Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty but mentally ill on a charge of arson of a dwelling, MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267. She was sentenced to twelve to twenty years in prison. This Court granted defendant’s motion for a remand to allow defendant to move for a new trial on the grounds of lack of competence to stand trial *102 and рrejudice resulting from the nonproduction of a witness. Following the hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals as оf right from this decision and raises several claims of error, two of which we find dispositive. We reverse and remand.
On appeal, defendant claims that it was error for the trial court to fail to have her competence reevaluated prior to trial. We agree.
A criminal defendant is рresumed competent to stand trial absent a showing that "he is incapable because of his mental condition of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense in a rational manner.” MCL 330.2020(1); MSA 14.800(1020)(1). An incompetent defendant "shall not be proceeded against while he is incompetent.” MCL 330.2022(1); MSA 14.800(1022X1). The issue of a defendant’s competence to stand trial may be raised by either party or the court. MCL 330.2024; MSA 14.800(1024). Although the dеtermination of a defendant’s competence is within the trial court’s discretion,
People v Newton (After Remand),
Defendant was charged with having started a fire at her apartment complex on August 11, 1985. The complex was for senior citizens and disabled persons. It is undisputed that defendant had long suffered from severe mental illness. She had been *103 hospitalized and treated for schizophrenia at least fifteen times since 1977. In January, 1986, defendant was determinеd incompetent to stand trial. Less than two months later, however, she was determined competent to stand trial. However, when trial began, in January, 1987, defendant stated that she felt incompetent, requested a court order for hospitalization, and stated that she was incoherent. The trial cоurt responded that defendant seemed to be "getting along pretty good,” and defense counsel stated that "as far as I’m concerned . . . it’s our position that while Ms. Harris has a serious mental problem, it was not a factor in this particular case.”
Our examination of the record finds that it is replete with instances of bizarre statements and behavior of defendant. This Court remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether the trial court should have determined defendant’s competence prior to the trial. At that evidentiary hearing, a clinical psychologist testified that defendant’s delusions would persist even when her medication was properly effective. He stated that it was highly unlikely that defendant was comрetent at the time of trial and that, had an examination for competence been performed at trial, she most likely would have been found not competent. Following the hearing, the court denied the motion for a nunc pro tunc competence hearing.
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing as well as the record of the trial itself shows that at the time of trial there was at least a bona fide doubt аs to whether defendant was competent to stand trial. Accordingly, we find that it was error for the trial court to fail to have defendant’s compеtence reevaluated prior to trial.
We also address defendant’s claim that she was
*104
denied effective assistance of counsel. We presume that trial counsel afforded his client effective representation.
Newton, supra
at 487-488. Defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise.
People v Ginther,
At the May, 1986, compеtence hearing, defense counsel did not question the psychologist who found defendant competent to stand trial, stating that he was "really not opposing this” and "I’m satisfied she’s competent to stand trial.” At that point, the court questioned the psychologist at length. Following the court’s questioning, defеnse counsel did question the psychologist, but only as to whether defendant might become incompetent at some point during the trial. Counsel later аnnounced his position that "[i]f she’s able to stand trial, I’d like to have her tried.” He did state, however, that "for the record, I don’t think she can.”
As trial commenсed, defendant requested that the case be adjourned so that she could get some help. Defense counsel, however, stated his belief "thаt while Ms. Harris has a serious mental problem, it was not a factor in this particular case.” He later stated:
I would point out, your Honor, that this is a lady whо has never faced stress. She always tries to run from it. I don’t think it’s going to — this may sound harsh — I think making her stand trial might be good for her. It’s going to be very difficult because *105 I know she will interrupt, and everybody knows she’s going to have trouble. But if she stands trial and gets through it, I think it will benefit her and I know it sounds strange, but that’s what I have.
This statement not only directly contradicted the expressed wishes of defendant, but also showed defense counsel’s doubt as to defendant’s ability to assist in her defense. To request a trial under such circumstances cannot be said to be effective assistance of counsel.
This attitude continued into the sentencing stage. A сriminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.
People v Dye,
At the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial, defense counsel testified that his basic approach was to keep defendant calm and seated. In response to questioning by thе court, he stated his two defenses at trial were "not guilty by reason of insanity” and "guilty but mentally ill,” despite the *106 fact that defendant always maintained her innocence.
We note that "guilty but mentally ill” is, in essence, not a defеnse, but is a functional equivalent of a guilty plea. See
People v Fisher,
Reversed.