On March 24, 1975, defendant pled guilty in Detroit Recorder’s Court to attempt to carry a pistol in a motor vehicle and was sentenced to 2 years on probation. On March 25, 1976, defendant was bound over for trial in Detroit Recorder’s Court on two charges of delivery of heroin. He waived preliminary examination on a third such charge. On April 14, 1976, a notice of probation violation was filed and on April 16, 1976, a warrant for the violation was issued.
Defendant was arraigned on the probation violation warrant on May 17, 1976, bond was set at $10,000 and a hearing scheduled for May 20, 1976. On May 20, 1976, the hearing was adjourned at the prosecutor’s request, until July 20, 1976, because the complaining witness, a state police officer, was in the hospital in a body cast as the result of an accident and was unable to testify. Throughout this time, defendant remained incarcerated.
On July 20, 1976, when the probation revocation *93 hearing was held, the officer testified that on three separate dates defendant delivered heroin to him. Defendant’s probation was revoked and on August 4, 1976, he was sentenced to 20 to 30 months in prison on the original conviction for attempt to carry a pistol in a motor vehicle. He was given 79 days credit for time served since the arraignment on the probation violation warrant. Defendant appeals as of right from the order revoking his probation.
Defendant contends that he was deprived of due process because the court failed to hold a preliminary hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that a probation violation had occurred. Such a hearing, defendant claims, is mandated by
Morrissey v Brewer,
This Court has held several times that the due process requirements of
Morrissey, supra,
and
Gagnon, supra,
are satisfied by Michigan’s single revocation hearing procedure if that hearing is held sufficiently close in time to the notice of the probation violation.
People v Blakely,
In
People v Leroy Jackson, Jr., supra,
at 245-246, fn 7, the Court also observed that several jurisdictions have held that there do exist certain situations in which a preliminary hearing need not be conducted. Following the rationale that
Morrissey
and
Gagnon
were not intended "to create an inflexible structure” for revocation procedures,
Morrissey v Brewer, supra,
The California Supreme Court in In re Law, supra, remarked that when the conduct which constitutes a prima facie probation violation is also an independently charged new felony, the procedures afforded through the holding of a preliminary hearing are inclusive of or can be made to conform to the Morrissey requirements. But, the court stated, "[d]ue process would further require * * * that a [probationer] have fair notice of the nature and effect of a hearing intended to serve such a dual purpose”. 10 Cal 3d at 27.
In the present case, probable cause determinations were made on the heroin charges before defendant’s arraignment on the probation violation warrant. A merger of the probable cause hearing on the new felony and the preliminary revocation hearing would have appropriately satis *95 fied the due process requirements of Morrissey, as In re Law, supra, suggests, had the defendant been given notice of the nature and effect of a hearing intended to serve such a dual purpose.
Though no notice was given, petitioner is not entitled to relief by reason of the failure to hold a probable cause hearing unless he was prejudiced thereby.
Cf. Callison v Dept of Corrections,
Here defendant was held for the probation violation only after the preliminary examination on the heroin charges which were the basis of the violation. When the court formally determined that he had violated his probation and sentenced him, defendant was given credit for the time he had served in jail in the interim.
Cf. People v Hallaway,
Finally, defendant claims that if probable cause to believe a probation violation had occurred was
*96
found, he was entitled to a full jury trial to determine if his probation should be revoked. The Supreme Court has held that due process requires only that revocation proceedings be conducted in a fundamentally fair manner. The whole range of due process rights associated with criminal trials does not apply to such proceedings.
Morrissey, Gagnon, supra.
"Probation revocation * * * is not a stage in a criminal prosecution * * * .” It deals with "the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer * * * only because he has been convicted of a crime”.
Affirmed.