Lead Opinion
Defendant Graves was charged with first-degree murder on the basis of the fatal shooting of Frank Stephens. At the close of the prosecution’s case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal regarding the first-degree murder charge. The trial court denied the motion and instructed the jury that it could find defendant guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter (thereby acquitting defendant of the first- аnd second-degree murder charges).
Defendant argued in his appeal to the Court of Appeals that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court had erred in submitting the first-degree murder charge to the jury. Defendant’s argument was
[W]here a jury is permitted consideration of a charge unwarranted by the proofs there is always prejudice because a defendant’s chances of acquittal on any valid charge is substantially decreased by the possibility of a compromise verdict. For this reason it is reversible error for a trial judge to refuse a directed verdict of acquittal on any charge where the prosecution has failed to present evidence from which the jury could find all elements of the crime charged. [Emphasis added.]
The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant’s contention that there had been insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the first-degree murder charge and therefore held that Vail required dеfendant be granted a new trial on the manslaughter charge.
However, Judges Griffin and Bandstra urged this Court to overrule Vail.
In any event, the standards we apply in deciding whether to overrule a case do not rest upon the length of time that the rule hаs been in effect. It is true of course that we do not lightly overrule a case. This Court has stated on many occasions that “[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction should not be lightly departed.” People v Jamieson,
Before this court overrules a decision deliberately made, it should be convinced not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but also that less injury will result from overruling than from following it.
When it becomes apparent that the reasoning of an opinion is erroneous, and that less mischief will result from overruling the case rather than following it, it becomes the duty of the court to correct it. Attorney General ex rel Barnes v Midland Co Bd of Supervisors,
We first note that Vail is a rule of automatic reversal. As this Court recently reiterated in People v Belanger,
As explained in People v Grant,
If the error is constitutional, it must be further classified as structural or nonstructural. If the constitutional error is structural, reversal is automatic. People v Anderson (After Remand),
If the error is a preserved error, but not constitutional in its nature, the Court must determine whether the error was harmless. This Court grappled in Mateo and People v Gearns,
Thus, depending on the nature of the error, it is appropriate to (1) automatically reverse, (2) reverse unless the error is harmless bеyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) (pursuant to the preference of four justices in Geams) reverse unless it is highly probable that the error did not affect the verdict.
Every member of this Court is now on record as holding that preserved nonconstitutional error, such as occurred here, should be reviewed under a lesser standard than the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Moreover, Michigan is one of only a handful of states that requires reversal under the circumstances of this case. Anno: Modem status of law regarding cure of error, in instruction as to one offense, by conviction of higher or lesser offense, 15 ALR4th 118, part III, §§ 21-24, pp 164-177. The vast majority of states apply a harmless-error analysis. Id.
The idea that courts of review should automatically undertake a reconstmction of the jury’s deliberative process anytime the jury is presented with an erroneous instruction, even where there is no record evidence of jury compromise, is flawed both in principle and in practice. Automatic reversal represents, at best, a rough guеss at the psychological dynamic at work during jury deliberations, guesswork that seemingly concludes that at least one juror argued for acquittal on all charges, while another juror argued for conviction on the erroneous charge, and those
It is well established that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People v Hana,
There is no basis on this record to assume that the jury’s verdict was a product of compromise. There is simply no more reason for assuming that jurors have compromised on a verdict when there is an erroneous charge than there is to believe they have simply reached a middle ground when several instructions are correctly given. If there was error in allowing the first-degrеe murder charge to go to the jury, the jury corrected that error by acquitting defendant of that charge and returning a proper verdict of second-degree murder. Most courts agree that a proper verdict of second-degree murder cures an error in instructing a jury on first-degree. . . . While Michigan cases have not agreed, . . . any other conclusion is based on judicial speculation that jurors who have acquitted the defendant have compromised their views desрite an express direction from the trial court to the contrary. [Citations omitted.]
The Vail rule gives the jury far less credit than is warranted.
Further, the Vail rule also overlooks the fact that the error is cured when the jury acquits the defendant of the unwarranted charge. We are persuaded by the view that a defendant has no room to complain when he is acquitted of a charge that is improperly submitted to a jury, as long as the defendant is actually con
On the basis of this record, we are satisfied that it is highly probable that the error did not affect the verdict. Although it might have been error to submit the first-degree murder charge to the jury, it is undisputed that a second-degree murder charge was properly submitted to the jury. The jury acquitted defendant not only of the first-degree murder charge, but also of the supported second-degree murder charge. Where a jury acquits a defendant of an unwarranted charge (first-degree murder) and a lesser included warranted charge (second-degree murder) before convicting of a still lesser charge (voluntary manslaughter), we find that it is highly probable that the erroneous submission of the unwarranted charge did not affect the ultimate verdict.
If, however, sufficiently persuasive indicia of jury compromise are present, reversal may be warranted
It is for these reasons that we overrule Vail and find that any error in submitting the first-degree murder charge to the jury was harmless in light of the fact that the jury returned a manslaughter conviction.
Because the Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of Vail, without reaching defendant’s other issues, id. at 681, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the other issues Graves raised in his appeal.
Notes
Judge Fitzgerald concurred separately to indicate that he believed Vail had been correctly decided. Id. at 681.
We find that it is unnecessary to determine whether the close question whether the first-degree murder chаrge was properly submitted to the jury (the victim was shot in the back). Given that we are overruling Vail, defendant is not entitled to a new trial even if it was error to submit the first-degree murder charge to the jury. Judicial expediency allows courts
In Vail, it is not еntirely clear that the issue of automatic reversal was “deliberately examined.” In that case, whether error in submitting the greater charge was necessarily error requiring reversal was stipulated by the prosecution and the defense. The Court, noting the parties’ agreement, simply cited a series of earlier cases for the proposition. Vail, supra at 463. Review of the cases preceding Vail reveals that the underpinnings of the principle stated in Vail are tenuous at best.
As explained in United States v Mechanik,
The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences. The “[pjassage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible.” Thus, while reversal “may, in theory, entitle the*482 defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution,” and thereby “cost society the right to punish admitted offenders.” [Citations omitted.]
Although Justice Cavanagh dissented from this holding in Mateo,
Justice Weaver and I have indicated that a defendant should be required to establish prejudice before a nonconstitutional error will require reversal of a conviction.
Justice Kelly signed Justice Cаvanagh’s concurrence/dissent in Geams, where Justice Cavanagh indicated agreement with the “highly probable” test.
In Mateo, this Court analyzed the error using a level-of-assurance test that was less than the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, and in Geams, the “highly probable” test was used. In any case, neither test is even close to the draconian automatic reversal rule of Vail. We agree with the dissent that prior cases held that it is improper to submit a first-degree murder charge to a jury where there is no evidence of first-degree murder. Post, p 490. However, the issue is whether such an error always requires reversal. As to this point, the dissent says that it would uphold Vail because it cannot say there is a high probability that the erro
This Court held in Mateo, supra at 206, that MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 does not impinge on this Court’s authority to determine practice and procedure and does not require a literal definition of miscarriage of justice. Thus, we regret the dissent’s claim, post, p 491, n 1, that this statute is inconsistent with the “highly probable” test. Surely the dissent does not believe that all the cases listed in footnote 10 of Hall, supra (which applied this statute) were overruled by Geams. Indeed, the Mateo Court itself specifically said that the highly probable standard may represent the appropriate test, id. at 207, and this was after the Court had made the previously mentioned statements regarding the statute.
As the Court of Appeals noted, only three to five states, other than Michigan, have Vail-type holdings.
See People v Hall, supra at 614: “To require automatic reversal of an otherwise valid conviction for an error which is harmless constitutes an inexcusable waste of judicial resources . . . .” Here, there is no serious dispute that the jury’s manslaughter verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.
Compare People v Beach,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I would decline to overrule People v Vail,
I agree with the Court of Appeals:
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find insufficient evidence to establish the elements of premeditation and deliberation. There were no witnesses to the shooting and the weapon was never found. The only direct evidence linking defendant to the shooting was defendant’s confession that, because of fear inspired when the man who had just robbed him at gunpoint turned to again approach defendant’s vehicle, defendant crouched down and fired his gun through his car window. There was no evidence of a prior relationship between defendant and*489 the victim, or that the victim or anyone else was defendant’s intended target. Under these circumstances, a reasonable factfinder could not find premeditation or conclude that defendant had time to take a “second look” before firing his weapon. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict with regard to the charge of first-degree murder. [224 Mich App 676 ;569 NW2d 911 (1997).]
The next question that must be resolved is whether the error of the trial court was harmless. The majority in this case holds that the error was harmless, and it overturns established precedent that has proved to be workable under People v Vail. In Vail, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder for his participation in a shooting that resulted in the death of the victim. The defendant was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter by a jury, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The defendant appealed in this Court, contending that thеre was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of first-degree murder and that it was error to deny his motion to dismiss the count. This Court held that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant the defendant’s motion for a dismissal of the first-degree murder count where the proofs were insufficient to establish the elements of premeditation and deliberation.
This Court stated:
[W]here a jury is permitted consideration of a charge unwarranted by the proofs there is always prejudice because a defendant’s chances of аcquittal on any valid charge is substantially decreased by the possibility of a compromise verdict. For this reason it is reversible error for a trial judge to refuse a directed verdict of acquittal on any charge where the prosecution has failed to present evi*490 dence from which the jury could find all elements of the crime charged. [Id. at 464.]
The precise holding of Vail has been part of this state’s jurisprudence dating as far back as 1926. See People v Hansen,
In Stahl, supra at 572, we stated:
When twelve jurors agree on amount or degree generally there must be composition of views. Here the jurors to determine degree were required improperly to compose their views between the major charge of murder in its degrees, and manslaughter. Defendant testified; if truly, he was innocent. The case was serious, sad. If the murder feature had been omitted from the instructions, and the case submitted on the theory of manslaughter, it cannot now be said with certainty that the jury would have reached the same result.
Further, in People v Gessinger,
[I]t is evident to most practitioners of experience that it would be much easier to secure an acquittal if the defendant were only charged with the lesser offense than it would be were he charged with all three offenses. The tendency of jurors is to compromise their differences. Where there is only one charge they are obliged to meet the question squarely by yes or no, or disagree, but where the charges are three, the juror who thinks there should be no conviction, and the juror who thinks that a conviction should be had of the greater offense are quite hable to agree upon a conviction of the lesser offense.
Recently, in People v Gearns,
A rule requiring reversal where a first-degree murder chаrge is erroneously submitted to the jury under
In Price v Georgia,
In addressing the harmlessness of the second trial, the prosecution argued that, because the defendant was convicted of the same crime at both the first and the second trials, therefore, he suffered no harm. However, the Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating:
[W]e cannot determinе whether or not the murder charge against petitioner induced the jury to find him guilty of the*493 less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence. See United States ex rel Hetenyi v Wilkins, 348 F2d 844 (CA 2, 1965), cert denied Mancusi v Hetenyi,383 US 913 (1966). [Price, supra at 331-332.]
The Court held that the error was not harmless.
I recognize that this case dealt with double jeopardy, while Graves does not. However, I cite it merely to show that the United States Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s harmless error argument because it could not determine whether the jury compromised its verdict. I agree. Because I cannot state that there is a “high probability” that the submission of the first-degree murder charge did not affect the jury’s verdict, I would find that the error requires reversal.
In People v Harris,