People v. HinesPeople v. Hines
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Buckley, J.), rendered March 3, 2003, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of rape in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree.
The victim met defendant in late 2000 or early 2001 while she worked at a grocery store in Chemung County and, thereafter, they often spent time together. However, on December 4 and 6, 2001, incidents allegedly occurred between defendant and the victim that led to defendant being indicted for the crimes of burglary in the second degree (two counts), rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, assault in the second degree and assault in the third degreе. Defendant and the victim, both of whom testified at trial, related varying versions regarding the relevant events.
The victim stated that the relationship had never involved sexual intimacy and that, оn December 4, 2001, when she rebuffed defendant’s sexual advances, he became angry and choked her, leaving bruises on her neck and arms. While defendant acknowledged choking thе victim on December 4, he related that they had been involved sexually since shortly after meeting and that his actions occurred when the victim had made threats against his wife and children. The victim sought medical attention and she spoke to officers in the Elmira City Police Department regarding the incident. Defendant was contacted by police by phone on December 4 and 5, 2001 and returned the phone calls, agreeing to voluntarily go to the police station to discuss the incident. He gave a statement on December 5 in which he сontended that he “snapped” because of the victim’s threats against his children. He was not detained following his interview with police.
According to the victim, she awoke on the morning of December 6, 2001 to find defendant in her bedroom holding a novelty baseball bat. He struck her twice on the head with the bat before she could cover her head with a pillow, and he continued striking her through the pillow. Defendant expressed anger because the victim had reported the December 4 incident
On the evening of Deсember 6, 2001, defendant called the police station seeking to speak with the officer who had interviewed him regarding the December 4 incident. He stated on the phone that he was being falsely accused of rape and also inquired whether there was a warrant for his arrest. The officer who took the call told him he would check to see if there was a warrant. Upon speaking with other officers, it was decided that defendant would be told there was an arrest warrant, even though one had not yet been issued. Defendant called back a short time later and the officer told him there was a warrant for his arrest. Defendant responded that he would walk to the police station, which he then did. Upon arriving at the station, defendant was read his Miranda rights. He then spoke with investigators and maintained his innocence regarding any events of December 6. He was, however, arrested later that evening.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the December 4, 2001 third degree assault (count six of the indictment) and of the December 6, 2001 second degree burglary, first degree rape, first degree sexual abuse and second degree assault (counts two through five of the indictment). He was sentenced to various concurrent determinate sentences of imprisonmеnt, the longest of which was 17½ years for first degree rape. Defendant appeals.
Defendant first argues that, because the police incorrectly informed him that an arrest warrant had been issued, he was unlawfully induced to leave his home in viоlation of federal and
While the use of misinformation about an arrest warrant certainly could—and, indeed, in most situations, would—support a finding of impermissible coercive conduct, the unusual circumstances of this case do not leаd to such a conclusion. Defendant had voluntarily gone to the police station the prior day and talked to an officer. On December 6, 2001, defendant was the one who made the call to police and he initiated the discussion about an arrest warrant. Defendant also stated to the officer who answered the call that he was being accused of raping someone, threats had been made against him and his family, and he wanted a protective order. He was thus aware of the serious accusations being made agаinst him and he was seeking police involvement in the matter. When the officer indicated that he did not know if there was a warrant and that he would check, it was defendant who later made the follow-up call seeking such information. The officer, after wrongly informing him that an arrest warrant had been issued, asked defendant on the phone whether he wanted the police to pick him up and defendant declined the offer, stating that he would walk to the station. While by that time police had defendant’s home under surveillance, significantly, they neither entеred nor arrested him in his home (see Payton v New York, supra at 588-589; compare Bumper v North Carolina,
Defendant next contends that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. A verdict is legally sufficient if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, a rational jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty (see People v Calabria,
When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we act analogous to a thirteenth juror (see People v Cahill,
Finally, we find neither an abuse of discretion in the sеntence imposed nor the presence of extraordinary circumstances justifying a modification of the sentence (see People v Perkins,
Notes
Defendant is not contesting on appeal his conviction for assault in the third degree, which arose from the events of December 4, 2001.