obtain a conviction under
1.
2. The elements of a violation of
3. A report of a crime necessarily entails the subjective perception of the person who is reporting. It is the perception of the person seeking to report the crime or attempt that is significant, not whether the crime was actually committed or attempted.
Reversed; conviction reinstated.
Justice KELLY, joined by Justices CAVANAGH and MARKMAN, dissenting, would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of a crime.
CRIMINAL LAW - REPORTS OF CRIMES - INTERFERENCE WITH REPORTS OF CRIMES - PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS - BURDEN OF PROOF.
The prosecution is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime sought to be reported was attempted or committed in order to obtain a conviction for the offense of preventing or attempting to prevent through the unlawful use of physical force a person from reporting a crime attempted or committed (
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General,
State Appellate Defender (by Christine A. Pagac) for the defendant.
TAYLOR, C.J. At issue is whether
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 7, 2005, defendant arrived at the house of his child‘s mother, Peggy Gordon. Defendant had been drinking, and he and Gordon began to argue. After Gordon asked defendant to leave, defendant went to the kitchen and returned with a knife. While approaching Gordon with the knife, defendant said, “I‘ll hurt you.” Gordon replied, “No you won‘t.” When Gordon reached for the telephone and told defendant that she was going to call the police, defendant grabbed the telephone and cut the telephone cords with the knife. Defendant then threw the knife on the stool where the telephone was located. Although defendant never pointed the knife directly at Gordon, she testified that defendant was within arm‘s reach of her with the knife in his hand and that she believed that he was going to hurt her. After defendant left Gordon‘s home, she summoned the police.
Defendant was charged with felonious assault and the offense of preventing or attempting to prevent the report of a crime. Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant not guilty of felonious assault. However, with regard to the charge of preventing or attempting to prevent the report of a crime, the court concluded that the prosecution did not need to prove felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal, in a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. In analyzing
The prosecution applied for leave to appeal in this Court. After directing the parties to address whether
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether
III. ANALYSIS
The statutory scheme at issue in this case involves
continues with
As is evident, all the offenses described attempt to prevent interference, of one sort or another, with the investigation of a crime or the administration of justice. By including
This conclusion is harmonious with the proper construction of the statute,
The criminal action that
This is significant because a report will necessarily entail the subjective perception of the person who is reporting. “Report” is relevantly defined as “a detailed account of an event, situation, etc., [usually] based on observation or inquiry.”12 And “observation” is defined as “an act or instance of noticing or perceiving.”13 Therefore, although the term “perceived” is not expressly stated in
focus of the criminal act proscribed by the statute, and it is the perception of the person reporting that “a crime [has been] committed or attempted by another person” that is significant, not whether the crime was actually committed or attempted.14
This assertion cannot be correct because although defendant here was the one who was accused of committing the crime that was being reported, the statute does not require that the person accused of interfering with the report of a crime be the person who also committed the crime being reported. Rather, the statute‘s plain language criminalizes preventing or attempting to prevent the reporting of “a crime committed or attempted by another person.” The statute does not state that it criminalizes preventing or attempting to prevent the reporting of a crime committed or attempted by the person who is preventing the reporting. This distinction is significant because whether another person - who is not on trial for the offense of interfering with the report of a crime - committed or attempted to commit the crime being or sought to be reported is irrelevant to whether the person who is on trial for interfering with the report of a crime actually interfered or attempted to interfere with the report of a crime. For example, if person A commits a crime, and person B tries to report the crime, but person C prevents person B from making the report, whether person C is guilty of interfering with the report has nothing to do with whether the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that person A committed the crime being reported. In other
words, the culpability of the person accused of interfering with the report of a crime cannot hinge on the guilt of another person. Contrary to defendant‘s argument, the phrase “committed or attempted” is necessary to establish that the reporter need not be attempting to report an accomplished crime; interference with the report of an attempted crime is enough. The statute would not achieve its purpose if it merely referred to a report of “a crime” because this implies a completed crime. It
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that the prosecution is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime sought to be reported was attempted or committed by another person in order to obtain a conviction under
Reversed.
WEAVER, CORRIGAN, and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with TAYLOR, C.J.
KELLY, J. (dissenting). After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of interfering with the report of a crime.1
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. Now the majority reinstates it, and I dissent from that decision. Prosecutors are still required to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Because it is not clear that the third element of the crime was proved in this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should stand.
THE FACTS
The alleged facts are as follows. Defendant and the complainant, Peggy Gordon, had a child together. On March 7, 2005, defendant arrived at Gordon‘s home. An argument ensued. At one point in the argument, defendant retrieved a knife from the kitchen and told Gordon that he was going to hurt her. Gordon told him, “No you won‘t.” As Gordon moved to pick up the phone to call the police, defendant cut the telephone cord. He then stated, “That‘s not me,” put down the knife, and left the home. Gordon substituted a different phone cord and called the police.
Defendant was arrested and charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and interfering with the report of a crime. He opted for a bench trial before Judge Thomas E. Jackson of the Wayne Circuit Court. Judge Jackson found that the prosecution had not met its burden to prove assault with a dangerous weapon, and he acquitted defendant of this charge. On the charge of interfering with the report of a crime, the judge entered a provisional verdict of guilty. But he asked the parties to address whether the statute prohibiting interference with the report of a crime requires that a crime actually had been committed or attempted. Specifically, the judge stated:
[I]f, in fact, [Gordon] only has to perceive a crime being committed and that is in her mind... if, it‘s enough that she
perceived it, then that‘s enough for that charge to stand. If, in fact, it has to be an actual crime for that particular one to stand, then I would find that that doesn‘t stand.
After considering the parties’ arguments, Judge Jackson accepted the prosecution‘s position that the statute requires only that the person reporting the crime perceive that a crime had been committed or attempted. Relying on this interpretation, he found defendant guilty of interfering with the report of a crime.
Following the Court of Appeals decision, the prosecution applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We heard argument on the application to consider whether
ADEQUATE PROOF OF THE THIRD ELEMENT MAY BE LACKING
The most basic rule of criminal procedure is that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime unless the
prosecution has proved each element of it beyond a reasonable doubt.4 The issue in this case is whether the offense of interfering with the report of a crime requires the prosecution to prove that another person committed or attempted to commit a crime.
(1) A person shall not do any of the following:
* * *
(b) Prevent or attempt to prevent through the unlawful use of physical force another person from reporting a crime committed or attempted by another person.
Under the statutory definition of this crime, the prosecution must prove the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction: (1) the defendant used unlawful physical force, (2) the unlawful physical force prevented or attempted to prevent another person from reporting a crime, and (3) the crime sought to be reported was committed or attempted by another person.5 It follows, therefore,
defendant cannot be convicted of interfering with the report of a crime unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt the third element of that crime: (a) that another person sought to report a crime and (b) that the crime had been committed or attempted by another person.6
Here, the finder of fact, the trial judge, assumed that the statute requires only that the person seeking to report a crime perceived that a crime had been committed or attempted. Because this is an incorrect interpretation of the statute, defendant‘s conviction cannot stand. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that reversed defendant‘s conviction. The Court of Appeals was correct in remanding the case to the trial court. That court should consider whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant or another person committed or attempted to commit the crime sought to be reported.7
The majority concludes that the prosecution need not prove that an actual crime was committed or attempted because “[i]n
THE MAJORITY‘S ERROR
The glaring weakness in the majority‘s interpretation is that, in order to justify its conclusion, it reads language into the statute. The majority essentially interprets the statute as providing that a person is guilty of interfering with the report of a crime if the person “prevents or attempts to prevent through the unlawful use of physical force another person from reporting a crime that the reporter perceives to have been committed or attempted by another person.”
Contrary to the majority‘s interpretation, the statute does not prohibit preventing or attempting to prevent another from reporting a “perceived” crime, or a “pos-
sible” crime, or an “alleged” crime. It prohibits preventing or attempting to prevent
Holding that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime sought to be reported was committed or attempted by another person is consistent with this Court‘s decision in People v Burgess.10 In Burgess, the defendant‘s underlying conviction of felonious assault had been reversed. The issue was whether, in light of the reversal, his conviction for the offense of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony could stand.
At the time, the felony-firearm statute11 provided in relevant part: “(1) A person who carries or has in his possession a firearm at the time he commits or attempts to commit a felony, except the violation of section 227 or section 227a, is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years.”
The Burgess Court held that an element of felony-firearm was that a defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony.12 The language used in the felony-
firearm statute and the language used in the statute prohibiting interference with the report of a crime are similar. The felony-firearm statute prohibits a person from carrying a firearm when he or she “commits or attempts to commit a felony....” The statute prohibiting interference with the report of a crime prohibits an individual from preventing or attempting to prevent another person from reporting “a crime committed or attempted....”
The Burgess Court concluded that the felony-firearm statue requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony. This logic supports holding that the statute under consideration here requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime sought to be reported was committed or attempted by another person.13
CONCLUSION
The statute prohibiting interference with the report of a crime prohibits a person
attempted by another person.” It necessarily follows that, if no crime has been committed or attempted by another person, a defendant cannot be convicted under this statute. Because the majority opinion holds to the contrary, I dissent.
CAVANAGH and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with KELLY, J.
Notes
The majority also claims that my interpretation does not give effect to the phrase “committed or attempted.” I disagree. This language is included to make clear that one violates the provision by interfering with the reporting of a committed crime or an attempted crime. My interpretation recognizes this fact.
[r]etaliate or attempt to retaliate against another person for having reported or attempted to report a crime committed or attempted by another person. As used in this subsection, “retaliate” means to do any of the following:
(i) Commit or attempt to commit a crime against any person.
In making this determination, the trial court normally would consider whether the behavior of defendant that prompted the alleged victim to call the police constituted a crime. But the judge was the trier of fact here. And a judge, unlike a jury, is not allowed to reach inconsistent verdicts. Hence, the judge cannot find defendant guilty of interfering with the report of a crime using the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon as the underlying crime. The judge has already acquitted defendant of that charge. See People v Ellis, 468 Mich 25, 26; 658 NW2d 142 (2003). The judge could consider, however, whether defendant committed a crime that is a lesser-included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon.(ii) Threaten to kill or injure any person or threaten to cause property damage.
A person shall not do any of the following:
(a) Give, offer to give, or promise anything of value to any person to influence a person‘s statement to a police officer conducting a lawful investigation of a crime or the presentation of evidence to a police officer conducting a lawful investigation of a crime.
(b) Threaten or intimidate any person to influence a person‘s statement to a police officer conducting a lawful investigation of a crime or the presentation of evidence to a police officer conducting a lawful investigation of a crime.
Ante at 228.A person shall not do any of the following:
(a) Knowingly and intentionally remove, alter, conceal, destroy, or otherwise tamper with evidence to be offered in a present or future official proceeding.
(b) Offer evidence at an official proceeding that he or she recklessly disregards as false.
It is possible that some may find the majority opinion compelling because of the facts alleged and the verdict of not guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon. As alleged, the facts could well have supported a guilty verdict for this charge. But that is not the issue before this Court. Rather, our task is limited to ascertaining the elements of interfering with the report of a crime and deciding whether the prosecution proved those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. As I have demonstrated, a remand is required. It is not clear that the prosecution satisfied its burden, given the trial court‘s verdict of not guilty of the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon.The majority argues that we should not assume that the Legislature was aware of the interpretation that the Burgess Court gave the felony-firearm statute when it enacted the instant statute. But I do not need to make such an assumption to find Burgess relevant. Even if the majority were correct that we should not assume this fact, this Court is obligated to be aware of its own judicial construction of the similarly worded felony-firearm statute. And the Court should take guidance from that interpretation in this case.