This сase presents the question whether a probationer was lawfully arrested pursuant to a probation-violation warrant when the probation-violation warrant was not sworn under oath. We conclude that, because a warrant is not required under the Fourth Amendment to make an arrest for a probation violation, it is irrelevant whether the warrant was properly issued in determining whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Defendant was on probation in an unrelated case in the Washtenaw Circuit Court. His probation officer, Thomas Mihalic, requested an arrest warrant for probation violations. Mihalic utilized a standard State Court Administrator’s Office (SCAO) form entitled “Motion, Affidavit, and Bench Warrant.” That form alleged three reasons to arrest defendant and revoke his probation: failure to notify the probation officer of a сhange of address, commission of a crime (assault), and failure to comply with the requirement that he partidpate in an adult education or general equivalency diploma (GED) program. The motion and affidavit section was signed by Mihalic, but it was not subscribed and sworn under oath. The bench warrant portion was signed by the circuit judge in this case.
A few days later, defendant reported to Mihalic at the Washtenaw County Courthouse. Washtenaw County Deputy Sheriff David Anderson was summoned to place defendant under arrest. Deputy Anderson testified that the arrest was based on the warrant that had bеen presented to him by Mihalic. A search subsequent to the arrest conducted by Deputy Anderson yielded 35 packets of heroin. Defendant was charged with possession of heroin.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the search followed an unlawful arrest. The triаl court thereafter granted defendant’s motion on the basis that the arrest warrant was defective because it was not supported by an affidavit made under oath or affirmation as required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court also rejected the argument that the gоod-faith exception applied. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice. The prosecution now appeals, and we reverse.
There are, in fact, a number of reasons why the arrest and subsequent search in this case was, in fact, lawful. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress.
We begin by noting that the trial court did not conclude, nor does defendant argue, that there is any defect in the search aside from the arrest issue. That is, the only claim that the search was improper is based оn the argument that the arrest
The first reason why this was a valid arrest is that an arrest warrant was not, in fact, required in this case. MCL 764.15(1)(g) authorizes an arrest without a warrant whenever a “peace officer has reasonable cause to believe the person . . . has violated 1 or more conditions of a. . . probation order imposed by a court of this state ....” As noted above, there is no argument in this case that there was, in fact, probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a probation violation or that the arresting officer had probable cause to so believe.
Although defendant acknowledges in his brief that probation-violation proceedings can be commenced without the issuance of an arrest warrant, he attempts to argue that that is irrelevant because a warrant was nevertheless obtained and was invalid. Defendant supports this argument with the observation that the arresting officer stated that the warrant was the only basis for the arrest. But, as discussed already, the warrant was not the only basis for the arrest. And the fact that the arresting officer may have erroneously believed that it was is irrelevant.
In Devenpeck v Alford,
Our cases make clear that an arresting officer’s stаte of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. See Whren v. United States,517 U.S. 806 , 812-813,135 L. Ed. 2d 89 ,116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)(reviewing cases); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 ,149 L. Ed. 2d 994 ,121 S. Ct. 1876 (2001) (per curiam). That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause. As we have repeatedly explained, “ ‘the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectivеly, justify that action.’ ” Whren, supra, at 813,135 L. Ed. 2d 89 ,116 S. Ct. 1769 (quoting Scott v. United States,436 U.S. 128 , 138,56 L. Ed. 2d 168 ,98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978)). “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.” Whren, supra, at 814,135 L. Ed. 2d 89 ,116 S. Ct. 1769 . “[EJvenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.” Horton v. California,496 U.S. 128 , 138,110 L. Ed. 2d 112 ,110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).[6 ]
While Devenpeck involved the question whether the arresting officer correctly identified the crime for which to book the suspect, and this case involves whether the arresting officer correctly identified the legal basis for the arrest, we do not believе that that supplies a meaningful difference. The Supreme Court clearly established that the Fourth Amendment creates an objective standard to determine whether an arrest was lawful, without regard to the arresting officer’s subjective belief. And the objective truth in this case is that the arresting offiсer had a legitimate basis to arrest defendant without a warrant. Therefore, the arrest was valid without regard to the officer’s subjective belief that he needed a warrant. In sum, the officer’s erroneous belief that a warrant was necessary, as well as any erroneous belief that the wаrrant was valid, is immaterial to the question whether the arrest was valid under the Fourth Amendment.
The next reason that this arrest was valid is similar to the first. One of the reasons for the probation violation was that defendant had committed an assault. An ordinary assault and battery
Finally, the prosecution also argues that the principle discussed in Triplett v Deputy Warden, Jackson Prison,
Probation is a matter of legislative grace. People v Johnson.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court observed in Griffin v Wisconsin
If the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant to search a probationer’s home, then it is not unreasonable to conclude that it does nоt require a warrant to arrest a probationer. Therefore, given a probationer’s reduced privacy interests, we agree with the prosecution that the principle discussed in Triplett can be extended from parolees to probationers. As such, the oath or affirmation requirement generally applicable to warrants does not apply to a warrant for the arrest of a probationer.
Finally, even if we were to agree with defendant’s argument that under MCR 6.445(A) a probation violation proceeding must be commenced with either a summons or an arrest wаrrant and, if it is commenced with an arrest warrant, the warrant must be made under oath or affirmation, that does not support the conclusion that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. In Virginia v Moore,
For the above reasons, we conclude that it does not matter whether the arrest warrant in this case was unsworn because it was unnecessary for there to be a sworn arrest warrant. Defendant’s arrest was lawful under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, so was the subsequent search.
In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the prosecution’s second argument, whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in this situation assuming that the arrest was, in fact, unlawful.
For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial сourt erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(u).
Devenpeck v Alford,
Wash Rev Code 9.73.030.
Devenpeck,
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
MCL 750.81.
MCL 764.15(l)(d).
Triplett v Deputy Warden, Jackson Prison,
See id. at 781.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 781-782 (agreeing that a revocation of parole does not constitute a seizure that invokes the oath or affirmation requirement and concluding on that basis that the prisoner’s “reincarcerat[ion] pursuant to a parole-violation warrant that was not supported by oath or affirmation” was not illegal).
People v Johnson,
Id.
People v Harper,
United States v Knights,
Id. at 121.
Griffin v Wisconsin,
Id. at 880.
Id. at 876.
Virginia v Moore,
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 176-177.