People v. Goldston

People PEOPLE v GOLDSTON (Calendar 2). 12, 2003 Argued No. Decided 122364. November Docket No. 15, July charged Wayne Court with in the Circuit was Glenn Goldston court, felony The circuit and misdemeanor offenses. numerous J., suppress Boykin, granted Ulysses defendant’s motion W the premises, ruling that because in a search of a obtained evidence place the to be affidavit did connect the search warrant that the did not state the date with the defendant and searched committing one the offenses for police the defendant observed probable charged, did the not establish he was affidavit which felony the The court dismissed of a warrant. cause for issuance EJ., (Kelly, J., charges. Appeals, The and Zahra, Court of Hood, delayed applica- granted appeal), leave to denied the have would (Docket unpublished appeal in No. leave an order tion for 241605). appealed. by joined opinion by Chief Justices Corrigan, In an Justice Supreme Court held: Young, Weaver, Markman, Taylor, adopted exception exclusionary good-faith rule is in to the exclusionary purpose Michigan. § art 11. The Const case, police In the officers is to misconduct. this rule deter wrong that of the would deter. no exclusion evidence committed good-faith performed police in reliance on the The search objectively reasonable. search warrant was (1914), States, the United In v United 232 US 383 1. Weeks that, Supreme prosecution, held in a Court federal States pursuant the use of evidence obtained Fourth Amendment barred illegal v followed search or seizure. Leon, Marxhausen, In United 468 US 204 Mich 559 States good-faith (1984), adopted United States exclusionary police obtain evidence to the rule where subsequently reasonable, good-faith invalidated reliance on good-faith case, Michigan adopts the warrant. In this search exclusionary exception to rule. purpose to deter misconduct 2. The rectify judges magistrates. The police, not to the errors case-by-case employed basis and on rule should 470 Mich 523 purpose deterring police where exclusion would further the misconduct, either in the search and seizure or the affidavit case, process. police because the officers’ reliance objectively reasonable, purpose on the search warrant was rule, i.e., misconduct, to deter would not be by applying exclusionary served the rule. concurring, Justice stated that the dissent offers Markman, way response principal arguments little in the of to the in set forth (1) majority concurring opinions: exclusionary the an rule good-faith exception by without a is not mandated either the (2) Michigan Constitution; United States Constitution or the the exclusionary good-faith exception costs rule a of an without are enormously high, virtually nonexistent; the are while benefits (3) exclusionary the rule that in has existed the United States and Michigan, preferred dissent, by always unlike that the has taken balancing into a consideration of costs and benefits. ruling Circuit court reversed and case to the remanded circuit charges. court for reinstatement joined by dissenting, Justice Justice stated Cavanagh, Kelly, Supreme obligated accept major the is Court not a to protections Michigan contraction of citizen the under Constitution simply Supreme because the United States Court did so under the majority provides United compelling States Constitution. The no rights Michigan reason the Court for to contract the citizens down Michigan to the level of the United States Constitution. is provide protections free to more its to citizens than the United Court, Supreme pursuant States Constitution The does. to the Michigan Constitution, adopted evidentiary exclusionary the rule remedy illegal seizures, giving a for all searches or rights citizens more than under available the United States purposes exclusionary Constitution. The the two rule to are protect person’s rights by deterring Fourth Amendment lawless police officers, majority agrees, conduct a basis with which the the to close courthouse to use doors of evidence obtained unconstitutionally. previously rejected good- This Court has the exception rule, exclusionary preserving faith Michigan’s the expanded rights. Michigan adopted citizens’ constitutional After exclusionary rule, the adopted the United States exclusionary then, broadening rights citizens, the of all later, adopted good-faith rule, to the contracting rights all citizens. seeking In this case the affidavit a search warrant offered absolutely linking no information the defendant to on address objectively It police warrant. was not reasonable for the Goldston Opinion of the Court provide any that did not to have relied on warrant officers place connecting the defendant with the to be information This was searched. warrant insufficient. magistrate’s approval of the can be term the

There no other for it as of the this case other than describe issuance warrant police. magistrate being stamp The did not review a rubber for required and detached scru- warrant with neutral the search found, nothing in the tiny. there is search As the trial court connecting to be searched with defendant. warrant address by government that does not Public confidence shattered respect rights its the constitutional citizens. evidence pursuant search should be unlawful warrant obtained suppressed and from consideration the trial court. excluded — — Exclusionary Exception. Good-Faith and Seizures Rule Searches misconduct; police purpose rule is deter by excluding purpose not be evidencethat the would achieved warrant; on recovered in reliance a search Michigan, rule does bar admission reasonable, good-faith on a search evidence seized in rebanee (Const 1963, ultimately art found to have been defective warrant IV). Const, § US Am Attorney General, Casey, L. Cox, Michael A. Thomas General, At- Duggan, Prosecuting Solicitor Michael E. Research, torney, A. Chief of Timothy Baughman, and for Training, Appeals, people. A. Blanchard for the defendant.

Carolyn case, In this we determine must C.J. CORRIGAN, “good-faith” exception a to the recognize whether Leon, 897; exclusionary In United US rule. States (1984), 104 S 82 L Ed 2d the United States Ct Const, Am Supreme interpreted US IV rule exclusionary adopted good-faith a a for and seizures. remedy as unreasonable searches Leon, not bar the exclusionary Under rule does reasonable, good-faith admission of evidence seized ultimately a warrant found to have reliance on search 470 Mich 523 Opinion op the Court been defective. The is a judicially that is text remedy created not based on the our constitutional search provision, and seizure Const 1, 1963, Indeed, § art records of the 1961 Constitu- tional Convention evidence an on intent behalf people Michigan to retreat from the judge-made exclusionary rule consistent with the United States interpretation Court’s of the Fourth Amend- ment in Leon. adopt We therefore excep- tion to the rule in Michigan. The purpose rule is deter police misconduct. That purpose would not be furthered excluding evidence that objective, good- recovered in faith reliance on a search warrant. We thus reverse ruling suppressing circuit court’s the evidence seized pursuant to the defective warrant in this case.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 2001, twelve after days the terror- ist attacks of September 2001, police officers ob- served defendant collecting money on a street corner. He a wearing was shirt with the word “Fireman” on written it and a holding fireman’s boot. He also carried firefighter’s jacket. helmet and Defendant told a police officer that he was collecting money for the York, firefighters being but firefighter New denied himself. officers from confiscated defendant $238 along with the firefighter paraphernalia, but did not immediately him. arrest

Thereafter, sought officers successfully search warrant for defendant’s home. The warrant listed Hazelwood, address “29440 Inkster” authorized police following seize items: Opinion op the Court scanner(s) radios, fire, equip- Police or EMS, Police/Fire accounts, equipment, emergency bank Any and all ment. containers, any all or and type cans currency, donation illegal other contraband. a firefighter paraphernalia, uncovered more

The search charged defen- firearm, The marijuana. prosecutor and firearm, MCL a of a being possession felon dant with during attempt firearm 750.224f; of a possession 750.227b; two counts felony, of a MCL commission 333.7403(2)(d); lar- marijuana, MCL possession of MCL 750.218. ceny by pretenses, false evidence, as- suppress filed motion Defendant Const, Am grounds, US federal and state serting both the circuit court IV; 1, § art which Const warrant affi- The court ruled that search granted. searched with place not connect to be davit did and did not state date defendant The thus soliciting money. court defendant observed did probable not establish concluded that affidavit of a warrant dismissed cause for issuance marijuana pos- felony-firearm, in possession, felon charges.1 session delayed Appeals prosecutor’s denied the Thereafter, granted we appeal. for leave to

application this Court to the issue whether leave to limited appeal, exception to the good-faith adopt should rule.2

II. OF REVIEW STANDARD ex- recognize should Whether rule is a law question ception charge larceny hy false did not dismiss the misdemeanor court pretenses. 467 Mich 528 470 MICH 523

Opinion the of Court Gonzalez, this Court reviews de novo. Mich People 468 (2003). 636, 641; 664 NW2d 159

III. ANALYSIS A. THE FEDERAL GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION In Weeks States, 383; 341; v United 232 34 US S Ct 58 L (1914), Ed 2d 652 Supreme the United States Court that, held prosecution, a federal Fourth the Amend- ment barred the use of pursuant evidence obtained illegal search or The seizure. Court reasoned: private

If letters [illegally] and documents can thus be seized and against held used in evidence a citizen offense, protection of an accused the of Fourth the Amend- declaring right against ment his to be secure such searches value, and, and seizures is of no placed so far as those thus concerned, might are as well be stricken from the Consti- [Id. 393.] tution. at Ohio, 643;

In vMapp 1684; 367 US 81 S Ct 6 L Ed 2d (1961), 1081 the United States Supreme Court ex- tended the Weeks states. Court reasoned because Fourth Amendment right is against enforceable the states virtue Due Process Clause of the Amendment, Fourteenth sanction, i.e., same the exclusion illegally obtained evidence, must apply prosecutions state as well as to prosecutions. federal Id. at Leon, In Court adopted case, rule. rejected Court the notion that “the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary Leon, of the Fourth Amendment.” 905-906. The Court stated that the exclusion- ary rule is not derived from the text the Fourth Amendment:

2004] expressly provision no contains The Fourth Amendment of its violation precluding use of evidence obtained origin purposes commands, an examination its past search of fruits of a unlawful clear the use makes wrong.” no Fourth Amendment new “[works] or seizure Calandra, [94 US S Ct United States v wrong by the Amend- condemned 2d L Ed accomplished” unlawful search or “fully ment itself, ibid., rule is neither and the seizure defendant’s to “cure the invasion intended nor able [428 already Powell he has suffered.” Stone v rights which (1976)] 2d 465, 540; 49 L Ed 96 S Ct US operates (WHITE, as “a J., dissenting). The rule thus designed judicially remedy safeguard Fourth created effect, through rights generally its deterrent Amendment right party personal constitutional rather than a Calandra, supra [Id. at 348. at aggrieved.” States v United 906.] the exclusion of evi- that whether

The Court clarified particular in a case is sanction appropriate dence is misconduct vio- from whether separate issue rights. The Court Fourth Amendment person’s lated a “judicially invocation further stated that whether weighing involves remedy” appropriate created at particular in Id. 906- and benefits each case. costs exclusionary of the rule is that primary The benefit 907. by removing incentives it deters official misconduct in searches seizures. engage unreasonable however, pros- in costs, preventing include use trustworthy evidence obtained ecutor’s case-in-chief of found to subsequently in on a search warrant reliance be defective. Id. rigid adherence to concern that expressed

The Court rule, when law enforce- particularly transgres- faith their good act or when ment officers of the criminal minor, concepts are “offends basic sions for the law and justice system” contempt and breeds 470 Mich 523 Opinion of the Court administration Id. justice. Thus, at 907-908. recognized Court for the rule potential impede the truth-seeking judiciary, function of the guilty resulting parties punishment either evading altogether receiving plea bargains. favorable marginal Court concluded that “the or nonexistent produced by benefits suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a in- subsequently validated search warrant cannot justify substantial costs of exclusion.” at Id. reasoning

Central to Court’s was the exclusion- ary purpose rule’s of deterring police misconduct. The opined that no deterrence when police occurs rely on reasonably a warrant later found to be deficient. at Id. 916-919. short, where objectively the officer’s conduct is rea-

sonable, “excluding the evidence will not further the ends way; appreciable for it is painfully apparent acting that... the officer is as a reason- able officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding way the evidence can in no affect his future willing conduct it is to duty.” unless make him do less his 919-920, Stone, quoting J., (White, [Id. at 539-540 dissenting).]

The Court stated that this is true particularly when a law enforcement of, officer acts within the scope and in objective, good-faith on, reliance a search warrant ob- tained from a judge magistrate. or Excluding the evi- dence recovered in such cases would have no deterrent effect on the officer. Id. at 920-921. rejected

The Court the notion that a purpose rectify is to judges errors of magistrates. It stated that no evidence exists that judges magistrates ignore are inclined to Fourth Amendment or that the extreme sanction of People op Court among judges necessary for “lawlessness” is

exclusion no could discern Id. at 916. The Court and magistrates. of evidence would that exclusion believing basis for issuing judge on an or effect have deterrent significant a to the law “adjuncts not they are magistrate because team.” Id. enforcement exclusionary rule concluded Court case-by-case on a basis employed

should be deterring the purpose would further where exclusion however, emphasized, The Court police misconduct. magistrate’s prob- on a officer’s reliance that a on the technical suffi- determination and able cause objectively reasonable. ciency a warrant must be issuing mag- if the suppressed should also be Evidence by information in affidavit judge or misled istrate or would have the affiant either knew was false disregard for except known false his reckless was Further, stated truth. magistrate wholly apply does not where relies on judicial his role or where officer abandons “ in indicia of lacking on an ‘so

warrant based affidavit render in its existence cause official belief probable ”3 v quoting Id. at Brown entirely unreasonable.’ Ed 590, 610; 2254; 45 L 2d Illinois, 422 US 95 S Ct (1975) (Powell, J., concurring part).

B. RULE IN MICHIGAN THE EXCLUSIONARY Supreme Court years after the United States Five Weeks, Court decided opinion in issued its Evans, 1, 14-16; 131 L Ed 2d 34 US 115 S Ct In Arizona v employ (1995), and held that court Court followed Leon of evidence. Such error did not warrant the exclusion ee’s clerical personnel remedy deterred future errors court would have reasonably arresting on the erroneous officer who relied behavior of the computer record. 470 Mich 523 Opinion op the Court Marxhausen, 204 Mich 171 NW 557 Marxhausen, Court language this examined the Michigan’s then-existing provision, search and seizure 2, § Const art 10: houses, person, papers possessions every

person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and any place seizures. No warrant to search or to seize person things describing them, or shall issue without nor cause, probable supported without or oath affirmation. This Court stated provision that the “in above was effect the same found provision Fourth Amendment Marxhausen, the Federal Constitution.”4 This law, Court then reviewed federal case including Weeks, Michigan and concluded that would follow the exclusionary federal rule. Id. at Thus, long 568-574. before the Mapp required Court the states to follow the rule, Weeks Court elected to follow the exclusionary rule in Michigan. not, This Court did however, base its decision on language of the fact, Constitution. In nowhere in Marxhausen did this opine that the language our Constitu required tion exclusion evidence seized viola tion our constitutional provisions. Rather, the Marx hausen Court followed the aas matter of policy preference in Thus, favor the federal law.6 exclusionary rule, similar to the Weeks our rule in Michigan common-law, purely judge-made rule. Const, provides: US Am IV right persons, houses, of the secure be in their effects,

papers, against seizures, unreasonable searches and violated, issue, probable upon shall not be and no Warrants shall but cause, supported by affirmation, particularly describing or Oath place searched, persons things and the to be seized. vein, the Marxhausen Court stated: In this op the Court adoption the Leon Court’s Notwithstanding rule, exception to the federal a similar state date, recognized this Court has not stated, has States Court Supreme The United exception. stan however, impose higher are free to that the states Amend than the Fourth on and seizures dards searches 62; 58, S v 386 US 87 California, requires. Cooper ment (1967). Thus, arises question Ct 17 L Ed 2d 730 l6 1, § search 1963, provides art l more whether Const counterpart. than does its federal protection and seizure many by the United States An examination of cases decided involving Fifth Supreme the Fourth and Amendments both by that court will be reached that the rule announced satisfies us court, by by of decided careful consideration three cases three; by of cases a careful consideration these three we that, by clearly rule laid down understand the will able nation, reason for the rule. These court of resort of the and the last (6 States, Sup Boyd [29 Ct L Ed 116 616 524 cases are United US (24 York, Sup (1886)]); [48 192 585 Ct 372 L Adams v New US 1904)]); lsupra. and Weeks Ed 575 however, impressed, consideration of the a careful We are Boyd Case and the decisions Case in connection with the Adams above, courts, many but of which of which are cited the State some not, light the court in the Weeks taken in the ofwhat was said are Supreme Case, that in the main the United States demonstrates are in of the States Court and the courts last resort various claim, accord, Boyd conflict, its Case does not critics and that the [Marxhausen, supra holdings many State courts. with 568, 571.] 1963, 1, provides: § art Const houses, every person papers possessions of person, searches and seizures. No shall be secure from unreasonable any person things any place or shall to search or seize warrant cause, them, sup- describing probable nor without without issue ported provisions of this shall or affirmation. section oath any proceeding criminal to bar from evidence not be construed bomb, any danger- drug, firearm, explosive any other narcotic by peace curtilage weapon, officer outside the ous seized dwelling house in this state. 470 Mich 523 Opinion of the Court interpreting Constitution, our are not we bound by the United States Supreme interpretation Court’s Constitution, United States even where the lan- guage Harvey is identical.7 v Michigan, 469 Mich 6 n 3; 664 NW2d 767 Conversely, we are free to interpret our Constitution consistent with the United States Court’s interpretation the United States Constitution unless a compelling pre- reason cludes from doing us so. As this Court stated in Sitz v Police, Dep’t State 443 Mich 758; 506 NW2d 209 “ (1993), however, a ‘compelling reason’ should not be establishing understood as presumption conclusive artificially linking state constitutional interpretation to “ Rather, federal law.” we must determine what law ‘the ” people have at. 759, made.’ Id. quoting v Har- (1884). 481, Mich ding, 485; 53 19 155 NW The follow- ing factors are relevant in determining whether a compelling reason exists to the interpret Michigan the Constitution and United States Constitution differ- ently:

1) 2) language constitution, [T]he textual of the state significant parallel textual differences provisions between 3) constitutions, of the two state constitutional 4) history, preexisting common-law adoption state law of 5) provision, the relevant constitutional structural differ- 6) constitutions, ences between the state and federal peculiar of matters [People Collins, state or local interest. v (1991).] 8, 39; 438 Mich 31 n 475 NW2d 684 The above factors are also in helpful determining the intent of the ratifiers respect with to our state consti- provisions. tutional 7 necessary wording It is not that the of our Constitution be different Constitution, however,

from that the of United States for order interpret Court to our Constitution different from the United States interpretation People Court’s of the United States Constitution. Smith, 1, v 420 Mich 7 n NW2d 841 People Opinion of the Court 196; 341 NW2d 439 Nash, 418 Mich

In (1983) examined the J.), this Court (opinion by BRICKLEY, 1963, of surrounding the creation Const circumstances provided the 1, provision § 11 determine whether art than protection and seizure degree of search higher Sitz, at 752-757. supra Amendment. See also Fourth Nash, In this Court stated: Michigan of Constitutional Convention

The focus of the Mapp on third sentence of the effect of 1961 was on 10.[8] 1908, 2, § on Declaration art Committee Const Suffrage, proposed that the final Rights, and Elections 1908, 2, § 10 be deleted favor of Const art sentence shall phrase in violation of this section “Evidence obtained The committee except as authorized law.” not be used may holding Mapp have invali reasoned that broad 1908, 2, § 10. art final of Const dated the sentence by the considered com merits of that sentence were also phrase “except as autho mittee. The committee added rized law” because: imposed on of the federal limits

“Should definition admissibility respect evidence with the States future, Michigan Legislature and the change incorporate, in and court courts could statute decisions, respect admissibility with to the those rules 1963, 1, 1908, 2, predecessor § § art 10 was the of Const art Const provision “in found in the Fourth Amendment and was effect same Marxhausen, the Federal Constitution.” at 562. 2, § art 10 that added a third ratified an amendment Const Sitz, commonly “antiexclusionary clause.” to as the sentence referred supra at 753. That clause stated: Provided, however, provisions shall not That the of this section any court of criminal be construed to bar from evidence any

jurisdiction, proceeding magis- any or in criminal held before firearm, rifle, revolver, justice any pistol, peace, or the trate of bomb, shell, explosive, gun, pistol, bomb black- automatic machine device, knuckles, gas-ejecting jack, slungshot, billy, or metallic thing, by any peace dangerous weapon seized officer other curtilage any dwelling [Id. house in the state. outside the 753-754.] Mich 523 Opinion of the Court opinion Legislature evidence which reflect the of the Michigan ought courts as to what constitute sound practice State, subject only continuing in this to the recognition by of the limits set federal constitutional su- premacy.” Proposals Reports, Committee Constitu- 1961, Supporting Report, tional Convention Committee 15, 7, Proposal pp No 10. appears

It therefore attempting that the committee was possibility for the stringent application allow of a less of the by law, rule if allowed federal rather than attempting strengthen Michigan search and seizure protection.

The debates of the committee of the at the whole of, convention both considered merits effect of on, 1908, Mapp 2, § Record, Const art 10. See 1 Official 1961, pp 464-484, 488-533, Constitutional Convention 674- 688. The Mapp view that was limited to searches dwellings and that a limitation on the proper day. was on the Attempts merits carried the to unite and United States search and seizure law adopting language the exact of the Fourth Amendment in proposed Michigan Constitution were In- defeated. stead, anti-exclusionary-rule proviso 1908, of Const art 2, § 10 proposed was amended in to back constitution. Record, 1 Official 1961, pp Constitutional Convention Ultimately, language substantially 531-688. similar to that 1908, 2, 10, amended, adopted § Const art was people. convention and recommended to the people convention’s address stated that 1, proposed 1963, § change Const art 11 was “No from Sec. II, 10, present except Article constitution im- for provement phraseology.” Record, 2 Official Constitu- 1961, pp Indeed, tional Convention the common understanding people upon reading proposed provision nothing constitutional could be but the belief provision that the search and seizure of the new constitu- represented change. tion no There had been no substantive alterations. There is no indication that in readopting the 1908, 1963, language § Const art 10 in § Const art place state wished to restrictions on law People v Goldston op the Court required by the greater than those activities enforcement fact, contrary expressed. intent constitution. federal Sitz, [Nash, at 211-213; quoted supra also at at added).] (emphasis 754-756 concluded: The Nash Court cor- Though people have State gone they it to have believed have rected this Court when far, general power this Court to historical too relating to searches provision constitutional construe the history of Const has not been removed. The and seizures 11, however, suggest 1963, 1, plain import, § art and its expansion expansion, its with the concomitant further it, occur enforce should [Nash, supra to do compelling is a reason so. when there 214.]

Thus, of the it is clear from records constitutional stringent that the favored less search people convention under the Fourth protections required and seizure than of the Approval Amendment at that time. antiexclu- intent to move sionary people’s clause evidenced the rule of Marxhausen and away from and to as a matter of state constitutional law Mapp created, judicially remedy. application restrict 1963, 1, § art 11 itself is consistent The text of Const conclusion that intended with above art retreat from rule. Const provides: § 11 houses, possessions every papers and person,

person be secure from unreasonable searches shall any any place to search or seize seizures. No warrant them, describing person things nor or shall issue without cause, or affirmation. probable supported oath without bar provisions of not be construed to this section shall any proceeding any narcotic from evidence criminal firearm, bomb, explosive any dangerous drug, other 470 MICH Opinion of the Court weapon, peace curtilage seized officer outside any dwelling house this state. clause,

The antiexclusionary i.e., the last sentence above, quoted precludes Court from excluding from evidence of the enumerated items. This clause does authority not regarding constrain this Court’s items specifically in provision. enumerated the In other words, the may directive that this Court not exclude certain require evidence does not the exclu- sion of all other antiexclusionary evidence. The proviso should be viewed not as a ratification of the common- law exclusionary regarding rule in items enumerated proviso, but, rather, aas restriction on this Court’s authority to apply the judge-made rule to those enumer- ated items. the proviso Because does not restrict authority regarding Court’s evidence not enumerated in antiexclusionary clause, this Court remains free to repudiate modify the exclusionary rule virtue the fact it a judicially rule, is created not a constitutional rule. authority,

Under retain, above we are free to modify, or retreat from altogether. the Marxhausen rule Because we find the reasoning of Leon persuasive, we choose to a embrace Leon as matter of interpretive our right under the common law and retreat from the judicially exclusionary created rule announced in Marx- goal hausen. The rule, exclusionary expressed Leon, Leon, in police deter misconduct. at supra 906-907; People Hawkins, see also 468 Mich 510-511; 668 (2003); NW2d 602 People v Sobczak- Obetts, 463 Mich 711 n 625 NW2d 764 Thus, goal the exclusionary rule would not be furthered where police objectively officers act in reason- able reliance on search warrant. the Court rely pre-Leon on several colleagues dissenting Our misconduct is contending deterring police in cases Post at exclusionary rule. only purpose not the Leon, how- Supreme Court The United States 562. designed rule is exclusionary “the ever, stated to punish rather than misconduct deter Leon, at 916. magistrates.” judges errors of evi- suppression of Further, directed “that the Court or- to a should be pursuant warrant dence obtained in those only case-by-case basis on dered pur- further the exclusion will cases which unusual Thus, rule.” Id. poses rule, the apply whether to determining on enforce- effect law is on deterrent proper focus obtained officers, any. if “If exclusion of evidence ment is to warrant subsequently invalidated pursuant effect, therefore, it must alter the have deterrent or the officers of individual law enforcement behavior Thus, departments.” Id. while policies of their ascribed may purposes have had other Leon, effectively narrowed it Leon Court to before misconduct. remedy police the rule for the focus of as Further, that the rejected Leon the notion in remedying rule is an effective tool exclusionary deterring and viola- judges magistrates errors of and Amendment generally: tions of Fourth rely proponents on its To the extent that of exclusion areas, judges magistrates in on and these behavioral effects First, exclusionary misplaced. rule is their reliance is punish designed misconduct rather than to to deter Second, judges magistrates. exists and there the errors of judges magistrates suggesting are and no evidence or ignore or the Fourth Amendment inclined to subvert application of among requires these actors lawlessness of exclusion. the extreme sanction Mich 523 Opinion of the Court Third, basis, important, and we most discern no and are none, believing offered for that exclusion of evidence seized significant pursuant to a warrant will have a deterrent issuing Many judge magistrate. effect or on factors indicate that rule cannot provide “special” “general” an effective or deterrent for offending apply individual law enforcement officers as well And, judges magistrates. to to the extent that the rule is thought operate “systemic” as a deterrent on a wider audience, clearly it can have no such effect on individuals empowered Judges magis- to issue search warrants. and adjuncts team; trates are not to the law enforcement judicial officers, they neutral have no stake the outcome particular prosecutions. criminal The threat of exclusion [Leon, expected significantly thus cannot be to deter them. supra 916-917.] at

The reasoning persuasive. of Leon If judges magistrates detached,” are “neutral and the exclusion of evidence would have no on deterrent effect their practices. Because the rule would not errors, deter judicial the purpose of the rule would not served exclusion in all requiring cases.9 depart precedent dissent also criticizes our decision to from following People Bloyd, our decision 416 Mich 331 NW2d 447 (1982), post good-faith recognize at in which this Court declined to exception however, Bloyd, to the rule. Our decision in predated good-faith adopt Leon declined to without analysis of the issue. colleagues dissenting Our further contend that our decision “for- citizens,” sake[s] [our] “fail[s] commitment our resist lure of expediency,” analysis,” “discard[s] “treatfs] decades of sound our impediment.” 558, 560, Constitution as an Post at 564. The dissent fails acknowledge, however, very high exclusionary rule, cost of the including preventing prosecutor’s trustworthy use of evidence ob- tained in on reliance a search warrant of a because subse- Leon, quently discovered technical defect the warrant. See Excluding impedes, 906-907. use of such evidence rather than promotes, truth-seeking judiciary thereby the of function the hinders public integrity judicial process. confidence in the of the the While dissent People Goldston v Court 1, 1963, § art 11 nor the the text Const Neither protections broader of the ascribes history provision Fourth Amend- than the provision our constitutional fact, Consti- of the 1961 examination requires. ment a delegates that the favored reveals tutional Convention rule exclusionary at stringent application less limit the Mapp to time, but felt constrained outside occurring searches antiexclusionary clause to Nash, at As 212-213. curtilage dwelling. supra of a Nash, is no indication in there recognized this Court 1963, 1, adhering § 11 art by adopting Const 10, amended, the 1908, 2, § art language of Const on law enforcement restrictions sought place Amend- than those under the Fourth activity greater Id. contrary expressed.” intent is at fact, “In ment. consistent delegates of the is 213. intent of the adoption Court’s with the United States Leon, text the Con- good-faith and the exception recognizing exception. stitution is consistent with judicially exclusionary rule Because 1963, created, rule, we Const art nonbinding interpret Leon 1, interpretation § 11 with the Court’s consistent adopt good-faith of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary Michigan.10 rule in to the exception result, high we believe that the cost favors such Leon, 907-908, system. great justice on our See exacts too a toll 922. rule in By adopting to the scope Sitz, overruling Michigan, which did involve we are not 1, interpreted art which instead Const rule but protection greater affording § than does Fourth substantive 11 as Sitz, supra at in the context of automobile seizures. Amendment overruling Rather, Appeals cases in which the we are several See, Hill, People recognize good-faith exception. e.g., v Court declined (1991); Jackson, 56; App 54, 180 Mich 480 NW2d 594 192 Mich App 446 NW2d 891 542 470 MICH 523 Opinion OF C. THE APPLICATION GOOD-FAITH 11 IN THIS EXCEPTION CASE Applying good-faith exclusionary to the case, we rule conclude that the circuit court by suppressing marijuana, firearm, erred and fire- fighter paraphernalia. The officers’ reliance on the district judge’s probable determination of cause on technical sufficiency search warrant was objectively reasonable. The information in the affidavit was not false or and the misleading, issuing judge did “wholly judicial Leon, not her role. See abandonO” supra at 923. A review of the affidavit and search warrant can lead no other logical conclusion than that the address Indeed, listed was of defendant.12 jurisdictions rejected good-faith The dissent notes other have exception. post See at 560-561 n 2. While the manner in which other respective states have construed their constitutions and statutes entirely analysis, irrelevant to our we constitutional note that numerous jurisdictions adopted exception. Eason, e.g., have See State v 206; (2001); State, 452; 245 Wis 2d 629 625 v NW2d McDonald 347 Md (1997); parte Morgan, 1994); A2d (Ala, Crayton 701 675 Ex 641 So 2d 840 Commonwealth, (Ky, 1992); People Camarella, v 846 SW2d 684 v 54 Cal 592; 780; Rptr (1991); State, 3d 286 Cal 818 63 P2d Bernie v 2d 524 So (Fla, 1988); Saiz, (SD, 1988); 988 State v 427 825 NW2d United States v (DC Edelen, 1987); App, Wilmoth, 251; 529 774 A2d State v 22 Ohio St 3d (La (1986); Ebey, App, 1986); 490 NE2d 1236 v 491 State So 2d 498 State Sweeney, (Mo, 1985); McCrary Commonwealth, v 701 SW2d 420 v 228 Va jurisdictions 321 adopted SE2d 637 Still other have good-faith exception by statute, including to the (Ariz (Colo 13-3925), 16-3-308), Arizona Rev Stat Colorado Rev Stat (725 (Ind Comp 5/114-12(b)(l)), 35-37-4-5), Illinois 111 Stat Indiana Code (Tex 38.23(b). and Texas Code Crim Proc art 11 prosecutor concedes that the search warrant not on was based probable Thus, was, fact, cause. the search and seizure unconstitu tional. dissent, post Ramirez, n likens this to Groh case 1284, 1290; (2004), 551,_; US 124 S Ct 157 L Ed 2d 1068 in which the altogether “things search warrant failed to describe the to be seized.” In op the Court magistrate did even it occur probably defendant’s the address was not executing officers that Further, lacking was not “so the affidavit address. in its as to render official belief indicia of cause probable Brown, Id,., entirely quoting unreasonable.” existence supra. to be later determined

Although warrant was in good- deficient, the evidence recovered excluding not further on the warrant would faith reliance rule, i.e., deter police purpose rule should be Because misconduct. and when exclu- case-by-case on a employed basis rule, it should not the of the purpose sion further would in this case. employed IV CONCLUSION the to the adopt good-faith exception We i.e., deterring the Michigan. purpose rule, rule in misconduct, by applying served the police would not be police in this case because the officers’ objec- the warrant was good-faith reliance on search tively Thus, committed no reasonable. the officers deter. that exclusion the evidence would wrong Accordingly, ruling sup- we reverse the circuit court’s the and for reinstatement of pressing evidence remand against the defendant. charges cursory case, Supreme “even a the United States Court stated that glaring deficiency reading of the warrant... would have revealed constitutionally police known reasonable officer would have was fatal.” 1294. search warrant in the instant case does not Id. at deficiency” present Indeed, “glaring the such in Groh. contain a apprise police to even officers of which items warrant in Groh would not seize, very thereby impeding purpose of As the search. we have recognized, previously on which the an examination of warrant logical other than that in this can lead to no conclusion officers relied case belonged premises to be to defendant. searched 470 Mich 523 Concurring Opinion by J. Markman, JJ., con- Markman, Weaver, Taylor, Young, curred with C.J. Corrigan,

MARKMAN, I (concurring). majority concur with adoption in its to the exclu- rule, sionary exception recognized an United I separately only States Court. write order respond more to the fully dissent. myriad Among shortcomings, other the dissent ac- majority cuses the “fail[ing] resist the lure of “forsak[ing] expediency,” its commitment to our citi- “ zens,” discarding] analysis,” decades of sound “con- tracting] protections,” citizen “treating] our Con- 560, an at impediment.1,1 stitution as Post It must be understood that this overwrought language support following stands in proposition, which is found nowhere in either the Michigan Constitution or Constitution, wit, the United States no matter how much faith good is demonstrated 1 Further, opinion concurring dissent characterizes this aas 568; “hystericalü” “diatribe,”post argument,post at as an and as predicated upon somehow own notion” its “divine of the Constitution’s meaning. at 571. all language Post What the dissent’s unrestrained obscure, however, way response cannot that it offers little principal arguments majority concurring opin forth set in the (1) good-faith exception ions: rule without a is not by Michigan mandated either the United States Constitution the (2) Constitution; the an costs of rule a without enormously high, virtually are while the benefits are nonexist (3) ent; that has existed in the United States Michigan, preferred dissent, by always and in unlike that has taken balancing into consideration a of costs and benefits. doubtlessly past twenty-two years One would search in vain over justices language dissenting for similar from other of this Court whose my opposition dissenting colleague’s justice decisions, criminal opposition to the in his whose direction which decisions took this Court many years, deeply and the Constitution for less was no felt colleague. my dissenting than that of Concurring Markman, J. matter how no investigation, a criminal conduct no matter investigation,2 in such imperfection an slight and no investigation, under the crime serious how during obtained the evidence indispensable how matter of who the truth determining in investigation his carrying in out crime, prosecutor, a perpetrated Michigan, on behalf responsibilities is, the That that evidence. to trial without proceed must (if even possible that is to trial proceed must prosecutor excluded) the dead though as has been after evidence illegal exist, though did not in body the basement there, and as really never the sofa was firearm under were garage in the materials incendiary though the process in imagination, of one’s merely figment jury peers—a defendant’s jury requiring for the together brought citizens of twelve comprised and common exercising judgment their purpose sole criminal truth of a determine the in order to sense being just verdict while accurate and charge—render avail- the most relevant may well be of what deprived evidence. able gives the dissent also system, urging justice such decision-making by the effect that

little consideration in the confidence public jury upon has a blindfolded correctly, as people, viewed process of a integrity responsibility out the first carrying in indispensable what the Constitu- maintenance of government—the tran- “domestic describes as the United States tion of majority is of the denunciation The dissent’s quility.” juries more will which justice system of a defense imperfection case is not in this dissent asserts While the slight it is or not truth, whether slight, relevant to the dissent it is not imper magnitude view, because, whatever the dissent’s under fection, must he excluded. the evidence [July- Mich 523 Concurring Markman, evidence, and, therefore, in of more which deprived juries guilt more will render more verdicts in or which is inaccurately. innocence determined The dissent’s is also in defense of a in which system denunciation juries serving more citizens on more will their perform afterward, civic obligation to learn for the first time, they deprived have been to facts and access might evidence that have been their determinative jurors, decisions. The attitude of these well as victims, witnesses, attitude of public, toward a system government’s justice ability which carry responsibility protecting out its from people is compromised criminals such a cavalier attitude imagined. toward evidence can only be While the may, exclusion of evidence under excep- circumstances, tional constitutionally compelled, where it compelled—as is United States Su- preme Court has to be determined the case where the police have carried out responsibilities good their hardly faith—it why self-evident of our more, State would wish to fewer, have rather than critical guilt decisions of or innocence by jurors decided who each has one of his hands tied behind his back. Evidence is lifeblood justice process, criminal indispensable it is in ensuring just fair deter- minations.

Concerning what protections” furthers “citizen un- Constitution, der our the dissent’s conclu- dismissive sion that Michigan “managed has to exist for decades with rule and our yet streets have teeming become with criminals released on ‘technicali- ” ties,’ post real, belies there is a but uncertain, number of on criminals our who streets have gone unprosecuted, either prosecuted on charges, lesser unconvicted, because evidence has been withheld Opinion by Concurring Markman, J. logical reality an undeniable and That is jury. from even to pertains perhaps police. the While part on the of errors “teeming” are not our are or to which streets extent incarcerated but would have been criminals who with cannot be good-faith of a for the absence fact, have, in crime calculated, rates of violent precisely par- Had our recent decades.3 enormously over grown inception of at the time of grandparents, ents lacking good-faith Michigan in exclusionary rule into their future and able to look exception, been now, it then and is crime compared levels violent our many viewed would have quite they certain Doubtlessly, crime. “teeming” with today streets as “man- will continue to however, of crime are contributed levels age to exist” whatever of the courts.4 decisions by justice individual criminal uniformly is, course, crime rates do not correct that The dissent point upward n This notwithstand proceed or downward. Post at 568 9. States, Michigan specifically, ing, and in crime rates in the United violent forty years ago. higher today they This can be than were are far cursory analysis by of Justice Statistics or of Bureau confirmed FBI latter, grown According figures. murder rates have to the Uniform Crime 237%, 90%, rape by aggravated by assault approximately forcible rates by <http:// 240%, violent crime rates 144%. rates and overall 2004). (accessed July 9, www.disastercenter.com/crime/micrime.htm> “hystericalQ,”post at 568. The to be The dissent finds this discussion well, i.e., being it apparently have its cake and eat dissent wishes to allegedly doing majority damage that it is for the allowed to criticize being government, immune itself while the cause of constitutional If, position. consequences from the its own criticism for the from dissent, majority position the loss of perspective cost of the is of the majority, perspective protections, of the the cost from the constitutional imperative that, any position is absent constitutional of the dissent’s impact deterring searches or unconstitutional conceivable absent seizures, offenders position in more violent would result the dissent’s consequence Certainly, not a populating streets. this is our justices, dissenting it would be but nonetheless or desired intended position. consequence no free lunch for their There is inevitable 470 MICH523 Concurring Opinion by Markman,

Despite hyperbolic rhetoric dissent, rights of criminal defendants have remained well- protected, both the federal system and in those growing numbers of states which exception to the exclusionary rule has been adopted.5 hand, On the other rights else, of everyone and of society generally, have been protected better because the criminal justice system has been allowed to assess a guilt defendant’s or innocence on the basis of the full range of relevant And, evidence. result, as a in some unknown, real, but very cases, number of criminal defendants, who, under the dissent’s approach, would have left been on the streets to continue to prey upon their communities, have been convicted of serious crimes on the basis of trustworthy evidence and after full process due of law.

The dissent asserts that it is “unclear an alleg- how edly increasing crime rate is relevant in determining our citizens’ constitutional rights.. . .” Post argue positions, dissent. It is entitled to its but it is no more immune than majority accountability responsibility from positions. for these Further, it should be dispute understood that the dissent does not what opinion practical this consequences asserts about the far-reaching of its exclusionary rule; merely responds it “hysteri- that such assertions are cal!;].” 5 Moreover, by dissent, i.e., rule advanced an rule good-faith exception, by definition, without a could have no effect in deterring single search; improper even a all that this rule could do would serendipitous be to afford a guilty party by windfall occasional enabling person rehable, such inculpatory to exclude evidence from trial. “[A]ny jury rule of clearly evidence that denies probative access to heavy and rehable justification, evidence must bear a burden of and must carefully limited to the pay way by circumstances in which it will its deterring Gates, official 257-258; lawlessness.” Illinois v 462 US (1983) (White J., S Ct 76 L Ed concurring). 2d 527 The hard-to- understand approach calculus of deny jury the dissent’s would be to clearly probative access to any and rehable apparent evidence without countervailing deterring benefit in official lawlessness. PEOPLE V GOLDSTON by Concurring Opinion Markman, nor that of my position is, course, neither That cited crime rates have been Increasing majority. that there suggestions to the dissent’s response and that position to its consequences are no adverse despite exist” absence “managed to Michigan has is accurately, my position More exception. a good-faith rule of the dissent’s the absolutist that exclusionary rule do with the constitution, has little to in the United actually prevail that the constitutions Michigan. States this concurrence agitated seems dissent impact as the invoke such considerations

would of deterrent crime, the absence upon rule dissent’s misconduct, and the rule on effect of the dissent’s integrity upon of the dissent’s impact adverse are allegedly considerations justice system. These concern about to the dissent’s more focused in contrast analysis is problem with the Constitution. Madison,6 not that of James constitution is the dissent’s Court, of the United States not that Rather, Michigan. by ratified part of James Madison’s Constitution That the dissent’s rule is not by of such a rule the absence of mention in the Constitution manifest early judicial practice. As summarized one as well as consistent scholar: private premises generally required warrants. [Slearches of unnecessary. Any person, circumstances, were all other warrants own, including private citizen, acting on his could search and peril. If uncovered contraband or seize at his own the search forfeiture, subject completely property then he was otherwise fruitless, If, however, proved party

justified. then the the search damages find unless he could who made the search was hable good pursuant A search conducted faith the shelter of statute. [Harris, statutory authority Back to reasonable. was considered rule, L 37 Ark R An examination basics: (1983).] 647 (1818); 246; United Hoyt, 4 L Ed 381 Wood v also Gelston v 16 US See (1842). States, 342; 41 US 10 L Ed 987 550 470 Mich 523 Concurring Opinion Markman, J.

United Supreme States Court has made clear that the exclusionary rule is of “quasi-constitutional” dimension applicability and that its in particular contexts is a variety function of a pragmatic balancing con- siderations.7 While the dissent is entitled to its view the rule should applied broadly, more contain exceptions, fewer the dissent should not con- its fuse own views with those of either the United States Constitution or the Michigan Constitution.

Among rule, other limitations on the exclusionary the United Supreme States Court has concluded that the rule not apply retroactively does unlike most rules constitutional, Walker, are 618; Linkletter v 381 US 1731; 85 S Ct 14 L (1965); Ed 2d 601 the rule does not apply to lacking those standing, Alderman v United States, 165; 961; 394 US 89 S Ct 22 L (1969); Ed 2d 176 the rule does not apply grand jury proceedings, Calandra, United States v 338; 613; US 94 CtS L Ed 2d (1974); the rule not apply does to civil proceedings, Janis, United States v 433; 428 US 96 S Ct 3021; (1976); 49 L Ed 2d 1046 the rule not apply does deportation proceedings, & Immigration Naturaliza- tion Service v Lopez-Mendoza, 1032; 468 US 104 S Ct 3479; L (1984); 82 Ed 2d 778 the rule apply does not where the unlawfully seized evidence is used against a parolee in parole revocation hearings, Bd Pennsylvania Scott, 357; Probation v 2014; US 118 S Ct 141 L (1998); Ed 2d 344 the rule does not apply where evidence impeach is used to defendant a criminal 7 While, perspective, majority’s approach from the dissent’s interpreting may the breadth of the seem “distinctive” “idiosyncratic,”post essentially indistinguishable at 568 n it is from that of the United States view of that Court’s uniquely “judicially characterization remedy. of the rule as a created” Pennsylvania Scott, 357, 363; Bd Probation v 524 US 118 S Ct 141 L Ed 2d 344 551 Goldston v Concurring J. Opinion by Markman, Illinois, James v 307; 648; 493 US 110 S Ct proceeding, (1990); L not in the apply 107 Ed 2d 676 the rule does has corpus context of habeas relief where state litigation for full and fair provided opportunity Powell, Stone v claim, 465; Fourth Amendment 428 US (1976); L 3037; 96 S Ct 49 Ed 2d 1067 the rule does not in objectively have acted reason- apply police where is de- upon subsequently able reliance statute Krull, Illinois unconstitutional, 340; clared 480 US 1160; (1987); L the rule 107 Ct 94 Ed 2d 364 does S government if the can be said to have also apply means, through independent the evidence discovered States, Silverthorne Lumber Co v United 385; 40 251 US 182; (1920); L Ed if apply S Ct 64 319 the rule does not illegality the connection between the and the seizure taint, dissipate has become so attenuated as to States, Nardone v United 338; 266; 308 60 S Ct 84 L US (1939); Ed 307 the rule does not where the apply at future likely evidence would some time have been Williams, Nix v discovered, 431; 2501; 467 US 104 S Ct (1984); L apply 81 Ed 2d 377 the rule does not where faith police good upon have relied defective Leon, United States v warrant, 897; 468 US 104 S Ct v Sheppard, Massachusetts 3405; (1984); L Ed 2d 677 981; 3424; (1984); L 2d 468 US S Ct 82 Ed the rule does apply, respect even with substantial Amendment, only deliberate violations of the Fourth “in the of a absence more efficacious sanction... Delaware, Franks v 2674; L 438 US 98 S Ct 57 Ed 2d 667

“Neither cases nor others hold that [these] com- anything illegal thereby which deters searches is manded the Fourth Amendment. The deterrent the incrimination of those preventing values of whose rights have violated have been considered justify suppression probative sufficient evi- 470 Mich 523 Concurring Opinion by Markman, though against dence even the case the defendant destroyed. judgment. weakened or adhere to that We But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending rule to other defendants justify further upon public would encroachment interest those accused of prosecuting crime and having them on the of all acquitted convicted basis Alderman, the evidence which exposes the truth.” su- pra 174-175.

“Despite purpose, its broad deterrent the exclusion- ary interpreted rule has never been to the proscribe use illegally seized evidence in all proceedings against or persons. device, all As with any application remedial the of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives thought are most efficaciously Calandra, served.” at 348. supra “In deciding whether to extend the rule grand jury proceedings, weigh potential we must the injury to the historic role and grand functions of the jury against potential the benefits of the rule as applied in this context. It is evident that this extension of the exclusionary rule would seriously impede grand the jury.” Id. at 349.

“Against potential this damage to role and func- grand jury, tions of the weigh we must the benefits to be derived from proposed this extension of the exclusion- ary rule. Suppression of the use of illegally seized evidence against the search victim in a criminal trial is thought an important effectuating be method of Fourth Amendment. But it does not follow that Fourth Amendment requires adoption every proposal that might deter misconduct.” Id. at 350.

“ ‘Illegal hardly sanctioned, conduct’ is nor are the foundations of the Republic imperiled, by declining to make an unprecedented extension of the exclusionary v Goldston Concurring Markman, objec- rule’s where the grand jury proceedings rale to other and where served effectively tives would unduly preju- would be and historic values important diced.” Id. at 355 n civil pro- from federal that exclusion conclude

“[W]e criminal by a state unlawfully seized of evidence ceedings to have suffi- not been shown officer has enforcement conduct of state deterring likelihood of cient imposed outweighs it the societal costs police so therefore, in so Court, justified is not This exclusion. Janis, at 454. rale.” extending “ rule [Weeks] is a forget not do will ‘[It] competing the nicest balance of on arrived finding necessity in view the considerations preserve Consti- judicial sanction effective some The rule is guarantees. seizure search and tution’s dispensa- compensatory reparation unsupportable criminal; justifica- rational injured its sole tion to the in “[exert- its experience indispensability tion to the legal to secure obedience ing] pressures general law-enforcing part of federal Amendment on Fourth needed, function, the rule is As it serves officers.” medicament; taken, no should be more but [grudgingly] combat the disease. than needed to swallowed is criminals free as go must will many Granted that so of blundering, pursuance this deter from the constables necessity beyond the confines of liberation policy as de- public on the interest gratuitous harm inflicts Seizure, Amsterdam, Search, Congress.’ by clared 378, L. Rev. Comment, 112 U. Pa. 2255: A Section (1964).” Janis, supra at 454 n 29. 388-389 ' rule are not exclusionary the policies behind “[T]he light in Rather, be evaluated they absolute. must Stone, at 488. supra policies.” competing utility by weighing found “The answer is to be extending the costs of it to against rule 470 MICH523 Concurring by Opinion Markman, collateral review Fourth Amendment claims.” Id. at 489. exclusionary rule, any,

“[T]he contribution of the if of the effectuation Fourth Amendment is minimal and the substantial societal costs of application of persist special rule with force.” Id. at 494-495. “In these circumstances we are persuaded that Janis balance between costs benefits out comes against applying exclusionary rule civil deporta- tion hearings held Lopez-Mendoza, at supra INS.” 1050.

“As with any device, remedial application of the exclu- sionary rule has properly been restricted to those situa- tions which its purpose remedial is ad- effectively Thus, vanced. circumstances, in various the Court has examined whether the rule’s deterrent effect will be achieved, and weighed has likelihood such deter- against rence the costs of withholding rehable informa- from Krull, tion the truth-seeking process.” at supra “[T]o the extent that application of the exclusionary could provide rule some deterrent, incremental possible benefit must be weighed against the ‘substan- tial social costs exacted rule.’ When indulge we in such weighing, we are convinced applying context unjus- (citation omitted). tified.” Id. at 352-353 “[Bjecause the rule is prudential rather than consti tutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence outweigh benefits its ‘sub ” stantial social Pennsylvania Probation, costs.’ Bd 363.8 history 1, § “The plain import, however, of Const art and its suggest expansion, that its expansion further with concomitant People 555 v Goldston by Opinion Concurring Markman, J. a variety are there

It is for these reasons beyond far those that considerations—extending in deter- fully are relevant assess—that dissent would in a exclusionary applicable rule is mining whether the rule is not instance, explain why particular prefer. the dissent would as absolute as as broad or majority recognized—and it must Further, n at 535 8—that see ante point, addresses this opinion ex- 1936, Michigan Constitution far back as drug narcotic exclusionary “any rule from the empted revolver, firearm, rifle, pistol, automatic drugs, any or bomb, shell, explosive, black- gun, bomb pistol, machine knuckles, gas-ejecting billy, metallic jack, slingshot, device, thing, or seized any dangerous weapon other curtilage dwell- any peace officer outside by is, Michigan That Consti- in this state.”9 ing house Ohio, v 1961, when 367 US Mapp tution 1936 until from (1961), 1684; 6 L 2d 1081 introduced 643; 81 Ed S Ct rule, limitation on imposed national uniform more considerably rule was restric- See, counterpart. e.g., v People tive than its federal (1959); 247; v Gonzales, People Mich 97 NW2d 16 356 (I960).10 Winkle, 551, 556; 100 309 Mich NW2d 358 it, should when there is rule to enforce occur 196, 214; Nash, People compelling v Mich 341 NW2d reason to do so.” 418 439 9 2, 10, § Const art ratified an amendment of anti-exclusionary language, now as the which the above known added clause. (1960), Winterheld, Mich 102 NW2d 201 See also Michigan preclude does which held that evidence, platter” application doctrine which of the so-called “silver unlawfully jurisdiction, foreign utilized in a can be seized borders, by beyond respect acts its officers officers. “With and, hence, State, guarantees them do not extend to another such it, and, regard disappears Id. at with rule.” reason the rule in that for added). (emphasis 470 Mich 523 Concurring Markman, Moreover, sought was to be continued relationship by in which, years 1963 constitution two after again its drafters limited the reach of the exclu- Mapp, sionary rule by inserting language substantially similar 2, 1908, § to that of art 10 (exempting Const from the “any rule drug, firearm, bomb, narcotic other explosive any dangerous weapon, by a seized officer peace curtilage any outside the dwelling house state”). in this

Thus, while the alleged “eighty dissent cites the year” period during which the that it rule favors existed in Michigan, post unadulterated form in 568, at in the “heyday” truth of the exclusionary rule that the dissent recalls did not exist for at least a quarter-century preceding Mapp—because Michigan had substantially limited the in scope the rule precisely those areas of criminal law in which it tends to regularly most invoked—and it did not for exist many years afterward because the United Su- States preme Court quickly made clear that merely judicially created, was “prophylactic” remedy rather than a rule of absolute and invariable constitutional dimension.11 Calandra, supra consistently See at 348. It has been the constitu Michigan provision tional law that “search seizure Constitution, Michigan 1963, 1, 11,§ Const art affords defendant no greater rights upon support suppression to which than the Fourth People Chapman, 245, 252-253; Amendment.” v Mich 387 NW2d 835 (1986). 1, provide “[A]rt § 11 to be protection is to construed the same by Amendment, that ‘compelling secured the Fourth absent reason’ impose interpretation.” People Collins, 8, a different 438 Mich clearly “[T]he NW2d 684 historical record indicates that people Michigan imposing stringent no had intention of more restric upon tions law enforcement than is mandated the Fourth Amend compelling interpret ment.” Id. at “There is 32-33. no reason Const 1, affording greater § protection art 11 as for this defendant than is provided dissent, under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at It is majority, “ignor[ing] Michigan’s history,” post that is Concurring Markman, J. re- to create constitutional purports

The dissent and choose it is able to pick in which gime rules of as the “best” it views among from what them to create a constitu- eras, particular and combine in the for real world has existed regime tional an exclu- The dissent would combine brief moments. failing to coverage, in its rule that broad sionary is firearms, bombs, explosives drugs, “narcotic exclude exclu- weapons,” with an dangerous other [and] most exceptions, narrow its sionary rule It is seri- good-faith exception. importantly lacking suggest its misleading for the dissent ously of consti- legitimate “eighty years” is a heir position in our state. understanding tutional one that summary, dissent’s constitution is the the the United unrecognizable to framers of would be Constitution, as Michigan or the States Constitution the United justices of of both generations well as to Michigan Supreme and the Supreme Court States is ill-serves constitution one Court. dissent’s system.12 justice of a criminal responsible the interests effect, consequence the only its lack of deterrent Given relationship failing between consider this of the traditional to statement 1, § 11 States and art Fourth Amendment of the United Constitution the Michigan the Constitution. intimations, majority Contrary the not uncon the is to dissent’s investigative process. good-faith imperfections in the about even cerned only However, suppression is the issue before this Court whether good-faith appropriate remedy are far for a violation. There is an evidence kind, appropriate finely for of this and tuned remedies violations more against government. damages One or remedies as civil tort claim such they enacting would alternative remedies is that virtues of such of the only persons respect a crime compensate to evidence of not with whom discovered, respect no such those with to whom been but also has been the victims been hut who have nonetheless evidence has discovered contrast, By rule Amendment of Fourth violations. respect crime to of a to with whom evidence accords benefit those discovered. has been 470 Mich 523 Opinion by Dissenting Cavanagh, of the be to dissent’s absolute would extraordinarily costly way raise obstacle effective law enforcement.

CAVANAGH,J. task (dissenting). combating “[T]he crime and seem convicting guilty every will era pressing such critical and concern that we be lured may temptations expediency into forsaking our protecting pri- commitment to individual and liberty vacy.” Leon, 897, 929-930; United States v 468 US 104 S (1984) Ct 82 L (Brennan, J., Ed 2d 677 dissent- ing). Today, the majority ignore has chosen Michi- gan’s history of protecting against our citizens unrea- result, choosing sonable searches. As adopt exclusionary rule, the ma- jority has forsaken to our its commitment citizens and Therefore, failed to resist the lure of I expediency. must respectfully dissent.

The majority claims that compelling there no for provide greater reason Michigan protection against that provided by unreasonable searches than I federal constitution.1 with disagree majority must have compelling provide reason to right houses, persons, papers, “The to he secure in their effects, against unreasonable searches seizures shall violated, issue, cause, probable supported upon and no Warrants shall but affirmation, particularly describing place Oath or to be searched, persons things Const, and the to be US Am seized.” IV houses, person, possessions papers every person “The of shall be secure from unreasonable searches seizures. No warrant to search any place any person things to describing or seize or shall issue without them, cause, probable by supported nor without oath or affirmation. provisions of this section not be to shall construed bar from evidence in any proceeding any drug, firearm, bomb, explosive criminal narcotic dangerous peace weapon, by other seized a officer outside the curtilage any dwelling 1963, 1, § in house this state.” Const art People 559 Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, that provided our than to citizens protection greater I Instead, believe this federal constitution. compelling a reason be show required should Collins, v 438 People from See past precedent. depart (1991) C.J., 8, 50; NW2d Mich 475 684 (CAVANAGH, demon- However, even if this Court must dissenting). greater protection a reason to offer compelling strate cer- history citizens, Michigan’s jurisprudential our tainly this test. meets United States years

Over before the forty rule to the states Court extended 1684; 643; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 Ohio, v US 81 S Ct Mapp 367 (1961), adopted 559, 573-574; NW Marxhausen, 204 Mich 171 v People (1919). con- body of state Court created “[T]his 557 law adopted and seizure stitutional search rule, subject was all before either Nash, 196, v Mich 341 People federal floor.” J.). (1983) Marx- (opinion NW2d BRICKLEY, hausen, it is wisely stated that this Court the individual government essence of a free “the home and his person, property in his his shall secure search, from invasion, from unlawful from unlawful unlawful seizure.” importance Court further articulated

This Halveksz, Mich exclusionary rule 138; 183 NW security per- afforded government

Under a laws sons, against possessions search without houses and obtained, warrant, by officers lawfully must not be violated legitimate point way to search law. law must law tolerate other. Officers of the and seizure and will none they security invade must act the law and if within Constitution, such invasion guaranteed individuals justice aid of the fruit their violation. bring cannot to the courts, seasonably called duty when It is the attention Mich 523 560 470 Dissenting J. by Opinion Cavanagh, right, obtaining a violation of a constitutional to evi- prosecutions, protection in criminal dence vindicate Constitution, suppress and to afforded individuals [Id.] such evidence. test compelling reason “should be under- establishing

stood as a conclusive presumption artifi- cially linking state constitutional fed- interpretation to Dep’t Police, 758; eral law.” Sitz v Mich 744, State 443 (1993). majority’s 506 NW2d 209 application of disregards this, compelling however, reason test ignores jurisprudential history this Court. Those have who come before us have dedicated upholding Michigan’s themselves to Consti- tution and providing analysis. reasoned Not did Court adopt rule before being so, it required recognize to do also declined to a good- faith to the exclusionary rule v People 538, 556; 416 Mich Bloyd, 331 NW2d 447 Our obligated state is not discard decades of sound analysis jurisprudence and reasoned merely because the United Supreme State Court has announced a limiting decision federal citizens’ constitutional rights contrary Michigan jurisprudence.2 This Court “not 2 jurisdictions rejected good-faith exception Other have also on statutory See, Lacasella, grounds. e.g., state constitutional or State v 313 185, 194; (2002); Dorsey State, 807, 817, Mont 975 60 P3d v 761 A2d 820 2000) (“Without (Del, remedy, a constitutional a Delaware ‘constitutional right’ oxymoron protections is an that could unravel the entire fabric of twenty-five year in Delaware’s two hundred and old Declaration of Rights.”); State, 671, 672; Harvey (1996); v 266 Ga 469 SE2d 176 v State Canelo, 376,382-383; (1995); Gutierrez, 139 NH 653 A2d 1097 State v 116 (1993) 431, 446-447; government (“Denying P2d NM fruits unconstitutional conduct at trial best effectuates the constitu proscription by preserving tional of unreasonable searches and seizures rights government’s of the accused to the same extent as if the stayed law.”); Guzman, 981, 989, officers had within the State v 122 Idaho (1992); Edmunds, 842 P2d 660 Commonwealth v 526 Pa 397-398, 402; (1991); Oakes, 171, 173; 586 A2d 887 State 157 Vt Dissenting Cavanagh, contrac- major what we deem to be accept

obligated simply constitution under our citizen protections tion of has chosen to States the United because provide is free to Sitz, Our state do so.” States than the United to its citizens protections more the exclu- adoption of does. This Court’s Constitution so, do required to being rule decades before sionary good-faith excep- adopt decision not subsequent its compelling qualify sufficient tion, is more than reason. adopted the Consti-

Notably, who framed those protection the expanding were concerned about tution beyond provision and seizure search Michigan’s under interpreted the as it was that of federal constitution Nash, at Collins, 27; see 214. supra supra at also 1963. 1963, Supreme adopted Court had the United States yet the rule, adopted but had not exclusionary the Therefore, 1963 the ratification good-faith exception. the that our support cannot notion our Constitution Michigan’s Constitution sought adopt to have citizens as contained in federal constitution, it twenty years be over before when would recognized exception was indeed under federal guarantees may disregard “[W]e constitution. citizens that our constitution confers on 150, 151; (1990); (1991); Marsala, 58 A2d v 216 Conn 579 A2d 119 State (1988) (The Carter, 709, 710, 719-720; 553 v 322 NC 370 SE2d State maintaining integrity necessary “for the sake of rule is Novembrino, 95, government.”); judicial v 105 branch of State NJ (1987) 153, 156-159; (“By eliminating any for noncom- A2d 820 cost 519 probable cause, requirement pliance with the constitutional good-faith exception assures that the constitutional standard will be us (1987); 114; diluted.”); McKnight, 110, 352 471 State 291 SC SE2d v 363, 365-366; (1985); Upton, 476 548 394 Mass NE2d Commonwealth v 422-423; People Bigelow, NE2d 66 NY2d 488 451 v 470 Mich Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, J. merely Supreme because the United States Court has Sitz, . protection.” withdrawn.. such they Unless were prescient, the ratifiers could not know how the United State might interpret Therefore, the federal constitution in future years. it is illogical claim essentially the 1963 ratification an interpretation foreclosed of our Constitution that differs from federal constitution. Remarkably, majority claims that the pur- pose rule is to deter miscon- duct. That claim is incomplete ignores the other well-documented purpose exclusionary rule. The United States Supreme Court has stated the pur- poses protect person’s rule are to Fourth guarantees Amendment by deterring lawless by police conduct officers and to close the courthouse doors “to use of unconstitutionally evidence ob- tained.” Wong States, Sun United 486; 371 US S Ct 9 L 2d (1963); Ed see also Brown v Illinois, 590, 599; 2254; 422 US S95 Ct 45 L Ed 416 2d (1975); Ohio, Terry 1, 12-13; v 392 US 88 1868; S Ct 20 (1968) (The L Ed 2d 889 exclusionary rule serves to deter police misconduct preserve judicial and integ- rity.); States, v 206, 222; Elkins United 364 US 80 S Ct (I960).3 1437; 4 EdL 2d 1669 3 Supreme Court, While decision, the United States after its Leon has primarily police on justifying focused the deterrence of misconduct in good-faith exception, recognize purposes it has not failed to that other Krull, 340, 347; 1160; still exist. In Illinois v 480 US 107 S Ct 94 L Ed 2d “ (1987), police ‘prime 364 the Court refers to purpose’ as the deterrence exclusionary rule,” but it purpose. does not state that it is the sole (Citation omitted.) discussing While the deterrent of the effects exclu sionary Illinois, 314; 307, 648; rule in James v US 493 110 S Ct 107 L Ed (1990), purposes 2d 676 the Court refers to the of the rule. Connelly, 157, 169; 515; See also Colorado v 479 US 107 S Ct 93 L Ed 2d (1986) (the exclusionary deterring by 473 rule is aimed at lawless conduct prosecutor). and the v Goldston by Dissenting Cavanagh, J. cannot and our Constitution which sit under

“Courts of the to invasions party not be made lawless will unhin- by permitting citizens rights of constitutional such invasions.” use fruits governmental dered at rule “is directed 13. The supra at Terry, seizures, merely and not and all unlawful searches incriminating material or produce to happen those that Brown, (emphasis at 601 fruits.” testimony supra as added). 648, at the United States In Mapp, supra States, v 232 US United quoted Weeks 341; (1914), L Ed as follows: 393; 34 383, S Ct private thus and “If documents can be seized letters against a citizen accused in evidence held used offense, declaring of the Fourth Amendment protection right against and seizures is such searches his be secure value, concerned, and, placed far are so as those thus of no might from the Constitution. The be stricken well bring guilty of the courts and their officials efforts they are, praiseworthy as are not to be aided punishment, great principles established the sacrifice those suffering have resulted in years of endeavor and which law of the land.” in the fundamental their embodiment v recently also wrote As Justice Scalia Crawford 1354, 1373; 158 124 Ct S Washington, US_,_; (2004), States United L Ed 2d 177 the framers Supreme Court has the United States if one to assume that Even were supra expressed Mapp, it at about the concerns abandoned judicial agree maintaining integrity, ensuring I cannot those Mapp, As stated concerns should be abandoned. government quickly “Nothing destroy than its failure can more laws, worse, disregard its of the charter of own its observe its own in Arizona in his Justice Stevens stated dissent existence.” And as Evans, (1995), [Fourth] 1, 18; “The S 131 L Ed 2d 34 514 US 115 Ct merely power sovereign, on is constraint on the Amendment agents.” of its some 564 470 MICH 523 Dissenting Cavanagh, judges, government Constitution “knew like other always safeguard officers, could not be trusted to rights . . . .”4 against rule,

Without the the assurance unreasonable searches and would seizures be “valueless undeserving perpetual of in a mention charter of .Mapp, supra inestimable human liberties . . at 655. protect The Constitution exists to us all. Hundreds years ago, recognize our founders had the wisdom to government highest that our must be held to the people, standards.5 It to must accountable for people, government without the no has to reason exist. today’s majority decision, In treats our Constitu- impediment tion as an that courts must maneuver justice system around for to work. This is evident adopt good-faith exception zeal its to in this case when the search warrant at issue does come close meeting the standards articulated in Leon. “Probable cause to issue search warrant exists where there ais inferring probability’ ‘substantial basis’ for a ‘fair or contraband evidence of crime will be found in a particular place.”6People Kazmierczak, 411, 461 Mich 417-418; Leon, 667 914-915, NW2d Clause, While with dealt the Confrontation Justice Scalia’s Crawford fitting words are most this case as well. argued against general James Otis writs assistance government that allowed British to search homes at time day night. argued warrants, special Otis in which complainant suspected goods specific swore that he were located in a place, were valid. The concern with writs “[a] of assistance is that person Otis, doings.” man accountable no for his James argument, Superior Massachusetts, February 24, 1761, oral Court of (accessed <http://douglasarchives.org/otis_a34.htm> February 2004). Unfortunately, years later, issue, almost 250 same albeit it slightly form, plagues yet again. different us course, Leon, majority, get finding even concedes the probable lack cause. Dissenting Cavanagh, J. if exception does not apply that the held and neutral his detached abandoned magistrate reckless, or were dishonest or

role, officers police objectively had not have officers could police cause existed. probable that reasonable belief typographi- a mere case there was a where This until after the warrant not discovered cal error was Evans, 514 US See, e.g., Arizona was carried out. (a (1995) 131 L Ed 2d 34 15-16; 115 S Ct by a data entered computer acted incorrect officer on clerk). a there certainly not case where court And this is See, sufficiency of an affidavit. call about was close findings in the Leon, 904. We concur e.g., court, stated: trial which to be the observa- for the warrant sustained

In order nature. Examination of were made a recent tions warrant, warrant, dues support search affidavit nothing [sic, enlighten anyone. It obtains no does] to these Officer Born reference as to when contacts between had, to not able tell how close and the defendant were was respect defendant’s were with to time the contacts posing firefighter, how close the time alleged as a activities of the affidavit for the activities were to the date those warrant. affidavit, anything looking I don’t find in the

Also at the dwelling, connecting the location of the affidavit Hazelwood, Michigan, Inkster, defendant for stating why request there is a to search this information location. but there

It doesn’t have defendant’s residence connecting be, something judgment, has to in this Court’s to the location that was searched. the defendant worked, he whether it was it was somewhere Whether going of. it was he seen in and out Whether somewhere was lived, going him into after somewhere he or someone saw 470 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, girlfriend incident, being was it his or him associated some manner with that location.

And on anything the face of affidavit I don’t find connecting the defendant location that was searched. findings Court,

So on therefore based those I’m going grant the motion. I don’t think that the affidavit sufficiently probable necessary established the cause so magistrate properly could have issued the war- granted. So rant. the motion is is a This case which the affidavit offered absolutely linking no information defendant to the on address warrant. It objectively was not police reasonable for the officers have relied on a warrant that did not provide any information connecting defendant place with the be searched. The majority pointedly states that information provided was not false or misleading. And I agree, but that is impossible because it is for one to find nonexistent information false misleading.7 7 Remarkably, majority violating prob refers to our Constitution’s requirement, able rights, cause our therefore citizens’ constitutional as a “technical disagree. case, defect.” Ante at n I 540 In this conducting a any search based on a warrant that does not establish place connection between the to be searched and a defendant is not merely a technical violation. As the United States recently held, a when warrant does not describe the items to seized be at all, obviously the warrant so regarded was deficient that the search is as Ramirez, 1284, 1290; warrantless. Groh v 551,_124 540 US S Ct 157 L Ed 2d 1068 It was unreasonable for a law enforcement officer to rely patently on a warrant “so cursory “[E]ven defective.” Id. at 1292. a reading case—perhaps just simple glance—would warrant in this a glaring deficiency any have revealed a reasonable officer constitutionally Likewise, would have known was fatal.” Id. at 1294. an provides linking affidavit that no information defendant to the address searched, case, glaring deficiency like the affidavit in this is also a any that would be evident to reasonable law enforcement officer. While qualified immunity, Groh dealt with Court used the same standard of objective reasonableness articulated in Leon. Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, J. on belief premised The “ ‘acting officer was the law enforcement act in similar and should officer would

reasonable ” Leon, quoting Stone circumstances.’ L 2d 539-540; S Ct 49 Ed Powell, US (1976) states, J., dissenting). Leon even (White, we standard of reasonableness that the emphasize “We we objective standard adopt objective is an one.... have a reasonable moreover, officers to adopt, requires 920 n 20. law Id. at knowledge prohibits.” of what the I our law enforce- majority, give trained Unlike the credit, I law enforce- more believe ment officers submitting affidavit that when ment officers know they must of a search warrant of the issuance support area be searched. why they believe the should include linking defen- lack of information Because searched, under the Leon even place dant to to be is insufficient.8 good-faith exception, warrant Further, in this case did review magistrate for of a search warrant with the affidavit issuance scrutiny. Id. at 913-914. neutral and detached provided magistrate authorized search warrant A with defendant. linking no information the address magistrate would have directed neutral detached linking the provide officers to information is simply to with defendant. There address be searched a the address indicating no fact connection between magistrate’s There no other term for the defendant. is it being than to in this case other describe approval 914. stamp police.” for the Id. at a “rubber argues high “that the cost of majority also great justice toll our exclusionary rule exacts too on 8 1997) (the (Ind, See, e.g., Figert State, NE2d sufficiently apply link the does not does not when affidavit activity). searched to criminal home to he 470 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, J. system.” rule, Ante 541 n The exclusionary grounded Constitution, in our has been the rule of law eighty years. for over While it be may obvious, I note managed that our state has to for exist decades with the rule and our streets have to yet become teeming with criminals released on “technicalities.”

Finally, I am somewhat heartened the fact that the ever-sensitive fit my concurrence has seen to attack dissent a lengthy championing with diatribe law I applaud order. also ability vigor- the concurrence’s ously criticize the dissent “overwrought for its lan- guage” rhetoric,” and “hyperbolic yet still manage to hysterically argue that approach dissent’s leaves criminal defendants “on the streets to continue to prey upon their . . . .” communities Ante at 548. I am While unclear how an allegedly increased crime rel- rate is evant determining our citizens’ rights, constitutional it quite is marvel watch the concurrence criticize the dissent attempting protect for our citizens’ constitutional At core, liberties.9 its the concurrence 9 Notably, actually going See, crime rates have been down. (accessed e.g.,<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov> <http://www.fbi.gov> 2004). February 27, If crime rates are to considered in constitutional indicates, interpretation, falling as the concurrence then the rates should give pause. Perhaps change concurrence the concurrence will its Or, unfortunately increase, if the notion rates continue to fall. if the rates argue may greater the concurrence for contraction of constitutional way, idiosyncratic liberties. Either the concurrence’s method of constitu interpretation certainly unique. tional The concurrence’s interpreta- distinctive ideas about constitutional tion also dealing extend its recitation of numerous federal cases with settings, deportation rule in proceed- various such as ings. citing “balancing Janis, test” from United States v 428 US 433, 454; (1976), 96 S Ct 49 L Ed 2d 1046 the concurrence apparently disregard believes that more law enforcement officers rule, Therefore, the less effective it is. the lack of a deterrent by Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, J. between difference the fundamental

clearly indicates and the liberties citizens’ constitutional view of our my that I believe concurrence’s views. majority and citizens, Bill of all and the protect exists to Constitution amendments, citizens to all protect ten the first Rights, I do believe government. acts from unlawful law, while to follow the requiring government that it, breaking allegedly are to catch those who attempting If, as concur- easily dismissed. is radical notion so of the advocates, is the lifeblood “[e]vidence rence I that then justice process,” ante believe criminal democracy, I of our is the lifeblood the Constitution it. agree attempts with to violate do not exclusionary rule argues that The concurrence search. deterring single improper even a has no effect actions of law argue It disingenuous is by the will not be influenced enforcement officers that violate a citizen’s knowledge that even “mistakes” a court of rights are admissible in constitutional still majority of this case indicate that law. facts classify willing almost conduct concurrence are far goes The concurrence even so as as a “mistake.” “good-faith im- violations rename these constitutional take Ante n 12.10It hard to perfections.” at 557 seriously majority and concurrence arguments case, do in this that a argue, they they when make the enforcement officer would reasonable law submitting support “mistake” of an affidavit very rights. justifies This the violation of citizens’ constitutional effect justifies rights government’s disregard of constitutional notion—that disregard government’s of constitutional continued and increased and, course, history. contrary logic rights—appears our nation’s argues rights whose constitutional concurrence also However, damages pursue a civil lawsuit. have been violated could immunity majority governmental preclude these the vast lawsuits will seq. and, remedy. See, e.g., therefore, MCL 691.1401 et it is not a realistic 470 Mich

Dissenting Cavanagh, link provides search warrant no between the and place defendant to be searched. majority argue concurrence also that exclud-

ing evidence seized violation of our Constitution public hinders confidence. I have much more faith in of our I public state. believe that confidence by government is shattered respect that does not rights constitutional of its citizens. I believe the citizens of our state protects understand that the Constitution all they us and that do not have to make choice justice. between constitutional I liberties and believe our expect government citizens law, follow the they just required are do. No matter how “indis- be, pensable” may evidence law enforcement officers are not given a free pass merely they because are governmental cloaked with authority. concurrence its indicates belief that our citizens’ constitutional liberties should be discarded because it will make us “safer.” a peculiar What notion. Contrary to the concur- rence, agree I values, with the following stated so eloquently by Justice Brandéis in dissenting opinion his States, Olmstead United 277 US 48 S Ct (1928): 564; 72 L Ed 944

Decency, security liberty govern- alike demand that subjected ment officials shall be to the same rules of conduct that are commands government citizen. In a laws, government existence of the imperilled bewill if it fails to scrupulously. observe the law Our Government is potent, omnipresent good ill, teacher. For or for it people by teaches the whole example. its Crime conta- is gious. If the lawbreaker, Government becomes a it breeds contempt law; every for it invites man to become a law unto himself; anarchy. it invites To declare that in the adminis- justifies tration of the criminal law the end the means—to may declare that the Government commit crimes in order private secure the conviction of a bring criminal—would People v Goldston Dissenting Cavanagh, Against pernicious doctrine this retribution. terrible resolutely set its face. should history will show I confident future, am are flawed the concurrence used that the tactics safety not be should citizens’ concerns about Our ones. exploited it has believes the concurrence because meaning. If about the Constitution’s some divinenotion truly concurrence what the means Constitution argues, public have confidence then crime rates and analysis. nothing claims The concurrence to do with the that wouldbe one the “the dissent’s constitution that unrecognizable of the United States to the framers Michigan Constitution, as well as to or the Constitution justices generations . . .” believe what . Ante 557.1 past gen- unrecognizable to the framers would be majority justices and concur- erations of would be discarding rights of our citi- insistence on rence’s society of a law and order for their new version zens people. justices is best have decided for that these judge, History legacy. our our will be Our decisions are review. and I welcomeits government our our violates citizens’ consti- When rights, refuge no in our courts. it should find tutional disregards Today, majority reasoned and decades of protecting jurisprudence our citi- this Court sound against Therefore, re- I unreasonable searches. zens spectfully dissent. J., Cavanagh,

Kelly, concurred with

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Goldston

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 15, 2004

Citation: 682 N.W.2d 479

Docket Number: Docket 122364

Court Abbreviation: Mich.