THE PEOPLE, Plаintiff and Respondent, v. CRAIG DANNY GONZALES, Defendant and Appellant.
S240044
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Filed 8/27/18
Ct.App. 3 C078960; Sacramento County Super. Ct. No. 03F07705
In a single consolidated proceeding, defendant Craig Danny Gonzales pleaded guilty to multiple offenses stemming from three different cases, including four counts of check forgery arising from conduct that occurred in 2003 and one count of identity theft committed in 2006. After California voters enacted Proposition 47, Gonzales petitioned the trial court to reduce his
We agree with the Court of Appeal‘s decision to reverse. The terms of
Here,
I.
On September 9, 2003, law enforcement officers conducted a search of a van in whiсh Gonzales was a passenger. During the search, the officers located a wallet containing three counterfeit driver‘s licenses — each bearing a different name corresponding to Gonzales‘s photograph. Also found in the wallet were counterfeit currency and checks in the names corresponding to those other identities. Officers also discovered copies of receipts for purchased goods — some of which were purchased with checks corresponding to Gonzales‘s counterfeit licenses. In addition, the vehicle search revealed a pouch containing four bags of methamphetamine, a gram scale, clear plastic bags, and two pipes. A search of Gonzales‘s person uncovered another counterfeit driver‘s license bearing a fourth identity, which was also tied to certain checks used to make purchases of goods.
The Identity Theft Task Force investigated the matter and confirmed that Gonzales used counterfeit driver‘s licenses and checks to make purchases in July and September of 2003. On July 2, 2004, Gonzales was arrested and released on bail, but he failed to appear for his jury trial that was scheduled to begin on October 19, 2010. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest.
On November 1, 2005, law enforcement officers witnessed Gonzales walk from a motel parking lot into a room. Officers arrested him and conducted a search of the motel room, seizing a bag of methamphetamine, cash, paperwork, and various drug paraphernalia.
Between December 22, 2005, and June 12, 2006, AT&T opened several accounts in Sacramento County — later determined to be fraudulent — relying on personal identifying information of six individuals. In the course of investigating these accounts, law enforcement officers uncovered a scheme in which Gonzales and his fellow inmate opened the fraudulent telephone accounts, enabling them to make free telephone calls from jail.
On April 12, 2006, a consolidated information was filed against Gonzales arising from the 2003 and 2005 incidents — the one arising from allegations involving forgery, theft, and drug charges stemming from the September 2003
On July 13, 2007, while the consolidated matters in Nos. 03F07705 and 05F09704 were still pending, the district attorney filed a second information (No. 06F11190) charging Gonzales with five new offenses, including identity theft, stemming from his jailhouse conspiracy to obtain unauthorized phone services in the names of various individuals.
In a negotiated plea deal, Gonzales admitted to all charges alleged in the consolidated information (Nos. 03F07705 and 05F09704) and pleaded no contest to one count of identity theft stemming from the 2007 case (No. 06F11190) in exchange for a total maximum sentence of 20 years. On February 29, 2008, in a single proceeding, the court denied probation and imposed a total term of 19 years eight months for all three cases, including 18 years four months for the 2003 (No. 03F07705) and 2005 (No. 05F09704) consolidated cases and a consecutive term of one year four months on the 2007 information (06F11190).
A few years later, in the November 2014 election, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (
Forgery is one of the offenses amended by Proposition 47. As a consequence of Proposition 47, forgery remains punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony if the value of the instrument exceeds $950, or if the
On January 21, 2015, Gonzales filed a petition with the trial court requesting resentencing based on the enactment of Proposition 47. The trial court denied the request on March 13, 2015, by checking a box on a file form noting that the denial was based on the “[c]urrent conviction(s).” The court did nоt hold a hearing or take evidence in deciding the petition and offered no additional reasoning for its decision.
Gonzales appealed the trial court‘s decision, and the Court of Appeal reversed the order as to counts one and three through seven.3 The Court of Appeal thought it clear that the “convicted both of” language in section 473(b) applies only to the “identity theft that is committed in a transactionally related manner with the forgery of an instrument, and not where, as here, the identity theft occurred in an independent transaction that simply happened to be part of the same sentencing proceeding.” (Gonzales, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073.) The Court of Appeal held that Gonzаles‘s 2006 identity theft conviction was not a proper basis for the trial court‘s denial order as to certain counts in the 2003 and 2005 cases. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the trial court‘s order denying relief under section 1170.18 as to counts one and three to seven, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine defendant‘s eligibility for relief on the affected counts. (Gonzales, at pp. 1073-1074.)
On February 15, 2017, we granted review on our own motion to resolve what relationship, if any, must exist between convictions for forgery and identity theft in order to exclude a forgery conviction from sentencing as a misdemeanor under section 473(b).
II.
The scope of section 473(b) is a question of law, so we review the Court of Appeal‘s interpretation of Proposition 47 de novo. (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) Our interpretation of a ballot initiative is governed by the same principles that apply in construing a statute enacted by the Legislature. (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571 (Pearson).) We first look to “the language of the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing
Applying these principles, we conclude that Proposition 47‘s language and structure indicate that the provisions at issue require that a forgery and identity theft conviction be related to preclude resentencing. We also conclude that, in resolving that statute‘s textual ambiguity, the voters’ intended purpose — as evidenced by the election materials — was indeed to bar from resentencing only those offenders whose conduct related to the forgery and identity theft convictions were made “in connection with” each other. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal.
As enacted in Proposition 47, section 473(b) sets forth that “any person who is guilty of forgery . . . where the value of the [instrument] . . . does not exceed $950 ... shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, except that such person may instead be punished pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if that person has one or more prior convictions for an offense specified in [Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)] or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to [Section 290, subdivision (c)].” This subdivision reduces the punishment of forgеry to a misdemeanor when the amount in question does not exceed $950. This subdivision also provides, however, that it “shall not be applicable to any person who is convicted both of forgery and of identity theft, as defined in Section 530.5.” (
The language of section 473(b) specifically precludes from eligibility for resentencing individuals who are convicted both of forgery and identity theft. As used in this provision, the term “both” establishes that a relationship is necessary between a forgery and identity theft conviction to disqualify an offender from the benefit of having his or her sentence recalled. Here, Gonzales was convicted and sentenced in a single, consolidated proceeding stemming from three different cases that included forgery and identity theft convictions. But Gonzales‘s forgery conviction was based on acts committed in 2003, years apart from an identity theft conviсtion based entirely on acts committed in 2006. It is uncontested that these offenses are not only years apart, but entirely unrelated. But the word “both” does not illuminate whether these convictions must be contemporaneous or concurrent, whether they include past convictions, or whether the acts supporting the convictions occurred during the same course of conduct.
The People argue that Gonzales is ineligible for resentencing because section 473(b) precludes the reduction of a forgery offense if an offender is concurrently convicted of both forgery and identity theft. Gonzales argues, however, that his forgery and identity theft convictions were not related because his forgery and idеntity theft offenses involved conduct that occurred at separate times. Specifically, Gonzales‘s identity theft conviction was based on conduct that occurred in 2006 and 2007, and his forgery convictions were based on conduct that occurred in 2003.
If we embraced the People‘s interpretation, Gonzales would be ineligible for resentencing simply because he was convicted and sentenced in a consolidated proceeding, whereas another defendant in a comparable situation would be eligible for resentencing if he were convicted in separate proceedings. Under the People‘s reading of the statute, had Gonzales been promptly tried and cоnvicted of his forgery offenses in 2003 or 2004, he would be
The Court of Appeal concluded that Proposition 47‘s language was ambiguous because of the word “both” and its placement in describing the circumstances in which an offender is ineligible for a sentence reduction, i.e., when an offender “is convicted both of forgery and of identity theft.” (
As we explain below, use of the present tense in the statutory provisions at issue, along with use of the word “both” in the context of a remedial statute (see People v. Dehoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 597-599 [describing remedial objectives of Proposition 47]), strongly suggest the two convictions must have some connection with each other. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the word “both” in section 473(b) could have several possible interprеtations affecting when a forgery conviction is excluded from resentencing as a misdemeanor: (1) whenever the defendant has also been convicted of identity theft; (2) whenever the defendant is convicted of identity theft at the same time he is convicted of forgery; or (3) whenever the defendant is convicted of identity theft for the same conduct as his forgery conviction. We may therefore consider Proposition 47‘s ballot summary and pamphlet to glean the voters’ intended purpose and to ascertain the statute‘s overall purpose. (See Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.)
Although Proposition 47 does not specifically address whether forgery and identity theft convictions must arise in a single proceeding, the ballоt summary does suggest the exclusionary provision in section 473(b) was meant to apply only where check forgery bore some connection to identity theft. The Legislative Analyst writes: “Under current law, it is a wobbler crime to forge a check of any amount. Under this measure, forging a check worth $950 or less would always be a misdemeanor, except that it would
The People contend that the analyst‘s statement referenced only forged checks. It also failed to mention the other instruments that Proposition 47 applies to, namely bonds, bank bills, notes, cashier‘s checks, traveler‘s checks, and money orders. And because of this omission, the People argue that the statement should not be read to narrow the identity theft exception in relation to all forgeries. But the People‘s reading of the analyst‘s statement would imply that only convictions involving forged checks and identity theft would be subject to the “in connection with” requirement. Nowhere in the statute‘s text or in the election materials is there an indication that such a limited exception was contemplated. A more sensible reading of the ballot materials, in context, suggests that the anаlyst‘s statement merely offered an example of how Proposition 47 would require a meaningful connection between forgery and identity theft to preclude an offender from being resentenced.
The statutory provisions governing disqualifications based on a defendant‘s past convictions appear to create a different result. The provisions deny relief for certain categories of offenders who committed specific offenses earlier, irrespective of the relationship between these offenses. (See
The relatively similar nature of the offenses mentioned in section 473(b) nonetheless suggests that the convictions in question must bear some meaningful relationship to each other — beyond the convictions’ inclusion in the same judgment. Instead of including two entirely unrelated offenses — such as criminal violation of an environmental law and felony assault, for example — the provision at issue lists two offenses that tend to facilitate еach other and, committed together, arguably trigger heightened law enforcement concerns. A person who commits forgery by imitating the victim‘s signature on a check, for example, will often present identification to falsely represent his or her identity. The nature of these two offense categories helps explain why it makes sense for these to be included together in section 473(b), and for this provision to be read as relevant to situations where the offenses bear some
Such a reading is consistent with the text and structure of this section of the statute, which separately precludes relief for certain categories of prior convictions and offenses. The first sentence in section 473(b) concerns the nature of the defendant and his past actions that would limit relief. This sentence prescribes misdemeanor treatment for a subset of forgeries “relating to” certain types of enumerated instruments valued at $950 or less, where the defendant has not suffered certain prior convictions. (
The last sentence of section 473(b) evinces concern with the nature of the defendant‘s current offense: was it for just forgery, or forgery and identity theft? The Attorney General contends that the drafters could have used “in commission” to indicate a “transactionally related” requirement. But the statute reflects a somewhat broader concern — involving defendants ”convicted of forgery and of identity theft” (
Because Gonzales‘s forgery and identity theft convictions did not occur “in connection with” each other, we conclude he is among the group of convicts eligible for resentencing relief under Proposition 47.
III.
Section 473(b) is best read to require that the offenses resulting in defendant‘s forgery and identity theft convictions must have been undertaken “in connection with” each other to preclude him from resentencing eligibility. This understanding is consistent with the language and intended purpose of Proposition 47, and what insights we can glean from the ballot materials. Here, Gonzales‘s convictions were based on conduct committed years apart and bearing no relationship to each other. That defendant was convicted and sentenced in a single consolidated proceeding for his forgery and identity theft offenses does not automatically tether these sufficiently to leave Gonzales ineligible for resentencing under Propositiоn 47.
We affirm the Court of Appeal and remand the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CUÉLLAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
MOORE, J. *
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
CONCURRING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J.
I agree with the majority that there must be some relationship between a conviction for forgery and identity theft for the latter to preclude misdemeanor treatment of the former under
The relationship required betweеn forgery and identity theft appears in the statutory language of section 473, subdivision (b) itself: “Notwithstanding
The first sentence of section 473, subdivision (b) prescribes misdemeanor treatment for a subset of forgeries “relating to” seven types of enumerated instruments valued at $950 or less when the offender has not suffered certain prior convictions. Because this sentence narrows the class of forgeries eligible for misdemeanor treatment to those “relating to” certain instruments, the most natural reading of the second sentence‘s exclusion of those “convicted both of forgery and of identity theft” suggests the exclusion applies оnly if one is also convicted of identity theft “relating to” the same instrument involved in the forgery conviction. (
This understanding is also consistent with the identity theft statute. As relevant here, section 530.5, subdivision(a) provides: “Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying information . . . and uses that information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or medical information without the consent of that person, is guilty of a public offense . . . .” This offense may be committed in myriad ways. However, for this offense to have some nexus to a forgery conviction “relating to” a particular instrument under section 473, subdivision (b), the personal identifying information must be used with respect to the same instrument. As we observed in People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 913, “a check can contain some of the same information that is found on an access card, along with the owner‘s address and other details that would facilitate identity theft.” (Id. at p. 913.) The presence of such personal information on the types of instruments listed in section 473, subdivision (b) would seem tо confirm that
Section 473, subdivision (b) reflects the electorate‘s intent to prescribe misdemeanor treatment for forgery not exceeding $950 “relating to” seven types of instruments. In light of the electorate‘s focus on these, and not other, instruments, the applicability of section 473, subdivision (b)‘s exception for those “convicted both of forgery and of identity theft” should likewise be interpreted to focus on whether the identity theft conviction “relat[ed] to” the same instrument involved in the forgery conviction. Here, the record reflects defendant‘s identity theft conviction stemmed from his jailhouse efforts between 2005 and 2006 to open fraudulent phone accounts. This conviction did not “relat[e] to” the particular instruments at issue in the 2003 incident, which was the basis for his forgery convictions. (
CORRIGAN, J.
I CONCUR:
CHIN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Gonzales
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 6 Cal.App.5th 1067
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S240044
Date Filed: August 27, 2018
Court: Superior
County: Sacramento
Judge: Marjorie Koller
Counsel:
Elizabeth M. Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatmаn, Raymond L. Brosterhous II, Eric L. Christoffersen, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Ivan P. Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Elizabeth M. Campbell
PMB 334
3104 O Street
Sacramento, CA 95816
(530) 786-4108
Ivan P. Marrs
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 210-7734