This case comes to us on remand from the Supreme Court.
Defendant appealed by leave granted from the trial court’s order imposing sanctions upon him. In a prior opinion, we reluctantly followed
Richmond Twp v Erbes,
After reconsidering the merits of dеfendant’s appeal, we vacate the trial court’s decision and remand.
In the underlying proceeding, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver bеtween 50 and 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii), and between 225 and 650 grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten to twenty and twenty to thirty years, respectively. The convictions were affirmed by this Court in an unpublished opinion per curiam, decided December 7, 1988 (Docket No. 100861). Leave to appeal was denied.
Defendant then filed a delayed motion requesting an evidentiary hearing regarding whether he had received effective assistance of counsel and also requesting a new trial or resentencing. That motion was denied. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration that was also denied. He then filed a motion for relief from judgment that was, again, denied. The trial court then found that defendant’s last motion was frivolous under MCR 2.114(E) and fined him $150 payable to the court.
In granting leave to appeal, this Court ordered the parties to brief the following issues:
*337 I. Whether fines, as opposed to costs, may be imposed under MCR 2.114(E);
II. If so, whether some form of due process is required before sanctions may be impоsed;
III. Whether doctrines of preclusion such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the law of the case are relevant to the imposition of sanctions; and
IV. Whether, given the constitutional issues involved, sanctions are ever appropriate in criminal cases involving pro se defendants and, if so, whether a higher stаndard should apply to such cases.
We now turn to the merits of these issues, albeit not exactly in that order.
MCR 2.114(D) imposes various requirements of good faith and reasonable inquiry upon the signatories of legal pleadings. MCR 2.114(E) provides that, "[i]f a pleading is signed in violation of this rule, the court . . . shall impose ... an appropriate sanction . . . which may include an order to pay . . . reasonable expenses incurred . . . including reasonable attorney fees.” Because the rule could be interpreted to allow the imposition of fines, it was amended on April 1, 1991, to resolve a split between panels of this Court and clarify that "[t]he court may not assess punitive damages.” See MCR 2.114(E) and (F); see also
Normally, "the rules of civil procedure apply to [criminal cases] еxcept (1) as otherwise provided by *338 rule or statute, (2) when it clearly appears that they apply to civil actions only, or (3) when a statute or court rule provides a like or different procedure.” MCR 6.001(D). Defendant argues that MCL 600.2591(1); MSA 27A.2591(1), which is incorporated into the court rules by MCR 2.114(F) and MCR 2.625(A)(2), controls here because it explicitly provides that sanctions may be imposed only in civil cases. We disagree.
First, the subsections noted by defendant apply where a frivolous claim is submitted. Here, the issue is a frivolous pleading. Second, MCR 2.114(F) explicitly states that sanctions under MCR 2.625(A)(2) and, by refеrence, under MCL 600.2591(1); MSA 27A.2591(1), apply “[i]n addition to sanctions under” other provisions of MCR 2.114. (Emphasis added.) Thus, although MCL 600.2591(1); MSA 27A.2591(1) admittedly applies only to civil cases, the question remains whether sanctions may be imposed in criminal cases under MCR 2.114(E).
It is clear from the language of MCR 2.114(B), (D), and (E) that sanctions may be imposed upon unrepresented parties who sign their own pleadings as well аs on attorneys and even represented parties. However, because defendant is a prisoner who proceeded in propria persona, he had a constitutional right of access to the courts and a constitutionally protected liberty interest that demand further scrutiny before sanctions may be imposed. See
Bounds v Smith,
Sanctions such as filing limits, refusals to waive fees, dismissals, and аwards of costs may interfere with the right of access to the courts and with the ability to assert constitutionally protected liberty interests. Therefore, they may not be imposеd upon pro se prisoner litigants without first affording them rudimentary due process. See
Morrissey v Brewer,
We agree with federal decisions construing FR Civ P 11, that, because of the constitutional issues involved, a prisoner’s pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard in determining whether there has been a violation warranting sanctions. See
Thomas v Evans,
880 F2d 1235, 1240 (CA 11, 1989); see also
Haines v Kerner,
In determining the reasonableness of defen
*340
dant’s pleadings, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel — which would bar relitigation in a separate proceeding of all issues that were or could have been decided in the context of the main action, that is, in the context of defendant’s appeal from his criminal conviction — are inaрplicable because this case does not involve a separate action but rather a motion for relief from judgment.
1
Cf.
id.
(pro se prisoner may be sanctioned for filing collateral civil claims barred by res judicata). Instead, the doctrine applicable here is the law of the case.
People v Usher,
Normally, the law of the case doctrine "applies without regard to the correctness of the prior determination.”
Muilenberg v Upjohn Co,
To summarize, we vacate the trial court’s order because fines are not permissible under MCR 2.114(E). We note thаt, because defendant was not afforded rudimentary due process before being sanctioned, we could have independently reversed on that basis. The trial court is frеe to determine on remand that, in light of all the circumstances existing at the time of the filing and after consideration of the issues raised by this opinion, sanctions are still apрropriate. However, any sanctions must be chosen with care to minimize interference with defendant’s constitutional rights.
The trial court’s decision is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
We stress that we do not decide whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply in criminal proceedings. Likewise, we do not address the application of the doctrine of preclusion in the context of habeas corpus proceedings.