People v. GuclaPeople v. Gucla
Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, the “public safety” exception to the Miranda rule (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), applied to the question the police officers posed to him regarding the location of a gun (see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649, 655-657 [1984]; People v Howard, 162 AD2d 615, 616 [1990]). It was reasonable for the arresting officer to believe that the public safety was at risk, because the officers did not recover a gun either from the defendant‘s person or the codefendant‘s person after the complainant described being held up at gunpoint, and because the suspects were apprehended in a residential area at twilight in September (see People v Melvin, 188 AD2d 555 [1992]).
Furthermore, it was within the Supreme Court‘s discretion to impose consecutive sentences (see People v Day, 73 NY2d 208, 212 [1989]). Consecutive sentencing is permissible when the defendant‘s acts are “distinguishable by culpable mental state, nature and manner of use, time, place and victim” (People v Brown, 80 NY2d 361, 365 [1992]; see People v Ramirez, 89 NY2d 444 [1996]). Here, the defendant‘s act of possessing a loaded weapon in the car with the intent to rob the complainant was a complete crime and separate and distinct from his participation in the robbery (see People v Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126, 130 [1984]; People v Bellamy, 247 AD2d 627 [1998]). Under these facts, the imposition of consecutive sentences was proper. Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Spolzino and Lifson, JJ., concur.