OPINION OF THE COURT
The People appeal from an order of the Appellate Division which reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of bribe receiving by a witness (Penal Law § 215.05). The issue before us is whether an unlawful agrеement to alter one’s testimony or avoid appearing at an action or proceeding may fairly be inferred from a "release” agreement in which one party agrees to "drop” criminal and civil charges in exchange for money and other valuable consideration. We agree with the Appellate Division that such a purported "release” is, without more, legally insufficient to establish the elements of the crime.
This appeal revolves around a feud between the Harper and Johnson families. The imbroglio began during the spring of 1981 when defendant, Montey Harper, became romantically
A few days later, Harper approached Betty Gladden, informed her about the аssault and threatened to bring a civil suit and pursue the criminal charges, unless she paid Harper $10,000. Gladden acceded to Harper’s demands. Prior to giving Harper any money, however, Gladden had Harper execute a general release agreement. This agreement, drawn up on law firm stationery, and signed by Harper and Gladden in the presence of a notary, provided that:
"I, Montey Harper, promise to drop сharges against James A. Johnson, Jr. also known as Rick James for a cash reimbursement in the sum of $5000.00 (five thousand and no/100 dollars).
"This sum represents my reimbursement for medical expenses that concurred [sic] due to a scuffle at the 2001 Night Club in Amherst, New York on June 1, 1984.
"Upon receipt of the $5000.00, I promise not harass or molest Mr. James, either verbally or in any other way.
"In return, I would like him to also not harass or harm me either verbally or in any other way.
"I, also promise to drop all Criminal or Civil Suits against Mr. James also Carmen Sims.”
The agreement further provided a time schedule by which an additional $5,000 would be paid to Harper.
After the initial $5,000 was delivered to Harper, Gladden drove Hаrper directly to the Amherst Town Court so that Harper could perform his end of the bargain by having the
On October 3, 1984, Harper retained a new attorney who refiléd the assault charges in criminal court because Glаdden had failed to make some of the scheduled payments, and James was purportedly violating the nonharassment clause of the release. At this time, Harper informed Assistant District Attorney Graff that he no longer wanted to drop the charges against James, since he had not received ail of the money that he was supposed to have received under the release agreement. Thereafter, Harper proceeded to make himself available to the prosecution and attended each court appearance made by James. Ultimately, the assault charges were again dismissed on March 19, 1985, uрon the court’s own motion, because of its view that the matter was better handled in alternate dispute resolution or in a civil action.
Meanwhile, Betty Gladden, having paid a total of $6,400, became financially unable to fulfill the remainder of her side of the bargain. Concerned that Harper would continue to harass her family, Gladden spoke with an attorney, who brought this entire matter to the attention of the District Attorney.
Harper was charged with bribe receiving by a witness in contravention of Penal Law § 215.05, and, after a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed Harper’s conviction and dismissed the indictment, сoncluding the evidence presented was legally insufficient since "the record contains no evidence that defendant would alter his testimony if the criminal prosecution against the son were continued or thаt defendant sought to absent himself or otherwise avoid appearing as required by the People.” (
As a threshold matter, in reviewing legal sufficiency we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and decide whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Contes,
Penal Law § 215.05 provides that: "A witness * * * is guilty of bribe receiving by a witness when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that (a) his testimony will be influenced, or (b) he will absent himself from, or otherwise avoid or seek to avoid appearing or testifying at, such action or proceeding.”
The gist of the crime is not the payment of money, but rather the "agreement or understanding” under which a witness accepts or agrees to accept a benefit (see, People v Arcadi,
Our inquiry in this case focuses upon the meaning of the word "drop” as that term appears in the general release agreement executed by defendant and was used by him in his conversations with A.D.A.’s Kurtzhalts and Graff. Indeed, defendant’s signed agreement to "drop” civil and criminal charges in exchange for the payment of money сonstitutes the heart of the People’s case.
The People argue that although defendant’s signed promise to "drop the charges” does not explicitly state that he would avoid testifying or absent himself from thе criminal proceedings, the expectation that he would not appear is implicit in the agreement. Further, the People maintain, the phrase "drop the charges” can be interpreted as a promise to attempt in some manner to halt the criminal proceedings or hinder the prosecution. In the People’s view, the solicitation or acceptance of a benefit in exchange for а refusal to cooperate with the prosecutor or an attempt to have a criminal complaint dismissed is a violation of Penal Law § 215.05. Under the circumstances of this case, the People’s argumеnts cannot be sustained.
Thus, the decision to drop сharges cannot provide a sufficient basis from which a rational jury could infer that defendant had entered into the kind of agreement prohibited by Penal Law § 215.05. Since the record is devoid of any additional evidenсe establishing such an agreement, the jury verdict could only have been based upon sheer speculation that defendant, in addition to agreeing to drop the criminal and civil charges, also agreed to еither perjure or absent himself if the assault case had gone to trial. This is especially so where, as here, the terms of the agreement itself reveal a far less sinister purpose.
Finally, the People’s argument, that the statute should be construed to encompass agreements to hinder a prosecution or attempt improperly to remove a case from the criminal justice system, would, if accepted, viоlate the general principle that penal statutes are to be interpreted according to the fair import of their terms so that penal responsibility is not extended beyond the fair scope of thе statutory mandate (see, People v Ditta,
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur; Judge Alexander taking no part.
Order affirmed.