People v. Holland CA3
C102408
Cal. Ct. App.Jan 8, 2026Check TreatmentFiled 1/8/26 P. v. Holland CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE, C102408
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
2020-0013878)
v.
CHRISTOPHER LEE HOLLAND,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Christopher Lee Holland guilty of two murders, two
counts of robbery, and one count of burglary. As to each murder, the jury found true
three special circumstances. The trial court imposed six separate prison terms of life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP)--one LWOP sentence for each special
circumstance finding for each murder conviction.
1
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the robbery
conviction and the robbery-murder special circumstance finding as to one of the victims.
He adds that the trial court erred in imposing three separate LWOP sentences for each
murder conviction. As to the first claim, we disagree. As to the second claim, the People
concede the error, and we agree with the parties. We will modify the judgment to impose
one LWOP sentence for each murder conviction and affirm the judgment as modified.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The People charged defendant with the murder of James and Mary Reiswig (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 first degree burglary (§ 459), and the first degree robbery of
both murder victims (§ 212.5, subd. (a)). As to each murder, the People alleged the
special circumstances of multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), murder while engaged
in the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), and murder while engaged in
the commission of a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)). The People also alleged as to
each murder and each robbery that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to the burglary, the People alleged
that defendant personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The People also alleged
two prior strike convictions.
At trial, the People introduced evidence that in early December 2020, defendant
asked an acquaintance, C.G., to help commit a robbery. C.G. did not agree to do so.
On December 17, 2020, the victims’ son and granddaughter went to the victims’
home to check on them. When they arrived, the back door to the house was already open.
The son discovered his mother, Mary, lying unresponsive in her bed with blood on her
face, and his father, James, lying on the floor by the foot of Mary’s bed with his legs
extending into the hallway. An autopsy determined that both victims died from multiple
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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chop injuries and a single penetrating gunshot wound to the head. Mary’s cellphone and
some of her jewelry were missing. No bullet casings were found at the scene.
An expert in scene reconstruction testified that, based on the bloodstain pattern
and other evidence, the most likely scenario was that the perpetrator entered through the
back door and first incapacitated Mary in her bedroom. The perpetrator then went to the
living room to incapacitate James before returning to the bedroom to ransack it. Later,
James got up and encountered the perpetrator again in the kitchen, hallway, and outside
Mary’s bedroom. A less likely but also possible scenario was that James was initially
attacked in the living room before Mary was later attacked in her bedroom. In either
scenario, the perpetrator initially attacked James in the living room, and then
subsequently confronted James in the kitchen, hallway, and outside Mary’s bedroom.
The victims’ son testified James owned several firearms that were usually kept on
the gun rack in a spare bedroom. One of those firearms was a .22-caliber handgun that
was missing after the incident. The victims’ daughter testified the .22-caliber handgun
was sometimes kept in the laundry room. When firing that handgun, bullet casings do
not discharge from the gun. The bullet fragment recovered from James and the bullet
recovered from Mary were both .22-caliber. Neither bullet was fired from the two .22-
caliber rifles that remained in the house.
At the time of the incident, defendant lived with his then-girlfriend, who was
previously married to the victims’ son. Investigators found defendant’s DNA in a
bloodstain in the victims’ home. GPS data placed defendant’s car near the victims’ home
around the time of the incident. Investigators also found shoeprints outside the home
matching shoes found at defendant’s home. Defendant’s then-girlfriend testified that on
the night of the crimes, defendant told her he “had to go clean up a mess that would ruin
his life.”
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Sometime after the murders, defendant met with C.G. and indicated a robbery had
gone badly. C.G. drove defendant to a friend’s house and then back to defendant’s car.
Before they parted ways, defendant thanked C.G. for helping him and gave C.G. a gold
bracelet. The gold bracelet was later determined to be Mary’s.
Defendant testified on his own behalf, denying that he had killed the victims or
entered their home. He claimed that someone else must have driven his car to the
victims’ home and said he had “[n]o clue” how his DNA was found there. He also
claimed he had given C.G. a bracelet different than the one that belonged to Mary.
The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of both victims and all
other charged offenses. The jury found true the three alleged special circumstances as to
each murder but deadlocked on the firearm allegations. The trial court found true the
alleged prior strike convictions.
For the first degree murder of James, the trial court sentenced defendant to three
consecutive terms of LWOP, one for each of the special circumstances found true by the
jury. For the first degree murder of Mary, the court also sentenced defendant to three
LWOP terms based on each of the special circumstances found true by the jury, but
stayed the LWOP term imposed for the burglary-murder special circumstance. The court
sentenced defendant to 25 years to life imprisonment for each robbery and the burglary
and stayed all three sentences under section 654.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant raises two claims on appeal. First, he argues there was insufficient
evidence to prove the robbery and robbery-murder special circumstance as to James.
Second, he contends the imposition of multiple LWOP sentences for each murder
conviction was error.
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I
Insufficient Evidence of Robbery and Robbery-Murder Special Circumstance
In assessing a claim of insufficient evidence, we “ ‘ “examine the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
(People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329.) We presume the evidence of each element of the offense was sufficient, and defendant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating otherwise. (People v. Sanghera (2006)139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573-1574
.) To meet this burden, defendant must do more than just recite his own
evidence or portray the available evidence in a light favorable to him. (Ibid.)
“ ‘[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Pham (2009)180 Cal.App.4th 919, 924-925
.) “We must accept all logical inferences that the jury may have drawn from circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Lucero (2019)41 Cal.App.5th 370
, 411.) “ ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made
by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another,
from his [or her] person or immediate presence, and against his [or her] will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) To prove the robbery-murder special
circumstance, there must be substantial evidence of a robbery. (People v. Morris (1988)
46 Cal.3d 1, 19, disapproved on another ground in In re Sassounian (1995)9 Cal.4th 535
.)
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Case law has more precisely defined the statutory elements of robbery. The
“taking” element has two aspects: “ ‘(1) achieving possession of the property, known as
“caption,” and (2) carrying the property away, or “asportation.” ’ ” (People v. Sexton
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 457, 469.) The “force” element must consist of “some quantum of force in excess of that ‘necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2011)51 Cal.4th 989, 995
.) The forcible act must be “motivated by
the intent to steal,” but need not “include an intent to apply force against the victim or to
cause the victim to feel fear.” (Id. at pp. 991-992.)
Case law also defines the necessary timing for these elements. “[R]obbery in
California is a continuing offense.” (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 262.) “[A] taking is not over at the moment of caption; it continues through asportation.” (Id. at p. 256.) Thus, “a robbery can be accomplished even if the property was peacefully or duplicitously acquired, if force or fear was used to carry it away.” (Ibid.) “[A]sportation is not confined to a fixed point in time. The asportation continues thereafter as long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety.” (People v. Cooper (1991)53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165
, fn. omitted.) “The force or fear element of robbery can be
satisfied during either the caption or the asportation phase of the taking.” (Gomez, at
p. 261.)
As an initial matter, defendant argues there is no substantial evidence he took
James’s .22-caliber handgun. We disagree. The victims’ son and daughter both testified
that James owned a .22-caliber handgun and that it was kept in the house. It is
undisputed that the handgun was missing from the home after the robbery. The trier of
fact could reasonably infer from this evidence that defendant took the handgun. (Cf.
People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 211 [concluding there was substantial evidence
of a taking where the victim had his car keys before the murder and the keys were “not
found on his person or at the scene” after the murder].)
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Defendant submits the evidence of robbery as to James was insufficient in two
further respects. First, he contends there was insufficient evidence that any personal
property was taken from James’s “immediate presence.” According to defendant, the
evidence established James was not: (1) in Mary’s bedroom when her cellphone and
jewelry were taken; or (2) in the laundry room or the spare bedroom, the two rooms
James’s handgun may have been taken from.
This argument fails to persuade. Our Supreme Court has explained: “The
generally accepted definition of immediate presence . . . is that ‘ “[a] thing is in the
[immediate] presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach,
inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or
prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.” ’ ” (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577,
626-627.) “[I]mmediate presence ‘ “must mean at least an area within which the victim
could reasonably be expected to exercise some physical control over [the] property.” ’
[Citation.] Under this definition, property may be found to be in the victim’s immediate
presence ‘even though it is located in another room of the house, or in another building
on [the] premises.’ ” (Id. at p. 627, italics added.)
Here, defendant contends that because there is no evidence James was in the
specific rooms from where the property was taken, there is insufficient evidence the
property was taken from his “immediate presence.” The premise of this argument is not
entirely sound, as a factfinder could reasonably infer James was in Mary’s bedroom
based on the fact that James’s body was found there. Beyond that, there is no dispute
James was in the house when the takings occurred. From this evidence, the jury
reasonably could have found that James exercised sufficient control over the rooms from
which the property was taken to satisfy the immediate presence requirement. This is
especially true given the evidence that defendant may have incapacitated James prior to
taking personal property from other rooms. (Cf. People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1385A,
675 [“the property taken in the kitchen was taken from ‘[the victim’s] immediate
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presence’ since the kitchen was in an area over which [the victim] had control until
defendant subdued her”]; People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 52 [“Areas of the
victims’ apartments outside the bathroom were areas over which they had control before
appellant coerced them into the shower”].)
Second, defendant contends that, while force was used, there is no substantial
evidence that the takings were accomplished by means of force or fear on James. In his
view, the evidence only establishes that the takings occurred either before or after James
was attacked, and thus James was not attacked in order to accomplish the takings. This
argument fails because, as discussed above, the force or fear element can be satisfied
either during the caption of the property or the asportation. Here, there is evidence James
confronted defendant after defendant had ransacked Mary’s bedroom, and that defendant
attacked and ultimately murdered James before leaving the home. Accordingly, there is
sufficient evidence to satisfy the force or fear element for the robbery of James.
Resisting this conclusion, defendant relies on People v. Morris, supra,46 Cal.3d 1
, but that case is inapposite. There, the victim was fatally shot in the restroom of a
public bathhouse. (Id. at pp. 10, 19-20.) He was “entirely nude except for shoes and
socks” and there was “no evidence that any personal property was in the victim’s
possession at the time of the murder.” (Id. at p. 20.) A witness saw a man with the
defendant’s features standing in the doorway of the restroom and firing a gun. (Id. at
p. 10.) After the murder, the defendant attempted to use a credit card belonging to a
friend of the victim. (Id. at pp. 11, 20.) That friend had lent this credit card to the victim
two months prior to the murder. (Id. at p. 20.) Our Supreme Court reversed the robbery
conviction and set aside the robbery-murder special circumstance, in part because there
was insufficient evidence “that the taking was accomplished either before or during the
killing by means of force or fear.” (Id. at p. 21.) The court explained it was entirely
possible the defendant had taken the credit card at some point before the shooting or that
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the victim “volunteered the credit card to his assailant as a form of consideration for
sexual services.” (Id. at p. 20.)
In Morris, there was little to no evidence about how or when (or even if) a robbery
occurred and thus the record did not support a reasonable inference that a taking was
accomplished by means of force or fear. Here, in contrast, the evidence readily supports
the inference that the takings occurred during the home invasion in which defendant
attacked and killed James.
Because substantial evidence supports the robbery conviction, we reject
defendant’s challenge to that conviction and the robbery-murder special circumstance.
II
Multiple LWOP Sentences for Each Murder Conviction
Defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing multiple LWOP sentences for
each murder conviction. The People agree, as do we.
Section 190.2, subdivision (a) provides that “[t]he penalty for a defendant who is
found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life without the possibility of parole if one or more . . . special circumstances has been
found . . . to be true.” (Italics added.) Multiple true special circumstance findings do not
justify additional punishment. (See People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 874
[defendant “faced no additional punishment merely as a result of” additional special
circumstance true finding].) Accordingly, the trial court’s imposition of a separate
LWOP sentence for each special circumstance finding as to each murder conviction was
error. We modify the judgment to strike the two additional LWOP sentences imposed for
each murder conviction and direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to
reflect this change.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect a single LWOP sentence for each murder
conviction. We direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect this
modification, and to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
/s/
Duarte, J.
We concur:
/s/
Mauro, Acting P. J.
/s/
Wiseman, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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