People v. GrimesPeople v. Grimes
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Difiore
OPINION OF THE COURT
Chief Judge DiFiore.
In People v Andrews (23 NY3d 605, 616 [2014]), we held that counsel‘s failure to file a timely criminal leave application (CLA) to this Court within the 30-day statutory time frame provided by
I.
In 2012, defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. Counsel filed a notice of appeal on defendant‘s behalf and perfected the first-tier appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, by order entered November 13, 2015 (133 AD3d 1201 [4th Dept 2015]), a copy of which was served on appellate counsel by the People with notice of entry on November 17, 2015, starting the
More than a year later, defendant was released from prison. Approximately six weeks later, counsel received a letter from defendant, dated January 9, 2017, inquiring about the status of the CLA. Having failed to timely file an application for leave to this Court or seek an extension of time to file such an application pursuant to
Counsel argued that defendant was deprived of his right to due process and his right to counsel under
The Appellate Division denied defendant‘s motion for a writ of error coram nobis (148 AD3d 1724 [4th Dept 2017]). A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (29 NY3d 1127 [2017]). We now affirm the Appellate Division order.
II.
By coram nobis, defendant seeks to extend his time to file a CLA for a discretionary, second-tier appeal to this Court beyond the time limitation set by the legislature in
Therefore, in Syville, the Court recognized the continuing, albeit limited, availability of a “coram nobis type[ ] of relief [largely] abrogated when the Criminal Procedure Law was enacted“; specifically, we permitted the continued use of a type of “so-called ’Montgomery claim’ ” (Andrews, 23 NY3d at 610-611). In People v Montgomery, we held “that every defendant has a fundamental right to appeal his conviction and that, accordingly, basic fairness and due process require that the right not be dissipated either because the defendant was unaware of its existence or counsel failed to abide by a promise to either file or prosecute an appeal” (24 NY2d 130, 132 [1969]). This Montgomery relief, whereby coram nobis was initiated in the trial court for claims premised on the loss of the right to a first-tier appeal, was codified, in a modified form, in
The legislature amended
We have carved out rare exceptions to this one-year jurisdictional bar, excusing a late
In Syville, we were called upon to reconcile the conflict between the one-year time limitation of
Four years later, we clarified the parameters of coram nobis under Syville in People v Kruger—a companion case in Andrews—where counsel failed to file a CLA to this Court.2 We held that coram nobis relief was not available because, “[u]nlike an appeal as of right, . . . there is no federal constitutional entitlement to legal representation on a discretionary application for an appeal to a state‘s highest court” (Andrews, 23 NY3d at 616, citing Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 615-616 [1974]; Halbert v Michigan, 545 US 605, 611-612 [2005]). “Thus, the failure to file a CLA, standing alone, does not necessarily establish” a deprivation of effective assistance of counsel—or due process—because there is no federal constitutional right to counsel under the Due Process Clause on a second-tier appeal (Andrews, 23 NY3d at 616). And, in the absence of a violation of a constitutional right, coram nobis does not lie and the statutory remedy for an extension of time to take an appeal cannot be abrogated. Andrews left open the question presented by this appeal: whether a defendant has a state constitutional right to representation to file a CLA in this Court (see id.).3
III.
There is no federal constitutional right to appellate review (see McKane v Durston, 153 US 684, 687-688 [1894]) and no state constitutional right to appellate review in a criminal case, except to the Court of Appeals where the judgment is of death and as otherwise legislatively provided (
In interpreting our state‘s constitutional right to counsel, we have stated that
“[t]he Right to Counsel Clause in the State Constitution is more restrictive than that guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (compare,NY Const, art I, § 6 , withUS Const 6th ,14th Amends ). Nevertheless, by resting the right upon this State‘s constitutional provisions guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to assistance of counsel and due process of law we have provided protection to accuseds far more expansive than the Federal counterpart” (see People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 338-339 [1990]).4
In certain postconviction accusatory proceedings, we have held the right to counsel is required “because the outcome—liberty or imprisonment—depends upon an arbiter‘s determination as to the truth of assertions” affecting defendant‘s status (People v Garcia, 92 NY2d 726, 730 [1999]). We have never held that a defendant is entitled to a state constitutional right to counsel in all postjudgment criminal proceedings.
Even so, the U.S. Supreme Court has long established that when a state grants a defendant the absolute statutory right to appeal a criminal conviction, the
“In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant is attempting to demonstrate that the conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of liberty, is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an adversary proceeding that—like a trial—is governed by
intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant—like an unrepresented defendant at trial—is unable to protect the vital interests at stake” (Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387, 396 [1985]).
A first-tier appeal “is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney” (id.), and when there is a denial of a first-tier appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel, it is a violation of the
In contrast, a second-tier appeal—where the defendant has the benefit, from the perfection of the first-tier appeal, of a prepared or original record of the trial court proceedings, briefs by both counsel on the merits of the errors that allegedly occurred at trial, and the written opinion of the intermediate appellate court determining the validity of the conviction—does not require, as a matter of constitutional law, the assignment of counsel for a meaningful appeal under the
This conclusion is fortified by the function and scope of a discretionary second-tier appeal, which is markedly different than that of a first-tier appeal.
“The critical issue in [a second-tier appellate] court . . . is not whether there has been ‘a correct adjudication of guilt’ in every individual case, but rather whether ‘the subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest,’ whether ‘the cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State,’ or whether the decision below is in probable conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court” (Ross, 417 US at 615 [citation omitted]).
Based on these differences, ”Ross held . . . that a State need not appoint counsel to aid a poor person in discretionary appeals to the State‘s highest court” (Halbert, 545 US at 610, citing Ross, 417 US at 610-612). And since the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is entirely dependent on the existence of a constitutional right to counsel itself, there is no corresponding federal constitutional violation in the failure of counsel to take a second-tier appeal (see Evitts, 469 US at 396 n 7; Wainwright v Torna, 455 US 586, 587-588 [1982]; see also Pena v United States, 534 F3d 92, 95 [2d Cir 2008]).
That well-reasoned federal analysis is pertinent to our interpretation of the corresponding
Rather, our jurisprudence has consistently relied on U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the context of due process protections for defendants seeking appellate review and we have paralleled federal precedent in providing similar procedural safeguards for a meaningful appellate process (compare Griffin, 351 US at 19, with Pride, 3 NY2d at 550-551 [acknowledging Griffin as providing a constitutional basis in addition to our public policy grounds for holding a meaningful first-tier appeal requires providing defendant with a trial record]; compare Anders v California, 386 US 738, 744 [1967], with Emmett, 25 NY2d at 356 [meaningful first-tier appeal requires an opportunity for a defendant to file a brief]).
In New York, a defendant in a non-death penalty criminal case has no constitutional right to an appeal to this Court (
“[T]he basic premise underlying our appellate court system is that the intermediate appellate tribunals—particularly the Appellate Divisions—will dispose with finality of the great majority of the appeals,
leaving for further review by the State‘s tribunal of last resort, the Court of Appeals, only a relatively small number of selected cases worthy of such further review. The primary function of the Court of Appeals, like that of the United States Supreme Court in the Federal sphere, is conceived to be that of declaring and developing an authoritative body of decisional law for the guidance of the lower courts, the bar and the public” (Arthur Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals § 1:1 at 3-4 [3d ed rev 2005]).
While the dissent attempts to differentiate between the structure of appellate review of other states examined in Evitts and Ross (see dissenting op at 325-328), it eschews the defining features of the review process essential to the finding of no constitutional due process entitlement to the discretionary appeal and the representation of counsel thereon: this Court is a second-tier reviewer of questions of law on established factual records of the trial court and does not sit “to correct errors in individual cases, but to decide matters of larger public import” (Halbert, 545 US at 618).
As in the federal courts, a criminal defendant‘s “absolute right” and “basic entitlement” to appellate consideration of a direct first-tier appeal does not translate to a similar constitutional entitlement to a discretionary, second-tier appeal in this state (see Ross, 417 US at 610; People v Ventura, 17 NY3d 675, 679-682 [2011]). The CLA process is predicated on the presentation of issues argued and briefed in the trial court and the intermediate appellate court; the first-tier appellate record and briefs are readily available to both this Court and a pro se defendant for a CLA. Consequently, representation by counsel in the CLA process is not mandated by due process for a meaningful review of the CLA.
IV.
Against this backdrop, we reject defendant‘s attempt to abrogate the statutory time limit of
Defendant invokes the term “due process” while simply ignoring that our precedent hews closely to the path of the
The dissent, in comparison, mistakenly equates the attachment of our state‘s constitutional right to counsel—which is unique in that it prohibits the defendant‘s waiver of counsel in the absence of counsel even before an accusatory instrument is filed (see People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154, 162-163 [1978]; Bing, 76 NY2d at 339 [the constitutional right to counsel is applicable in “two well-defined situations“: (1) “waivers after formal proceedings have commenced” and (2) police may not question uncharged individuals in custody who have retained or requested an attorney in the absence of counsel])—with the entirely separate claim that the right to representation on the first-tier appeal extends to a CLA seeking permission for a second-tier appeal (see dissenting op at 330) and is a right presumably constitutional in nature at that juncture. The dissent‘s hodgepodge references to case law on this state‘s right to counsel reveals a failure to examine the specific context explaining why and when the constitutional right to counsel attaches during interrogation and upon commencement of the criminal action (see People v Claudio, 83 NY2d 76, 80-81 [1993]). We created the “indelible right, a right that defendant could not waive in the absence of counsel, to justify suppression of the voluntary statement” made by a defendant represented on the charge on which he was held in custody; the rule is that defendant could not be interrogated in the absence of counsel on any matter, whether related or unrelated to the subject of the representation (see Bing, 76 NY2d at 350). Our case law recognizing the importance of the constitutional right to counsel as a buffer between the defendant and the coercive actions of the State at the pre-conviction stage, particularly as a necessary protection against self-incrimination, is addressed to concerns that are not implicated in a second-tier appeal.
Similarly, our case law interpreting the right to counsel at a postjudgment proceeding depends on whether it is a ” ‘critical stage’ of the prosecution, where counsels’ absence might prejudice due process rights“; the determinative factor is whether, in an adversarial fact-finding hearing, the liberty of defendant rested on the arbiter‘s de novo factual determinations (Garcia, 92 NY2d at 730-731, citing People ex rel. Donohoe v Montanye, 35 NY2d 221, 226 [1974]; People ex rel. Menechino v Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 NY2d 376, 381-382 [1971]). In sharp contrast, on a second-tier appeal, the facts for the appeal are confined to the trial court record, the legal issues have been fully briefed, and the appeal is “not an accusatory proceeding affording defendant an opportunity to explain charges against him or requiring the court to make [de novo] factual or legal determinations affecting his liberty” (Garcia, 92 NY2d at 731; People v Colwell, 65 NY2d 883, 885 [1985] [rejecting the requested extension of the Rogers rule (People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167 [1979]) to situations in which “the defendant already stands convicted and is represented only on an appeal from the conviction“]). As in Andrews and Arjune, neither defendant nor the dissent can “cite any legal support for the imposition” of a state constitutional right to representation on a CLA for a second-tier appellate review (Arjune, 30 NY3d at 354; see Andrews, 23 NY3d at 616). We note that the lack of citations for support or authority is particularly striking in light of the magnitude of judicially declaring a constitutional right to counsel on every CLA filed or not, whether years ago or years from now.
In order to enhance the appellate review for both the Court and the defendant, this Court may assign counsel once a leave application is granted (see 22 NYCRR 500.20 [e]) and the Appellate Division rules require counsel in the first-tier appeal to assist in filing a CLA (see 22 NYCRR 606.5 [b] [2] [1st Dept]; 22 NYCRR 671.4 [a] [1] [2d Dept]; 22 NYCRR 821.2 [b] [3d Dept]; 22 NYCRR 1015.7 [4th Dept]). But those court rules do not create a constitutional entitlement to counsel during the CLA process, or a claim of a constitutional deprivation of due process when counsel‘s performance is deficient at that stage of appellate review (see Arjune, 30 NY3d at 355 n 7, citing Roe, 528 US at 479). As we have made clear, and as the dissent fails to comprehend (see dissenting op at 321-322), rules of professional conduct ” ‘cannot be applied as if they were controlling statutory [authority] or decisional law’ ” and not “every violation of an ethical rule will constitute ineffective assistance of counsel” (People v Berroa, 99 NY2d 134, 140 [2002], quoting S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d 437, 443 [1987]; see Claudio, 83 NY2d at 83 [counsel‘s deficient performance during interrogation at the preaccusatory stage does not implicate the state‘s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel to a suspect]).
We turn now to defendant‘s concern that his inability to exhaust all available avenues for state appellate review may have negative consequences on his ability to seek federal habeas relief. Federal habeas courts are “guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism” (Martinez v Ryan, 566 US 1, 9 [2012]). Moreover, a federal court may invoke a miscarriage of justice exception to the general rule of procedural default “to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons” (McQuiggin v Perkins, 569 US 383, 392 [2013] [quotation marks and citation omitted]). In any event, federal court rules governing whether a petitioner exhausted state remedies or failed to adhere to state procedures are not an invitation for this Court to abandon our own independent state procedural law of reasonable time limitations, which is jurisdictional in nature. Nor is it a reason to artificially manufacture layers of constitutional rights that otherwise have no textual origin.
Given our history paralleling our jurisprudence with that of the federal courts in affording defendants meaningful review on appeals, and without any reason to deviate from that tradition today, we hold that there is no state constitutional right to legal representation on an application for leave to appeal to this Court.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Wilson, J. (dissenting). This case is not about whether criminal
The sleight of hand appears at the start, where the majority states that in People v Andrews (23 NY3d 605 [2014]), we held that counsel‘s failure to file a criminal leave application (CLA) within the time limits in
We have repeatedly and emphatically stated that the right to counsel provided by the New York Constitution is older, broader and more powerful than that provided by the United States Constitution. “So valued is the right to counsel in this State, it has developed independent of its Federal counterpart. Thus, we have extended the protections afforded by our State Constitution beyond those of the Federal—well before certain Federal rights were recognized” (People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154, 161 [1978] [Cooke, J., writing for a unanimous Court] [citations omitted]). The majority‘s decision disserves the rights of all New Yorkers and diminishes the role of this Court in ensuring justice. The majority‘s rationale would satisfy neither a constitutional scholar nor—more importantly—the lay citizens to whom the right to counsel belongs. I discuss those in reverse order.
I.
The Appellate Division affirmed Mr. Grimes’ conviction. Mr. Grimes’ counsel assured him in writing that he would prepare and file a CLA requesting review by our Court. Counsel prepared the CLA. Unbeknownst to Mr. Grimes, his counsel mistakenly never filed it. Mr. Grimes served his sentence and was released the day before Thanksgiving. Shortly after New Year‘s Day, Mr. Grimes asked his lawyer the status of his application. His lawyer then—one month after the grace period in
People v Syville holds an attorney‘s failure to timely file an appeal for an intermediate appeal when requested violates the defendant‘s right to counsel, entitling the defendant to a writ of error coram nobis if the time allotted in
As the majority recognizes, Mr. Grimes’ counsel was required to file the CLA upon request (majority op at 317). Before the adoption of the uniform rules of the Appellate Divisions, each Division‘s rules required appellate counsel to discuss CLAs with the defendant and to file one if requested (22 NYCRR 606.5 [b] [1] [1st Dept]; 22 NYCRR 671.4 [a] [1] [2d Dept]; 22 NYCRR 821.2 [b] [3d Dept]; 22 NYCRR 1022.11 [b] [4th Dept] [all hereinafter 22 NYCRR 606.5]). Our own website advises the public: “The Rules of this Court and the Appellate Division require counsel assigned or retained at the intermediate appellate court to file an application for leave to appeal if the defendant requests” (New York Court of Appeals, Frequently
Thus, Mr. Grimes’ attorney at the Appellate Division remained his counsel for filing the CLA; he had an uninterrupted attorney-client relationship, mandated by state law. Indeed, because of 22 NYCRR 606.5, it should surprise no one that virtually all criminal defendants who petition this Court for leave are represented by counsel: for the first six months of 2018, we received 1106 criminal leave applications on direct appeals. Of those, 1089 (98.5%) were prepared by counsel.2 So,
Whatever might be said about whether New York has a constitutional obligation to provide counsel for those who wish to seek our review, New York has provided it—which is wholly laudable, not just as to criminal defendants, but as to the State‘s efforts to provide legal representation to indigent persons in civil cases broadly (22 NYCRR 51.1 [creating the Permanent Commission on Access to Justice]); Family Court (
The majority‘s analysis, therefore, cannot logically turn on the fact that review is discretionary, because this case does not concern the right to counsel once review is granted, but the right to file a CLA, which is no less established than the right to obtain review by the Appellate Division. Daunting is the prospect of explaining to the citizens of New York why the only time we tolerate ineffective lawyers is when they are petitioning the highest court to hear issues of “significant public interest” or to decide “legal principles of major significance” (majority op at 313). The answer the majority would have us give to the public appears to be that we do not need the parties’ lawyers to assist us in determining when to grant leave. I, for one, do. I suspect the same is true for others. Many of us have a practice of holding a conference with counsel before deciding a CLA that may have merit, which I understand to be a long-standing practice of the Court. I also believe that, as a general matter, we do not hold such conferences when the litigant is pro se. Additionally, the fact that we require lawyers to prepare CLAs when requested suggests an institutional determination that lawyers add value to the CLA process.
II.
I doubt a constitutional scholar would find today‘s decision satisfying, either. For starters, the majority has boarded the wrong boat. The question of whether due process requires the provision of counsel to represent defendants filing CLAs is not raised here. That right is guaranteed by 22 NYCRR 606.5, rendering the question of any constitutional entitlement not before us. The question before us is whether, having granted a statutory right to file a CLA and a statutory right to counsel for that specific purpose, that counsel should be held to our governing state constitutional standard for effectiveness. Whatever the Federal Constitution might say about whether states are compelled to provide counsel for applications for discretionary appeals within their own court system or on certiorari petitions to the United States Supreme Court, nothing in federal law suggests that the effectiveness of counsel should be judged differently when counsel‘s representation concerns a right to petition for review rather than a nondiscretionary right to appeal. Although the majority complains that Mr. Grimes has cited no law for the proposition that New York‘s Constitution
The analysis coursing throughout the majority‘s opinion does not concern the constitutional right to counsel. Instead, it promotes the proposition that because the
A.
The federal law referenced by the majority is off point and does not advance its position. The majority relies on Ross v Moffitt (417 US 600 [1974]) and Evitts v Lucey (469 US 387 [1985]), but neither bears on the question raised here. In Ross, the United States Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution did not compel North Carolina to provide counsel to indigent defendants for discretionary appeals to either the North Carolina Supreme Court or when petitioning the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. For several reasons, Ross does not support the majority‘s position.
First, North Carolina lacks New York‘s broad interpretation of the right to counsel under its State Constitution. Second, also unlike New York, North Carolina did not statutorily provide counsel to indigent defendants seeking to petition its Supreme Court for review; that is, whereas Mr. Grimes was represented by counsel who was required to file a CLA on his behalf, Mr. Moffitt had no attorney, and was not statutorily entitled to one. Ross, therefore, says nothing about whether a defendant represented by counsel (here, counsel provided by the State) for the purpose of filing a petition for review by a state‘s highest court has a right that such counsel perform in a manner consistent with settled law as to effectiveness. Third, unlike the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of North Carolina is able to review lower court decisions sua sponte (
Nothing in Ross suggests that when a state makes the legislative choice to provide counsel, that counsel is not held to constitutional standards of effectiveness. Thus, Ross bears on whether the Federal Constitution compels states to provide counsel, not on whether a state constitution should be interpreted to require that counsel perform competently when a state has chosen to provide a statutory right to counsel for a statutory right to petition for review. Finally, Ross‘s discussion of the right to counsel when petitioning the United States Supreme Court for certiorari is irrelevant here. As the Supreme
The majority also misreads Evitts. The question before the Supreme Court was, where a criminal defendant has a right to counsel, “whether the
Likewise, the majority‘s further quotations from Evitts (majority op at 311-312) emphasize the importance of effective assistance of appellate counsel, without making any distinction between an appeal as of right and a petition for review by a state‘s highest court (which issue was not remotely present in
B.
The majority‘s conclusion that “this is not one of those instances in which . . . it can be said that ‘established New York law and traditions [mandate that] some greater degree of protection must be given’ ” (majority op at 314) is addressed to the question of whether New York‘s Constitution requires the provision of counsel to prepare CLAs. Again, that is not the question here. New York has provided counsel for that purpose. No New York authority suggests that appellate counsel may be ineffective, nor does any federal authority suggest so.
The most mystifying feature of the majority‘s analysis is that, in attempting to draw in irrelevant federal due process jurisprudence, it omits any discussion of the interpretive standards by which we determine whether to extend a constitutional right (here, the right that counsel be effective) more broadly than the federal courts have interpreted it, though it cites some of those cases incorrectly and for a completely different purpose.
Examine the following passage from the majority:
“That well-reasoned federal analysis is pertinent to our interpretation of the corresponding State Due Process Clause in the context of an application to the highest court in the state for leave to grant a second-tier review as ‘[t]he Supreme Court‘s analysis . . . [is] consonant with New York State law and interest[ ]’ (People v Alvarez, 70 NY2d 375, 379 [1987]; see People v Kohl, 72 NY2d 191, 197 [1988]; People v Pitts, 6 NY2d 288, 291-292 [1959]; People v Pride, 3 NY2d 545, 550-551 [1958])” (majority op at 313-314).
Alvarez has nothing to do with the right to counsel; it is a case in which we decided to follow the federal constitutional rule that the failure of police to take a breath sample from a drunk driver did not violate the driver‘s due process rights under the New York Constitution. We did not reach that conclusion by blindly following the federal rule; we expressly relied on an analysis that compels rejection of the majority‘s position here:
“We recognize that regardless of whether there exists a Federal constitutional provision parallel to a State provision, we must undertake a ‘noninterpretive’ analysis, proceeding from ‘a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and fundamental fairness’ (id., at 303). Under this analysis relevant considerations include whether the right at issue has historically been afforded greater protection in New York than is presently required under the Federal Constitution, whether the right is ‘of peculiar State or local concern,’ or whether the State citizenry has ‘distinctive attitudes’ toward the right” (Alvarez at 378-379).
The other cases in the majority‘s string cite have nothing to do with the right to counsel, and some of them repeat the proposition that we diverge from the federal courts’ interpretations, even when textual language is identical, if the right in question has historically been offered greater protection in New York or is of peculiar local concern, which is more true of the right to counsel than any other (see People v Kohl, 72 NY2d 191, 197 [1988] [“we look further to see whether there are fundamental justice and fairness concerns of this State which are left unaddressed under prevailing Federal law and which are therefore warranted under the independent broader State protection“]; People v Pride, 3 NY2d 545, 549-550 [1958] [“Our State has always regarded the right to appellate review in criminal matters an integral part of our judicial system and treated it as such. Since long before the Supreme Court‘s pronouncement (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12), it has been the consistent policy of our courts to preserve and promote that right as an effective, if imperfect, safeguard against impropriety or error in the trial of causes“]).
“[t]he safeguards guaranteed by this State‘s Right to Counsel Clause are unique. By constitutional and statutory interpretation, we have established a protective body of law in this area resting on concerns of due process, self-incrimination and the right to counsel provisions of the State Constitution which is substantially greater than that recognized by other State jurisdictions and ‘far more expansive than the Federal counterpart’ ” (People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434, 439 [1991] [citation omitted]; see also People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 155 [2005]).
How, in the face of our long-standing and unyielding commitment to protection of the constitutional right to counsel, do we conclude that a defendant should suffer from counsel‘s malpractice—which would constitute constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel in any lower court—simply because the malpractice affected a defendant‘s right in this Court instead?
C.
I come, then, to the linchpins of the majority‘s analysis: the New York Constitution tolerates deficient counsel for CLA applications because: (1) ” ‘a correct adjudication of guilt’ in every individual case” is not a “critical issue” for the Court of Appeals (majority op at 313); (2) indigent defendants do not need effective counsel for CLAs because they have “the benefit . . . of a prepared or original record of the trial court proceedings, briefs by both counsel on the merits of the errors that allegedly occurred at trial, and the written opinion of the intermediate appellate court determining the validity of the conviction” (majority op at 312); and (3) unlike the lower courts, the Court of Appeals is concerned with matters of “significant public interest . . . legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State . . . [or] probable conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court” (majority op at 313). Those arguments are not even compatible with each other, and provide no basis to conclude that New York‘s Constitution should excuse malpractice in CLAs.
Next, if we thought the briefs in the intermediate court were sufficient to determine when we should grant review, why would we bother entertaining petitions from litigants? If, as the majority implies, a lay defendant without even a high school education can convert intermediate appellate briefs into a cogent CLA, we can readily determine leaveworthiness from those same Appellate Division briefs. To the contrary, the petitions substantially assist us in determining whether to grant leave; to conclude otherwise is to render our certiorari factors an invitation for busywork: “[E]xperience has demonstrated that there are just not enough hours in the day to permit judges of busy appellate courts, no matter how conscientious and willing, to examine and read the records before them as carefully or as critically as single-minded counsel for the appellant” (People v Breslin, 4 NY2d 73, 81-82 [1958]).
The majority is correct that our determination to grant leave involves factors that differ from those with which the Appellate Division is concerned (majority op at 313). The majority is also correct that we require CLAs to include the parties’ briefs, the order below, and relevant opinions or memoranda of the courts
“(1) Whether the law is well settled
“(a) Discuss whether this is a case of first impression; and
“(b) Mention whether there is a split in the Appellate Division Departments.
“(2) Significance and novelty of issue
“(a) Note whether the case involves a recent United States Supreme Court decision and, if so, how it should be interpreted in New York. Also, mention whether the case involves the construction of new state statutory provisions.
“(b) Explain why this case may otherwise present an issue of statewide importance.
“(3) Case specific factors
“The Court will consider how well the case is presented by the attorneys, both in terms of quality of arguments and focus on key issues” (New York State Court of Appeals Criminal Leave Application Practice Outline at 11, https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/forms/claoutline.pdf [last accessed on Sept. 27, 2018], cached at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/webdocs/CrimLvPracticeOutline.pdf).
The majority acknowledges that these factors animate our decisions on CLAs.
For good reason, briefs in the lower courts typically do not address most of these factors: they are irrelevant to those courts. Although counsel might incidentally address some of
Moreover, there are cases in which the error first presents itself in the intermediate appellate court‘s decision, so that the briefs in that court do not address the error at all (see e.g. People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 [1987]). In short, what the majority terms the “markedly different” role of our Court when compared to that of the lower courts is precisely why the arguments made by counsel in the lower courts are not sufficiently informative for defendants to rely on as a substitute for effective counsel when preparing a CLA. The majority‘s belief that the trial and intermediate courts are “governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding” (majority op at 311-312) is equally true for us. Ask a lower court judge, or try Karger for bedtime reading.
D.
I do agree wholeheartedly with the sentiment that “[c]ases on appeal barriers . . . ‘cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis’ ” (majority op at 319, quoting Halbert v Michigan, 545 US at 610). That is why, in Halbert, the Supreme Court rejected Michigan‘s argument that, for defendants who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, appeals to its intermediate court were only by permission, so no right to counsel attached—refusing to accept the pigeonhole of “discretionary” to strip away the right to counsel. That is why, here, when New York has chosen to provide counsel for the express purpose of filing CLAs; when we have held that appellate counsel‘s failure to file a document necessary to effectuate a client‘s wish to seek further review is a per se violation of the right to effective counsel; and when we have no defensible basis to conclude that a defendant may lose the right to petition us no matter the egregiousness of his counsel‘s conduct, no resort to slogans or pigeonhole analysis is necessary.
The balance of the majority‘s observations is just that—observations, not arguments. Yes, the Constitution requires
Finally, the majority erects two bogeymen to ward away Mr. Grimes’ claim that he should not be penalized for his counsel‘s failure to file the promised CLA. One warns us that such a rule will expand to every form of post-conviction relief, swamping the system. But no state statute or rule requires attorneys to represent defendants in post-conviction matters, and, in contrast to CLAs, a substantial fraction of the post-conviction motions we receive are pro se applications. The line can easily be drawn at direct appeals, and it would be impossible to believe that requiring the existing CLA attorneys to meet constitutional effectiveness standards will swamp anything.
Bogeyman two cries out, “[i]t is the legislature that sets this Court‘s jurisdiction, including the time limitations for seeking leave to appeal” (majority op at 315). Were that always so, Syville could not have been decided as it was. In Syville we expressly “recognize[d] the need for a second exception” to
“Where an attorney has failed to comply with a timely request for the filing of a notice of appeal and the defendant alleges that the omission could not reasonably have been discovered within the one-year time period, the time limit imposed in
CPL 460.30 should not categorically bar an appellate court from considering that defendant‘s applicationto pursue an untimely appeal. Turning to the procedure to be used in invoking the exception, we conclude that the common-law writ of error cram nobis affords the appropriate avenue for relief. Since the adoption of the CPL, we have acknowledged that the writ continues to be available to alleviate a constitutional wrong when a defendant has no other procedural recourse” (15 NY3d at 399-400).
Here, as in Syville, the attorney failed to comply with the client‘s timely request; in Syville we set aside
As a practical matter, our application of the exception we created in Syville demonstrates both that the exception will not swallow the statute, and that Mr. Grimes’ situation is quite different from the circumstances in which defendants have been denied use of the exception. In People v Perez (23 NY3d 89, 101 [2014]), we denied coram nobis relief to all three defendants based on “[t]wo compelling facts [that] stand out in all three cases: the delays were extremely long, and the defendants did not have a good excuse for them.” Two defendants did not complain about counsel‘s failure to file an appeal until after they had served their sentences, were tried for new crimes, and were sentenced as predicate offenders many years later. As to the third, Mr. Perez, we wrote that his claim “is more colorable than [the others‘] because Perez had a lawyer—one who was undoubtedly ineffective in failing to perfect the appeal that he was hired to pursue. We have held that a client who was victimized by his appellate lawyer‘s procedural errors has been deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel” (id. at 100). We have thus made a quite sensible distinction, as to the strength of a claim of exemption from
In People v Andrews (23 NY3d 605, 615 [2014]), we held that Mr. Patel, who had unsuccessfully attempted the
III.
Stripped bare, the majority opinion says that because the United States Supreme Court decided in Evitts that the
Judges Stein, Fahey, Garcia and Feinman concur; Judge Wilson dissents in an opinion, in which Judge Rivera concurs.
Order affirmed.
Notes
“[a]n application for leave to appeal from an intermediate appellate court order determining an appeal taken to that court shall include: (i) one copy of each brief submitted on defendant‘s behalf to the intermediate appellate court; (ii) one copy of each brief submitted by the People to the intermediate appellate court; (iii) the order and decision of the intermediate appellate court sought to be appealed from; [and] (iv) all relevant opinions or memoranda of the courts below, along with any other papers to be relied on in furtherance of the application” (22 NYCRR 500.20 [b] [1] [emphasis added]).
With these essential materials providing an ample foundation, the CLA may be but a brief letter summarizing what was already argued in the courts below. The representation by counsel is not a fundamental prerequisite to a fair hearing under these circumstances. Indeed, the pro se CLA is not a rarity in this Court as pro se litigants regularly seek permission to appeal an adverse determination by the intermediate appellate court on motions for writs of error coram nobis pursuant to Bachert (see 69 NY2d at 599-600; CPL 450.90). Of note, the dissent‘s reference to statistics is limited to CLAs from direct appeals from conviction (see dissenting op at 322).