69 N.Y.2d 154 | NY | 1987
OPINION OF THE COURT
As a condition of probation, a court may order a security guard convicted of attempted arson and criminal mischief to make restitution to the security company that employed her, where the company has reimbursed its own customer for the loss suffered by reason of its employee’s conduct. In the particular circumstances presented, the employer is a permissible recipient of restitution under Penal Law § 65.10.
Defendant — employed as a security guard by Burns Interna
At the hearing to fix the amount of Trojan’s loss, it emerged that Trojan had been reimbursed by Burns for its fire damage, in the amount of $9,200. Over defendant’s objection that there was no authority for restitution to a person other than Trojan, and after taking evidence of defendant’s financial circumstances, the court ordered defendant to pay Burns roughly half the $9,200 over a five-year period and sign a confession of judgment for the balance. The Appellate Division vacated the direction to make payment to Burns as a condition of probation, on the ground that under the Penal Law restitution could be made only to the direct victim of the crime. On the People’s appeal, we conclude that, on these facts, restitution to Burns was within the range of discretion allowed by Penal Law § 65.10, and we therefore reverse the Appellate Division order.
The concept of restitution is not new to the criminal justice system. Indeed, in many ancient societies offenders were routinely required to reimburse their victims for the losses they caused (Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv L Rev 931, 933). In this State, restitution has been authorized as a condition of probation since 1910, and its use has long been advocated (see, People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152, 157).
While long available as a sanction, restitution has recently
Against this backdrop we consider defendant’s contention that Penal Law §§ 60.27 and 65.10 must be strictly read to preclude restitution to anyone other than the direct victim of a crime. In particular, she contends that the court is without discretion under Penal Law § 65.10 to order her to make restitution to Burns. We cannot agree.
Provisions of the Penal Law "must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law.” (Penal Law § 5.00.) On the facts presented, we read Penal Law § 65.10 to permit restitution to Burns as a condition of probation. Defendant’s guilty plea was expressly conditioned on the court’s right to impose restitution, a condition she acknowledged by entering her plea. Restitution was thereafter imposed at sentencing, and defendant indicated in writing that she understood and would abide by the conditions. There was a full hearing with respect to amount and affordability.
Burns, which in fact has sustained the loss, was hardly a stranger to the transaction. The economic forces that may
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division insofar as appealed from should be reversed, the sentence reinstated, and the case remitted to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, for consideration of the facts (CPL 470.40 [2] [b]; 470.25 [2] [d]).
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.
Order insofar as appealed from reversed, etc.
Penal Law § 65.10 (2) provides, in relevant part: "the court shall, as a condition of the sentence, consider restitution or reparation and may, as a condition of the sentence, require that the defendant * * * Make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make reparation, in an amount he can afford to pay, for the loss or damage caused thereby.”