THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER HENDERSON, Appellant.
No. 98887
Supreme Court of Illinois
August 18, 2005
Rehearing denied September 26, 2005
217 Ill. 2d 449
3. Elements of the Crime Considered as an Aggravating Factor
Defendant also argues that “the trial court erred in the determination of his sentence by considering as an aggravating factor elements which were inherent [in] and essential to the crime and the nature of the offense.” Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court improperly considered steps that defendant took to avoid being caught. In support of this argument, defendant cites to a page from the transcript of the sentencing hearing. However, there is no mention on this page of any attempt by defendant to avoid being caught. Indeed, an examination of the transcript of the sentencing hearing reveals no mention by the trial judge of defendant‘s attempt to avoid being caught. Defendant‘s argument has no basis. Accordingly, we reject it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed defendant‘s convictions and sentence.
Affirmed.
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Beth Herndobler, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Annette Collins and Colleen M. Nevin, Assistant State‘s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
CHIEF JUSTICE MCMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Christopher Henderson was convicted of two counts of robbery (
BACKGROUND
The evidence presented at trial established that the offenses occurred early in the morning of June 28, 2002. At about 12:30 a.m., the victims, Daniel Fonseca and Kevin Schwarze, got off a bus on the north side of Chicago and began walking south on Broadway. They noticed defendant and several other people standing together on the other side of the street. As Fonseca and Schwarze continued south on Broadway, a man whom they had initially seen standing with defendant approached the victims from behind and asked Fonseca for a cigarette and a light. Fonseca gave the man a cigarette but said he did not have a lighter. Fonseca and Schwarze then began walking faster, having noticed that defendant and several other people were walking parallel with them on the other side of the street. At that point, the man who had asked for a cigarette yelled, “Don‘t ---- with the Kings,” and struck Fonseca in the face. When Fonseca and Schwarze began to run, defendant yelled, “Stop those guys.” People from both sides of the street converged, tackled Fonseca and Schwarze, and started to go through their pockets. Schwarze saw defendant going through Fonseca‘s pockets. Fonseca‘s wallet, cellular telephone, bracelet and ring were taken. Fonseca saw defendant kicking Schwarze in the face. Schwarze‘s wallet (containing $200), his cellular telephone and his watch were taken.
While Fonseca and Schwarze were still surrounded, several squad cars arrived, and defendant and the other offenders fled. Fonseca and Schwarze pointed out the offenders, and rode with the police in pursuit. Within about 20 to 30 seconds, the police converged on defendant and two others. The victims identified defendant as one of the offenders. Fonseca‘s cellular telephone was recovered from the sidewalk.
The circuit court found defendant guilty on all counts. Defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial, and the circuit court denied the motion.
At the sentencing hearing, the State noted defendant‘s criminal history, which included convictions for vehicular hijacking and attempted robbery. The State argued that, in light of this criminal history, defendant should receive an extended-term sentence of 7 to 14 years’ imprisonment. In mitigation, defense counsel presented two witnesses who testified regarding defendant‘s talent as an artist and his involvement in a community arts center and a social service agency for Native Americans. Defense counsel argued, in addition, that although defendant had a drinking problem, he also had a strong work history and was self-sufficient. Defense counsel requested a sentence within the nonextended, three- to seven-year range for a Class 2 felony.
The court sentenced defendant to extended terms of nine years’ imprisonment for each of the robbery convictions and four years’ imprisonment for each of the aggravated battery convictions, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The court then admonished defendant:
“Mr. Henderson, you have a right to appeal which can be preserved only by filing a written notice of appeal with the clerk of the court within thirty days.
You have a right to request the clerk of the court to prepare and file a written notice of appeal on your behalf.
If you cannot afford it, a copy of the transcript will be given to you free, and
a lawyer would be appointed to represent you on appeal. You also must file within thirty days a written motion to reduce sentence that must be filed in the clerk of the court‘s office. If you file a written motion to reduce sentence, then the appeal will be held in abeyance until the court has ruled on the motion to reduce sentence.
Do you understand that?”
Defendant indicated that he understood. Counsel for defendant then made an oral motion to reduce sentence, and the circuit court denied the motion. No written motion to reconsider sentence was filed.
On appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court failed to give him adequate admonishments regarding the filing of a motion to reconsider sentence. Specifically, defendant argued that the circuit court did not fully inform him that he had 30 days to file a written motion to reconsider “all aspects” of his sentence, and that any issue not included in this motion would be waived for appellate review. Defendant contended that his cause should be remanded for proper admonishments pursuant to
In rejecting defendant‘s argument that the cause should be remanded, the appellate court relied on People v. Williams, 344 Ill. App. 3d 334 (2003), which, upon similar facts, held that no remand was required. The appellate court observed that, in the case at bar, as in Williams, defendant failed to raise any sentencing issues on appeal. In Williams, the appellate court noted the defendant‘s failure there to challenge his sentence on appeal, and concluded that the defendant therefore was neither prejudiced nor denied real justice by the inadequate admonishments. Accordingly, the court in Williams held that remand was not necessary. The appellate court in the case at bar applied the same reasoning as in Williams, and similarly held that defendant was neither prejudiced nor denied real justice by the incomplete admonishments. Accordingly, no remand was necessary. The court explained:
“[D]efendant fails to identify any issue regarding ‘any aspect of his sentencing hearing’ which he wishes to challenge or identify any issue regarding his sentence which was deemed waived. Therefore, we conclude that ‘[to] require remand in the instant matter, so defendant could hear the steps necessary to challenge an issue that he has no basis to challenge, would elevate form over substance without serving the ends of real justice.‘” No. 1-03-1623 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23 ), quoting Williams, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 339.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. We granted defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to
ANALYSIS
Rule 605(a)
Prior to its amendment on October 1, 2001,
“(1) In all cases in which the defendant is found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment ***, excluding cases in which the judgment and sentence are entered on a plea of guilty, the trial court shall, at the time of imposing sentence ***, advise the defendant of the right to appeal, of the right to request the clerk to prepare and file a notice of appeal, and of the right, if indigent, to be furnished, without cost to the defendant, with a transcript of the proceedings at the trial or hearing.
(2) In addition to the foregoing rights, in cases in which the defendant has been convicted of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor or convicted of a lesser offense and sentenced to imprisonment ***, the trial court shall advise the defendant of the right to have counsel appointed on appeal.”
210 Ill. 2d Rs. 605(a)(1) ,(a)(2) .
In 2001, admonishments regarding the preservation of sentencing errors for appeal were added to
“(3) At the time of imposing sentence or modifying the conditions of the sentence, the trial court shall also advise the defendant as follows:
A. that the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, excluding the sentence imposed or modified, will be preserved only if a notice of appeal is filed in the trial court within thirty (30) days from the date on which sentence is imposed;
B. that prior to taking an appeal, if the defendant seeks to challenge the correctness of the sentence, or any aspect of the sentencing hearing, the defendant must file in the trial court within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed a written motion asking to have the trial court reconsider the sentence imposed, or consider any challenges to the sentencing hearing, setting forth in the motion all issues or claims of error regarding the sentence imposed or the sentencing hearing;
C. that any issue or claim of error regarding the sentence imposed or any aspect of the sentencing hearing not raised in the written motion shall be deemed waived; and
D. that in order to preserve the right to appeal following the disposition of the motion to reconsider sentence, or any challenges regarding the sentencing hearing, the defendant
must file a notice of appeal in the trial court within 30 days from the entry of the order disposing of the defendant‘s motion to reconsider sentence or order disposing of any challenges to the sentencing hearing.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)(3) .
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the circuit court‘s admonishments complied with subsections (1) and (2) of
Remand for Proper Rule 605(a) Admonishments
The question presented in this appeal is whether strict compliance with
As previously indicated, the appellate court below held that remand was unnecessary even though defendant here received incomplete
Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant here argues that, absent strict compliance with
In support of this position, defendant advances two main contentions. First, he attempts to draw an analogy between
In support of defendant‘s first contention--that because strict compliance is required for other subsections of
“If a defendant who has pled guilty fails to follow the admonishments of Rule 605(b) or (c), that defendant cannot raise issues on appeal because he has not perfected his appeal. Similarly, if a defendant who has pled not guilty fails to follow the admonishments of Rules 605(a)(3)(B), (a)(3)(C), and (a)(3)(D) [the provisions dealing with preservation of sentencing issues for appeal], such a defendant cannot raise sentencing issues because the defendant has waived those issues on appeal.” Bagnell, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 327.
The court in Bagnell held that “the strict compliance required for Rules 605(b) and (c) admonishments also is required for Rule 605(a) admonishments” and “the remedy for failure to give the proper Rule 605(a) admonishments is the same remedy as for failure to give proper Rule 605(b) or (c) admonishments--that is, remandment for proper admonishments.” Bagnell, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 327.
The same result as in Bagnell was reached in People v. Glenn, 345 Ill. App. 3d 974, 984 (2004), another decision cited by defendant. In Glenn, the court held that, because “[s]trict compliance with Rule 605(b) is required and remand is not discretionary,”
The reasoning in Bagnell and Glenn regarding the analogy between
Breedlove rejected the defendant‘s analogy. The court noted that guilty plea defendants who were misinformed under preamended
“[D]efendant here and others like him have not suffered the kind of detriment that guilty plea defendants suffered under preamended Rule 605(b). They do not lose their appeal rights. Their sentences may still be reviewed for plain error.” Breedlove, 213 Ill. 2d at 521-22.
The court in Breedlove concluded that fundamental fairness did not entitle the defendant to a remand for admonishments under amended
We acknowledge that, in contrast to the situation in Breedlove, defendant here and the defendants in Bagnell and Glenn were admonished under amended
Defendant‘s reliance here on Bagnell and Glenn is misplaced. Pursuant to the reasoning in Breedlove, we reject defendant‘s argument that, because strict compliance and remand are required in the
Defendant‘s next argument relies upon recent decisions of our appellate court in which the cause was remanded for proper
In People v. Mazar, 333 Ill. App. 3d 244 (2002), as in Breedlove, the defendant was admonished under preamended
Mazar has been overruled by Breedlove. As previously indicated, Breedlove held that the situation with regard to preamended
Defendant also points to People v. Taylor, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1064 (2004), and People v. Parker, 344 Ill. App. 3d 728 (2003), where the defendants were admonished, as was defendant in the case at bar, under the amended version of
Taylor is inapposite to the case at bar for several reasons. First, Taylor makes no mention of the rule articulated in Davis that remand is required only where the defendant is prejudiced or denied real justice as a result of the inadequate admonishments. Second, unlike defendant in the case at bar, the defendant in Taylor raised a sentencing issue on appeal. More importantly, in Taylor, the State conceded that the cause should be remanded. Taylor, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 1082-83. Defendant‘s reliance on Taylor is unavailing.
In People v. Parker, 344 Ill. App. 3d 728 (2003), the defendant argued on appeal, similarly to the defendant in Taylor, that he received improper
In sum, we hold that the principle articulated in Davis, i.e., a trial court‘s failure to give proper admonishments does not necessarily require reversal in every instance, applies to the case at bar. We therefore conclude, contrary to defendant‘s contention, that where a defendant is given incomplete
Prejudice or a Denial of Real Justice
We turn now to the question of whether, in the case at bar, defendant suffered prejudice or a denial of real justice as a result of the incomplete admonishments that he received. The State contends that no prejudice has been shown. The State notes that defendant failed to file a written motion to reconsider sentence in the trial court, despite being admonished by the trial court regarding the need to file such a motion. The State also notes that defendant raised no sentencing issues on appeal. According to the State, because defendant points to no specific sentencing issues that he was precluded from raising because of improper admonishments, defendant “was not prejudiced or denied real justice by the trial court‘s admonishments.”
Defendant argues, on the contrary, that he was prejudiced by the trial court‘s incomplete admonishments, particularly the trial court‘s failure to advise him that he could challenge any aspect of his sentencing in a motion to reconsider sentence and that any issues not included in such a motion would be waived for purposes of review. Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise any sentencing issues on appeal, but he contends that this does not mean he suffered no prejudice. Rather, defendant argues that his failure to challenge his sentence on appeal is evidence that he was prejudiced.
Defendant asserts that, on appeal, only issues of record may be raised. In defendant‘s view, had the trial court informed him that he could challenge any aspect of his sentencing in a postsentencing motion, he might have raised (in that motion) sentencing issues that were dehors the record, and defendant thereby would have made these issues potentially appealable by placing them on the record. However, lacking the information that any such issues could be--and, indeed, should have been--included in the motion to reconsider sentence, defendant did not include them, and consequently he lost his right to raise them on appeal. According to defendant, the loss of this right demonstrates that he was prejudiced by the circuit court‘s incomplete admonishments.
There are two difficulties with defendant‘s argument. First, in his briefs to this court and in oral argument, defendant offers only hypothetical examples of sentencing issues dehors the record that might have been raised if he had been properly admonished. Defendant presents
In considering the question of whether defendant in the case at bar was prejudiced or denied real justice, we find the reasoning in People v. Williams, 344 Ill. App. 3d 334 (2003), instructive. The defendant in Williams was given inadequate
“Likewise, we find that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court‘s failure to properly admonish defendant of the steps necessary to challenge his sentence on appeal. Since defendant raised no challenge to his sentence in this appeal, his ability to raise a sentencing issue on appeal was not compromised or limited by the actions of the trial court. Thus, defendant suffered no prejudice from the lack of proper admonishment. To require remand in the instant matter, so defendant could hear the steps necessary to challenge an issue [which] he has no basis to challenge, would elevate form over substance without serving the ends of real justice. For this exercise in futility, we see no need.” Williams, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 339.
We conclude that, as in Williams, defendant in the case at bar was neither prejudiced nor denied real justice as a result of the incomplete admonishments he received. Accordingly, “[t]o require remand in the instant matter *** would elevate form over substance without serving the
CONCLUSION
We hold that, where a defendant has received incomplete
Affirmed.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
The issue in this case involves the interpretation of
The rules of statutory construction apply to interpretation of our supreme court rules. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 404 (1998). The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of the drafters of the rule. People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176, 179 (2005). The best evidence of intent is the plain language used by the drafter. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005). If the drafter‘s intent can be determined from the plain language, this court must give that intent effect without resorting to other interpretive aids. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116 (2005).
The plain language of
Such a conclusion is further supported by this court‘s familiar maxim that “[t]he rules of court we have promulgated are not aspirational. They are not suggestions. They have the force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995). Thus, strict compliance with the rules of this court is generally required. Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 116 (2004).
Further, requiring strict compliance with
In sum, the plain language of