People v. GrangerPeople v. Granger
The defendant‘s contention that the testimony of the arresting officer at the pretrial suppression hearing was incredible and patently tailored to overcome constitutional objections is unpreserved for appellate review (see
The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant‘s application to present an expert witness as to the reliability of identification testimony. Where a case “turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the witness‘s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror” (People v LeGrand, 8 NY3d 449, 452 [2007]; see People v Santiago, 17 NY3d 661, 669 [2011]; People v Rhodes, 115 AD3d 681, 682 [2014]). Here, however, there was sufficient corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crimes to obviate the need for expert testimony, including surveillance videos, physical evidence placing the defendant in the vicinity of the crime shortly after the crime occurred, and evidence probative of the defendant‘s identity as the perpetrator in this case admitted pursuant to People v Molineux (168 NY 264 [1901]), demonstrating that the defendant had committed crimes in the past by using a distinctive and unique modus operandi that was nearly identical to the manner in which the crime was committed in this case (see People v Abney, 13 NY3d 251, 269 [2009]; People v Young, 7 NY3d 40, 46 [2006]; People v Lee, 96 NY2d 157, 163 [2001]; People v Rhodes, 115 AD3d 681, 682 [2014]; People v Rodriguez, 98 AD3d 530, 532 [2012]).
The defendant‘s claim, made in his pro se supplemental brief, that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel is based, in part, on matter appearing on the record and, in part, on matter outside the record and, thus, constitutes a “mixed claim of ineffective assistance” (People v Maxwell, 89 AD3d 1108, 1109 [2011] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]; see People v Evans, 16 NY3d 571, 575 n 2 [2011]). In this case, it is not evident from the matter appearing on the record that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel (see People v McBride, 103 AD3d 920, 921 [2013]; People v Ropiza, 100 AD3d 935, 936 [2012]). Since the defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved without reference to matter outside the record, a
The defendant‘s remaining contentions, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Miller and Duffy, JJ., concur.