In a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and assault with intent to rob being unarmed, MCL 750.88; MSA 28.283. He appeals as of right.
On appeal, defendant contends that his inculpatory statement to police should have been suppressed from evidence. Defendant claims that his statement was given during interrogation which followed his invocation of his right to remain silent. We cannot agree based on the facts presented at the
Walker
hearing.
People v Walker
*237
(On Rehearing),
Defendant claims that his 2:30 p.m. refusal to change his earlier statement was an invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent. The failure to scrupulously honor this right, defendant contends, negates any subsequent waiver of his right to remain silent.
The right to cut off custodial interrogation is a critical safeguard of the right not to give testimony against oneself.
Michigan v Mosley,
We also agree with the circuit judge that defendant’s 8:30 p.m. statement to police was not the result of the exploitation of the earlier arrest of defendant without probable cause. At the time the statement sought to be admitted into evidence was made, probable cause to arrest defendant had existed for hours. We find that there were sufficient intervening circumstances to attenuate the taint of defendant’s illegal arrest. See
Johnson v Louisiana,
Defendant also claims on appeal that the trial judge erred by admitting into evidence the identification testimony of Simpson Webb. An appellate court reviews a trial court’s determination following a Wade
2
hearing by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged pretrial identification and determining whether those procedures were so impermissibly suggestive that they gave rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.
People v Dean,
We also agree with the trial judge’s holding that
*239
Mr. Webb’s inability to identify the defendant at a line-up does not preclude the admission of his subsequent positive in-court identification. In such a case, defense counsel is free to inform the jury of the circumstances of the unsuccessful identification. See
People v Belenor,
Even if the decision to admit Mr. Webb’s identification testimony was an error, we would not reverse because we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it was harmless. Error in admitting testimony tainted by impermissibly suggestive procedures conducive to irreparable mistaken identification warrants reversal only where the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gilbert v California,
Defendant also objects to the admission into evidence of bloodstained clothing found in his room. He claims that the evidence presented was insufficient to show any connection between him and the clothing. This claim is without merit. Pursuant to the execution of a search warrant, police confiscated from defendant’s room some shirts, a pair of tan pants, a beige jacket, a hat and a pair of shoes. All of the clothing was stained with what appeared to be blood. Another resident of the house in which defendant lived testified that *240 she saw defendant shortly before the killing wearing beige pants, a print shirt and a beige jacket. This testimony was sufficient to allow the prosecution to present in evidence the clothing found in defendant’s room.
Affirmed.