*1 Thus, contrary City’s to the position, Senator Donahue’s announcement a “catastrophically injured” firefighter synonymous “firefighter with a who, injuries, due to has been forced take a line of duty disability” is not an isolated “eleventh hour” state- Rather, ment. the foregoing demonstrates, as account both of the sponsors Bill’s were concerned from line-of-duty disabilities, outset with explicitly informing their colleagues immediately of the Bill’s focus prior to every vote. In light unambiguous legislative this his- 10(a)’s tory, light of section facial ambiguity, we will legislature’s judgment. defer to the like Accordingly, below, the appellate and circuit courts we construe the phrase “catastrophic injury” synonymous with an injury resulting line-of-duty disability in a under section 4—110 of the Code.
CONCLUSION reasons, For the foregoing judgment of the appel- late court is affirmed.
Affirmed. (No. 89940. ILLINOIS,
THE PEOPLE THE OF STATE OF Appel- lant, GRECO, v. PETER M. Appellee.
Opinion May 2003. fled *4 J., RARICK, part. took no THOMAS, J., concurring. specially General, Springfield, E. of and Ryan, Attorney James (Joel Birkett, of D. Joseph Attorney, E. State’s Wheaton General, and L. Bertocchi, Solicitor William Browers General, Iskowich, of Attorneys David H. Assistant counsel), Chicago, People. the of for Lisle, Lynch, for George appellee. E of of the opinion KILBRIDE delivered the JUSTICE court: constitutionality
At in this case is the of sec issue 103.2(b) of Illinois Vehicle Code tions 1— 191 and 4— (West 2000)). (Code) 103.2(b) (625 ILCS 4— 5/1 — (720 one of theft ILCS with count Defendant (West 1(a)(1)(A) 2000)), of aggravated two counts 5/16 — (625 unlawful of (West 103.2(a)(5) 2000)), and one of ILCS count 5/4 — defacing a manufacturer’s identification unlawful of 103(a)(2) (West 2000)). (625 number ILCS 5/4 — counts, the circuit court dismissing the latter three of “[sjpecial the definition County Du found Page (625 ILCS section 1— 191 equipment” within (West 2000)) unconstitutionally vague. 5/1 —191 court found that also 103.2(b) (West 2000)) 103.2(b) (625 violates ILCS 5/4 — appeals The State separation powers. doctrine court directly pursuant to this ruling
the circuit court’s 302(a) (134 302(a)). R. For Ill. 2d Supreme Court Rule affirm in reverse reasons, part we following court, and hold that sec circuit part judgment circuit and that process violates due tion *5 challenge court sustained defendant’s facial improperly of 1—191. section
I. STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND case, procedural posture
Due to the of this the record severely below is limited. this facial Because was a chal- statute, of lenge disputed provisions of the facts surrounding defendant’s indictment were not adduced before the trial court.
Defendant was under section 4—103.2 with possession stolen special equipment. of mobile relevant part, section states:
“(a) Chapter of It is violation this for: * * * *** (5) a not person possession any entitled to the *** *** *** special equipment possess mobile the vehicle or in part vehicle described paragraph knowing this it is 103.2(a)(5) (West stolen or converted!!.]” ILCS 5/4 — 2000). (b) Subsection of section 4—103.2 a permis- invokes 103(a)(1) sive inference contained of the Code. Under that provision, may be inferred that a person who exercises the exclusive unexplained posses- sion of a stolen vehicle has knowledge that the vehicle 103(a)(1) (West 2000). stolen. 625 ILCS Moreover, 5/4 — provision explains that the permissive may be whether the date when the vehicle was stolen (West 103(a)(1) 2000). is recent or remote. ILCS 5/4 — The General Assembly the permissive inference, based part, upon finding that:
“the acquisition disposition and of vehicles and their es- parts strictly sential are by controlled law and that such acquisitions dispositions and are reflected documents title, contracts, invoices, leasing agreements uniform rental 103(a)(1) (West 2000). and bills of sale.” 625 ILCS 5/4 — Code, Under the special equipment is defined as follows:
“Every designed vehicle not used primarily or for the incidentally only transportation persons property or and including operated highway, or over a but moved sweepers, digging apparatus, ditch well limited to: street and construction and maintenance boring apparatus road mixers, machinery asphalt spreaders, such as bituminous tractors, ditchers, loaders, than bucket tractors other truck machines, finishing graders, motor road levelling graders, rollers, scarifiers, moving scrapers, earth and carryalls drag lines, and power self-propelled cranes shovels moving house The term does not include equipment. earth trailers, trucks, mixers, dump truck mounted transit cranes shovels, transporta- designed or or vehicles for other machinery been persons property tion of to which has (West 2000). attached.” 625 ILCS 5/1 —191 that defendant’s provided aggravated The indictment charges unlawful *6 “Case from his of one Wheeled stemmed machinery referred to Loader Model 1845C.” loader,” a commonly known as “wheel indictment “uni-loader,” or loader.” a “skid-steer indictment, arguing to
Defendant moved dismiss (1) that: among things other 103.2(b) process into violates due incorporated section 4— (2) doctrine; the defini powers and the and separation contained “special equipment” tion vague. granted 1—191 The court unconstitutionally under motion, appeals and the State now defendant’s 302(a) 302(a)). (134 Ill. 2d R. Supreme Court Rule
II. ANALYSIS constitutional, to and All are be presumed statutes on the party rebutting presumption the burden validity of the statute to demonstrate challenging 198 Sypien, v. clearly People violation. a constitutional (2001). reasonably 334, possible, If statute Ill. 2d 338 constitutionality must construed so as to affirm its be (1999). 1, In Ill. 10 Fuller, v. 187 2d validity. People 1—191 that sections the circuit court declared this case
407
facially
are
unconstitutional. Such chal
legislative
challenges
acts are the most difficult
lenges to
R.C.,
In re
291,
(2001),
195 Ill. 2d
quoting
mount.
297
C.E.,
re
United
200,
(1994),
161
quoting
Ill. 2d
210-11
Salerno,
745,
States v.
739,
697,
95 L.
2d
481 U.S.
Ed.
“
(1987).
707,
S.
2095,
challenger
‘[T]he
107
Ct.
2100
must establish that no set of circumstances
under
exists
” R.C.,
297,
which the Act would
valid.’
195
2d at
be
Ill.
C.E.,
In re
Ill.
quoting
200,
(1994),
161
2d
210-11
quoting
Salerno,
United States v.
739, 745,
481
L. Ed. 2d
U.S.
(1987).
697, 707,
2095,
Moreover,
107 S. Ct.
might
statute
some
operate unconstitutionally under
set of
insufficient to render
conceivable
circumstances is
invalid,
it wholly
recognized
as we have not
an over-
breadth doctrine
the limited
outside
context of
first
C.E.,
quoting United
210-11,
amendment.
161 Ill. 2d at
Salerno,
States
v.
745,
739,
697,
481 U.S.
95 L.
2d
Ed.
(1987).
707,
S. Ct.
We review de novo circuit court’s
that a
holding
statute is unconstitutional.
Sypien,
A. 103.2(b); Section Permissive Inference in Relation
to Special Mobile Equipment An inference or presumption is a legal device that either permits requires the fact finder assume of a presumed existence or ultimate fact based on certain Watts, predicate or basic facts. People Ill. 141-42 While inferences and presumptions play “a vital role in the expeditious ques resolution of factual *7 (People Hester, v. tions” 91, (1989)), 131 Ill. 2d 98 their prove use to an of a may element crime process raise due Watts, 2d concerns. 181 Ill. at 143. The due process clause “ ‘protects against the except upon accused conviction proof a beyond reasonable every necessary doubt of fact ” to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ People v. Jeffries, re 104, (1995), 164 Ill. 114 quoting In Win 2d ship, 358, 364, 368, 375, 397 U.S. 25 L. Ed. S. Ct. 90
408 (1970).
1068, Thus, the process “the due clauses of the upon Fifth and Amendments set limits Fourteenth make legislature of or that to power Congress of state of facts of the proof group the of one fact evidence predi- fact on which is guilt existence the ultimate 463, 467, L. Ed. States, cated.” Tot v. 319 U.S. United (1943). 1519, 1524, 63 S. Ct. allows,
A inference one that but permissive simply finder require, does not the of fact to infer the existence presumed upon proof of the ultimate or fact fact, any on predicate placing without burden Watts, Ill. 142. In where defendant. 2d at situations corroborating there is some evidence a defendant’s inference constitutionality permissive of a guilt, under “more than not” judged likely should be Housby, 84 Ill. 2d People standard. standard, will permissive presumption
Under this more process presumed due concerns if the fact is satisfy predicate Housby, than to flow from the fact. likely presumption 2d at 425. the permissive 84 Ill. Where however, guilt, finding the lone basis for from beyond flow a reasonable doubt presumed fact must 421. fact. 84 Ill. 2d at proven, predicate Housby, matter, argues that defen- As a threshold the State inference standing challenge permissive dant lacks section section from by borrowed 4 — 103(a)(1). lacks that defendant The State contends not have standing that the would posses- him because he was with been and not a stolen equipment of stolen sion 103(a)(1) State, to the According vehicle. acquisition and the of vehicles solely applies to vehicles documents, includ- by legal reflected controlled law as Con- titles, and bills of sale. leasing agreements, ing registered need not be versely, special Thus, the State by oral contract. and can be transferred
409 maintains the inference of section not meant in involving posses- be used cases the sion of stolen mobile equipment.
Defendant counters that the State has waived its standing argument by requesting that the trial court make a on the ruling alternative, issue. defendant maintains that he has standing because he is charged with an statutory offense under a places scheme that him being subjected at risk of to the inference. Regard- less of the State’s announced position rely upon not to inference, a trial appellate court or the court could rely upon statutory reaching scheme a finding of guilt.
The doctrine of standing is intended to insure that is sues are raised and argued only by parties those with a real interest in the outcome of controversy. Chicago Union, Teachers 1 Local v. Board Education City (2000). 200, Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d To have standing to challenge the constitutionality statute, of a person must have suffered or inbe immediate danger of suffer ing a direct injury as a result of enforcement of the chal lenged statute. Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d (1993). Standing is an element of justiciability, and it must be defined on a case-by-case basis. In re Marriage Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d
We need not address arguments defendant’s concern- ing waiver agree because we with defendant statutory scheme places him in danger of being subjected to the permissive inference. The State’s arguments are belied the plain language of the Code. Section 4—103.2 is a provision of the relating Code to aggravated offenses sale, involve the receipt of motor (West vehicles and other vehicles. 625 ILCS 5/4 —103.2 2000). Defendant was pursuant to section 103.2(a)(5) of the Code with possession of “special *** mobile equipment knowing the special [that is stolen or converted.” ILCS
equipment] 5/4— (b) 103.2(a)(5) (West 2000). Subsection of section 103(a)(1) expressly provides 4— 103.2 the section 4— to the offenses set out subsection apply inference shall (a) That allows of section 4 — 103.2. of a vehicle to be evidence unexplained possession stolen *9 that the is stolen possessor that the knows vehicle is recent whether the date when the vehicle was stolen (West 2000). 103(a)(1) only or 625 ILCS Not remote. 5/4 — from this special exempted mobile inference, included in specifically it is also permissive (5) (a). Moreover, very by of subsection its paragraph title, entirety of section 4—103.2 involves “vehicles.” the that Thus, argument, appears to the it contrary State’s equip- intended to include mobile legislature special the and intended the meaning ment within the of “vehicle” involving posses- in cases applicable inference to be equipment. sion of the definition of supported by This conclusion in of the Code that contained section 1—217 “vehicle” and sales registration no reference to or transfer contains 217, simply In a vehicle is section requirements. 1— defined as: device, in, any or
“[e]very upon by person which upon a may transported be or drawn property is or human devices except by power, devices moved highway, stationary rails or tracks and exclusively upon used Registration in Snowmobile as defined snowmobiles (West 2000). Safety Act.” 625 ILCS 5/1—217 the term expressly 1— 191 uses Additionally, equipment. defining special when “vehicle” 2000). (West statutory this accord with ILCS 5/1 —191 by the developed statutory and the scheme language sufficiently has shown hold that defendant legislature, we to the being subjected danger in immediate that he is has and thus inference of section 4— constitutionality. that section’s standing challenge Nevertheless, cites 133 Ill. People Rogers, State (1989). In with 2d 1 the defendant was Rogers, alleged The indictment the defen child abduction. car purpose dant lured two children into his for committing the act of criminal sexual abuse. Defendant indictment, moved to complaining dismiss (Ill. 1987, child section of the abduction statute Rev. Stat. 5(b)(10) 38, 5(b)(10), ch. par. now 720 ILCS 5/10 — (West 2000)) impermis was unconstitutional sibly proof shifted the burden of onto a defendant including presumption person that a who lures a child into a motor vehicle parent’s without consent is do ing for “other than a purpose.” so lawful Ill. Rev. Stat. 5(b)(10), ch. par. now 720 ILCS 5/10— 5(b)(10) (West 2000). argued The defendant also that the phrase “other than a purpose” lawful was unconstitu tionally vague.
This court held that
the defendant
lacked
Rogers
standing to challenge the inference because it
appar
ent that the inference
would not be
to him. Rog
*10
ers,
The
easily
instant case
distinguished. Quite simply,
is
there
no
indication from the record that
the State
relinquished
ability
rely
its
to
on the permissive infer
103.2(b). Thus,
ence of section
unlike the Rogers
defendant,
this defendant
standing
has
the
challenge
statute
he
in
because
immediate
of
danger
sustaining
some
injury
direct
as a result of enforcement of the
(1983).
Ziltz,
statute.
People
38,
See
v.
98 Ill. 2d
turn
We now
to the merits of the parties’ arguments
103.2(b).
concerning section
Defendant maintained
disputed
separation
below that
the
violates the
provision
powers
process
of
doctrine
and due
because it allows
knowledge of the fact a vehicle was stolen to be inferred
vehicle,
unexplained possession
regard
from the
of that
actually
the
The circuit
less of when
vehicle was
stolen.
separation
powers.
court held that
the section violates
of
court,
nominally
before
defendant
Accordingly,
this
of
argument
separation
powers
confines his
to the
doctrine, maintaining
permissive
the
inference of
the court a
imposes upon
legal
section 4—
that contravenes
the law of the state as set out
premise
(1981).
Ill.
Housby,
v.
2d 415
People
Under
a defendant’s
“recent and exclusive
Housby,
of items
in a
reason
possession
burglary,
stolen
without
to an inference that
explanation, gives
pos
able
rise
added.)
burglary.”
by
(Emphasis
session was obtained
Thus,
defendant,
according
nounced
is not
recent
Comfort
(1870),
v.
“[W]hile
prima
guilt,
explained
when it is
other
evidence
facie
circumstances,
surrounding
posses
[such
evidence or
after
possession
sion] should not control. If the
is recent
circumstances,
theft,
and there are no attendant
presumption
rebut the
or to create
other evidence to
of such
guilt,
reasonable doubt of
the mere fact
added.) Comfort,
(Emphasis
a conviction.”
would warrant
Accord Smith v. 229 Ill. 382-83 People, cases we refined the subsequent recency requirement. the rationale behind the
identified *11 (1921), Bullion, Ill. 208 we v. 299 example, People For
413 arise, inference to for the that, in order explained “soon must be property of the stolen possession after of the possession the exclusive crime,” and it must be added.) Bullion, 299 Ill. at (Emphasis charged. individual that: clarify on to 212-13. wentWe indicate that recent as to be so possession must “[t]he it is so and where property, taken the must have possessor to the opportunity fair given have in time as to remote acquire defendant to goods and to the dispose of the thief to guilt slight, any, if evidence honestly, possession is them Kubulis, 212-13, Bullion, citing People v. 299 111.at ***.” (1921). 523, Ill. 530 298 flow guilt the inference Housby, inway another
Stated of items possession recent and exclusive ing from the “ ‘inherently strong is burglary justified in a stolen ” 84 Housby, is accurate. the inference probability’ recent is possession Ill. 2d at 422. Whether time and no definite jury, for the ordinarily question law, when, a matter of can fixed be (1959); v. 82, People 92 Pride, 16 Ill. People recent. Kubulis, Ill. at 530. 422, (1939); Malin, Ill. in order for earlier, generally speaking, As stated muster, there constitutional pass permissive proved the fact between be a rational connection must 420, citing Ill. 2d at Housby, presumed. and the fact 1245. 1524, 63 S. Ct. at at 87 L. Ed. at Tot, 319 U.S. presumed fact and a a proved The connection between “ “ir regarded as context ‘must be fact in a criminal law unconstitutional, un and hence “arbitrary,” rational” substantial assurance least be said with less it can at than not to flow likely fact more presumed ” made to depend.’ on it is from the fact which proved 420-21, Leary v. United quoting Ill. 2d at Housby, 84 57, 82, Ct. 6, 36, Ed. 2d 89 S. States, 23 L. 395 U.S. standards, cannot hold we these Employing inference contained within *12 414 to special equipment. constitutional as mobile
Plainly there put, is no substantial assurance that a person of of unexplained possession piece special with stolen, mobile equipment example ago, for 10 years more not likely knowledge than has that the of piece equip words, ment by removing was stolen. In other the re cency of requirement permissive the as cur rently 103.2(b), legislature in section embodied the 4— dramatically has the weakened that the infer probability regard ence correct to special will be with mobile equip ment. The State concedes that the acquisition and special subject transfer of is not to equipment and strict control documentation that at requirements conveyance We, accordingly, tends of other vehicles. express opinion no with to the of regard constitutionality inference in the context of other vehicles e.g., Gentry, v. See, as defined under the People Code. 192 v. (1989); Ill. 774 People Ferguson, App. 3d 204 Ill. App. (the (1990) 3d 146 not permissive inference did violate vehicle). Gentry due in relation to a motor process legislative finding court relied specifically on the motor is strictly transfer of vehicles documented and by Ill. App. Gentry, controlled law. 192 3d at 778-79. appears the circuit court to confined its While have holding separation powers doctrine, to we af may firm on any supported its decision basis record. by (1998). Golan, v. Gunthorp See Ill. 2d 184 438 case, this defendant before the circuit court argued 103.2(b) due process specifically section violates and cited Tot and Moreover, court, Leary. before defen this Housby, mainly dant relies on stated unequivo we cally Housby in that our decision was “mandated due Housby, Ill. 2d 423. Accord process requirements.” at ingly, has raised due here. implicitly process defendant decision, on part, The trial court likewise based its concerns, finding: process due permis- of difference between great deal “[There is] *** recently- possession drawn from inference to be sive property which opposed property stolen that scenario any time. Under stolen at may have been of a bought part to have been reasonable have would a Class charged with market and be [sic] at a flee tractor infer- type that that absurd, absolutely absurd felony. It’s statute.” under the be allowable ence would duty construe a statute our mindful of We are ever constitutionality validity upholds its a manner reasonably possible.People Ill. Malchow, whenever can case, In this regard reasonably with as constitutional construed be due it violates because to process *13 piece by removing requirement that a of recently special equipment for stolen in order be mobile give equipment to an inference to rise of the possessor stolen. knows that the that the 191; Definition of B. Section 1— Special Equipment Mobile ruling challenges lastly court’s the trial The State equipment” “[sjpecial of the definition on its 1—191 unconstitutional contained in section is (West2000). vague. 625 ILCS face it is because 5/1—191 sufficiently argues clear is that the definition The State op- ordinary intelligence give person a reasonable of to a knowing portunity it. The are covered of what devices a contends that the statute withstands therefore State challenge vagueness in rul- the trial court erred and that ing otherwise. challenge, process challenge vagueness is a due A “ ‘give[s] person [a]
examining of a whether statute opportunity ordinary intelligence to know a reasonable ” accordingly.’ may prohibited, that he act so what is Department Ill. 2d Resources, 183 Natural Russell v. of (1998), Orayned City quoting 408 Rockford, v. 434, 442 of 2294, 227, Ct. 222, 92 S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. U.S. (1972). not, however, 2298-99 An act is unconstitution ally vague simply can conjure up hypotheti because one meaning cal dispute over some of the act’s terms. Monmouth, Gem Electronics Department Inc. v. Revenue, (1998). 470, Ill. 2d statute, considering challenge
When
to a
vagueness
used,
a court
only
considers not
language
but also
the legislative
objective
and the evil
the statute
R.C.,
designed
remedy.
Section 1— 191 classifying *14 equipment “[ejvery designed as vehicle not or used primarily transportation persons property for or or only incidentally highway.” moved operated over (West 2000). 625 ILCS The potential difficulty 5/1 —191 with this it can either by classification be satisfied usage. an design individual vehicle’s its Neverthe- less, whether we cannot determine section 1— 191 is defendant, unconstitutionally as there vague could fact-finding has been no in this case. Nor have the for result, inappropriate it was As court done so. trial As this is vague. declare the statute court to the trial vague freedoms, the first amendment involving case have resolved been properly could not challenge ness The trial of the case. to the facts except by application unconstitu the statute determination court’s must be therefore, was, premature tionally vague possible it is 299-300. While R.C., 195 Ill. at reversed. “ ‘ engender “may future applications specific dimension, it bewill of constitutional problems concrete they when any problems such enough to consider time ’ ” 299-300, quoting Village R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at arise.” Estates, Inc., 455 Flipside, Estates v. Hoffman Hoffman 362, 375, 102 S. Ct. 489, 504, 71 L. Ed. 2d U.S. Sons, & Inc. v. E. (1982), Joseph Seagram quoting 336, 348, S. Ct. 35, 52, 16 L. Ed. 2d Hostetter, 384 U.S. 1254, 1265
III. CONCLUSION reasons, hold that section we For the above-stated constitutionally of the Illinois Vehicle Code because applies infirm as it that the trial addition, we hold process. due violates challenge defendant’s facial improperly court sustained vagueness grounds. 1—191 of the Code on of section if necessary to determine development factual Further judgment to defendant. clearly applies this is, therefore, affirmed County Page the circuit court of Du remanded and the cause is in part, and reversed part opinion. this consistent with proceedings for further in part; and reversed part Affirmed remanded. cause in the consideration part took no JUSTICE RARICK case. or decision this
418 THOMAS,
JUSTICE specially concurring: I agree majority’s with the conclusion that section is unconstitutional to special I also equipment. agree majority’s with deci- to trial sion reverse the court’s that ruling section 1— 191 However, unconstitutionally vague. is I disagree with the majority’s that early assertion is too to decide this I question. would address the and hold issue that section 1— 191 is not unconstitutionally vague. majority asserts it cannot determine if the unconstitutionally vague
statute because there has fact-finding. majority been no The rule on relies from In re to avoid the is the following issue statement R.C., (2001): 195 Ill. 299 “As this was a civil case, amendment, involving vagueness first challenge properly could not have been resolved except by application Here, to the facts of the case.” no more are required facts to decide the issue. We know from the indictment that defendant charged unlawfully was with a possessing “Case Wheeled Loader Model 1845C with Product Identification Number JAF 0196424.” In its response dismiss, to defendant’s motion to the State industry noted that in the construction the wheeled commonly “uni-loader,” loader is referred to as a a “skid steer,” or a “Bob Cat.”
Thus,
indicted,
given
when defendant was
he was
exactly
notice
he
pos
what
was
with
cases,
sessing
In criminal
unlawfully.
most common
for a
bring
vagueness challenge
time
defendant
statute
is after
indictment
but
trial. As in this
before
case, the
in the form
argument
generally raised
See,
motion to
the indictment
dismiss
information.
Izzo,
e.g.,
Law,
v.
v.
(2002);
People
People
Ill. 2d 578
Russell,
v.
(2001);
People
195 Ill. 2d
2d 23
Ill.
News,
Inc.,
It should be unconstitutionally vague challenged as defendant statute Rather, the indictment. to dismiss original motion in his 103.2(a)(5), the section argued defendant section charged, defendant the offense with which defining *16 it an makes unconstitutionally vague. This section was conceal, of, receive, dispose or transfer to possess, offense doing so knows person if the equipment, mobile special that this argued Defendant to be stolen or converted. because, “There is vague unconstitutionally section defines clearly which in the Statute no definition found ” immediately The State equipment.’ mobile ‘special statute, section indeed such that there was responded defini- comprehensive and a detailed gives which Surprisingly, equipment.” “special tion of mobile argument. vagueness his defendant did not withdraw to section argument Rather, simply he transferred textbook the fact that this section is a despite nonvague of a statute. example majority opinion, in full in the 191, set out Section 1— “every as vehicle1 not equipment mobile special defines for the designed primarily transportation or used or only incidentally and property operated or persons The statute then lists several highway.” over a moved that are mobile of vehicles examples that are not. The vehicles and of vehicles types several or designed that are not that are are indeed ones listed or persons transportation used for the primarily or incidentally operated moved only and are property are excluded Likewise, the vehicles that highway. over transportation are that are for the primarily ones used detailed, clear, property. or The statute is persons follow, seriously and no one could contend easy to vague this is a statute. (625 ILCS in 1—217 defined 1The term “vehicle” is (West 2000)).
5/1 —217 we do not position seems to be that majority’s enough if a wheeled loader is yet have facts to determine too “special equipment,” early thus it is vagueness question. decide the Two are problems im- mediately apparent. First, defendant had the burden to Law, demonstrate statute was invalid. 202 111. 2d at 582. Defendant argued his memorandum of law his support of motion to dismiss that “we have no idea what a ‘Bobcat’ is or vague how it relates to the defini- tion of special true, If equipment.” this then defendant has failed in burden to his demonstrate to a unconstitutionally vague statute wheeled loader.
Second, the fal majority’s position rests on subtle correctly lacy. majority notes, As the a statute is void for (1) vagueness only if it “provide fails to kind of notice that would enable a person ordinary intelligence (2) understand what prohibited,” conduct “provide explicit standards for who apply it, those thus authoriz ing or even encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory *17 Law, enforcement.” Here, 202 Ill. at 582-83. the statute that “prohibits conduct” is not section 1— 191 but section 103.2(a)(5), which makes it an to offense possess, receive, of, conceal, dispose or transfer special doing mobile if the knows it to equipment, person so be merely provides stolen or converted. 1— 191 a Section “special equipment.” comprehensive definition of mobile however, crime, It is a for a to exert person also in if the general person control over stolen “property” knows it to stolen or it under be obtains circumstances reasonably property that would lead him to believe 1(a) (West 2000). was stolen. It is See ILCS 5/16 — “receive, sell, to felony conceal, dispose, also a possess, transfer” a “vehicle” if the knows that the vehicle person 103(a)(1) (West is stolen or converted. ILCS See 625 5/4 — 2000). Thus, no a is, matter what “wheeled loader” it that it it if he knew defendant to possess unlawful of was it' thought he argued Defendant has not stolen. was wheeled loader possess to a stolen permissible be would All “special equipment.” mobile if not considered it was mobile “special property of designation of the offense. change does the class equipment” of stolen possession Unlawful (West (625 103.2(c) 2000)), ILCS felony is a Class 5/4 — is Class vehicle a while a stolen unlawful 103(b) (West (625 2000)), and theft can felony ILCS 5/4 — A to a Class X from a Class misdemeanor anywhere be it was stolen and how depending on what was felony, 2000)). (720 1(b) (West Thus, no mat ILCS taken 5/16 — notice is, a loader” defendant was on ter what “wheeled to it if he knew that possess that he not entitled was he fair what stolen, given warning and was thus prohibited. conduct was give explicit not fail to
Similarly, statute does it, arbitrary those apply standards for who enforce- If law encouraged. ment is neither authorized nor person posses- enforcement officials believe that forth are property, sion of stolen statutes set above sufficiently charge clear for them to determine how to Likewise, statutory the offense. are suf- definitions ficiently trier fact. It be applied by clear be would extraordinarily legisla- difficult and for the burdensome every type ture list conceivable of vehicle that Instead, “special they provided have equipment.” definition, specific examples types clear of the with definition that are included vehicles those that are not. subsequent to be that if majority implying seems that a loader” is not included in the
facts show “wheeled property- theft 2Defendant in this case was with *18 $10,000 $100,000, more less than which is a Class worth than but 1(b)(5) (West 2000). felony. See ILCS 5/16 — unconstitutionally vague definition, then the statute is disagree. to a wheeled loader. I If it is determined designed that a “wheeled loader” is “not or used primarily transportation persons property” for the or “only incidentally operated and is moved over highway,” possessed it, and defendant is shown to have knowing guilty stolen, that it was then defendant is offense. If turns out that a “wheeled definition, loader” does not meet that then the State has mischarged these counts of the indictment and defendant guilty particular way, is not of this offense. Either unconstitutionally vague. statute is not We have suf- now, ficient information to decide this and I issue would vague. unconstitutionally hold that the statute (No. 89226. Appel- ILLINOIS,
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Appellant. BROWN, lee, CORTEZ Opinion rehearing October on denial filed 2002. Modified March 2003. RARICK, J., part. took no