53 Colo. 231 | Colo. | 1912
delivered the opinion of the court:
The attorney general of the state, in the name of the people thereof, filed in the court below, by its leave first had and obtained, two informations purporting to charge D. E. Gibson, W. M. Gibson, Herman Loehr, John Cleghorn and A. R. Erisbie with the' commission of certain felonious offenses.
In one information they are charged with having unlawfully conspired to obtain from the state of Colorado, the sum of $25,000, by falsely and fraudulently representing to the t board of commissioners of the • Colorado1 state penitentiary that goods, wares and merchandise of such value were sold and delivered to the state of Colorado1 for use in the state penitentiary. In the other, they are charged with having-obtained such sum of money from the state of Colorado by false pretenses.
The informations are substantially in the form prescribed by the statute, except the name of the attorney general appears therein instead of the district attorney, and the recitals that the governor of the state requested the attorney general to prosecute the actions. Capiases were issued, defendants arrested, and subsequently admitted to bail. Thereafter motions were filed questioning the validity of the informations and proceedings thereunder, upon the ground, that the attorney general had no power to commence and prosecute the actions by informations. The court sustained the motions, discharged the defendants and dismissed the proceedings. The people . bring the cases here for review.
The sole question for determination is, whether the attorney general had authority to charge by information, in the name of the people, the commission of a felony, and to otherwise prosecute the actions in the district court.
While neither conceding nor denying the correctness of the contention as. to- the non-existence of common law powers in the attorney general, the plaintiff maintains that the written law vests the power in, and makes it the duty of such official to prosecute by information, those guilty of the commission of-felonies and other crimes, when requested so to do by the governor or the general assembly.
In arriving at a correct conclusion as to the powers of the attorney general, we deem it helpful to refer briefly 'to some of the territorial and state legislation pertaining to the prosecution of crimes.
In 1861 the council and house of representatives of the territory established the grand jury system, and authorized the institution of prosecutions by indictment. It also- established the office 'of county attorney in each county, and provided for the election of an incumbent thereof for a designated term. Pie was required to appear in the district court in his county and prosecute and defend on behalf of the territory or county, all suits, indictments, applications or motions, civil or criminal, to which the territory or county was a party, and, inter alia, to draw and sign all indictments or other pleadings connected with his office, and whenever required by the grand jury, to appear before that body and examine witnesses, etc.
By chapter 24, R. S. 1868, the office of county attorney was abolished and the office of district attorney for .each judicial district established. The district attorney was, inter alia, required to appear in behalf of the territory and the. several counties of his district in all indictments, suits and pro
By an act of the territorial legislature of 1876 it was provided' that: “If the district attorney be interested or shall have been employed as counsel in any case which it shall be his duty to prosecute or defend, the court having- criminal jurisdiction may appoint some other person to prosecute or defend the cause,” or “if he be sick or absent, such court shall appoint some person to discharge the duties of the office until the proper officer resume the discharge of his duties;” and “the person thus appointed shall possess the same power * * * as the proper officer would if he were present. Sections 897, 898, 899, G. L.; sections 2109, 2110, 2111, R. S. 1908.
Thereafter the constitution was adopted and the office of district attorney became an office thereunder, the duties of which were to be as provided by law. Art. VI, sec. 21, Const. And by section 1 of the schedule to the constitution, R. S. 1908, p. 60, the duties pertaining- to the territorial office of
The constitution also created the office of attorney general, made the incumbent thereof -an executive officer of the state, and required him to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the constitution or by law. Art. IV, sec. 1. No specific duties pertaining to the matters here under consideration are prescribed by the constitution to be performed by the attorney general. However, art. Ill of an act of the general assembly, approved February 27, 1877, sec. 1103, ct seq., G. L. — sec. 6168, ct scq. R. S. 1908 — prescribes some of the duties to be performed bjr that official. Among others' therein prescribed, he is required to “appear for the state, prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, in which the state shall be a party or interested,' when required to do so- by the governor or general assembly.” ' ■ " ■
The above and foregoing constitutional and statutory enactments constituted the only written law pertaining to the matter here under consideration, until- the enactment of 1891 authorizing prosecutions- by information. That act is entitled: “An act providing for the prosecution and punishment: of crimes, misdemeanors and offenses by information.” ' The first section thereof invests the courts of the state with the same power and jurisdiction to hear, try and determine prosecutions upon information and to do all acts in connection therewith as in cases of prosecution under indictment'.' The second section, as far as it has any bearing' upon the matter before us, provides that “all informations shall be filed in term time, in the court having jurisdiction of the offense specified therein, by the district attorney of the proper county as informant, and his name shall be subscribed thereto either by himself, or by his deputy.” The third section insures to the defendant the same rights as to all proceedings therein, as he
While the act of 1891 permitted the filing of informations when verified by the oath of the district attorney or his deputy, or by the oath of some person competent to testify as a witness in the case, under, an amendatory act of 1893, S. L.' p. 116, it was provided that, “In all cases in which the defendant has not had or waived a preliminary examination there shall be filed with the information the affidavit of some credible person verifying the information upon the personal knowledge of affiant that the offense was committed.” The latter act also provided that the information shall be sufficient if it can be understood therefrom, inter alia, “that it is presented by the person authorized by law to prosecute the offense.”
The same general assembly that passed the act of 1891 authorizing prosecutions by information, amended the law which theretofore required the calling of a grand jury at each term of the court, so that thereafter grand juries should not be required to attend the sitting of any court ir» ««v county unless specially ordered by the court having jurisdiction to make, such order. S. L. 1891, p. 253; R. S. 1908, sec. 3695.
“Where enactments separately made are read in pari materia, they are treated as having formed, in the minds of the enacting body, parts of a connected whole, though considered by such a body at different dates, and under distinct and varied aspects of the common subject. Such a principle is in harmony with the actual practice of legislative bodies, and is essential to give unity to the laws, and connect them them in a symmetrical system. Such statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and, so far as still in force brought into harmony, if possible, by interpretation.” — 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Stat. Const., p. 853; Sales v. Barber A. P. Co., 166 Mo. 671, 678.
Moreover, in harmonizing different legislative acts so as to connect them in a symmetrical, -system, and arrive at the legislative intent embodied in the whole- law, the nature of the
As said in County Commissioners v. Lunney, 46 Colo. 403, 415: “In the interpretation of a statute the legislative purposes and objects are always to be borne in mind, and an indispensable requisite is to first inquire what object was sought to be accomplished by it. The intent of the statute is the law, ■ and general words may be restrained to it, and those of a narrower import may be expanded to embrace it to effectuate that intent. * * * The -intention of an act will prevail over the literal sense of its terms.”
When the act prescribing the duties of the attorney general became effective, the method for prosecuting felonies was by means of an indictment returned by a grand jury. The law, however, required the indictment to be signed by the district attorney and the latter to appear in the courts of his district and prosecute in behalf of the people. Such being the state of the law, it. is clear that when the legislature empowered :the attorney general to prosecute under certain conditions/ that official, when the required conditions existed, could do' each and 'everything the district attorney might have clone' in the premises. Though the letter of the law required one official alone to do certain things, its spirit permitted another to do and perform the same or similar acts under certain conditions.
This principle is recognized' and applied in mairy cáses. In 1855 tihe legislature of the territory of Kansas created'the office of district attorney for each judicial district, and prescribed his duties'. He was required to- appear in each county at the district court and prosecute and defend, on behalf- of the territory or county, all suits, indictments, applications • or
• The law of North Dakota made it the duty of the attorney general, inter alia; “to consult with and advise the several state’s attorneys in matters relating to the duties of their office ; and when in his judgment the interests of the state require it, he shall attend the trial of any party accused of crime and assist in the prosecution.” Another statute made it the duty of the state’s attorney to áppear before the grand jury to give
The following cases are analogous in principle: State v. District Court, 22 Mont. 25; State v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 289. In the last case cited the statute considered, provided that “Eivery county attorney shall prosecute all cases under this chapter arising in his county.” The court said: “Tire statute under consideration, imposing specific duties upon county attorneys in the matter of its enforcement, is in no proper view a limitation upon, nor does it exclude, the general authority of the attorney general upon the same subject.”
So under the law of this state, district attorneys are specifically authorized, inter alia, to appear in all indictments, criminal cases and proceedings which may be pending in the district court of their respective counties. Nevertheless, general authority is imposed upon the attorney general to appear and prosecute in all cases wherein the state is a party or interested when required so to do by the governor or general as
.However, as under the constitution no power existed -.in district attorneys or in the., attorney general to prosecute felonies by information, it is argued .that such power was corn ferred.by-the act of 1891 exclusively upon the district .'attorneys or their representatives, and. can be exercised by no one else. If the words “district attorney” as used in the act can not be construed to include “public prosecutor,” .the contention is doubtless correct. As a general rule, where by statute, authority is given to a particular officer, its exercise by any other officer is forbidden by implication. However, when we apply the well-known rules of construction to the constitutional and statutory provisions constituting the system by which criminal offenses are to be prosecuted in this state, we have no doubt the words “district attorney” found in the information act must be construed to mean “public prosecutor” authorized to prosecute in any particular case. Sec. 8 of art. II of the constitution recognizes but two methods whereby a person may be proceeded against criminally in the courts’: the one method is by indictment; the other, by information, and until otherwise provided by law a prosecution for a felony could be by means of the former method only. Each of these methods was well-known and understood at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and there is no more uncertainty as to what was meant by the word “information” used therein than there is as to what was meant by the use of the word “indictment.” An information is essentially a written accusation of crime preferred by the public prosecuting officer without the intervention of a grand jury. It is used ’in the constitution in the common law sense of’ the term, that is, an accusation preferred, as at common law, by the public prosecutor. As the purpose of the information act, together with that dispensing with the calling of a’ grand jury, unless
Williams v. The People, 26 Colo. 272, was a prosecution for perjury in which the district attorney had been of counsel in a civil case, during the trial of which the alleged perjury was committed. The information was signed and presented by a special prosecutor appointed under the provisions of the Territorial Act of 1876, supra. The right of the special prosecutor to sign and file the information was challenged. It was argued in the briefs there filed by the plaintiff in error that as the information act provides for the filing of informations by the district attorney or his deputy, the power was exclusive and the alleged information was, in fact, no information at all. The authority of the special prosecutor in that case, like the authority of the attorney general in the case at bar, rested primarily upon a statute enacted long prior to the information act, at a time when prosecution of felonies by information was impossible. We, however, held in that case that the special prosecutor, having been appointed by the court, had the right to sign his own name to the information, and that such an instrument so signed, was valid. When the court in any case, exercising its powers under the law, appoints a special prose
Believing as we do that the attorney general had full power and authority to sign and file the informations as disclosed by this record, it is unnecessary to consider the matter further. The cases, in accordance with the rule applied in U. S. v. Keitel, 221 U. S. 370, 399, are, therefore, remanded with instructions to reinstate the same, overrule the motions to quash in each case, and proceed therewith in accordance with the law: Reversed and Remanded.
Decision en banc.