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G064798
Cal. App. 4th Div. 3
Apr 16, 2026
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
O P I N I O N
STATEMENT OF FACTS
DISCUSSION
I.
THE PRIOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
A. Factual Background
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling Is Reviewable
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling Was Erroneous and Prejudicially Violated
II.
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
DISPOSITION
Notes

THE PEOPLE, Plаintiff and Respondent, v. JAN CURTIS HARZAN, Defendant and Appellant.

G064798

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

Filed 4/16/26

Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge.

(Super. Ct. No. 20WF1838)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAN CURTIS HARZAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

G064798

(Super. Ct. No. 20WF1838)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,

Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Reversed.

Quinn & Dworakowski and David Dworakowski for Defendant

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Donald W. Ostertag and Flavio

Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Over a nine-day period in 2020, defendant Jan Curtis Harzan,

then age 65, exchanged sexually explicit electronic messages with an

undercover police detective whom he believed was a 13-year-old girl named

Brianna. At Harzan’s trial for communicating with and arranging to meet a

minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense, the trial court ruled there

was sufficient evidence to support jury instructions on the defense of

entrapment. Howevеr, the court ruled that if Harzan decided to pursue that

defense, it would allow the prosecution to introduce evidence Harzan had

engaged in sexual misconduct nearly 50 years earlier, when he was in his

teens. To prevent the jury from hearing that highly prejudicial evidence,

Harzan surrendered his right to present an entrapment defense, and he

ultimately was convicted as charged.

On appeal, Harzan contends: (1) the trial court should have

excluded the prior misconduct evidence altogether, irrespective of the

entrapment issue, and its failure to do so violated his constitutional right to

present a defense; and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support his

convictions. Although we find Harzan’s convictions are supported by

substantial evidence, we conclude the trial court prejudicially violated

Harzan’s constitutional rights by requiring him to give up his entrapment

defense in order to keep his prior sexual misconduct out of evidence. We

therefore reverse the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In May 2020, Harzan posted an ad on Craigslist under a category

called “Missed Connections.” Entitled “Missing my young friend,” the ad

stated: “GL older M here looking to find my young coed friend I use[d] to

hang out with. We would have such good times together. Is that you?”

Harzan’s ad caught the attention of Huntington Beach Vice

Detective Joseph Baugh, who specializes in internet-related crimes against

children. Baugh believed the ad’s repeated use of the word “young” indicated

the person posting it might be trying to contact minors for illicit purposes. So,

on June 25, 2020, he responded to the post using an undercover email

account.

Pretending to be a girl named “Brianna,” Baugh asked Harzan

what “GL” meant and what he did for fun. Harzan replied: “GL means ‘Good

Looking’ which is of course in the eye of the beholder. LOL I am looking for a

fun little playmate and someone I can mentor. What are you looking for? Do

you have a pic? Yours gets mine.” “Brianna” did not respond to that message.

The next day, Harzan emailed a photograph of himself to

“Brianna,” along with the following message: “Would you like to talk? I can

give you my cell number or we could meet somewhere and talk. A pic would

be nice. Here’s mine. I‘m available all afternoon today.” When “Brianna” did

not reply, Harzan sent her several follow-up messages, saying he was

generous and asking if she would like to meet. Still, she did not reply until

four days later, on June 30, 2020.

That day, the following email exchange occurred between

“Brianna” and Harzan:1

“[Brianna:] im only 13 so im pretty inexperienced...but wouldlike

to get some from someone that knows what to do lol.

“[Harzan:] I am more than happy to talk with you, but honestly

you are only 13 and therefore underage so sex is out of the question. I would

focus on your school work and getting a good education at this point and

forget about sex until you are at least 18. Always happy to talk with you

about life, boys, school, careers, and anything else on your mind. You sound

like a very sharp and intelligent young lady. Let me know if you would like

this type of mentoring support.

“[Brianna:] ur so sweet,,,but I have enough friends to talk with,

thk u tho

“[Harzan:] Would you be sweet enough to share a picture of

yourself?

“[Brianna:] why would u want a pic of me,,,u basically just said u

didnt want to do anything lol and how do I kno ur not gonna spread my pic

everywhere??

“[Harzan:] I promise I would never do that.

“[Brianna:] but i dnt know that....im 13 but im not a dumb girl. id

have to get to know you beforе sending pics...and u already said i was to

young for u

“[Harzan:] Well, we better meet then. When are you avail.”

At that point, “Brianna” reiterated she already had enough

friends. But she gave Harzan a phone number and told him he could text her

if he wanted to.

A couple of minutes later, Harzan sent “Brianna” a text message,

asking if she used Signal or WhatsApp, which are encrypted messaging apps

that have heightened privacy protections. “Brianna” said she used to use

WhatsApp, but her parents made her delete it. In response to Harzan’s

inquiry about what she liked to do, she said she was into “all sorts of things”

and wanted to “try some different stuff,” as well.

“Brianna” then asked Harzan what his initial post was about,

which led to the following exchange:

“[Harzan:] I like teaching young ladies like yourself about life

“[Harzan:] Sex for sure.

“[Brianna:] like what

“[Brianna:] mmmm

“[Brianna:] im interested,,

“[Brianna:] how do uteach

“[Harzan:] But other things as well if you’re up for it.

“[Harzan:] We would need to meet and talk about it

“[Brianna:] id wanna kno what im getting myself into,,,,but im for

sure down for stuff

“[Harzan:] I prefer hands on teaching to be honest

“[Brianna:] Ill be honest with u,,,ive never gone all the way with

a guy

“[Harzan:] But nothing would happen without your consent

“[Brianna:] have done pretty muvh everything else

“[Brianna:] well if ur nice and not an asshle when we meet

up,,,like I said

“[Brianna:] im down

“[Harzan:] I am very nice and respectful

“[Harzan:] Okay then. When would you like to get started”

The two then began discussing the logistics of getting together.

When “Brianna” asked how long their first meeting would be, Harzan told

her, “One hour maybe. Or two. Could be shorter if you like.” “Brianna”

replied “an hour? that’s it......i don’t kno if id want my first time being a

complete rush” “im not really sure how this woud go” “was hoping u would

kno and show me lol.”

Harzan texted back: “How about I swing by tomorrow or

Thursday and we meet face to face. If you like what you see we will set up

time on Friday. Several hours for training and taking it slow.” “Or you tell me

what your dream would be and I’ll make it come into being. It sounds like

you’re ready to move to the next step.” When “Brianna” asked Harzan what

they would do, he told her, “I have some ideas.” “Dream your vision tonight

and let’s talk about it tomorrow.” He then encouraged “Brianna” to delete

their conversation and said he would do the same.

The following morning, July 1, 2020, “Brianna” tеxted Harzan

saying, “i was up all night thinking about u” “u r very handsome btw [smiling

emoji]” She asked Harzan, “[I]f we were to have sex,,, would it be likein a

hotel?” Harzan answered, “Yes or my office.” “Brianna” told Harzan she

wanted to have sex but not get pregnant. When she asked Harzan about birth

control, he said condoms used with foam were the best way to prevent

pregnancy. That led to further discussions about their prospective encounter:

“[Brianna:] will u get whatever [birth control] u think is best if

we decide today is the day??”

“[Brianna:] i dont thnk I can get that stuff without it looking

sketchy

“[Harzan:] Yes

“[Harzan:] I‘ll do that

“[Brianna:] last dumb question,,,[¶] . . . [¶] . . . because ur older

than me,,,will it hurt more because urs is probably bigger than boys my age?

“[Harzan:] It could. The trick is to go slow and work up from

there

“[Harzan:] Stretch you out as it were

“[Brianna:] Wat do u mean as it were? [¶] . . . How do you stretch

a vagina…that sounds terrible lol [¶] . . . or not....

“[Harzan:] Very slowly and carefully. It is built to stretch and

expand. Where do you think babies arrive from?

“[Harzan:] It’s built to handle different sizes of penises

“[Harzan:] [Eggplant emoji]”

Harzan then asked “Brianna” about her prior sexual experiences

and whether she had ever had an orgasm. ‍‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍She said she had a few sexual

encounters with boys her age but had never gone “all the way” or had an

orgasm. Harzan then told her, “I can make you orgasm by licking you, or by

fingering you while I lick.” “There is the Gspot inside your vagina that gives

you the best orgasms. One has to hit it.” “Brianna” responded, “gotcha” “ok

now im excited” “lol.”

About half an hour later, “Brianna” messaged Harzan saying “if

we are planning on doin this today lemme kno” because I “have to start tellin

my parents something” as an excuse to get out of the house. Harzan

suggested they meet in two days, on Friday July 3, 2020. He also asked

“Brianna” if she would be willing to send him a picture of herself. She said

she preferred not to, but if things went well when they met, he could have all

the pictures he wanted.

Harzan later asked “Brianna” why she wanted to lose her

virginity so badly. When she replied she wanted her first time to be with

someone who knew what he was doing, Harzan said, “I can teach you alot.”

“Brianna” told Harzan “im ready” and asked about his previous sexual

encounters. Harzan said he had never had sex with someone as young as

“Brianna,” and his first sexual encounter—with “an older married woman”

when he was 17 years old—was not very good. He also told “Brianna” sex is

more pleasurable when “you‘re doing it with someone who” “you‘re attracted

to,” to which “Brianna” repliеd “well at least i got that going [kissing emoji].”

When “Brianna” asked where they were going to “do it,” Harzan said he had a

comfy blanket in his office that they could lay on, and she replied “ok.”

More texting ensued the following day, July 2, 2020. “Brianna”

told Harzan her parents had given her permission to go to her friend‘s house

the next day, to which Harzan replied, “Great!” He then sent “Brianna” a long

message that read:

“Brianna, I want to encourage you to consider 5 reasons NOT to

have intercourse before you are over 16. Preferably 17 or 18. Here they are; 1.

Boys will always want to sleep with you that is how they are genetically

wired. Your not having sex (intercourse) with them only makes them want

you more. You already know how to satisfy their desires without having

intercourse. Trust me they will respect you more. 2. When you have

intercourse with someone we are wired to want to bond with that person. The

more partners one has the less and less the stickiness for bonding occurs.

This can create potential problems when you get married and want to bond

with your mate. It‘s a chemical thing. You do not want to ‘lose’ your stickiness

for bonding. 3. Once you begin sexual intercourse you turn on your biological

internal clock and begin aging faster. Girls who hold off tend to blossom later

and age at a slower rate. 4. Once you start you are going to want it all the

time. You will live 100 years at your current age. What‘s holding off 3 or 4

more years? Thats 84 years of sex ahead of you. 5. Finally, the usual issues of

pregnancy and or disease that can come with promiscuity. Please give these

points careful consideration.”

That led to the following exchange:

“[Brianna:] i dont understand..

“[Brianna:] u could have just said u didnt want to meeet with me

“[Brianna:] im not forcing u to do anything

“[Harzan:] I do want to meet you

“[Brianna:] u didmnt have to be ,mean about it

“[Brianna:] Im not stupid and have thought about all that

“[Brianna:] Its MY choice

“[Brianna:] not urs or anyone elses

“[Harzan:] I‘m not being mean. I just want to make sure you‘ve

thought it all the way through

“[Brianna:] so what are u saying?

“[Harzan:] You decision”

“Brianna” then told Harzan, “i truly feel like u dont really want

to have sex with me anymore, which isn‘t how I wanted to feel for my first

time.” “[P]lease let me know if you still want to meet me, and if you are still

good with having sex with me, i want to know that you WANT to, just let me

kno either way.” Harzan replied, “I cannot because it is illegal for me to do so.

Believe me I WANT to. Let‘s talk tomorrow.” “Brianna” told Harzan she was

confused and would talk to him later.

The next day, “Brianna” messaged Harzan saying she still

wanted to have sex with him, but she wanted to know if the feeling was

mutuаl. Harzan replied, “I really really really want to, but i also really really

really don‘t want to go to jail. [Frowning emoji] A call would be nice.”

At that point, Detective Baugh had a female undercover police

officer call Harzan, pretending to be “Brianna.” During the call, the following

exchange occurred:

“[Brianna]: So are we going to meet up or something? Because I

told my mom I have soccer practice at 2:00.

“[Harzan]: Oh, gosh.

“[Brianna]: Because like, you know, it seems like you don‘t really

want to, and I thought this was like for sure.

“[Harzan]: Well, look. I really, really want to. The problem is I‘m

the one who takes the risk because if anyone finds out we did this, I am

hosed, I‘m screwed. That‘s the thing I‘m concerned about, so—

“[Brianna]: But, like, no one will know and it will just be us.

“[Harzan]: Yeah. And then what? If you tell a girlfriend or you

tell a friend at school, I‘m—and it gets back, then I‘m the one who is going to

be damaged. Not you. I mean, I‘m going to be—look, I really, really want to

do it. I mean, honestly. I mean, trust me. I want to help—I want to help you

do this. I‘m just nervous about—

“[Brianna]: Well, I don‘t—well, I don‘t have a lot of friends at

school anyways so I wouldn‘t tell anyone. And, like, I‘ve been talking to you

for a while now. I thought like—like—

“[Harzan]: Okay.

“[Brianna]: I thought we had something special here. And, like, I

don‘t even like the guys my age or anything so I thought this would be nice.

“[Harzan]: Why? Is this a one-time deal? Is that what we‘re doing

or were you thinking of something more?

“[Brianna]: I don‘t—well, I don‘t know. Whatever you want to do,

but I just really want to lose my virginity already. It feels like all the girls in

my class have already done it.

“[Harzan]: Wow. I doubt they have. They‘re probably just talking

big. Seriously. You think they all have? I don‘t think so. I don‘t think—

“[Brianna]: Well, yeah.

“[Harzan]: Is that—is that what‘s driving yоu is you want to—you

don‘t want to—you want to be like the other girls that you‘ve done it?

“[Brianna]: Well, kind of, but I want it to be like, I don‘t know,

better.

“[Harzan]: Uh-huh. How better?

“[Brianna]: Well, okay. Well, my mom is calling me. She wants to

know if I‘m actually going to go out or not. So I got to go. I‘m going to text

you. Okay?

“[Harzan]: Okay. Thanks, Brianna.”

Pretending to be “Brianna,” Detective Baugh then started texting

with Harzan again:

“[Brianna:] are we doing this or not?

“[Brianna:] i dont know what else i can do to make u want to

“[Harzan:] How about we meet and talk and see where things go

from there

“[Brianna:] i told u I don‘t need friends

“[Brianna:] i wanted to have sex with u,,,,but its kinda ovbious u

dont anymore

“[Harzan:] Tell me when and where and I‘ll be there

“[Brianna:] u promise?

“[Harzan:] Y

“[Brianna:] [Smiling hearts emoji]”

Harzan and “Brianna” then made arrangements to meet at a fast

food restaurant in Huntington Beach later that day. When Harzan arrived at

the restaurant, the police arrested him and took him into custody. Harzan

did not have any condoms in his possession, but he had already deleted about

70 percent of his text messages with “Brianna” by that time.

Harzan was charged with one count of communicating with a

minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense and one count of arranging

to meet a minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense. (Pen. Code,

§§ 288.3 & 288.4.)2

Before trial, the prosecution moved to admit evidence that

Harzan had sexually molested his younger sister and her friend when he was

in his teens, back in the early 1970s. The ‍‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍trial court ruled the evidence could

not be admitted in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, but if Harzan was going to

raise the defense of entrapment, the prosecution could introduce the evidence

to rebut that defense.

Harzan ended up foregoing an entrapment defense, and he did

not present any evidence in his defense. In closing argument, defense counsel

argued Harzan did not have the intent tо have sex with “Brianna” when he

was communicating with and arranging to meet her. However, the jury

convicted Harzan as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to two years

in prison for his crimes.

DISCUSSION

I.

THE PRIOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE

Harzan contends the trial court erred in ruling the prosecution

could admit evidence of his prior sexual misconduct if he raised an

entrapment defense. Harzan argues the misconduct evidence should have

been categorically excluded as unduly prejudicial and, by conditioning its

exclusion on him giving up an entrapment defense, the court infringed his

constitutional right to present a defense. The Attorney General asserts the

court’s ruling is nonreviewable because the misconduct evidence was never

admitted at trial and, in any event, the ruling was within the court’s

discretion and constitutionally sound. For the reasons explained below, we

conclude the court committed prejudicial error by allowing the prosecution to

introduce evidence of Harzan’s prior sexual misconduct if he did not

relinquish his right to assert the defense of entrapment.

A. Factual Background

In their trial briefs, the parties laid out the communications

between Harzan and “Brianna” and set forth their respective positions on the

admissibility of Harzan’s prior sexual misconduct. According to the

prosecutor, that misconduct came to light after the Huntington Beach Police

Department posted about Harzan’s arrest on its Facebook page. In response

to the post, Harzan’s sister (Jane Doe #1) reached out to the department and

reported Harzan had molested her one time when she was about six years old

and Harzan was about sixteen. She said the incident occurred in the garage

of their family home. Harzan pulled down his pants, exposing his erect penis,

and told her to put it in her mouth like “a lollipop.” She did as told, orally

copulating Harzan for a brief period. Afterwards, she did not tell anyone

about the incident, but she did bring it up to Harzan years later, when they

were adults. Harzan told her he was sorry, wrote her an apology, and offered

to go to therapy with her to help her work through it.

In addition to revealing her own abuse, Jane Doe #1 told the

police Harzan may also have victimized her childhood friend, Jane Doe #2, so

the police interviewed her, as well. Jane Doe #2 alleged Harzan molested her

one day when she was about eight or nine years old and he was about 18. She

had gone over to Harzan’s house to play with Jane Doe #1 that day, and when

she went into Harzan’s room to retrieve a toy, he orally copulated her and

offered her a dollar to lick his penis. When she refused, Harzan rubbed his

erect penis against her vagina, but he did not penetrate her. At one point

during the encounter, Jane Doe #1 opened the door, saw what was going on,

and quickly ran away. After that, Harzan made a comment that made Jane

Doe #2 think he might have molested Jane Doe #1, too.

The prosecutor contended this evidence was admissible under

Evidence Code section 1108 to show Harzan’s propensity to commit the

charged offenses.3 Alternatively, the prosecutor argued the evidence was

admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b) to show Harzan’s intent and

absence of mistake.

Defense counsel objected to admitting the evidence of Harzan’s

prior sexual misconduct, arguing, among other things, it was unduly

prejudicial under section 352. Defense counsel also informed the trial court

he would be seeking instructions on entrapment because, in communicating

with Harzan, Detective Baugh (under the guise of “Brianna“) engaged in “a

pattern of persistent badgering, cajoling, and importuning . . . which was

likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit” the charged

offenses. (Capitalization omitted.)

The trial court conducted a lengthy hearing on these issues. At

the outset, the court determined there was sufficient evidence to warrant

instructions on the defense of entrapment, based on the transcripts of the

messages between Harzan and “Brianna.”

The trial court then turned to the prosecution’s motion to

introduce evidence of Harzan’s prior sexual misconduct. The court ruled the

evidence was not admissible under section 1108 because Harzan was not

charged with a sexual offense as defined in subdivision (d)(1) of that statute.

It also ruled that, for purposes of section 1101, subdivision (b), the evidence

was not admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief because it was unduly

prejudicial under section 352. In fact, the court determined it would be

fundamentally unfair to allow the prosecution to admit the evidence because

Harzan’s prior sexual misconduct was “very, very old and very, very different

than the conduct we’re looking at in this case.”

However, the trial court believed the calculus would change if

Harzan raised an entrapment defense and requested instructions on that

theory. In that event, said the court, “the People [would] then have the

burden of proving the defendant was not entrapped.” And to meet that

burden, the prosecution could admit the evidence of Harzan’s prior sexual

misconduct to show he had the motive and intent to commit the charged

offenses.

Defense counsel challenged the trial court’s reasoning by pointing

to the wording of CALCRIM No. 3408, the standard jury instruction on

entrapment. That instruction statеs, “The defendant has the burden of

proving the defense [of entrapment] by a preponderance of the evidence.”

(CALCRIM No. 3408.) The instruction also makes clear the test for

determining whether a person has been entrapped is an objective one. That

is, whether the police “engaged in conduct that would cause a normally law￾abiding person to commit the [charged] crime” under the circumstances

presented. (Ibid.) Therefore, CALCRIM No. 3408 specifically states the jury

may not consider the defendant’s “particular intentions or character, or

whether [he] had a predisposition to commit the crime.” (Ibid.) Because the

focus of the entrapment defense is on the conduct of the police, defense

counsel argued Harzan’s prior sexual misconduct was not relevant to whether

he was entrapped by Detective Baugh.

The trial court disagreed. Although it stated it never liked “to put

a defense attorney in a position where they can’t do their defense,” the court

stood by its decision to allow the prosecution to introduce evidence of

Harzan’s prior sexual misconduct if he raised the defense of entrapment.

Faced with that prospect, defense counsel informed the court he would not be

seeking instructions on that defense. Counsel explained, “I am not requesting

the entrapment instruction in order to avoid the possibility of the

introduction of these other actions as a bootstrap way to get into the prior

conduct.”4

B. The Trial Court’s Ruling Is Reviewable

As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General contends Harzan

is procedurally barred from challenging the trial court’s decision to permit

the prosecution to introduce evidence ‍‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍of his prior sexual misconduct if he

raised an entrapment defense. Because Harzan did not raise the defense and

the misconduct evidence was never admitted, the Attorney General argues

Harzan failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.

In so arguing, the Attorney General relies on the rule that, to

challenge a pretrial ruling allowing the prosecution to impeach the defendant

with evidence of a prior сonviction, the defendant must actually take the

stand and suffer the impeachment. (Luce v. United States (1984) 469 U.S. 38;

People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378). The rationale for the rule is threefold:

“First, in order to determine the admissibility of [the

impeachment evidence], the court must balance its probative value against

its prejudicial effect under . . . section 352, an analysis that cannot be

performed unless the record discloses the content of the defendant’s

testimony. [Citations.] Second, if the defendant does not testify, any possible

harm from the trial court’s ruling is wholly speculative. The ruling might

change in response to the actual content of the defendant’s testimony, or the

prosecution might choose not to use the evidence at issue. [Citations.] Third,

if the trial court erred in its ruling, the appellate court could not ‘intelligently

weigh the prejudicial affect [sic] of that error.‘”

These three points underscore the core concern when the

defendant fails to testify and suffer impeachment by virtue of a prior

conviction. In that situation, there is an insufficient factual record to

determine whether the impeachment evidence was admissible and how it

would have impacted the defendant’s case in terms of prejudice. (Luce v.

United States, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 43 [the defendant’s testimony provides

the necessary factual context to permit meaningful review]; People v. Collins,

supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 384 [same].)

But, in this case, Harzan is not arguing the trial court’s decision

to allow the prosecution to use the evidence of his prior sexual misconduct

infringеd his constitutional right to testify. (See supra, p. 16, fn. 4.) Rather,

he is arguing the ruling infringed his constitutional right to present a defense

that the trial court had already deemed factually viable. Although we do not

know what Harzan would have said had he taken the stand at trial, the facts

pertaining to his entrapment defense are largely undisputed.

Those facts arose from the communications between Harzan and

“Brianna,” which were set forth at length in the parties’ trial briefs. So was

the evidence pertaining to Harzan’s alleged prior sexual misconduct. There

was no secret what the victims of that misconduct were going to say at trial if

Harzan had opted to raise the defense of entrapment. Under these

circumstances, there is a sufficient factual basis to review the propriety and

prejudicial effect of the trial court’s ruling regarding that evidence. Thus,

Harzan’s challenge to that ruling is not procedurally barred.

C. The Trial Court’s Ruling Was Erroneous and Prejudicially Violated

Harzan’s Right to Present a Defense

Relying on section 1101, subdivision (b), the Attorney General

asserts the trial court properly ruled the evidence of Harzan’s prior sexual

misconduct would be admissible if he raised an entrapment defense.5

We disagree.

Under section 1101, evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged

misconduct generally is inadmissible to prove his conduct on a specific

occasion or his propensity fоr criminal activity. (Id., subd. (a).) However, such

evidence may be admitted to prove a material fact in the case, such as

motive, intent, or absence of mistake. (Id., subd. (b).) Factors bearing on

admissibility include the relevance of the particular fact to be proven and

whether the evidence would be unduly prejudicial under section 352. (People

v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 705, disapproved on another point in People

v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)

Courts must keep in mind that “[e]vidence of uncharged offenses

‘is so prejudicial that its admission requires extremely careful analysis.

[Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘Since “substantial prejudicial effect [is] inherent in

[such] evidence,” uncharged offenses are admissible only if they hаve

substantial probative value.‘” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404.)

Here, the trial court determined that for purposes of proving the

charged offenses, the evidence of Harzan’s prior sexual misconduct was

“highly prejudicial” and “unfair” because the misconduct occurred roughly

half a century ago and was “very different” from what he was accused of

doing in this case. Therefore, the prosecution could not use that evidence in

its case-in-chief.

That evidence would not have become any less prejudicial if

Harzan had raised an entrapment defense. Nevertheless, the trial court

believed that with an entrapment defense in play, the probative value of the

evidence would increase, thereby tipping the scales in favor of admission.

This conclusion was informed by the court’s understanding that evidence of

Harzan’s state of mind was relevant to rebut a claim of entrapment.

As defense counsel pointed out below, however, entrapment turns

on whether the police conduct at issue would have caused a normally law￾abiding person to commit the charged offenses; it does not depend on what

the particular defendant was thinking when he committed the acts in

question. The California Supreme Court made this clear many years ago, in

People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675 (Barraza).

Tracing the historical development of the law on entrapment,

Barraza recognized the traditional test for entrapment is based on a

subjective standard that focuses on the defendant’s state of mind: If the

defendant had a preexisting intent or disposition to commit the charged

offense, he may be found guilty even if the police overstepped the bounds of

permissible investigative conduct. (Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 686–689.)

Barraza also acknowledged the subjective standard for entrapment is used in

the federal courts and in the vast majority of states. (Id. at pp. 686–689 & p.

692 (concur. and dissent. opn. of Richardson, J.); see also Roiphe, The Serpent

Beguiled Me: A History of the Entrapment Defense (2003) 33 Seton Hall

L.Rev. 257, 258.)

In Barraza, however, our Supreme Court took a different

approach to the issue and adopted an objective standard for determining

whether a defendant has been entrapped. As set forth in Barraza, “[T]he

proper test of entrapment in California is [whether] the conduct of the law

enforcement agent [was] likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to

commit the offense[.] For the purposes of this test, we presume that such a

person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime presented by

the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. Official conduct that does no more

than offer that opportunity to the suspect—for example, a decoy program—is

therefore permissible; but it is impermissible for the police or their agents to

pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such as badgering, cajoling,

importuning, or other affirmative acts likely to induce a normally law-abiding

person to commit the crime.” (Barraza, ‍‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 689–690, fn.

omitted.)

Under this standard, entrapment may be established if the police

induce a normally law-abiding person to commit a crime “because of

friendship or sympathy, instead of a desire for personal gain or other typical

criminal purpose.” (Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 690.) Or entrapment may

be established if the police make the crime unusually attractive to such a

person by promising the act is not illegal or the offense will go undetected.

(Ibid.)

“[W]hile the inquiry must focus primarily on the сonduct of the

law enforcement agent, that conduct is not to be viewed in a vacuum; it

should also be judged by the effect it would have on a normally law-abiding

person situated in the circumstances of the case at hand. Among the

circumstances that may be relevant for this purpose, for example, are the

transactions preceding the offense, the suspect’s response to the inducements

of the officer, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances

of its commission. [Citation.] . . . [H]owever, . . . such matters as the character

of the suspect, his predisposition to commit the offense, and his subjective

intent are irrelevant.” (Barrazа, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 690–691, italics

added.)

That being the case, the trial court’s conclusion that an

entrapment defense would open the door to Harzan’s prior misconduct

evidence bearing on his motive and intent was incorrect. Contrary to the trial

court’s understanding, those issues regarding Harzan’s subjective state of

mind were not relevant to whether Detective Baugh’s actions would cause a

normally law-abiding person to commit the offenses at issue here.

In arguing otherwise, the Attorney General relies on People v.

Foster (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 594, which upheld the admission of the

defendant’s prior criminal acts on the theory they were relevant to defeat his

entrapment defense by showing his predisposition to commit the chargеd

offense. (Id. at pp. 596–599.) In so doing, however, Foster applied the

subjective standard of entrapment that was disapproved five years later in

Barraza. (Foster at pp. 596–597.) Although evidence of the defendant’s prior

criminal activity may be admitted to refute a claim of entrapment under the

subjective standard, Barraza makes clear such evidence is inadmissible

under the objective standard of entrapment the court articulated in that case.

(Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 688–691.) The Foster decision is thus of no

aid to the Attorney General here.6

Even so, the Attorney General contends the trial court’s ruling

did not violate Harzan’s right to present a defense because he voluntarily

chose to surrender his entrapment defense to avoid the introduction of the

prior sexual misconduct evidence. According to the Attorney General, that

choice was no different than any other strategic decision criminal defendants

are called upon to make during the trial process, such as whether to present

favorable evidence that might permit the introduction of unfavorable

evidence.7

As we explained above, however, the choice Harzan was

presented here—to either abandon a factually-supported entrapment defense

or suffer the introduction of highly prejudicial prior misconduct evidence—

was based on the trial court’s legal misunderstanding of the entrapment

defense. Because Hаrzan should never have been put to that choice, we reject

the Attorney General’s claim that he voluntarily surrendered his right to

present an entrapment defense. (See Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547

U.S. 319 [absent a valid justification, the state cannot impede a defendant’s

constitutional right to present a defense]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S.

683 [same].)

Having determined the trial court violated Harzan’s right to

present a defense, we turn to the issue of prejudice. We must decide whether

that violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on the record before

us. (See People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 23 [assuming a violation of

a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense is rеviewed under the

harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v.

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18]; People v. Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136,

138 [applying the Chapman standard in deciding whether the trial court’s

failure to instruct on an affirmative defense was prejudicial]; People v.

Mulcrevy (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 127, 131 [same].) That is a demanding

standard: Reversal is required unless the failure to instruct on entrapment

was so unimportant and insignificant to the case that there is no reasonable

possibility it might have contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict. (Chapman,

supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367.)

According to Harzan’s Craigslist ad, he was seeking a “young

coed friend” to have “good times” with. And after “Brianna” contacted him, he

made it clear he was interested in having sex with her, even though she told

him she was only 13 years old. But Harzan also repeatedly told “Brianna”

he could not have sex with her, as much as he wanted to. As defense counsel

pointed out in closing argument, there is a difference between wanting to

commit a crime and actually carrying it out. Our criminal law prohibits the

latter but not the former.

More important, every time Harzan told “Brianna” he could not

have sex with her, she expressed disappointment and tried to convince him to

change his mind by using sympathy and guilt. In addition, “Brianna” assured

Harzan he would not get caught because she would not tell anyone if they did

have sex. These techniques were cited in Barrazа as examples of possible

police overreach. (Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 690.) Although there is no

way of knowing whether an entrapment defense would have succeeded at

Harzan’s trial, we cannot conclude the failure to instruct on that defense was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Harzan’s convictions cannot

stand.

II.

THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Although the judgment must be reversed due to the evidentiary

error discussed above, we do not believe the evidence was insufficient to

support the jury’s verdict, so as to preclude the prosecution from retrying

Harzan, if it chooses to do so. Harzan maintains there is insufficient evidence

he acted with the rеquisite intent to commit a sexual offense with “Brianna.”

The record shows otherwise.

8

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

Notes

1
The exchanges between “Brianna” and Harzan are reproduced largely as is, with abbreviations and grammatical errors intact, to accurately reflect the nature of their conversations.
2
These crimes do not require the prosecution to prove the purported victim is a real person; they simply require proof the defendant believed the victim was real. (See Pen. Code, § 288.4, subd. (a)(1); People v. Korwin (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 682 [it was no defense under Penal Code section 288.3 that the teenage girl the defendant thought he was communicating with was actually an adult undercover police officer].)
3
Unless noted otherwise, all further statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
4
In addition to allowing the prosecution to present evidence of Harzan’s prior sexual misconduct to prove his motive and intent if he raised an entrapment defense, the trial court separately ruled the prosecution could use that evidence to impeach Harzan’s credibility if he testified during the trial. Harzan’s appeal is limited to the first issue; he does not challenge the court’s ruling on the impeachment issue.
5
The Attorney General does not dispute the trial court’s ruling that the evidence was inadmissible for purposes of section 1108.
6
The Attorney General also cites Fоster for the proposition that the defendant must admit committing the charged crimes in order to raise an entrapment defense. That, too, is incorrect. (Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 691–692.)
7
For example, if the defense introduces evidence the defendant has a good character that is inconsistent ‍‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍with the charged crimes, the prosecution can introduce bad character evidence to rebut it. (§ 1102.)
8
Harzan also contends Detective Baugh‘s testimony exceeded the permissible scope of a pretrial ruling and expert testimony generally. Because we are reversing on other grounds, and because the testimony is likely to play out differently in the event the case is retried, we need not address these issues.

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Harzan
Court Name: California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
Date Published: Apr 16, 2026
Citation: G064798
Docket Number: G064798
Court Abbreviation: Cal. App. 4th Div. 3
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