This аppeal concerns the extent to which a licensed physician may delegate tasks to a physician whose liсense has been suspended.
Defendant was a licensed osteopathic physician practicing medicine in Bentоn Harbor, Michigan. On January 19, 1982, he was convicted by a jury of illegally prescribing a controlled substance to a patient for other than legitimate and professionally recognized purposes. MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401). As a result of that conviction, defendant’s license was suspended by the Board of Osteopathic Medicine for a period of six months beginning April 4, 1983. The board further ordered that defendant be placed on probation for a period of two years folllowing his suspension.. As a condition of probation, defendant was prohibited from holding a controlled substance license for an additional six months following the expiration of his suspension.
On July 26, 1983, with approximately two months remaining on his suspension, defendant allegedly dispensed refill prescriptions of phentermine, a schedule 4 controlled substance, MCL 333.7218(3); MSA 14.15(7218)(3), to two former patients. Defendant was subsequently charged with the unlawful delivеry of a controlled substance, MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401), and practicing medicine without a license, MCL 333.16294; MSA 14.15(16294).
Following his preliminary examination, defendаnt was bound over to circuit court for trial. A motion to quash the information was filed. In *834 support of the motion, defendant argued thаt he had been delegated proper authority by a licensed physician to dispense refill maintenance medication pursuant to MCL 333.16215; MSA 14.15(16215). The court denied defendant’s motion and further ordered that the issue of delegation was a question of fact for the jury. When asked at a later date to clarify its holding, the court reiterated its belief that the issue of whether a suspendеd physician could be delegated authority pursuant to state statute to dispense controlled substances was a question of fact for the jury. In this interlocutory appeal, the state appeals by leave granted and argues that, contrary to the holding of the trial court, the issue of delegation is properly a question of law for the court. We agree.
Any drug requiring a prescription, including phentermine, can be dispensed only by a licensed pharmacist or physician. MCL 333.17751; MSA 14.15(17751); MCL 333.17708(2); MSA 14.15(17708)(2). See MCL 333.7303(1); MSA 14.15(7303)(1). Becаuse of the suspension imposed by the Board of Osteopathic Medicine, defendant at the time in question was not licensed to either prescribe or dispense controlled substances. The statute upon which defendant bases his defense, MCL 333.16215; MSA 14.15(16215), provides in pertinent part as follows:
"(1) A licensee who holds a license other than a health profession subfield license may delegate to a licensed or unlicensed individual who is otherwise qualified by education, training, or experience the performance of selected acts, tasks, or functions where the acts, tasks, or functions fall within the scope of prаctice of the licensee’s profession and will be performed under the licensee’s supervision. An act, task, or functiоn shall not be delegated under this section which, under standards of acceptable and prevailing practice, re *835 quires the level of education, skill, and judgment required of a licensee under this article.”
"Delegation” is defined as:
"* * * an authorization granted by a licenseе to a licensed or unlicensed individual to perform selected acts, tasks, or functions which fall within the scope of practice of the delegator and which are not within the scope of practice of the delegatee and which, in the absence of the authorization, would constitute illegal practice of a licensed profession” MCL 333.16104(1); MSA 14.15(16104(1).
Under this seсtion, an unlicensed individual with proper delegation may perform tasks which, in the absence of that delegation, would constitute criminal conduct. The question is whether under the statute a licensed physician may delegate the tasks of prescribing аnd dispensing drugs to a physician whose license has been suspended.
The primary goal of a court when interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Hill v Highland Park General Hospital,
If defendant is held to be a proper delegate of the rights afforded licensed physicians, including the right to prescribe or dispense controlled substances, he will in effect be allowed to circumvent *836 the terms of and reasons for his suspension. Such a result could not have been intended by the Legislature. In addition, such a holding would frustrate the purpose behind the code’s enactment of protecting the public from incompetence, deception, and fraud. Even though defendant was presumably qualified by education, training, or experience to perform the functions of examining patients and dispensing prescriptions, his criminal сonviction demonstrated an adverse effect upon his ability to practice medicine in a safe and competent manner. That conviction also indicates a lack of the requisite "judgment” required of a licensee under § 16215 of the Public Health Code, and accordingly the function of prescribing or dispensing controlled substances could not be delegated to him as a matter of law.
This conclusion is consistent with prior interpretations by this Court of the Public Health Code which have severely circumscribed the authority of anyone other than a licensee to prescribe or dispense even noncontrolled substances.
Attorney General v
Raguckas,
Since any purported delegation of authority to defendant was a legаl nullity, the question of whether defendant’s actions constitute illegal conduct is one of law to be decided by the trial court.
Reversed and remanded.