People v. HansenPeople v. Hansen
Justices Holdridge and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Subsequent to a bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Carl Hansen, guilty of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer in violation of section 11-204(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code).
¶ 2 I. FACTS
¶ 4 On October 13, 2016, the case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Deputy Joseph Femali of the Henry County Sheriff‘s Department testified. On November 26, 2015, Femali initiated a traffic stop on the 300 block of East Court Street, also known as Route 81, in Henry County. Femali established that he was in uniform, driving a black, fully marked squad car with lights on top that were flashing red and blue. Deputy Corey Hixson of the Henry County Sheriff‘s Department saw Femali conducting the stop and pulled in behind Femali‘s squad car to assist. Femali stated that Hixson‘s squad car‘s emergency lights were on while assisting with the stop. Hixson testified that he was in uniform, driving a white, marked squad car with a light-emitting diode (L.E.D.) bar on top of the vehicle. He did not testify to the color of his squad car‘s emergency lights.
¶ 5 Hixson was observing traffic from his squad car while Femali was conducting the stop. Hixson watched a red Dodge passenger vehicle heading eastbound on Route 81 drive by Femali during the stop. Hixson believed the Dodge had not given Femali sufficient room to conduct the traffic stop in violation of Scott‘s Law.
¶ 7 Hixson further described the lights on his squad car to the court: “[y]eah I [had] *** my wigwags in the front and rear activate[d] when I flipped the full switch all the way on. I [had] my L.E.D. light bar, which also has takedowns that flash too. All [of] that was illuminated.”
¶ 8 The Dodge began to accelerate away from Hixson once the emergency lights and siren on his squad car were activated. The Dodge reached speeds varying between 85 and 90 miles per hour during the pursuit. The Dodge traveled at those speeds for approximately two miles on Route 81 while Hixson had his lights and siren engaged. During the pursuit, other traffic on the roadway pulled off to the side or stopped to let the vehicles pass. During closing arguments, defendant‘s attorney claimed that “[i]t wasn‘t the defendant causing these people to have to pull over because he was [not] creating a dangerous situation for them.” The Dodge eventually came to a stop at which time Hixson made contact with defendant.
¶ 9 Defendant testified at trial. He stated that he saw the squad cars during the initial stop and “thought [he] went over a little bit[]” to “give them the room they need[ed].” He went on to explain that it was loud inside of his vehicle because of a detached exhaust system and the elevated volume at which he was playing his music. Defendant asserted, “I heard sirens, so I
“Q. Okay. And do you remember, was there anything that the vehicle was doing; lights, siren, anything?
A. Sirens I heard over the music that I was listening to.
Q. And that caused you to look in the rear-view or side-view mirror?
A. Side-view.
Q. And what else did you see?
A. I just seen Hixson.
Q. Okay. And were there lights going?
A. Yes.”
¶ 10 The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated fleeing or eluding. The court also found Hixson “had all his lights and whistles running” while in pursuit of defendant. Defendant‘s motion to reconsider was denied. Defendant appealed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70. “[I]t is not the function of this court to retry the defendant.” People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209 (2004). In weighing evidence, the trier of fact need not disregard inferences which flow naturally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable
¶ 13 Section 11-204(a) of the Code provides, in pertinent part:
“Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop ***. The signal given by the peace officer may be by hand, voice, siren, red or blue light. Provided, the officer giving such signal shall be in police uniform, and, if driving a vehicle, such vehicle shall display illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights which when used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren would indicate the vehicle to be an official police vehicle.”
625 ILCS 5/11-204(a) (West 2014).
¶ 14 Defendant contends since the State failed to specify whether the lights activated by Hixson were “red or blue lights” as required by section 11-204(a), there is insufficient evidence to show that Hixson gave the statutorily required visual signal to stop. However, “[p]ursuant to section 11-204(a), the purpose of requiring use of a vehicle‘s ‘illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights’ with a siren is so that they ‘would indicate the vehicle to be an official police vehicle.’ ” People v. Brown, 362 Ill. App. 3d 374, 379 (2005). The only question before us is whether it can be inferred, based on the evidence, whether the lights used satisfied the statute, in that they were “oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights which when used in
¶ 15 Defendant relies on People v. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d 175 (2001), and People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133582, to support his argument that the State provided insufficient evidence. In Murdock, the State presented no evidence as to whether the officer pursuing the defendant was in uniform. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 176. The reviewing court overturned defendant‘s conviction for aggravated fleeing. Id. at 176-77. The court found the State‘s failure to establish that the officer was in uniform fatal to its charge of aggravated fleeing. Id. In Williams, the evidence established that the officer was in civilian clothing. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133582, ¶ 3. The court found Murdock to be controlling and reversed the defendant‘s conviction for aggravated fleeing. Id. ¶ 10. While we agree with the language in Murdock and Williams that ” ‘[w]e are not free to rewrite the language of the legislature, which speaks for itself[,]’ ” (Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133582, ¶ 11 (quoting Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 177)) it was established at trial that Hixson was in uniform making these cases factually distinguishable. We find People v. Brown, 362 Ill. App. 3d 374, applicable to the instant case. In Brown, the reviewing court dismissed the same argument presented by defendant; that the statute was not met where the evidence failed to establish that the officer displayed red or blue lights while attempting to curb the defendant‘s vehicle. See Brown, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 379. The officer testified he was driving a marked squad car and engaged the vehicle‘s siren and emergency lights when he pursued the defendant. Id. Although the officer did not testify that the emergency lights were red or blue, the court concluded that it reasonably could be inferred that the officer activated the squad car‘s “illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights” during the pursuit, clearly giving the defendant a visual sign to bring his vehicle to a stop. Id.
¶ 17 Consequently, the trial court reasonably inferred from all of the evidence in the record that the emergency lights on Hixson‘s squad car satisfied the statute, in that they were “oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights which when used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren would indicate the vehicle to be an official police vehicle.”
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Henry County.