THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUNDERA L. GARDNER, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. 4-23-0443
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT
August 6, 2024
2024 IL App (4th) 230443
Honorable William G. Workman, Judge Presiding.
FILED August 6, 2024 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate Court, IL;
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Steigmann and Lannerd concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant Aundera L. Gardner appeals from his conviction and 20-year sentence for possession of a converted vehicle (
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 A. The Body Camera Video
¶ 4 On February 13, 2022, defendant was living at White‘s apartment in Normal, Illinois, with their two children and White‘s daughter by another man. Defendant and White had an argument about White‘s expected $10,000 tax refund, which he wanted her to give him. She refused. Eventually, he went to his car and got a gun, which he put underneath his side of their bed. When he left to smoke a cigarette, she took the clip from the gun, wrapped it in a towel, and hid it in a clothes hamper.
¶ 5 When defendant took White‘s daughters to school the following morning, she fled with her son to a neighbor‘s apartment. After defendant returned to White‘s apartment, he sent her text messages threatening to kill her and demanding she return his clip. She called the police; one of the officers who responded to White‘s call was Christopher Nyman of the Normal Police Department.
¶ 6 Nyman was wearing a body camera that recorded his conversation with White about what had happened. The video includes the following exchange about a GMC Acadia parked outside of White‘s apartment:
“OFFICER NYMAN: *** Does he have a license in Missouri?
TERRIONA WHITE: No. He doesn‘t have a license at all, and the license plates on that truck[,] he stole them.
OFFICER NYMAN: Okay.
TERRIONA WHITE: Somebody reported those license on his car, they—they—I‘m pretty sure somebody has called them in and said that somebody took their license plates off their car. He just haven‘t gotten caught driving ‘em yet. He hasn‘t got pulled over, but *** his auntie told me that he took those
plates off somebody‘s car somewhere in Illinois and put ‘em on that truck.”
¶ 7 White gave Nyman consent to search her apartment; he found the clip in the clothes hamper, but the gun was not under the mattress, as White had said. The following day, White reported to the police that she had found the gun wrapped in a shopping bag in a plastic tub in her closet, so another officer came to retrieve the gun.
¶ 8 Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (
¶ 9 B. White‘s Evasion of Service
¶ 10 The trial court set defendant‘s bond at $250,000. As a condition of bond, the court ordered defendant to have no contact with White and to stay away from her apartment. Defendant could not post the required $25,000 bond deposit, so he was detained in the McLean County jail. While incarcerated, he made several telephone calls to White, asking her to recant and say that the gun belonged to her and not him. White repeatedly refused, saying that she did not want to be charged with unlawfully possessing the gun or with obstruction of justice, which her lawyer had told her were possible consequences of recanting.
¶ 11 On defendant‘s motion, his bond was reduced to $25,000 with the conditions that he live with his mother in Decatur, continue to have no contact with White, and stay away from her apartment. Defendant posted bond and filed a motion to remove the no-contact condition, attaching an affidavit from White saying that she had not requested the no-contact condition, wanted it to be lifted, and was not in fear of harm for herself if defendant had contact with her or went to her address. The trial court held a hearing, at which White testified that she was not afraid for her safety or her children‘s safety. The court removed the no-contact condition on April 6, 2022, and defendant began living with White at her apartment, rather than with his mother in Decatur.
¶ 12 The case proceeded to trial in December 2022. Before trial, the McLean County Sheriff‘s Office made 27 unsuccessful attempts to serve White with a subpoena and obtain her testimony at trial. The State moved in limine to admit some of White‘s February 14, 2022, statements to Nyman under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, asserting that its inability to serve White rendered her unavailable as a witness and that defendant‘s pressure on White constituted “wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of [White] as a witness.”
¶ 13 C. Nyman‘s Testimony at Trial
¶ 14 To obtain a conviction for possession of a converted vehicle, the State was required to prove that (1) defendant possessed
¶ 15 On the State‘s direct examination of Nyman, the State asked him about his investigation regarding the car as follows:
“Q. On your way to the apartment as you‘re walking along the sidewalk towards her apartment on her building, d[id] you see a vehicle parked out in front of her apartment?
A. Yes I d[id].
Q. At the time—did it have any particular significance at that time?
A. No it did not.
Q. Later on did that car become significant?
A. Yes it did.
Q. Why did it become significant?
A. Because Ms. White had told me that she believed the vehicle was stolen and had fictitious plates on it.
Q. And based on that, later on did you then follow up on that?
A. I did.”
Defense counsel did not object to Nyman‘s reference to what White had told him.
¶ 16 Later in its direct examination of Nyman, the State returned to Nyman‘s conversation with White as follows:
“Q. Then at some point in time after you seized the weapon did you turn your attention to that car?
A. I did.
Q. What did you do?
A. Ms. White told us that she believed the vehicle was stolen. It had different plates on it. I asked her what made her believe that. She said [defendant] showed up with it about a month ago, said he paid somebody $4,000—
MS. PATTON [(DEFENSE ATTORNEY)]: Objection Your Honor.
MR. SCHOENBEIN [(ASSISTANT STATE‘S ATTORNEY)]: Judge I‘ll rephrase.
Q. Once she gave you the information, did you yourself do some follow up then?
A. I did.
Q. Did you check the plates with dispatch?
A. I did.
Q. Did they check to [the GMC Acadia] or to a different vehicle?
A. To a different vehicle.”
Defense counsel did not state the grounds for her objection, obtain a ruling on her objection, or move to strike Nyman‘s testimony. Although the State purported to “rephrase” its question, it did not withdraw its prior question or concede that Nyman‘s testimony up to that point was inadmissible.
¶ 17 The jury convicted defendant on all four counts against him, and the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 18 This appeal followed.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by admitting statements by White under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule, (2) his counsel
¶ 21 A. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
¶ 22 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce White‘s statements under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule. Under this exception, the State was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant “engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of [White] as a witness.”
¶ 23 We will overturn a trial court‘s finding that the State has proven forfeiture by wrongdoing only if that finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning ” ‘the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or *** the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.’ ” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008)). As we will explain, none of the trial court‘s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 24 1. Engaging in Wrongdoing
¶ 25 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he engaged in wrongdoing because there was no evidence that White was afraid of defendant, so she cannot have been intimidated into absenting herself from trial. However, there is no requirement that the defendant secure the witness‘s absence through threats or intimidation; the State needs only to “show that the defendant engaged in witness tampering or some type of conduct designed to *** thwart the judicial process.” In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 40 (2008) (citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008)); see United States v. Jonassen, 759 F.3d 653, 662 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that pressuring a witness to recant constituted wrongdoing).
¶ 26 Here, the State showed that defendant repeatedly asked White to testify to something other than what she believed was the truth, even though he was forbidden from contacting her as a condition of his bond at that time. Violating a bond condition to encourage a witness to perjure herself is exactly the type of conduct that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception is intended to remedy. Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 40. Accordingly, the trial court‘s conclusion that defendant engaged in wrongdoing is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 27 2. Intending to Cause Unavailability
¶ 28 Defendant further argues that the State failed to prove that his actions were intended to cause White‘s unavailability. Defendant‘s troubling argument is that he cannot be faulted for the
¶ 29 As defendant points out in his brief, White was not afraid of him; in fact, she explicitly told him that she did not want him to serve a 10-year prison sentence for possessing the gun. At one point during his pressure campaign, she said to him, “There‘s got to be another way.” He responded by saying to her, “There‘s no other way, man, it[‘]s either you or me. That‘[s] a real hard decision. I know[,] man. It‘s you or me, either I‘m going or you lose all your benefits.” But defendant was wrong; White had three options: (1) take the stand and testify consistent with her earlier statement, bolstering the State‘s case and potentially exposing defendant to a long term of incarceration for possessing the gun, (2) take the stand and recant her earlier statement, potentially opening herself up to criminal liability for obstruction of justice and for possession of the gun, or (3) avoid taking the stand altogether.
¶ 30 Defendant‘s repeated statements to White made the first and second options unappealing, which had the natural consequence of driving her to choose the third option. ” ‘The defendant is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts *** ’ ” People v. Dorsey, 2016 IL App (4th) 140734, ¶ 34 (quoting People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 204 (1989)); cf. People v. Davis, 2018 IL App (1st) 152413, ¶ 42 (imputing coconspirators’ intent to silence a witness to the defendants under a theory of conspiracy liability). To be sure, defendant would clearly have preferred that White choose the second option over the third, but that does not change the fact that his overall intent was to avoid the first option. See Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, the trial court‘s conclusion that defendant was motivated at least in part by an intent to cause White‘s unavailability is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 31 3. Causing Unavailability
¶ 32 Defendant finally argues that the State failed to prove that his conduct in fact caused White‘s unavailability. Of course, an absent witness cannot testify to explain her absence, so a causal connection “may be established by inference from circumstantial evidence.” People v. Krisik, 2018 IL App (1st) 161265, ¶ 55; see People v. Melchor, 362 Ill. App. 3d 335, 355 (2005) (finding no causal connection when “[the witness‘s] death from a drug overdose [wa]s not a logical
¶ 33 White‘s conversations with defendant do suggest that she avoided recanting in part because the inescapable conclusion from her recantation would have been that the gun in her apartment was hers, even though she implied she could not lawfully possess a gun. However, she could have avoided this outcome by testifying to what she clearly believed was the truth: the gun was defendant‘s. It was defendant, not White‘s lawyer, who discouraged her from taking this course of action; as such, the trial court could fairly infer that defendant‘s statements discouraging White from testifying truthfully were what caused her to avoid testifying altogether.
¶ 34 Furthermore, White‘s belief about possible felony charges was not subsequent to defendant‘s pressure campaign; after she mentioned it to him on a jail call, he said, “still with that felony you can get it expunged in seven years, you would just not be able to get some of things that you already not, you don‘t f*** want, you never want, you never going to f*** go get a gun anyway.” Minutes later, she insisted that there had to be “another way” out of the situation. In other words, her decision to evade service was based not just on the possibility of felony charges but also on his expressed desire for her to incur those charges instead of him. The trial court could fairly infer that defendant caused White to avoid testifying by selfishly escalating, rather than reducing, the pressure on her after she mentioned her lawyer‘s advice about possible felony charges.
¶ 35 Defendant also points to a lack of evidence that he explicitly instructed White to absent herself by evading service. However, there was no requirement for the State to prove that he caused her to take any particular action to become unavailable, merely that he “procure[d] the unavailability of [White] as a witness.”
¶ 36 B. Counsel‘s Failure to Move to Strike Testimony
¶ 37 Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike Nyman‘s testimony about his conversation with White. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants the right to the assistance of counsel for their defense (
¶ 38 We will consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal unless the claim depends on facts not in the record on appeal. See People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶¶ 46-48. Here, the record is adequate for a consideration of deficiency because defendant‘s argument relies on materials in the record, even though those materials were not introduced at trial. Our standard of review is de novo. People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 40.
¶ 39 Even when damaging testimony is improperly admitted, counsel‘s decision to forgo a motion to strike the testimony may be the product of sound trial strategy because making the motion could draw the jury‘s attention to the damaging testimony. See People v. White, 2011 IL App (1st) 092852, ¶ 75; People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355, 396 (1992); see also People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 221 (2004) (noting that the significance of inadmissible testimony can be diffused when counsel forgoes an objection). As such, we will find counsel‘s decision deficient only “where no reasonably effective defense attorney, confronted with the circumstances of the defendant‘s trial, would [have] engage[d] in similar conduct.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Watson, 2012 IL App (2d) 091328, ¶ 24. Furthermore, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make a futile motion, such as a motion to strike properly admitted testimony. See People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 103436, ¶ 64.
¶ 40 Relying principally on the portions of the body camera video that were not introduced into evidence, defendant argues that no reasonably effective defense attorney would have failed to move to strike Nyman‘s testimony about White‘s statements. We disagree.
¶ 41 1. Truth and Admissibility
¶ 42 The reason defendant‘s argument fails is nuanced and turns in large part on the difference between truth and admissibility.
¶ 43 In a criminal jury trial, the arbiter of truth is the jury, not the trial judge. Before the jury reaches a verdict—a word roughly derived from Latin for “a declaration of the truth” (Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (veredictum))—everything is merely evidence. If Nyman‘s body camera video had been admitted into evidence, his testimony and the video would merely have been two pieces of competing evidence from which the jury could have discerned what White truly said on February 14, 2022. We cannot assume, as defendant does, that Nyman‘s testimony is obviously inaccurate because it is contradicted by the video; that determination would have been for the jury.
¶ 44 As a consequence of the jury‘s truth-finding role, the trial judge is relegated to the preliminary question of admissibility
¶ 45 However, testimony is not inadmissible simply because counsel knows that it could be contradicted by a video not in evidence but which counsel believes would be entitled to greater evidentiary weight. The remedy in such a situation is not for counsel to move to strike the testimony but to cross-examine the witness to correct the errant testimony; if the witness fails to conform his testimony to what is shown on the video, counsel might then be able to introduce the video itself as impeaching or substantive evidence. In the present case, defendant does not challenge counsel‘s decision to avoid taking these steps, which would have drawn even greater attention to White‘s statements about her view that the car was stolen.
¶ 46 Accordingly, defendant‘s argument can succeed only if Nyman‘s testimony was inadmissible; if Nyman‘s testimony was merely false or inaccurate (i.e., subject to being disproven by other evidence), then a motion to strike would have been futile, and counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to make the motion. See Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 103436, ¶ 64. The video is pertinent to our analysis of what an objectively reasonable attorney would have done, not because the video is necessarily true, but because counsel‘s demonstrated familiarity with the video was one aspect of the circumstances that informed her response to Nyman‘s contradictory testimony. See People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 433 (2010) (noting that courts defer to “strategic choices *** made after investigation of the law and the facts“).
¶ 47 2. White‘s Statements
¶ 48 Defendant argues, correctly, that Nyman‘s testimony included hearsay by White. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.
¶ 49 Here, Nyman‘s testimony was as follows: “Ms. White told us that she believed the vehicle was stolen. It had different plates on it. I asked what made her believe that. She said [defendant] showed up with it about a month ago, said he paid someone $4,000—.” Because we are considering only the preliminary question of admissibility, we are not concerned with whether Nyman‘s recollection of White‘s statements was true but whether his testimony was admissible when taken at face value.
¶ 50 As explained above, the trial court properly found that some of White‘s other statements to Nyman fell under the hearsay exception of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
¶ 51 However, a finding that the proponent has proven forfeiture by wrongdoing does not make other evidentiary rules more lenient. The State is to be placed in the same position it would have been in had the witness testified, including any evidentiary limitations on such testimony; it should not be placed in a better position. For this reason, those statements are not automatically admissible; they could still be irrelevant or inadmissible on some other basis. See People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 99 (2010) (explaining that statements admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception must be “relevant and otherwise admissible“); see also
¶ 52 a. Double Hearsay
¶ 53 Illinois Rule of Evidence 805 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) provides, “Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.” The language of Rule 805 is cumbersome, but its application to a witness‘s testimony is more straightforward. Consider the declarant‘s statements as though the declarant were on the stand and determine whether any part of those statements includes inadmissible hearsay by a second declarant. If so, that part of the witness‘s testimony is inadmissible double hearsay. The same process can be used again to determine whether any part of the second declarant‘s statement includes inadmissible hearsay by a third declarant, in which case that part of the witness‘s testimony is inadmissible triple hearsay, and so on. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1463 n.7 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Four statements are involved: (a) the probation officer stated (b) that the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] agent stated (c) that the inmate stated (d) that the defendant stated that he would get revenge.“). Although the process may involve the consideration of multiple
¶ 54 Here, the trial court held that White‘s statements fell under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule. For purposes of a double hearsay analysis, this meant that White‘s statements to Nyman could be considered as though she had made them on the stand instead. Recall that, according to Nyman, White said, “I believe the vehicle is stolen. It has different plates on it. [Defendant] showed up with it about a month ago and said he paid someone $4,000 [for it].” White‘s first statement clearly does not include hearsay because she was speaking about her own beliefs; we will return to the relevance of this statement shortly. White‘s statements that the plates were “different” and that defendant showed up with the vehicle about a month earlier also do not include hearsay, even though her knowledge may have been secondhand, because White was not purporting to relay an assertion by another person. See 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 247 (July 2022 Update) (distinguishing between the hearsay rule and the rule requiring firsthand knowledge).
¶ 55 White‘s final statement at first appears to include hearsay because defendant (a second declarant) told White (the first declarant), “I paid $4,000 [for it].” However, defendant‘s statement is defined by rule as “not hearsay” because it was being offered against him by his opponent, the State.
¶ 56 Prior to adopting the Illinois Rules of Evidence, the Illinois Supreme Court treated an opposing party‘s statements as “admissible as an exception to the rule excluding hearsay.” In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 406 (1998); see Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 801.14, at 945 (2024 ed.) (noting this technical change from the common-law definition of hearsay). A resulting problem of the change is that Rule 805, by its terms, applies only to the admissibility of “[h]earsay within hearsay,” as opposed to what we have in this case: “not hearsay” within hearsay. See 30B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 7042 (June 2024 Update) (pointing out “this messy corner of rule-based awkwardness“).
¶ 57 As explained above, the inquiry into a combined out-of-court statement is always whether any given statement is inadmissible hearsay. “[I]f each out-of-court statement in a combined statement, analyzed independently, would be admissible over a[n Illinois] Rule of Evidence 802 objection, the [combined] out-of-court statement overcomes a hearsay objection as well. If any statement is barred by Rule 802, however, the combined statement is inadmissible.” Id. We have tacitly followed this approach in previous cases applying the Illinois Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Carlson v. Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 2021 IL App (1st) 191961, ¶¶ 100-101 (finding no bar to admission of a combined statement where “neither of the statements was offered for [its] truth” and was therefore not hearsay); People v. Lofton, 2015 IL App (2d) 130135, ¶ 32 (finding party-opponent‘s
¶ 58 In sum, White‘s statements were admissible hearsay, and defendant‘s “not hearsay” statement would have been admissible over a Rule 802 objection if White had relayed it on the stand.
¶ 59 b. White‘s Lack of Firsthand Knowledge
¶ 60 Defendant argues that White‘s statements were not based on firsthand knowledge but on secondhand information she obtained from defendant‘s aunt. See 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 247 (July 2022 Update) (distinguishing between the hearsay rule and the rule requiring firsthand knowledge); 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 10 (July 2022 Update) (“Technically, if on its face the witness‘s testimony purports to describe observed facts but the testimony rests on statements of others, the objection is that the witness lacks firsthand knowledge.“). Here again, our focus is on the admissibility of Nyman‘s account of White‘s statements and not on what White said on the body camera video.
¶ 61 It is true that “as a general proposition, the out-of-court declarant must have had an opportunity to observe the fact declared“—that is, the declarant must have had “personal knowledge.” 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 10 (July 2022 Update); see People v. Wesley, 2019 IL App (1st) 170442, ¶ 26 (” ‘[P]ersonal knowledge’ *** is knowledge acquired by one‘s own senses.“); see also
¶ 62 Accordingly, the party seeking to introduce a statement under a hearsay exception needs to supply a foundation of “evidence *** sufficient to support a finding that the [declarant] ha[d] personal knowledge of the matter” for the statement to be admitted into evidence. See
the hearsay exception for statements of personal or family history does not require a foundation of personal knowledge). “Personal knowledge may appear from [the declarant‘s] statement or be inferable from the circumstances.” Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence
¶ 63 Here, Nyman‘s testimony, if credible, would permit a rational juror to conclude that White saw defendant arrive in the vehicle, saw fictitious plates on the vehicle, and heard defendant say that that he paid $4000 for the vehicle. This was sufficient to meet the low bar for admissibility under Rule 602. We note that the State was not required to establish defendant‘s personal knowledge that he paid $4000 for the vehicle because the personal knowledge requirement does not apply to a party-opponent‘s statement. See Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 801.14, at 947 (2024 ed.) (citing Waugh v. Cender, 29 Ill. App. 2d 408 (1961)). Because the State laid a sufficient foundation establishing White‘s personal knowledge, a motion to strike Nyman‘s testimony on this basis would have been properly denied.
¶ 64 It is true that Nyman also relayed White‘s “belief” that the car was stolen. Arguably, this extends beyond facts personally known to White to state something more in the nature of a conclusion than a personal observation. Assuming that such testimony would have been impermissible from White herself and should not, therefore, have been related by Nyman, its admission was harmless because defendant had stipulated before trial that the vehicle was converted and could no longer contest that fact. See People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 469 (2005) (“Generally speaking, a defendant is precluded from attacking or otherwise contradicting any facts to which he or she stipulated.“).
¶ 65 Furthermore, even if a motion to strike Nyman‘s recounting of White‘s statement had a chance of success, the remedy would not necessarily have been for the trial court to strike the testimony; the court instead could have denied the motion without prejudice and allowed the State to cure the lack of a foundation by introducing evidence about the source of White‘s knowledge—the information from defendant‘s aunt—which may have further prejudiced defendant. See
testimony in question, counsel‘s decision to forgo such a motion here was not objectively unreasonable under Strickland‘s deferential standard.
¶ 66 Because defendant has failed to show that his counsel‘s performance was deficient, his argument that his counsel was ineffective necessarily fails. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 94.
¶ 67 C. Constitutionality of the Unlawful Possession of a Weapon by a Felon Statute
¶ 68 Defendant argues that his convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (
¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 70 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
¶ 71 Affirmed.
People v. Gardner, 2024 IL App (4th) 230443
| Decision Under Review: | Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 22-CF-164; the Hon. William G. Workman, Judge, presiding. |
| Attorneys for Appellant: | James E. Chadd, Christopher McCoy, and Anne C. Fung, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Elgin, for appellant. |
| Attorneys for Appellee: | Erika Reynolds, State‘s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and David E. Mannchen, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel), for the People. |