Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f), and sentenced to twenty to forty years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Before trial in the present case, the prosecutor moved to introduce as rebuttal evidence testimony from a 1993 criminal sexual conduct trial in which defendant was charged with raping a woman. In that case, defendаnt’s defense was that the victim consented to sex in exchange for drugs. Defendant was acquitted in that case. The prosecution stated that it would use this testimony should defendant claim that the victim in the present case consented to sex in exchange for drugs. Thе trial court granted the motion.
*532 At trial, the victim testified that defendant forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. Defendant testified that the victim consented to sex in exchange for drugs. In rebuttal, the prosecutor introduced relevant portions of testimony from the 1993 trial. In allowing this evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that it should consider the evidence only to the extent that it “tends to shоw that the defendant used a plan, system, or characteristic scheme that he has used before or since” and that the jury should not consider it for any other purpose, such as evidence of character.
II
On appeal, defendant argues that this evidence was not admissible under MRE 404(b). We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discrеtion.
People v McAlister,
*533 A
In a sexual assault prosecutiоn, evidence of prior acts is admissible under MRE 404(b) if it “tend[s] to show a plan or scheme to orchestrate the events surrounding the rape of complainant so that she could not show nonconsent.”
People v Oliphant,
The assault in each case involved a woman who defendant knew was a crack cocaine user. In each case defendant took affirmative steps to be alone with the complainant. In each case defendant asserted not just the defense of consent, but consent in the context of an exchange of sex for drugs. This demonstratеs that defendant had a plan for choosing his victim on the basis of knowledge that she was a crack user that would enable him to сlaim a sex-for-drugs swap should he be accused of the crime. Therefore, the evidence was the type of evidence admissible under MRE 404(b).
B
We also conclude that the evidence was relevant. MRE 402. The fact that defendant employed a similar method and defense in a prior case is probative of whether he employed the same means in anticipation of using the sаme defense if accused. Further, the fact that defendant was acquitted in the previous trial does not destroy the relevanсe of the evidence. Oliphant, supra at 495-499.
*534 c
Defendant also argues that this evidence was more prejudicial than probative. We disagreе. The jury received an appropriate limiting instruction and was also informed that the 1993 trial resulted in an acquittal. Therefore, wе are not convinced that the trial court’s decision regarding this matter was an abuse of discretion.
m
Finally, defendant objects to the scoring of twenty-five points in the sentencing information report for Offense Variable (ov) 2. We find no error.
Defendant received twenty-five points for ov 2 for causing personal injury to the victim. Defendant does not dispute that he caused injury to the victim. Rather, defendant argues that this score results in his being punished twice for the same conduct. Specifically, defendant notes that because he was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct on the theory that he caused personal injury to the victim, MCL 750.520b(l)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f), the рersonal injury factor was already reflected in the crime charged. Thus, according to defendant, the evidence of personal injury should not also have been used to increase his minimum sentence.
A
Defendant’s argument fails because the Sentencing Guidelines allow a factor that is an element of the crime charged to also be considered when computing an offеnse variable score. In
People v Cotton,
B
Nor is there a double jeopardy violation. While we acknowledge that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions protеct against multiple punishment for the same offense, we conclude that the score a defendant receives on an оffense variable is not a form of punishment.
In
People v Milbourn,
Accordingly, we conclude that the scoring of the guidelines does not implicate double jeopardy issues. *536 Therefore, defendant is not entitled to relief with regard to this issue.
Affirmed.