Dеfendant appeals as of right his conviction by jury of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, and being an habitual offender, sixth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Defendant was *696 originally sentenced to imprisonment of three to ten years but that sentence was vacated and defendant was sentenced to seven to fifteen yeаrs as an habitual offender. We affirm.
The present case stems from the breaking and entering of a drugstore in East Detroit. Officer Tom Duggan responded to the drugstore’s alarm and, as he approached the drugstore, saw a car rapidly driving away. The car proceeded to run past stop signs and, as it passеd Officer Duggan, neither of the two people in the car made eye contact with Officer Duggan. Officer Duggan began following the car and at that point it began to accelerate to an excessive speed. Shortly thereafter, defendant, carrying a green duffle bag, jumped from the moving vehicle. He dropped the duffle bag and ran to the nearest curb. He then started walking casually in the opposite direction.
Officer Duggan arrested defendant, and after a struggle placed him in the back seat of the squad car. With the assistance of the Harper Woods Police, Duggan was able to apprehend the other suspect. Officer Duggan went back for the duffle bag approximately five minutes later.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to indorse an expert witness one month prior to trial. The late indorsement of witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
People v Hayden,
In this case, an expert witness was indorsed *697 approximately one month priоr to trial. The trial court allowed the late indorsement conditioned upon defendant’s being given an opportunity to examine the witness prior to trial. Defendant effectively cross-examined the expert witness and admitted he was able to effectively defend against the expert’s testimony. Given these facts, we do not find an abuse of discretion in allowing the late indorsement of the expert witness.
Defendant’s second issue concerns his preliminary examination. Defendant initially waived his right to a preliminary examination. However, he later moved to suppress evidence and to reduce the charge to conform with the admissible evidence. Defendant based these motions on information contained in the police report prepared by Officer Duggan and Officer Duggan’s testimony at defendant’s parole hearing. At the hearing on the motions, the prosecutor asked the court to remand the case to district сourt for a preliminary examination as there was no record upon which the court could rule on the motions. Because it is within the authority of the circuit court to remand a case for a preliminary examination to receive additional evidence, see
People v Miller,
In a related issue defendant claims that it was improper for the prosecution to ask for a remand for a preliminary examination. We find that this issue has been abandoned on appeal as no support was сited for this argument.
People v Sowders,
We next address whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant to proceed in pro per. Defendant’s first attorney asked to withdraw from the *698 case and at that point defendant expressed a desire to represent himself. Counsel was appointed to act in an advisory capаcity.
The right of self-representation is implicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Faretta v California,
Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s request for a specific jury instruction that "defendant cannot be convicted on an inference after an inference.” We find that this instruction was not appropriate and the cоurt did not err in refusing to give the instruction to the jury. Furthermore, defendant abandoned his request for the specific instruction and thus the issue is not properly before this Court on appeal.
Defendant argues that during closing argument the prosecutor’s reiteration of testimony about footprints at the crime scene matching defendant’s boots constituted error requiring reversal. We first note that defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments and thus appellate review of the
*699
alleged error is foreclosed unless the prejudicial effect was so great that it could not have been cured by an appropriate instruction and failure to consider the issue would be a miscarriage of justice.
People v Barr,
The next question is whether defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. The length of time between defendant’s arrest and his trial was
9V2
months. When analyzing a claimed violation of the right to speedy trial we need to consider four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.
People v Collins,
Defendant claims that his arrest was illegal and that the evidence obtained therefrom was inadmissible and should have been suppressed. In a supplemental statement, defendant claims that this case must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
People v Talley,
*700 As noted above, defendant initially waived preliminary examination in district court. In circuit court, he moved for suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to his arrest and to reduce the charge to conform with the admissible evidence. At the preliminary examination held on remand, the issue of probable cause for defendant’s arrest was argued extensively. The magistrate found probable cause existed for defendant’s arrest, along with the findings necessary for binding defendant over for trial. Defendant then filed another motion in circuit court entitled "Motion to Quash” based on the probable-cause issue. In the relief section of that motion, defendant requested that, in the alternative, the evidence gained as a result of thе arrest be suppressed. The trial court reviewed the preliminary examination transcript, affirmed the magistrate’s finding of probable cause to arrest, and denied defendant’s motion to quash. No separate evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress was ever held.
Following the prosecutor’s prеsentation of proofs at trial, including testimony from the officer concerning the probable-cause issue, defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal based in part on a claim that his arrest was not supported by probable cause and any evidence obtained following his arrest was thеreby obtained in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After having the opportunity to observe the arresting officer testify, and hearing all the proofs, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. Based on the number of opportunities defendant has taken to present the issue (two different judges, each having had the opportunity to hear live testimony from the arresting officer), we think remanding for a Talley hearing would require a useless expenditure of judicial time. We note that defendant took *701 full advantage of the opportunity afforded at trial to cross-examine the arresting officer concerning all the circumstancеs and observations made immediately surrounding defendant’s arrest. This included an attempt to impeach Officer Duggan with prior slightly inconsistent statements attributed to the officer, concerning his observations immediately prior to defendant’s arrest. We cannot conclude that a separate evidentiary hearing wоuld serve to further highlight the issues for which defendant sought a ruling.
If a defendant is detained or taken into custody by a police officer acting without a warrant, the detention is illegal unless the officer has probable cause to arrest the defendant.
People v Hamoud,
A review of the record leads us to conclude that, as a matter of law, Officer Duggan had probable cause to arrest defendant. Just prior to 3:30 a.m., Duggan responded to the alarm at the pharmacy. While on a shortcut route, which headed directly to the rear of the pharmacy, he observed defendаnt’s car come from around the corner by the pharmacy. The car was traveling at a relatively high speed and failed to stop at a stop sign. While it slowed a bit on approaching the patrol car, it thereafter sped up again and failed to stop at the next stop sign. Upon passing Officer Duggаn, the occupants turned their heads away from the patrol *702 car. Duggan turned around and followed. He observed defendant alight from the still-moving car, drop the duffle bag and run to the nearest curb then start walking casually. Based on the information Duggan had at the time, we conclude he had probable cause tо believe that defendant had committed or was in the process of committing a felony. Thus, defendant’s arrest without a warrant was proper and the trial court properly admitted the evidence obtained pursuant to the arrest.
We further note that even if probable cause were not established, defеndant would not necessarily succeed in suppressing all of the evidence. When he dropped the duffle bag and walked away from it, he may have abandoned the property so as to sufficiently abandon any reasonable expectation of privacy concerning that bag. See
People v Boy-kin,
The next question raised is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence. When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge must consider the evidеnce presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Hampton,
Defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his first attorney’s failure to raise the motion to suppress evidence.
A сriminal defendant is guaranteed effective assistance of counsel under both the Michigan and United States Constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. We recognize the split in decisions of this Court concerning whether the test for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Michigan Constitution differs from that afforded under the United States Constitution. See
People v Dalessandro,
A review of the record below indicates that defendant was represented by counsel who performed at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. Our earlier finding that the evidenсe was properly admitted means that defense counsel made no serious mistake without which defendant might have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. We conclude that defendant’s case suffered no adverse effect from his appointed counsel’s actions.
The remainder of dеfendant’s issues on appeal concern his habitual-offender conviction. He first argues that four of his prior convictions were constitutionally invalid and therefore inadmissible to charge him as an habitual offender. We have reviewed the alleged constitutional infirmities and find them to be without merit. All of his previous *704 convictions were constitutionally sound and admissible.
Defendant next alleges that his habitual-offender conviction violates his constitutional rights because there is no such offense. Defendant maintains that the habitual-offender statute is limited to four prior offenses. We disagree. MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084 applies to a person who has been convicted of three or more felonies. The statute does not place an upper limit on the number of felonies which may be used to supplement a conviction. This Court has recognized that a defendant may be charged with and convicted of being an habitual offender with six previous offenses. See
People v Curry,
Defendant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial where the prosecutor asked a witness to fingerprint the defendant in court so as to identify defendant at the habitual-offender proceeding. The grant or denial of a motion for a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. The court’s decision will be reversed only upon a finding that the court abused its discretion.
People v Green,
Affirmed.