People v. HicksPeople v. Hicks
Defendant‘s convictions result from his having sold $10 worth of crack cocaine, on credit, to the victim. When defendant confronted the victim for payment, an argument ensued and defendant, using a sawed-off shotgun, at point-blank range, shot the victim in the face. At the hospital, the victim‘s family asked for a “Do Not Resuscitate” order and elected to forеgo the use of antibiotics. The victim died 13 days later from bronchopneu
On appeal, defendant makes three relаted arguments addressed to the cause of death issue. He asserts that the murder verdict is not supported by legаlly sufficient evidence, that it is against the weight of the evidence and that County Court‘s charge on this issue was erroneous.
To prove defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, the People must establish beyond a reasоnable doubt that defendant‘s conduct caused the death of the victim (see
On this record, we cannot conclude that death was solely attributable to the victim‘s decision to forego medical treatment for infection (see People v Griffin, 80 NY2d 723, 727 [1993]), or that it was in no way attributable to defеndant‘s conduct. We thus conclude that the jury‘s determination is supported by legally sufficient evidence and is not аgainst the weight of the evidence (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Jefferson, 248 AD2d 815, 817 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 926 [1998]). Moreover, County Court‘s jury charge tracked, nearly word for word, relevant сase law and we find it to be entirely proper.
Next, defendant asserts that admission of autopsy photogrаphs and one photograph depicting the victim‘s appearance before being shot was so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. However, the most significant issue during trial was the cause of death and the photographs are relevant and probative on that issue (see People v Stevens, 76 NY2d 833, 835 [1990]). As a result, we discern no abuse of County Cоurt‘s discretion in admitting such photographic evidence (see People v Mastropietro, 232 AD2d 725, 726 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 1038 [1997]).
We also conclude that legally sufficient evidenсe supports the jury‘s determination that defendant did indeed possess and sell a controlled substance. Although the testimony regarding the actual drug transaction comes from defendant‘s accomplice, other evidеnce presented by the People sufficiently corroborates the testimony of the accomplice to support the conviction (see
Lastly, it is undisputed that defendant was improperly categorized as а second felony offender at the time of his sentence and, thus, a reduction in the sentences imposed for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controllеd substance in the third degree is required (see People v Alesandre [Jimmy], 175 AD2d 403, 404 [1991], lvs denied 79 NY2d 824, 828 [1991]). We modify the sentences imposed on each conviction to terms of 81/3 to 25 years (see
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgments are modified, on the law, by reducing the sentences imposed on defendant‘s convictions for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of а controlled substance in the third degree to 81/3 to 25 years for each conviction, and, as so modified, affirmed.