People v. GearyPeople v. Geary
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Duncan
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff in error (hereafter referred to as defendant) was tried and convicted on an indictment charging him with the murder of one Harry Reckas, and the jury by their verdict fixed his punishment at death. Judgment was entered on the verdict November 10, 192O) in which the date of the execution was fixed for December 17, 1920, in accordance with the provisions of our statute. A writ of error was allowed for the review of the judgment by this court at our February term, 1921. The writ of error was made a supersedeas, and all further proceedings on the judgment were stayed until the further order of this court. At the April term, 1921, the decision of this court was filed affirming the judgment of the criminal com t, and the clerk of this court was directed to enter an order fixing the period between nine o’clock in the forenoon and four, o’clock in the afternoon of June 17, 1921, as the time when the original sentence of death entered in the criminal court should be executed. (People v. Geary, 297 Ill. 608.) A rehearing was denied June 9, 1921, of the term now in session.
On May 19 of the May term, 1921, of the said criminal court, Thomas D. Nash, who has been acting as one of the attorneys for the defendant since his indictment, filed a petition in said court, verified by his affidavit, representing therein, in substance, that since said judgment and sentence defendant has been arid is now confined in the common jail of said county of Cook, and that since the entry of the judgment and
Upon the filing of the petition and affidavits aforesaid three alienists were appointed by the court, by agreement of counsel, who were to, and did, examine defendant for the purpose of determining if he were sane or insane and
“Question -1.—In your opinion, Doctor, did Eugene Geary at the time of your examination of him have sufficient intelligence to understand that he had been indicted, charged with the murder of Harry Reckas, that he was tried in the criminal court of this county on such charge, that he was convicted and sentenced to be hanged therefor, and that said sentence of death is about to be carried into execution?
“Question 2.—In your opinion, Doctor, did Eugene Geary at the time of your examination of him have sufficient understanding to know any facts that might exist which, if known, would exonerate him or mitigate his punishment, • and the intelligence requisite to convey such information, if any, to his attorneys or to the court?”
The answer to each of those questions was the same by each and every one of the alienists, to-wit, “He did.” Counsel for the defendant objected to the questions, both as to form and substance, and for the further reason that they did
On June 7, 1921, counsel for defendant filed in this court the record of said final order and judgment in this cause refusing to prolong the time of the execution of the original judgment and sentence and to impanel a jury to try the question whether or not the accused has become insane or lunatic since the judgment. A writ of error has been granted, and the same was made a supersedeas by this court.
Section 13 of division 2 (paragraph 285) of our Criminal Code (Hurd’s Stat. 1917, p. 1016,) provides as follows: “A person that becomes lunatic or insane after the commission of a crime or misdemeanor shall not be tried for the offense during the continuance of the lunacy or insanity. If, after the verdict of guilty, and before judgment pronounced, such person become lunatic or insane, then no judgment shall be given while .such lunacy or insanity shall continue. And if, after judgment and before execution of the sentence, such person become lunatic or insane, then in case the punishment be capital, the execution thereof shall be stayed until
The contention of defendant’s counsel that under the provisions of the foregoing statute he was entitled to a trial by a jury of the question whether or not he had become insane or lunatic after the original sentence of death had been entered against him is clearly right. The statute is plain and mandatory that it is the duty of the court in all the cases in said section mentioned to impanel a jury to try “the question whether the accused be, at the time of impaneling, insane or lunatic.” The question of such insanity was raised, and properly so, by the petition, in which it was alleged that the defendant had become insane, as aforesaid, since judgment and sentence, as it was supported by the affidavits of two persons detailing the facts upon which they based their judgment as to such insanity. The court treated the question as properly raised before him, and having done so could only try it legally in the manner provided by statute. In the absence of a statute requiring a jury trial it has been the practice of a number of courts of this country to try the question with or without a jury, and where a doubt has arisen as to a defendant’s sanity, even in the absence of a statute, it has been regarded as the better and more satisfactory method to impanel a ‘jury to try the issue. Under our said statute a jury trial in such cases therein mentioned is imperative, and such question, when so raised, cannot be legally tried otherwise. Other courts have made similar holdings on statutes providing for jury trials in such cases. State of Ohio v. Roselot, 69 Ohio St. 91; Sears v. State, 112 Ga. 382; State v. Helm, 69 Ark. 167; Holland v. State, 52 Tex. Crim. 160; Ex parte Maass, 10 Okla. 302; People v. West, 25 Cal. App. 369.
The case of Bulger v. People, 61 Col. 187, is the only case we have found that holds that a statute similar to
Our own statute contemplates that the trial of any one of the three questions therein mentioned shall not only be by a jury, but that both the defendant and the State shall be permitted to introduce all competent and legitimate evidence that they may have bearing upon the single and only question to be tried in the case, and that the verdict of the jury shall be based only upon the facts that are properly provable in the case. Each side is entitled to the right of cross-examination, and is also entitled to the same number of peremptory challenges in selecting the jury as in civil cases. In this case the only questions for trial are, Has the defendant become lunatic or insane since the entry of the original judgment and sentence in the criminal court? And was he lunatic or insane „at the time of the impaneling of the jury, within the meaning of said section of the statute? There can arise on the trial no question as to the sanity or insanity of the defendant at. the time he committed the crime for which he stands convicted, neither can there be any question raised as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged in the indictment. Those questions were all settled upon the former trial and cannot again arise, and ought not to be referred to in the trial of the questions now sought to be tried. The question of the insanity of the defendant at the time he committed the crime has been settled by the verdict of the jury, and the presumption now is that he is sane.
It is apparent from what v/e have already said and held in this case that the judgment of the criminal court refusing to impanel a jury and try the collateral question of defendant’s insanity must be reversed and the cause remanded for a jury trial, as provided by the statute. Inasmuch as the question to be tried by the lower court upon remandment in no way involves the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and as the proceeding is wholly statutory and no appeal is provided by statute, and as no appeal lies for review of the final judgment which shall be entered and it cannot be reviewed by writ of error, we conclude that public interest requires that we further discuss the nature of the questions that are to be decided under said paragraph 285 of the Criminal Code and the proper procedure for the disposing of the same. We think it has already been made sufficiently clear that the question to be tried by the court and jury in this case is not the question whether the defendant is sane or insane, in the sense of being responsible for crime, but the questions, as already indicated, are, is he or was he insane or lunatic at the time of the impaneling of the jury, within the meaning of said paragraph 285, and has such lunacy or insanity originated since November 10, 1920, the date on which his original judgment of conviction was entered?
One, of the important questions to be determined is as ■to the test on the question whether or not the defendant
The jury should make their finding from facts and circumstances properly proved on the trial, and expert witnesses should be examined in á proper way by making answers to hypothetical questions and by detailing any facts that they may know tending to show the insanity or lunacy of the defendant but should not be allowed to invade the province of the jury by deciding the very questions that the jury are required to pass on, as the three alienists were allowed to do in answering the two questions propounded to them by the court. The trial of the question or questions in this case is to be conducted as any ordinary trial before a jury in civil cases, where any question of insanity or unsoundness of mind is to be inquired into and all proper and competent evidence be submitted to the jury. The defendant has a right to cross-examine the witnesses, and the jury, after being properly instructed by the court by written instructions, after considering all the evidence in the case properly bearing on the issues, should make up their verdict and return it into court in the ordinary way.
When the question of the insanity or lunacy of one about to be executed has been properly raised, as in this case, by the filing of a petition supported by affidavit, and it becomes the duty of the court to impanel a jury to try the question of insanity or lunacy, the court should at once enter an order prolonging or staying the execution of the defendant until the conclusion of the proceedings and trial to determine whether or not the defendant is insane or lunatic. The trial court has authority to enter such order under section 1 of division 14 of the Criminal Code, which provides, in substance, that for good cause the court or Governor may prolong the time for the execution. The necessity of the court’s entering into such a trial to determine the qtiestion of insanity or lunacy of the defendant is good cause for such an order. After the trial- has ended and the jury make
On June 14, 1921, a motion was made by defendant’s counsel to vacate the order fixing date of execution or stay execution until the further order of the court. It being then apparent to the court that there would not be sufficient time between that date and June 17, 1921,—the date fixed by this court for the execution of the defendant,—this court changed the date of the execution of the defendant from June 17, 1921, to July 22, 1921, so that the criminal court of Cook county might have sufficient time to impanel a jury and try the question of the insanity of the defendant. If it should appear to the lower court that the date last fixed by this court for such execution does not give sufficient time for the criminal court to impanel a jury and try the said question of insanity, the criminal court has sufficient power and authority, under the statute already cited, to make any further prolongation of the time of execution to enable it to complete the trial for insanity and to make whatever order is necessary or expedient. The statute only provides for one trial to determine such insanity or lunacy of the
It is further suggested that the defendant’s attorneys should be accorded all reasonable opportunities by the court to have the defendant examined by alienists, if that shall appear to be necessary or proper for his counsel to sufficiently prepare his case for trial.
The order and judgment of the criminal court of Cook county are reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to that court to impanel a jury and try the question of insanity or lunacy of the defendant in accordance with the opinion of this court.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.