PEOPLE v GAGNON
Docket No. 67619
Michigan Court of Appeals
October 12, 1983
129 Mich App 678
Submitted April 20, 1983, at Lansing.
- The disorderly persоn statute provides no standards as to what is a public disturbance. It vests virtually complete discretion in a finder of fact to determine whether a public disturbance has been committed.
- Since no statutory standards elaborate on what actions qualify as a public disturbance, the statute cannot stand up to defendant‘s void-for-vagueness challenge as applied to the facts of this case.
- The entire statute need not be held unconstitutional since the Court of Appeals construed the public disturbance provisions of the disorderly person statute to require a finding that an accused, while intoxicated, directly endangered the safety of another person or of property as requisite to a finding of guilty of сausing a public disturbance while intoxicated.
Affirmed as modified.
V. J. BRENNAN, P.J., dissented. He would find that the common ordinary meaning of the phrase “public disturbance” is sufficiently definite to provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed and does not confer on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed. He would not find the statute so obscure that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability. He would rеverse.
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- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS — CRIMINAL LAW — STATUTES — VAGUENESS.
All persons are constitutionally guaranteed due process of law; a basic principle of due process is that a criminal stаtute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined (US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17). - CRIMINAL LAW — DUE PROCESS — STATUTES — VAGUENESS.
A criminal statute may be challenged for vagueness on three grounds: (1) it does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed; (2) it confers on the trier of faсt unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed; (3) its coverage is overbroad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms. - CRIMINAL LAW — DUE PROCESS — STATUTES — VAGUENESS.
Policemen, prosecutors, and juries cannot be allowed to pursue their personal predilections in determining whether a vague statutory standard has been violated. - STATUTES — JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION.
It is the duty of the Court of Appeals to interpret legislation in a manner that supports its constitutionality even when faced with a valid void-for-vagueness claim as applied to the facts of the case; where the general class of offenses under a statute can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, the Court must give the statute that construction. - CRIMINAL LAW — DISORDERLY PERSONS — PUBLIC DISTURBANCE.
Thе public disturbance provision of the disorderly person statute requires, as a requisite to a finding of guilty of causing a public disturbance while intoxicated, a finding that an accused, whileintoxicated, directly endangered the safety of another person or of property ( MCL 750.167[1][e] ;MSA 28.364[1][e] ).
DISSENT BY V. J. BRENNAN, P.J.
- CRIMINAL LAW — DISORDERLY PERSONS — PUBLIC DISTURBANCE.
The common, ordinary meaning of the phrase “public disturbance” contained in the public disturbance provision of the disorderly person statute is sufficiently definite to provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed and does not confer on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed; the statute is not so obscure that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability (MCL 750.167[1][e] ;MSA 28.364[1][e] ). - STATUTES — JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION.
The ordinary meaning of a word can be determined for purposes of statutory construction by consulting a dictionary or by looking to past decisions of Michigan‘s appellate courts where the word has bеen defined. - WORDS AND PHRASES — DISTURBANCES.
The word “disturbance” has been defined by the Court of Appeals as something which is less than threats of violence, is an interruption of peace and quiet, a violation of public order and decorum, or an interference with or hindrance of one in pursuit of his lawful right or occupation.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Margaret G. Horenstein, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Barry L. Brickner, for defendant on appeal.
BEFORE: V. J. BRENNAN, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and N. J. KAUFMAN,* JJ.
PER CURIAM. Defendant was found guilty by a jury in district court of assault and battery,
At 9:30 p.m. on January 25, 1981, Carston Seales was driving defendant home from a Super Bowl party, where both had been drinking beer. Seales veered out of his lane while going around a curve and was stopped by Oakland County Sheriff‘s Deputy Gary Woоds. Deputy Woods asked Seales for his driver‘s license, registration, and proof of insurance and asked him to step out of the vehicle.
Deputy Woods testified that he was about to give Seales some field sobriety tests when defendant, who appeared intoxicated, exited from the vehicle from the passenger side, walked to the trunk area, and came within a few feet of the officer. Woods asked defendant to return to the vehicle, but defendant refused and began using abusive language and expounding on his rights. Deputy Woods felt that defendant‘s actions prevented Woods from asking Seales questions and administering the sobriety tests. Woods arrested Seales and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car. Dеfendant returned to the passenger side of Seales‘s vehicle and got back in. Woods walked to
This appeal is concerned solely with the disorderly person conviction; the reversal and remand for retrial on the assault and battery conviction is simply held in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal but is nоt under consideration here. The disorderly person statute,
“(1) A person is a disorderly person if the person is any of the following:
* * *
“(e) A person who is intoxicated in a public place and who is either endangering directly the safety of another
person or of property or is acting in a manner that causes a public disturbance.”
The people contend, and the jury found, that defendant violated this provision to the extent that he was intoxicated in a public place аnd acted in a manner that caused a public disturbance.2
All persons are constitutionally guaranteed due process of law.
The instant statute provides no standards as to what is a public disturbance. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in a finder of fact to determine whether a public disturbance has been committed. Indeed, in the instant case only one member of the public, Officer Woods, was apparently “disturbed” by defendant‘s actions. Policemen, prosecutors, and juries cannot be allowed to pursue their рersonal predilections in determining whether a vague statutory standard has been
The entire statute, however, need not be held unconstitutional. Even when faced with a valid void-for-vagueness claim, it is our duty to interpret legislation in a manner that supports its constitutionality. Screws v United States, 325 US 91, 98; 65 S Ct 1031; 89 L Ed 1495 (1945); People v Downes, 394 Mich 17, 27; 228 NW2d 212 (1975). If the general class of offenses under a statute can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, we must give the statute that construction. United States v Harriss, 347 US 612, 618; 74 S Ct 808; 98 L Ed 989 (1954). The statute itself discusses the endangering directly of “the safety of аnother person or of property“. In order to avoid striking down the disorderly person statute as unconstitutional, we construe the public disturbance provision of the disorderly person statute to require a finding that an accused, while intoxicаted, directly endangered the safety of another person or of property as requisite to a finding of guilty of causing a public disturbance while intoxicated.
Affirmed as modified.
V. J. BRENNAN, P.J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I find that the common, ordinary meaning of the phrase “public disturbance” is sufficiently definite to provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed and does not confer on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed. I do not find the statute to be so obscure that men of
The ordinary meaning of a word can be determined by consulting a dictionary, People v Biegajski, 122 Mich App 215, 225; 332 NW2d 413 (1982), or by looking to past decisions of our appellate courts where the word has been defined. The word “disturbance” has been defined in Michigan:
“A disturbance, which is something less than threats of violence, is an interruption of peace and quiet; a violation of public order and decorum; or an interference with or hindrance of one in pursuit of his lawful right or occupation.” People v Weinberg, 6 Mich App 345, 351; 149 NW2d 248 (1967).
I would reverse.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to