*1 1971]
PEOPLE v. HAGGITT Opinion of the Court 1. Criminal Law —Sentences—Minimum Sentence —Indetermi- nate Sentence Act —Parole.
A minimum only sentence which is one month less than the per maximum se sentence is not unconstitutional and does not n defeat the purpose rehabilitative of the indeterminate sentence act, Legislature provided because the has for the reduction of speeding the sentences up parole eligibility by good time special good-time allowances, parole consideration for even serious offenders 10 years, after eligibility of all offenders early parole for with the consent of the judge, thus allowing every prisoner prison to reduce his sentence and to up parole move eligibility time (MCLA 769.8, §§
769.12, 791.233, 791.234, 800.33, 800.103). 2. Criminal Law —Sentences—Minimum Sentence —Indetermi- nate Sentence Act —Parole Board’s Discretion.
A minimum nearly which long is as the maximum per sentence does se legislative violate purpose in the indeterminate sentence act and does not constitute an abuse of discretion, every sentence, because except possible the shortest
sentence, parole limits the area of the board’s discretion and because point there never at which the board completely deprived to exercise its discretion (MCLA 769.8). [10] [7, [1-5] [6, 9,11,12] Validity, under ALB2d identical 21 Am Jur 21 Am Jur Am Jur 1344. 21 Am Jur minimum and Beferences 2d, 2d, 2d, Criminal Criminal Law Criminal 2d, Criminal Law 540. maximum terms of Law Law Points §§ §§ §§ 540, 581, 525, 577, 540, Headnotes law, 582. 614. of sentence imprisonment. fixing Sentencing—Inde- 3. Criminal Law —Parole Board’s Power — Legislative terminate Sentence Act — Intent. Legislature by enacting did not intend the indeterminate *2 power parole sentence act to create a in the co-equal board judicial power judicial with the sentence; to power the to judicial sentence and the sentencing exercise of discretion when are superior first time and to the parole exercise statutory (MCLA board of its 769.8). duties Appeal 4. Criminal Law —Sentences—Minimum Sentence — op Error —Standard Review. A minimum approximating statutory sentence maximum is per judicial se an abuse of discretion; in the absence of showing a of an abuse of discretion or of a refusal to exercise discretion, such a minimum presumed sentence must be to be product judge’s of the trial exercised discretion and will not be disturbed. 6. Criminal Law —Sentences—Minimum Sentence —Discretion.
Sentencing' a defendant, convicted of robbery, unarmed to a prison minimum years, term of 14 11 months, one month less
than the maximum, was not an abuse of discretion where history, defendant had a serious criminal which included convictions for robbery felonious assault and armed and the parole defendant was on for the latter conviction at the time that he robbery. committed the unarmed by Levin, Criminal 6. Law —Sentences—Minimum Sentence —Indetermi- nate Sentence Act. minimum, than, A sentence which is one month less the maximum sentence is not an (MCLA §769.8). indeterminate sentence 7. Criminal Law —Sentences—Judicial Power —Source. judge’s sentencing
The power source legislation, is not in- of judicial power herent (Const 1963, IV, §45). art Imprison op 8. Criminal Law —Power —Division Power —Cor- rectional Authorities. power The lawbreakers is judiciary divided between the confine authorities; the correctional branches, the two both legislation, derived equal equal in time and from right. 9. Criminal Law —Sentences—Minimum Sentence —Identical
Maximum Sentence. both A where the minimum maximum are years same term is not an indeterminate sentence. Purpose. Criminal Law —Indeterminate Sentence 10. Act — sentencing purpose act is to render judge’s view at-time-of-sentence offender subject reappraisal by parole some board time short of term; purpose service maximum thwarted closely approximates minimum sentence which the maximum (MCLA 769.8). Approximat- Criminal Law —Sentences—Minimum Sentence — ing Maximum Sentence —Effect. A minimum sentence set so close to the maximum sentence that there is little or no between the minimum maxi- difference mum sentences undermines the the correctional au- function of by preventing offering thorities them the convicted prospect release service felon before maximum sentence as an inducement to his rehabilitation and *3 prevents supervision by also the correctional authorities of readjustment society during parole (MCLA his §769.8). his 12. Criminal Law —Sentences—Minimum Sentence —Indetermi- nate Sentence Act.
A minimum sentence which one month short the maximum sentence, sentence, an indeterminate exceeds the statutory limit; such a sentence exceeds the bounds the con- stitutionally permissible statutorily and exercise discretion (MCLA 769.8). Appeal from Wayne, N. Canham, James Sub- J. mitted Division November 9, 1970, at Detroit. (Docket 8532.) No. Decided 1971. Leave April to appeal applied for.
Bobby Joe was convicted, plea guilty, of robbery unarmed. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Frank Kelley, J. A. Attorney General, Robert Derengoski, Solicitor General, Cabalan, William L. Carnovale, Dominick R. Prosecuting Attorney, App Luvenia D. Department, Chief, Appellate Attorney, Dochett, Assistant Prosecuting people. Defender, for Tarnow, J. Appellate
Arthur State defendant. J., P. J.
Before: V. Levin Brennan, JJ. Peterson,* 1970 session November, During Peterson, III heard 3 cases which 1, Panel
of Division v. Lessard (1970), apply was asked to Court fortiori, a to the situation 22 Mich sen a minimum imposes which judge sentence act which tence under maxi one month less than only violence. All mum. All involved crimes of involved with records of criminal long defendants be crimes of violence. All havior including previous were cor liberty involved defendants who at under two on and one on rectional supervision, And two of involved the probation. the three typical tolerated our overcrowded courts plea bargain under docket convenience. sorry euphemism v. Jordan App 15, ante, record an absconded with a probationer long acts of dis- violence, awaiting which'included while position charges theft, auto pending possession of stolen vehicles, motor forgery, probation held killed violation, up used car lot and shot and *4 first-degree the fleeing salesman. with Charged he included murder, was permitted plead offense of plea and substantiated manslaughter by admissions first-degree factually establishing
* by assignment, Circuit judge, sitting Appeals on the Court of 1HOLA (Stat 28.1080). 769.8 Ann 1954 Rev § § 99 minimum mnrder. He was sentenced to a felony of 14 11 maximum years, months, term years.2 15 being v. Pollard App 114,
post, charged with with intent defendant was assault to murder and convicted of felonious assault. by jury The trial felony record convictions prior discloses and that defendant was on at the time of the 3 offense. He was to a minimum term of sentenced 4 maximum years, months, being the statutory years.3
Here, Joe Bobby Haggitt, charged with armed was robbery, permitted to to the lesser plead offense of robbery unarmed. His narrative of the offense was sufficiently unlike on rec vague, that shown Jordan, ord supra, court was spared larger embarrassment having account of the offense on spread the record.4 It appears Hag has a gitt serious criminal which history includes convictions felonious assault and armed robbery, parole for the latter at the time of the dan, offense. As in J or present he was sentenced to a minimum term of 14 years, months, stat utory maximum being years.5
Michigan’s indeterminate sentence act provides follows:
“When any person shall hereafter be convicted for the first time of crime committed after this act takes effect, punishment for which prescribed by law may be imprisonment prison the state at Jack- son, the Michigan at reformatory Ionia, the state (Stat MCLA 750.321 Ann 28.553). 1962 Rev § § (Stat MCLA 750.82 Ann 28.277); 1962 Rev MCLA 750.503 § § (Stat 28.771). Ann 1954 Rev § 4 In fact, Haggitt only and the court not avoided mention special .38 revolver, caliber showing but also reference facts robbery. the elements of (Stat MCLA 28.582). 750.350 Ann 1954 Rev *5 95 of the state prison branch of correction house house of correc- the Detroit peninsula, upper in the sen- imposing court prison, or other tion, any imprisonment, fix a definite term tence shall not as hereinafter except fix a minimum term shall but law provided by penalty The maximum provided. in all cases as except maximum sentence shall be the judge by herein and shall be stated provided at the time of sentence. He shall before or passing examination of by such sentence ascertain passing such oath, otherwise, by such convict or other indicate tending evidence as can be obtained criminal character or con- the causes briefly facts of such which facts and such other convict, duct case, as shall to be in the he shall appear pertinent cause to be entered the court.” upon minutes of IX of Chapter sections of the Code following of Criminal No. (PA 1927, Procedure amended, 769.10, 769.11, 769.12; MCLA Stat §§ Ann 1954 Eev deal- 28.1082, 28.1083, 28.1084) §§ with ing do not repeat offenders sentencing use the same language, but 769.12 indicates legislative intent stating,
“Offenders sentenced this and under the last sections shall preceding eligible not be be- fore the expiration the minimum term fixed by judge at the time of sentence without the written approval court or judge such judge such if court sentencing judge not then A serving. person to punishable be under this and the last sections need not have preceding been indicted and convicted as a previous offender iii order to receive the increased punishment therein provided, but may be proceeded against as provided in the following’ section.” upheld decisions have sentences as long
Countless claim that constituted unconstitu- they against punishment, tionally reflected an or unusual cruel judge. the trial of discretion abuse sum- claim was 1,Mich such Guillett rejected marily one sentence: *6 say was sentence within that the “It sufficientto is by provided statute.” maximum say judicial may not discretion That not to Earegood (1968), People v. Mich as in be abused App App Snow 256, or may inas 510; abdicated, be that it supra. Lessard, reliance on Lessard, Defendant’s length misplaced for was not however, it per dispositive, minimum se that was policy judge, record, on the but the of the trial stated denying effect to the indeterminate sentence of act page in at said, all cases before him. The Court 350: * **
“ individual as it concerns action error in sen- reversible defendants constitutes tencing. discretion failed court trial exercise^ sen- setting minimum the individual defendant’s tences. remanding do not intend sentence, we
“In for new minimum sen- trial what the to the court to dictate attempt to determine nor we tence should be will requirements complies with the what sort of sentence trial court is for an indeterminate sentence. The required impose sound discre- sentence within his of the defendant tion accord with his evaluation as an individual.” setting penalty,
If Penal maximum Code, and the indeterminate sentence act constituted only legislative affecting defendant, his enactments argument long defeats the rehabili- purposes tation of the indeterminate sentence act plausible. would how- case, be That is not the more 33 provided Legislature has for Thus, the ever. hy good special time and reduction sentences (MCLA §§ good-time 800.33, 800.103 allowances 28.1514]) pro- [Stat §§28.1403, Ann 1954 Rev parole prisoners eligible for con- be vided that shall expiration minimum sentence at sideration good-time good special time and reduced 791.233(b) [Stat Ann 1954 allowances. MCLA may ]. 28.2303(b) §Rev look Thus, forward reducing by roughly years four his sentence good leaving period still a substantial for behavior, post-release parole supervision. Even the serious years, long offender, sentenced to life or term of first-degree excepting those convicted of murder, eligible years. are consideration after ten (Stat Supp MCLA 791.234 Ann 1970 28- Cum .2304). eligibility repeat And the offenders for early parole sentencing judge with the consent of the *7 provided or his successors, for MCLA under 769- quoted equally .12, above, available to those sen- by proviso tenced as first offenders the in MCLA 791.233(b), supra6 every prisoner Thus knows that there reducing is a fixed standard his time moving up parole eligibility, his and that earlier by special parole possible. release tencing judge is also The sen- presumed
knows it also and must be to take these factors exercising into consideration in discretion. argued
It is that the indeterminate sentence act by Legislature parole was intended the to vest the board with a broad discretion and that a sentence experience judges Practical Michigan- of in trial has established utility, the as a technique, long of shock-effect sentences in selectively appropriate coupled cases, with efforts to the motivate offender parole. to work an early Early “special” toward such or paroles understandably are longer most common in the categories, Michigan Department and statistics of the of Corrections indicate that special paroles these' remarkably are successful. power parole
depriving of constitutes hoard that the judicial But it is obvious discretion. of an abuse possible except every term the shortest that parole board in area discretion limits the longer point minimum sentence time, and the assuming prison- greater But, the limitation. entirely apart totally intractable, er who is not parole special procedures, is never a there from point completely parole de- which the board at prived Mich- under of room discretion to exercise its igan statutes. opinion, event, of the further
areWe Legislature to create the intent it was not judicial co-equal parole power to board in the qui prior tem- est power maxim, The sentence. to jure, applicable potior criminal as pore, to is as est power the exercise sentence, law. The to civil only judicial first therein, are not discretion superior by board to the exercise time but Legislature has That the duties. of its present judicial power not subordinated In re is clear sentence act Mich 75: Southard power “Objection delegation judiciary constitu- sentences was met over (Const § 4, 47, 1850, art of 1902 tional amendment 28). art Const amended, as amendment judicial away the inherent did take imposition power exercise discretion in ju- always in the That resided sentences. diciary until curtailed and there it must remain *8 legislature. Examination of removed penalties imposed shown in as crimes, for various [Comp (Act penal 328, No Pub Acts code § seq., Supp Ann 28.191 Laws 17115-1 et Stat 1940, recognition seq.]), legislative et adher- indicate policy of discretion ence to the of the exercise judge the maximum within limits imposed. therein discretion This extends to the imprisonment up amount of fine and stat- utory maximum fine the alternative of or imprisonment. “Blackstone comments on the inherent discretion- ary power length of courts over amount of fines and imprisonment. Cooley’s (4th 2See Blackstone ed), Chap p seq. 4, hook 1510 et 29, (code No Acts 1927 of crim- “Prior Act Pub procedure), inal for those the minimum sentence imprisoned prison, was cetera, in the et not State Compare Comp in case. less than six months Laws Comp Laws 1915, 15859,and (Stat 28.1080). permitted §Ann The 1927 act the the judge fixing trial to exercise discretion in except minimum term in a case where discretion this specifically was denied. This enactment of a code procedure necessity imposed duty of criminal upon sentencing judge to consider limitations placed by legislature upon penalties specific crimes.” reject proposition
We that a minimum sen- approximating per tence maximum is judicial an se abuse discretion. In the'absence showing of fact an abuse of discretion, as Eare- good supra, Snow, aor refusal discre- to exercise presumed tion Lessard, as in such a sentence must be product judge’s to be the of the trial exercised dis- cretion will not be disturbed.7
Affirmed. 7 If a approach, third presumptively such a discretion, taken, abuse of were same, the result here would be the there adequate a more showing judge than the trial did by giving exercise his discretion many careful attention to factors bearing upon the particular Southard, “needs of the case.” In re supra, p 82. Such needs are alone defendant, those of the but public well. approach This authority found in no cited and is inconsistent with reposing traditional views the discretion sentencing judge. *9 Haggitt People 105 v. by Levin, Dissent J. J.,
Y. J. P. Brennan, concurred. I Levin, J. dissent (dissenting). because a sen- 14 tence of 15 years and months years —a minimum sentence of the maximum —is not an 99% indeterminate sentence. 1 do quarrel with my colleagues’ thesis that and the Haggitt defendants in the companion cases,1 all of whom were convicted of assaultive crimes, belong jail. Nor is there any disagreement on my part with their strictures plea about bargaining; my about thoughts plea have bargaining been already set forth at length.2 considerable
Nor is there any disagreement regarding maxi- mum term for which and the other defend- ants should be jailed maximum term is estab- —the by lished law. question is whether a sentencing judge may fix a minimum sentence so close to the maximum the parole board is prevented releasing the offender on parole short of service of the maxi- mum sentence provided law. Our disagreement, then, does not center around the decision to incar- cerate the offender —that decision has, indeed, been confided to the sentencing judge alone. At issue is the release decision —the harmonization judge’s power to establish a minimum sentence and the parole board’s to release an offender on parole before the maximum term has been served.
The source of the sentencing power exercised by
a sentencing judge is legislation, not
inherent
ju
dicial power.3 In
v.
People
Cummings
(1891),
1 People v. Jordan
(1971),
App
People
33 Mich
15:
Pollard
v.
(1971), 33
App
Mich
114.
2 People
Byrd
v.
(1968),
seq.
App 186,
Mich
(Levin, J.,
196 et
concurring);
People v. Hollman
(1968),
App 231, 236,
12 Mich
seq.
et
(Levin, J.,
Earegood
dissenting);
(1968),
12 Mich
256,
App
Earegood
reversed in
(1970),
Manifestly, both maximum are for the same term of years an Michigan indeterminate sentence. And the Su In re has Cummins preme Court held. (1904), so See Westbrook 138 39, 40; People similarly, see v. 411 Ill (1952), (103 1341); 301 29 494, NE2d ALR2d Sanders v. State ; 294) 19 Ala 367 So (1923), (97 State v. Moore 342, 21 NJ 419 A2d (1952), Super (91 re Collins 347); 40). 215 P (152 Mont (1915), See In re Southard 75, 79. legislature may, by law, “The provide for the indeterminate sentences, thereof, so-called, punishment crime, as a on conviction persons imprisoned and for the detention and release of or detained 1850, 47, on IV, said sentences.” Const PA 1901 JB art added 11, election, 1901; No reprinted ratified at the in 1 MCLA November and MSA 212. provision change This in Const was continued without substantive 1908, V, IV, art and Const art 45. by Levin, sen- spirit and the policy a mere nod of literal more than require law tencing judiciary. part compliance technical maximum is month less than one A It substance. form than gesture nod, hut —more distinction legislative drawn sharply “the converts into sentences and indeterminate definite between Westbrook, of words.” formula empty p supra, with identical faced jurisdictions in other
Courts expressed have maximum sentences minimum and a determinate sentence —and well reasons why a deter- substantially here on appeal the sentence of indetermi- concept sentence —violates the minate nate sentencing. were imposed per-
“If as here such a sentence to thwart quite would tend mitted, conceivably it of the parole system intendment legislative prisoner supervision *11 remove the time which he is [sic] Parole Board during surveillance until released and under upon the maximum expiration equivalent the time to In prison period term. it would shorten that effect, the board those cases where a supervision by is released commutation of sentence prisoner by eliminate that cases where completely supervision no commutation is earned and directs the prisoner’s expiration at the minimum term. discharge of the Whatever powers persuasion toward rehabilita- tion of the board have the prisoner may during the period of or parole would en- seriously be reduced tirely eliminated and lost to the the benefits thereof prisoner and society. feel, to we This, contrary to the nature and very intent of parole system and its design purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.) Moore, State v. supra, p “The of the conception indicated Legislature, the use of by the term ‘indeterminate,’ was that by Levin, terms should so minimum and maximum be fixed period adjusted time to as to allow a substantial during application parole prison intervene might which the governor be and board of made, might inquiry commissioners determine its merits touching applicant, in conduct order disposi- ascertain whether tion to he has exhibited a and hence is entitled to invoke dis- reform, cretionary power lodged in them. This mani- festly sought accomplished, the end to be it is man- datory upon the courts enforce the statute in every spirit. according case, to its It is not to the purpose say provision prohibit that the does not fixing the both of the minimum and maximum so that expire
will they may, on the same date, because things, approach in the nature of each other until disappears. the difference This is not in view accord spirit provision, with the and would defeat effectually purpose Legisla- had in view the (Emphasis supplied.) ture.” supra, In Collins, re p 218. Michigan Supreme expressed Court has much same view of our indeterminate law. holding sentencing judge has no control statutorily-prescribed
over a maximum sentence, judge, by Court reasoned that otherwise trial “the very prescribing may totally deprive low maximum, governor, pardon board, board control opportunity of to exercise the discretion which give the statute intended to them. If it then does, judge, the trial in cases where he can fix the mini- by increasing larceny may, mum—as in the mini- — *12 reducing mum and the maximum, make a deter- legislative sentence, minate and thus frustrate purpose enacting the indeterminate sentence law”. (Emphasis supplied.) Campbell In re Levin, in the Con- is rooted “indeterminate” word The people purpose to override of the The stitution. power (People judicial protectionism judicial implementation Cummings, supra) of that and the purpose sen- the indeterminate the enactment of tencing an ineffectual carica- reduced law would be statutory maximum sentence of ture if a 99% than a deter- indeterminate, rather is held to be an minate, sentence. compassion, great in wisdom,
I confidence have judges. than Less and steadfastness trial 9% (statutory maxi- for serious felonies the sentences years) 5 and 20 exceed mum sentences between 1/2 of the maximum and less than exceed of the 6% 2/3 maximum.6 may purpose
But, however noble be legislative clearly purpose, sentencing judge, it is implementation people, of the intent of the sentencing judge’s view of at-time-of-sentence subject reappraisal by parole the offender be board some service of the maximum time short of purpose term. intention and should not be That by an exercise of the sentenc- thwarted overzealous ing power parole which excludes board from making reappraisal such a or which reserves to the judiciary a veto of the board’s determination —a veto which is been the sen- exercisable, as has tencing power, unguided by any and unrestrained objectifiable present prac- which, criteria and under by any tice, tribunal, is unreviewable other or man, court. figures only punishable by The are based on felonies not a man
datory (first-degree life murder) or a sentence for “life years” (e.g., seeond-degre murder, term of MCLA 750.317 § Ann 28.549]; rape 1954 Eev MCLA 750/520 Ann [Stat § [Stat § 28.788];; robbery, Eev MCLA Ann armed 750.529 [Stat 28.797]). figures Eev are for 1969 commitments all la, Statistics, courts are taken from Table B Criminal Michigan, Department State of of Corrections. *13 Mich by Levin, J. Dissent set so close to the maximum
A minimum sentence between the mini- there is little or no difference undermines mum maximum sentences the and the by prevent- of authorities function ing the correctional pros- offering them felon the the convicted pect of his maxi- of release before service mum sentence an inducement to his rehabilitation prevents supervision by and the correctional also readjustment society during his authorities to parole.7 length good
Since time reduces the the sentence discharge period against date, counts the good-time day between the date and the last release statutory period of the a dur- maximum term is not super- ing parole subject which the offender is on by vision the correctional authorities.8 The correctional authorities have access to pre-sentence report judge same sees that the before sentencing. Additionally, they opportunity an have long period during to observe the convicted felon a They, high purpose, of confinement. are men too, training experience, they, too, are concerned society. judge justified with the A needs is not 7 “An thing; law is not new men and long in sociology women interested have for time endeavored to provisions enact into law lawbreakers, that should be incentive to who crime, have been good convicted of to reform and become In (1906), citizens.” re Manaca 146 Mich design “The of the indeterminate sentence law is to reform crimi good citizens, nals and protect to convert bad citizens into and thus society. accomplish result, order to theory that, this when prisoner by may has shown his conduct that he from his turn career, opportunity, criminal he should have an favorable under People circumstances, v. Cook (1907), make test.” 127, 132. 8 Also, provisions (MCLA 769.10-769.12 §§ [Stat majority, Ann 1954 28.1084]), Rev referred to § 28.1082-§ concerning offenders, applicable of habitual are charged unless the defendant and convicted as a habitual offender. (1951), In re Wall 430, 434; Mich v. Hatt seq. 302, 307, et Haggitt Neither nor the defendants companion charged. cases were so Levin, point prejudging of release date depriving authorities the correctional person service short convicted release the to his maximum sentence sentencing judge unless the unreviewable discre- in his sole or his successor *14 accept parole decision board’s to chooses tion parole It is is desirable. an earlier release that against the against I mortifica- write, view that the indeterminate resulting sentencing law tion from the mini- imposition “mortmain” excessive mum sentences. parole might very sen- well share the
The board person tencing judge’s should a view that convicted statutory prison term for the maximum remain point, good is if the however, time. less sentencing judge disagrees parole it with the board something it—to release be about should able to do maximum sen- him on time short some tence. generally judge’s
Although a trial is said that it if stat- discretion, exercise of within utory exceptions. are not limits, reviewable, there colleagues agree, may, my and I Judicial discretion supra (majority may abused, abdicated, be and it be opinion, p 101). merely begs question presented say
It now “statutory that an within exercise of “discretion” convinced, limits” reviewable. I am a If, not as only month the maximum is one short of sentence, an ceeds the ex- then such sentence the bounds exceeds limit—it constitutionally statutorily permissible exercise of discretion. jurisdictions appellate
In other courts “have for many years affirm ‘reverse, construed the modify,’ judgment including as a criminal power to of a sentence.” See review the merits 33 by Levin, Project
American Bar Association on Minimum Standards for Justice, Criminal Standards Relat- Appellate ing commentary- Sentences, Review of accompanying pp listing, among 1.1, 14, such Jersey, States, Arkansas, Idaho, New Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Michigan Supreme early Court as-
In case reviewing exercised such a function serted and heavy “abuse discretion.” reduced Murray It does anomalous that as to this and to no seem aspect justice, appel- other of the administration of providing late courts shun their traditional role correcting relief from an abuse of discretion and opinion error. There is a clear trend of in favor appellate sentencing. review of See American supra. Bar Association, Michigan Supreme ap Court no case has
proved a one month short of the maximum. on review- The declarations the Court ability distinguishable of in cases sentences are (see 9) this In case.9 neither Guillett fn nor other case did consider the Court whether the sen spirit policy tence violated the or the indeter minate law. In this connection it is not significance without that from until 1927 the estab 9 In In (1904), the ease of re Leonard 137 Mich the Court merely People years held that a sentence of to 15 In “valid”. (1910), 45, 50, v. Dumas 161 Mich the Court reviewed the circum appear stances and concluded that it did not the sentence was appear shocking”. unwise “much less Clearly, does it those statements entirely are People consistent with a review for In abuse discretion. (1941), 242, 249, v. Allen 299 Mich the Court refused to review People years. a sentence of 15 In (1943), Costanza 306 Mich 415, 419, the Court years. refused to review a sentence of 4 In People v. Connor (1957), 456, 463, 348 Mich Court refused years. People review a (1965), sentence of 8 to 15 In v. Krum days. the sentence was 30 v. Guillett 1, 9, dictum, Court, in reviewing facts, after said years a to 10 would be reviewed. 7-1/2 by Levin, our lishment of Court 1965 a writ error to a did review criminal court conviction not issue as a of course. Criminal convictions were re matter granted by Supreme only on leave viewed tbe Court justice Eelatively few or a the Court.10 criminal Supreme convictions were reviewed, Court heavily compulsory appeals with burdened its civil jurisdiction.* upon Supreme Efforts to cast appellate Court this additional burden as matter right person of the convicted were turned aside Supreme Plainly Court itself.12 the Court discharge obligatory had no time to both its civil appellate responsibilities additionally, and, take on the review of sentences. beyond scope opinion,
It is of this to draw precise line between an indeterminate and deter- minate sentence. The Bar American Association Project on Minimum for Criminal Jus- Standards report Eelating tice, in its on Standards to Sentenc- ing Alternatives and Procedures, has declared: preserve principle
“In order to of indeter- minacy, impose the court should not be authorized to a minimum sentence which one-third of exceeds actually imposed.” (Standard maximum sentence [c] p 142.) 3.2 [iii], accompanying commentary the standard 158), representa- (p percentage
*16 states that “this provision many tive of the now in states”. effect enjoy superintending Our Court does not supervisory general practices control over the Supreme the trial courts as does the Court. We are Ann where stitutional PA [10] PA CL See § the defendant’s 27.2591) 1948, 1907, § No 650.1 to 175, part grant Stanley (Stat personal No 53, an X, Ann (1956), which amended CL appeal § liberty 3; § 27.2591). CL was involved. as of 1948, § right 770.3. 530, 1948, in a criminal ease holding § 650.1 uncon- (Stat App 33 Mich limited to for in reviewing particular errors actual cases and There controversies.13 is no need to draw in precise line order decide this case the com- It panion cases. enough that a say sentence of one month short of the maximum sentence is not an within meaning term as used the constitution or the governing statute. It is for the Court Supreme to say where, if at all, line shall be drawn. Judges Morcom v. Recorder’s Court App 358, 15 Mich Wayne Judges Wayne
360; County (1969), Circuit 713, 730.
PEOPLE v. POLLARD Sentence—Appeal 1. Criminal Law — and Error. An appellate court supervisory does not have control over a sentence that is within provided by the maximum statute. 2. Criminal Law —Sentences—Felonious Assault —Discretion. Sentencing a defendant convicted of felonious assault a mini- years mum months, term three eleven years, maximum sentence four was not abuse dis- cretion defendant, where the at charged, the time of the crime was on prior felony for two convictions the trial judge psychiatric recommended (MOLA care for the defendant 750.82). § [1] [2] [3, 21 Am 5 Am 21 Am Jur 58 Am Jur Jur 2d, Jur, References 2d, 2d, Criminal Law Appeal Witnesses Criminal Law 536. and Error §§ Points 938. 569. Headnotes