People v. HanssonPeople v. Hansson
Cliff Gordon, Monticello, for appellant.
James R. Farrell, District Attorney, Monticello, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Egan Jr., J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (McGuire, J.), rendered January 13, 2016, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree and criminal obstruction of breathing or
On June 18, 2014, police were dispatched to the Short Line bus terminal in the Village of Monticello, Sullivan County in response to a 911 call from a civilian reporting that two people had just gotten off of a bus with two small children who looked like they had been beaten. Upon arrival, the police encountered defendant, her three-year-old son (hereinafter the victim) and her 18-month-old son standing at a picnic table across the street from the bus terminal. One of the officers observed that the victim had two black eyes and various bruises. Upon inquiry, defendant informed the police that the victim was prone to falls and had fallen down a flight of stairs. Michael Croci, defendant‘s boyfriend, arrived shortly thereafter and, following a few additional questions, defendant and Croci agreed to accompany the police to their station. Shortly thereafter, the victim was transported by ambulance to Catskill Regional Medical Center (hereinafter CRMC) and then airlifted by helicopter to Westchester Medical Center. Upon admission to the intensive care unit, the victim was intubated and found to suffer from a major abdominal injury, a fractured neck, three pelvic fractures, a fractured left humerus, a fractured clavicle, numerous fractured ribs, multiple fractures in both his hands, bruises and hematomas across his abdomen, head, back, face and ears, a bruised pancreas and a perforated colon, and he was bleeding in his obturator muscle, belly and intestines. Meanwhile, defendant was questioned by police and gave a written statement wherein she admitted to punching, hitting, kicking, pushing and slapping the victim, as well as holding her hand over his mouth so he could not breathe.
Defendant was thereafter charged by indictment with assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree and criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation. Defendant‘s subsequent motion to preclude her oral and written statements
Defendant‘s initial contention that County Court erred in not suppressing her oral and written statements to law enforcement because she was taken into custody without probable cause was not preserved for our review as defendant failed to challenge the legality of her detention and/or arrest in her omnibus motion (see
We find similarly unavailing defendant‘s contention that County Court improperly limited her direct examination of Amber Dinoff, a friend of defendant who provided a temporary home for defendant‘s two children in the month prior to her moving into an apartment with Croci. Although County Court limited Dinoff from testifying to whether she observed Croci hit defendant during a visit to her residence, such testimony was not relevant to whether defendant was guilty of beating her son and, therefore, it did not serve to impair defendant‘s ability to present a defense (People v DeFreitas, 116 AD3d 1078, 1082 (2014), lv denied 24 NY3d 960 (2014)). To the extent that defendant argues that such testimony was relevant to establish Croci‘s coercive control over defendant, we note that
Next, we reject defendant‘s contention that she was deprived of her right to a fair trial when County Court denied her application to retain an expert witness in support of the theory that she was under the coercive control of Croci and that, by reason of that control, she falsely confessed to beating her son. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has recognized that psychiatric and/or psychological experts “may offer valuable testimony to educate a jury about those factors of personality and situation that the relevant scientific community considers to be associated with false confessions. While the expert may not testify as to whether a particular defendant‘s confession was or was not reliable, the expert‘s proffer must be relevant to the defendant and interrogation before the court” (People v Bedessie, 19 NY3d 147, 161 (2012); see People v Jeremiah, 147 AD3d 1199, 1204-1205 (2017), lvs denied 29 NY3d 1031, 1033 (2017)). In determining the relevancy of the proposed expert testimony, the trial court must examine “‘the nature of the interrogation, the applicability of the science of false confessions to the defendant and the extent to which the People‘s case relie[s] on the confession‘” (People v Jeremiah, 147 AD3d at 1205, quoting People v Evans, 141 AD3d 120, 126 (2016), appeal dismissed 28 NY3d 1101 (2016)). Notably, the admissibility of expert testimony is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or error of law (see People v Bedessie, 19 NY3d at 156; People v Heyliger, 126 AD3d 1117, 1120 (2015), lv denied 25 NY3d 1165 (2015); People v Salce, 124 AD3d 923, 926 (2015), lv denied 25 NY3d 1207 (2015)).
In support of her application, defendant argued that it was essential that she be able to retain and present the expert testimony of Evan Stark, a forensic social worker, to explain why she would falsely confess to beating her own child and/or why she would protect the person who actually inflicted injuries on her child. Defendant‘s proffer in this regard suffered from two shortcomings. First, defendant failed to present any evidence
Further, we find no error in County Court‘s admission of two statements that the victim provided to medical professionals implicating defendant as his abuser upon his admission to CRMC and Westchester Medical Center. Upon his admission to the emergency department at CRMC, a nurse inquired of the victim as to what had happened to his neck, to which he replied “mommy [choked] me, mommy tied me and pulled me,” which statements she included in a late entry note in the victim‘s medical records. Thereafter, upon being airlifted to Westchester Medical Center, the victim‘s attending physician inquired of the victim as to who had hurt him, to which the victim responded “mommy hurt me.” Both statements fall squarely within the business records exception to the hearsay rule as the inquiry was made for the express purpose of “determin[ing]
Nor did County Court err in admitting medical records with regard to various injuries that the victim sustained predating the time period set forth in the indictment. Admission of such evidence was material and relevant on the issue of whether defendant‘s conduct evinced a depraved indifference to human life — an element of assault in the first degree (see
Lastly, we find defendant‘s contention that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive to be without merit. The attending pediatric physician at the Westchester Medical Center emergency room — a level I trauma center — testified that the injuries that the three-year-old victim sustained were extreme, that he presented with “more bruises than any child abuse
McCarthy, J.P., Aarons, Rumsey and Pritzker, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Egan Jr., J.
Appellate Division, Third Department