PEOPLE v GLORIA WILLIAMS
Docket No. 20207
65 MICH APP 753
December 3, 1975
65 Mich App 753; 233 NW2d 70
Bеfore: J. H. GILLIS, P. J., and BRONSON and T. M. BURNS, JJ.
1. CRIMINAL LAW-PROSECUTORS-CLOSING ARGUMENT-INFERENCES.
A prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences based on the evidence in his closing argument.
2. CRIMINAL LAW-JURY-PROSECUTOR‘S REMARKS-DIVERTING JURY FROM DUTY.
A prosecutоr must refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence and must not inject issues broader than the guilt or innoсence of the accused under the controlling law.
3. CRIMINAL LAW-JURY-EVALUATING GUILT OR INNOCENCE-PROSECUTOR‘S REMARKS-JURORS’ EMOTIONS-SOCIAL PROBLEMS.
A prosecutor must exercise special care to avoid arousing jurors’ emotions concerning social problems, because their emotional reaction to social problems should play nо role in the evaluation of an individual‘s guilt or innocence.
4. CRIMINAL LAW-APPEAL AND ERROR-JURY-PROSECUTOR‘S REMARKS-IMPROPER ARGUMENT.
A defendant‘s conviction must be reversed where a court allowed a рrosecutor to argue that the jurors had an “opportunity to effect the drug traffic in this city“, and thereby appeal to the jurors’ fears and encourage them to go outside the evidence and decide the case on the basis of their desire to alleviate thе drug problem.
CONCURRENCE BY BRONSON, J.
5. CRIMINAL LAW-APPEAL AND ERROR-MANIFEST INJUSTICE-PROSECUTOR‘S REMARKS.
A defendant‘s conviction must be reversed where the prosecutor
Appeal from Recorder‘s Court of Detroit, Geraldine Bledsoe Ford, J. Submitted October 7, 1975, at Detroit. (Docket No. 20207.) Decided December 3, 1975.
Gloria Mae Williams was convicted of control of heroin. Defendant appeals. Reversed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Researсh, Training, and Appeals, and Barry J. Siegel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Lieberman & Tukel, P. C., for defendant on appeal.
J. H. GILLIS, P. J. Defendant, Gloria Mae Williams, was convicted by a jury of control of heroin,
At trial, the prоsecutor introduced testimony showing that defendant was arrested in the living room of the upstairs flat of a two-flat house she owned. Three tinfoil packets containing heroin were discovered in a jewelry box in her bedroom.
On appeal, defendant contends that certain comments made by the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal arguments denied her a fair trial. Although we will discuss only one of those remarks, we do not, by so doing, imply approval of the others.2
During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor said:
“Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, you have an opportunity to effect [sic] the drug traffic in this city. You have a voice. You have a chance to use it.”
Although defense counsel objected to the comment, the trial court overruled the objection.
This comment was highly prejudicial. We believe thе rationale of People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294; 193 NW2d 363 (1971), controls this case. Farrar, supra, adopted the following American Bar Associ-
“The prosecutor should refrain from argument whiсh would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the acсused under the controlling law.”3
This Court is aware of the seriousness of the drug problem and realizes it touches the lives of many average citizens, generating much fear and dismay. We recognize, too, that jurors share the average citizen‘s desire to eliminate the narcotics traffic. In such an emotion-laden situation, sensibilities are easily inflamed. Because emotional reaction to social рroblems should play no role in the evaluation of an individual‘s guilt or innocence, prosecutors must exercise special care to avoid arousing jurors’ emotions concerning such issues.
In the instant case, by arguing that the jurors had an “opportunity to effect [sic] the drug traffic in this city“, the prosecutor appealed to the jurors’ fears and encouraged them to go outside the evidence and decide the case on the basis of their desire to alleviate the drug problem. This type of prosecutorial argument does nоt comport with the mandate of Farrar, supra, and it will not be allowed by this Court. Consequently, defendant‘s conviction must be reversed.4
We have considered the remaining issue raised by defendant, and we find no error as to it.
Reversed.
T. M. BURNS, J., concurred.
BRONSON, J. (concurring). I do not feel that we must decide in this case whether the single objected-to remark by the prosecutor, quoted in the majority opinion, alone requires reversal. The prosecutor indulged in a whole series of comments characterizing defendant as the operator of a “dope house“. That allegation was not supported by thе evidence, and focused the attention of the jury on issues broader than the guilt or innocence of Gloria Mae Williams. The prosеcutor‘s remarks resulted in “manifest injustice“, and require us to reverse the defendant‘s conviction, People v Styles, 61 Mich App 532; 233 NW2d 70 (1975).
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 260.
[2, 3] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 225 et seq., 287.
[4] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 289.
[5] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 230.
